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Battlefield of the Future: Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future
by Barry R. Schneider
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Battlefield of the Future
Chapter 1
Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future
Barry R. Schneider
The United States would have fought its wars of the past half century far differently had Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, Kim Il Sung, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, Manuel Noriega, and Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons at the time.
A world of nuclear-armed states will require the United States and
its allies to revise force structures, strategy and doctrine,
intelligence capabilities, command and control procedures, and
logistics for major regional conflict scenarios. A proliferated world
of potential adversaries equipped with weapons of mass destruction
and the means of delivering them will require the US military to
implement a "revolution in military affairs," one that may require
significant departures from current US strategy, operational
policies, and military capabilities. 1
Clearly, US force planning and conflict preparation have not yet
taken into account a "Saddam Hussein with nukes" to use Les
Aspin's phrase when he announced the US Defense
Counterproliferation Initiative. The Bottom Up Review, conducted
by the Clinton Administration under then-Secretary of Defense
Aspin, did not assume the United States would confront an
adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction in either of the
two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs) that US
forces are supposed to be able to fight and win. Yet, it is clear that
radical and hostile states such as Iraq and Iran are probably just a
few short years away from having a nuclear weapons capability and
North Korea may already possess one. All three are presently
credited with biological and chemical weapons capabilities.
Implications for Military Strategy
So how do you fight a NBC-armed sponsor of terrorism and
intervention (NASTI) on the battlefield, if war breaks out? Do the
old principles of war work in this kind of conflict? And just what
are those principles which have guided US and allied forces in past
wars? In the United States, even young ROTC students are taught
the elements of war, summed up by the acronym MOSSCOMES:
M-Mass
O-Offensive
S-Surprise
S-Security
C-Command Unity
O-Objective
M-Maneuver
E-Economy of Force
S-Simplicity
Seven of these principles were extracted from the works of British
major general J. F. C. Fuller, who provided them for the instruction
of the British Army in World War I.2 They were then republished
in a 1921 US Army training regulation and have been passed on in
Air Force, Army, and Joint doctrine and professional military
education publications since.3
Some of General Fuller's ideas may be applied without
modification to future war against hostile radical adversaries armed
with weapons of mass destruction. Other principles of war have to
be modified to reflect changes in technology or situation. For
example, WMD in enemy hands suggests that future commanders
modify the way they apply the war- fighting principles of mass,
maneuver, command unity, and taking the offensive initiative in
combat. New technology provides new stealthy means of achieving
surprise, and end-of-war residual enemy WMD capability may very
well alter allied approaches to security and war termination ends
and means.
Further, there are some additional principles of war that Fuller did
not address that deserve attention in an era marked by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These include the
advantages to be gained by simultaneity and depth of attack,
effective force-projection logistics, information dominance, and
precision targeting.
What is new and what is constant in this brave new proliferated
world? Let us look first at the principle of "mass" in warfare.
The Principle of Mass in Warfare
The principle of mass suggests the wisdom of concentrating
superior combat power at the decisive place and time in military
operations in order to achieve decisive results.4 This massing of
resources directed at key enemy vulnerabilities helps one's own
forces to retain the initiative and makes it possible, together with
the proper application of other principles of war, for outnumbered
forces to achieve break- throughs and decisive war, campaign, and
battle results.
For example, Mao Tse-tung in his guerrilla war strategy
emphasized the importance of achieving local superiority in battle
even though one's own forces were greatly outnumbered overall in
the conflict across all major theaters. His tactics when engaging the
enemy called for ten against one, even if outnumbered ten to one at
the strategic level. In Mao's strategy, proper choice of the time,
place, and ratio of engaged forces could shift victory from the
hands of larger-but-more diffused enemy forces, to those of less
numerous-but-more highly concentrated forces that achieved greater
mass at the points of contact.5
When J. F. C. Fuller wrote his treatise on the principles of war in
World War I, mass was strongly correlated with numbers of ground
troops concentrated in a given location against enemy ground
forces in close proximity. Today, such massed units would be
vulnerable to a different type of mass derived from weapons of
mass destruction and precision guided munitions delivered by
missiles, aircraft, or superguns. 6 This gives a new meaning to
"local superiority."
Ideally, US forces can catch regional opponents in a paradigm shift,
where the adversaries may adhere to the older notions of mass--that
is massing of their armies. US forces can substitute the application
of massed firepower for massed troops. In such a competition,
massed allied firepower could put to flight or destroy massed
enemy units.
The increased lethality of conventional weapons has led to
progressively greater dispersion of forces in the field with each
passing era. For example, the density of troops deployed in the
battle zone has decreased from an average of 4,790 troops per
square kilometer in the Napoleonic Wars to just 2.34 troops per
square kilometer in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. WMD threats will
accelerate a historical trend toward a progressively emptier
battlefield.7
As military technology has improved over time, firepower has
increased and the size of units directing it and trying to avoid it has
decreased.
As one analyst observes:
The logical end point of such developments (advanced conventional
arms and WMD) is the replacement of the notion of concentration
of mass with one emphasizing concentration of fire. Increasingly,
modern armies of the future should achieve breakthroughs and
victory without resorting to large masses of troops directed at
vulnerable points. Instead, the combination of rapidly firing
systems, precision weapons of long range, and advanced command
and control systems will allow widely dispersed forces to focus
their fire on specific points. 8
Indeed, in combat with an adversary armed with WMD, one
corollary to Fuller's dictum on "mass" is that dispersing one's own
forces can make enemy WMD less cost-effective. A second
corollary is that massed allied firepower needs to be directed first
to destroying or degrading enemy WMD at the inception of combat
to permit the later massing of one's own general purpose forces for
combat in the war-termination phase of the conflict.
Just as in the American Civil War and World War I, when massed
offenses were slaughtered by heavily concentrated defensive
firepower, the future possession of WMD in enemy hands should
discourage the use massing of allied troops until after the
opponents WMD are silenced or neutralized.9 If it looks like
disabling early strikes cannot neutralize enemy WMD in a
projected conflict, perhaps such an adversary should not be
engaged in the first place, provided that is an option (i.e., if the war
has not yet begun and if one's homeland and forces are not already
engaged).
Unfortunately, in some inherently unstable situations, if the
adversary were to strike first with weapons of mass destruction, he
might achieve victory, at least temporarily, in a regional conflict. If
the adversary is vulnerable to an allied preemptive strike, he would
have an incentive to use his WMD first. Such a perceived "use or
lose" situation is inherently unstable and unpredictable, especially
in a crisis or escalating conflict.
Some analysts even suggest that the development of very advanced
conventional armaments, combined with new strategy and
organization of forces, can be a "revolution in military affairs,"
making the massing of troops impractical and dangerous. Thus, one
of three courses of action may be adopted by the allied commander
when faced with a NASTI armed force:
Desert Storm II: Proceed as if the threat did not exist, except to
rely upon escalation dominance to deter the adversary from
escalating to WMD use in the conflict. Dispersed Storm: Adopt
many measures to protect the allied force, such as disinformation,
extended dispersal of units, downsizing of units, constant mobility,
passive defenses, and active defenses while still engaging in
traditional forms of warfare, relying also on escalation dominance
to preserve intrawar deterrence of enemy WMD use. Remote
Engagement: Adopt a mode of "disengaged combat," where allied
forces conduct their military operations at a substantial remove
from their enemies.10
The first approach is the same approach that the United States and
its coalition took with regard to possible Iraqi use of its biological
warfare (BW), chemical warfare (CW), and Scud assets in the 1991
Gulf War. In this conflict, despite the vulnerability of allied forces
and capitals, the allies used counterforce strikes and active and
passive defenses to protect against Iraqi air and Scud attacks and
used escalation dominance to deter the possible Iraqi use of
available BW and CW assets. This combination might work again
in the future if the adversary is similarly outclassed in the air, and
where the preponderance of high-tech weapons is held by the allies.
Nevertheless, it is a risky strategy that might backfire with huge
downside results.
The second approach is where forces similar to those sent to the
Gulf War are given far more protection, by much improved air
defenses, missile defenses, and passive defenses. The regional
CINC would also reduce the number of lucrative theater targets
available to the enemy by an extensive dispersal of his own forces
and logistical units and by very pronounced use of mobility to
increase enemy uncertainty concerning the location of key allied
forces.
The third approach is where the main allied force stays outside of
enemy range and attempts to pick off his WMD and destroy his
massed forces by air, missile, and special forces attacks before
sending the bulk of the expeditionary force to engage him in the
endgame. In remote engagements, the allied force would attempt to
outrange the adversary and degrade his capability before closing
and attempting to finish the conflict on allied terms.
In the future, friendly forces may be well advised to avoid, where
possible, close massed engagements with heavily armed enemy
forces. Instead, they likely should adopt the Dispersed Storm or
Remote Engagement postures as a mode of operations out of
respect for the possible consequences of an enemy WMD strike,
particularly if the adversary develops a capability well beyond that
achieved by Iraq in 1991.
There are trade-offs in adopting the Dispersed Storm mode of
operations. On the one hand, failure to mass one's own troops can
make them more vulnerable to enemy conventional attacks.
Moreover, it would be difficult to conduct normal conventional
operations in a dispersed mode. On the other hand, one would run
less risk of having main force units obliterated by enemy WMD
strikes in this mode. The tradeoffs of adopting the Remote
Engagement mode of operations, when facing an enemy with
WMD, has received less discussion, and deserves to be considered
first.
Some would argue that if the United States is faced with such a
formidable opponent, the allies probably should first attempt to
outrange them, dealing punishment from a distance while staying
out of harm's way. In the words of former heavyweight boxing
champion, Muhammed Ali, US and allied forces should "float like
a butterfly, sting like a bee." On the other hand, getting bogged
down in massed armor and artillery duels, providing mass targets to
enemy advanced weapons, is a route to heavy casualties and
possible defeat.
If military forces follow the strategy of disengaged combat, the
battle front may be hard to find. Indeed, in such remote engagement
warfare, it may not exist. The initial stages of combat might find
two heavily armed rival forces, both dispersed, striking at each
other from a distance, each attempting to secure an advantage by
locating and striking the other's key units and assets, while
simultaneously trying to stay out of harm's way from the massive
and precise capabilities of the other.
If remote engagement were adopted as a strategy, then only after
sufficient damage has been inflicted on the adversary via
disengaged combat, would an attempt be made to close and force a
capitulation. If the adversary's weapons of mass destruction have
been eliminated with high confidence, this war-termination phase
of conflict might resemble more traditional forms of combat. The
opening scenarios of remote combat would require great standoff
capabilities, the spreading and hiding of forces, intensive
intelligence, attrition of enemy advanced capabilities, effective
active and passive defensive measures, and extensive coordination
of fire from many diverse points to the highest priority targets on
the other side.
In such conflicts, each of the armed services would need to be
tightly coordinated with the others. Regional CINCs would need
complete connectivity to theater forces under their command while
likely having to operate from highly mobile and hard-to-target
command posts.
This suggests the need for superior generalship, superior targeting
and battle damage assessment intelligence, combined with superior
high-tech weapons. "Using the accuracy of advanced sensors and
precision weapons, US forces may be able to jockey just out of the
range of enemy artillery, tanks, and battlefield missiles, picking
them off in turn."11
This kind of remote engagement conflict would require changes in
US strategy, doctrine, training, and organization. Regional CINCs,
in charge of fighting major regional conflicts, would have to be
schooled in a different kind of war fighting from that pursued in the
1991 Gulf War, the 1964-74 Vietnam War, the 1950-53 Korean
War, or World War II. Preliminary extensive war gaming, in-the-
field exercises, and operational planning for the new type of
warfare would be mandatory for later success in the region of
combat.
An enemy with WMD or very advanced conventional capabilities
obviously poses severe dangers to choke points, ports of entry,
regional air bases, and naval convoys. For example, aircraft carriers
and their surrounding task forces might be very vulnerable to an
adversary armed with nuclear or biological weapons. These floating
airfields, capable of carrying up to 100 aircraft and holding a
military population of 5,000 to 6,000, represent highly lucrative
targets and may be inappropriate in the future for confronting such
a very heavily armed regional foe capable of obliterating or sinking
them.
The US Navy in future combat against a "Saddam Hussein with
nukes" may be forced to operate from more numerous, smaller, less
expensive and more dispersed platforms, emphasizing ballistic and
cruise missiles rather than naval aircraft as theater strike weapons.
These might be augmented by longer-range, air-refueled, naval
fighter-bombers launched from carriers outside the range of enemy
aircraft or missiles that carried the threat of WMD bombardment
and obliteration. How far the US Navy needs to go in these
directions will be determined partly by how successful it is in
developing fleet defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles.
The US Army, likewise, may be forced to move away from strong
reliance on heavy tanks and armored personnel carriers that fight
close to enemy forces. Rather, Army units may be required to hit
and locate the enemy at much greater ranges, at least in the earlier
phases of battle, rather than close and attempt to destroy the NASTI
enemy with heavy mechanized forces before his WMD capabilities
have been neutralized. As one defense analyst observes, "such
armored forces are designed to fight a war that US commanders
should attempt to avoid, not bring about."12
US Air Force officials have become convinced that massed bomber
attacks are less productive than a few stealthy bombers firing or
dropping precision munitions at targets from a stand-off mode. A
few low-observable aircraft are now able to penetrate enemy
defenses with very few losses and inflict, via increased accuracy,
greater damage than whole air armadas previously could inflict
using less accurate bombs and missiles.
As one Air Force analyst notes, with the revolution in accuracy, "it
no longer took hundreds of bombers dropping thousands of bombs
or even tens of bombers dropping scores of bombs to destroy a
single target. Now, one aircraft often delivering only one weapon,
could destroy one target."13
A third element of "mass" to be considered in combat with very
heavily armed opponents is the need for whole-unit reinforcements.
Armies, divisions, naval task forces, or air bases brought under
NBC missile attack may suffer such wholesale losses in such short
time periods that they may entirely cease to function as cohesive
military units. In such horrific circumstances, front-line units may
need to be replaced by entire units of similar capability and
numbers, perhaps under new commanders due to the massive and
traumatic nature of the losses suffered from WMD bombardment.
Nuclear detonations, lethal nerve gas attacks, or clouds of deadly
biological agents could annihilate entire defense sectors and open
large gaps in friendly forces that could be filled only with fresh
units that retained their cohesion and command, control, and
communications linkages.
Thus, when confronting a NASTI, or even a hostile state possessing
very advanced conventional arms, it appears wise to rethink the
advisability of massing one's own troops. Consider, for example,
how different the outcomes of warfare might have been in the past
half century if US forces and those of the Allies had to consider
German nuclear strikes against the Normandy beachhead, Italian
biological weapons at Anzio, or Japanese nerve gas blanketing US
invasion forces at Iwo Jima.
Faced with WMD bombardment, would the allies have been able to
hold the Pusan beachhead or successfully mount the Inchon
invasion during the Korean War? Indeed, would the US nuclear
threat communicated to Beijing via the Indian govern- ment have
been credible if the People's Republic of China also had possessed
nuclear warheads and long-range aircraft in 1953? In the 1990-91
Gulf War, how would things have been different if Iraq had
possessed even a few nuclear weapons and had been prepared to
use them prior to the allied ground offensive while coalition troops
were massing in Saudi Arabia?
The Principle of Maneuver in Warfare
Perhaps far greater emphasis will have to be placed on maneuver,
the second "M" in J.F.C. Fuller's principles of war, rather than on
the first "M," mass. Inherent in maneuver is the idea that mobility
enhances both offensive and defensive capabilities as well as one's
ability to achieve a viable deterrent and escalation superiority in
both peace and war.
Coupled with the need for maneuver is the concept of dispersion.
Armies in modern times are increasingly mobile and dispersed due
to increases in battlefield lethality and other technical changes.
Moving and spreading out gives the adversary less probability of
targeting success and less of a target to hit. Prudence would advise
spreading friendly forces even more in the future to expose fewer of
them to any single WMD attack.
On the other hand, this need to disperse forces can greatly hinder
conventional combat capability. An army dispersed will have less
capability for achieving local superiority and breakthroughs against
its opponents armed forces and less opportunity for battle and war
termination until the main weapons of the enemy are silenced.
The need to simultaneously guard against vulnerability to WMD
attack and to conduct a conventional campaign will impose
contradictory pressures on regional CINCs planning future
campaigns. Such dual concerns might prevent quick, decisive
engagements in the future that are based on the 1991 Gulf War
model. Instead, future armies may be forced to fight more at the
low-intensity warfare level or to engage in prolonged conventional
wars of attrition while avoiding presenting the enemy with the
opportunity for a knockout blow delivered by their WMD.
Victorious armies facing NASTIs may be more preoccupied with
active defense, passive defenses, mobility, dispersion, and
concealment than with conventional offensive actions that could get
them annihilated. Indeed, the lethality of the future battle area may
be so great that a new vision of defensive deploy- ment is required
while simultaneously adding new urgency to the locating, targeting,
and destroying of enemy launchers and storage compounds for
enemy weapons of mass destruction and the adversary's very
advanced conventional weapons.
The Principle of Offensive Initiative in Warfare
One of the principles of war found in US military doctrine is the
necessity to "seize, retain, and exploit the initiative" in combat.14
Maintaining the offensive initiative in warfare is important to
victory, and also helps avoid defeat. An enemy on his heels is
seldom an enemy at your throat. There is still some truth to the old
adage that the best defense is a good offense. A good offense that
keeps the adversary busy defending his own forces and homeland
robs him of some of the potential to carry the fight to yours.
Unfortunately, offensive operations under attack by enemy WMD,
or the threat of such an attack, can be difficult to execute. US Army
operations during its Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical
Environment (CANE) exercises have shown that enemy WMD very
much hindered "Blue" forces' offensive success. As one report
summarized, "during offensive operations, it was noted that:
attacks and engagements lasted longer; fewer enemy forces were
killed; friendly forces suffered more casualties; friendly forces
fired fewer rounds at the enemy; fratricide increased; terrain was
used less effectively for cover and concealment." 15
Unfortunately, as two Army analysts point out, "the introduction of
NBC weapons on the battlefield by an opponent gives him the
initiative."16 Such actions, or even the threat of WMD strikes,
place allied forces somewhat on the defensive and give the initiative
to the opponent, since allied commanders and units are forced to
take fewer risks in exposing themselves to such lethality.
Enemy use of WMD can create residual radioactive, chemical, or
biological contamination of the battle area, hindering allied ability
to act for hours, days, or even weeks after their use. Protective
clothing, exhaustive decontamination procedures, extensive
vaccination programs, administration of antidotes, and the caution
borne of fear in an anthrax, highly toxic chemical, or radioactive
environment can easily degrade the offensive performance and
mind-set of allied forces subject to WMD bombardment. Maneuver
may also be limited in battle space so contaminated.
US Army war games suggest that enemy WMD can negatively
impact allied efforts to maintain the initiative, maneuver through
the battlefield, synchronize forces, and project power into certain
highly dangerous and contaminated areas.17 Moreover, while
conducting offensive operations, allied forces faced with WMD
threats will need to operate under a defensive shield to survive and
succeed. Thus, in future wars against enemies armed with weapons
of mass destruction, in contrast to General Fuller's day, it will be
important to supplement offensive strikes to disarm the adversary's
WMD with a combination of potent defenses to avoid lethal enemy
preemptions or counterstrikes to degrade the threat.
In the classic case, when dealing with a Saddam Hussein with
WMD, the US military commander is faced with a dual need. First,
he would like to neutralize both the enemy leadership and his
WMD potential. This means the prosecution of counter-leader
targeting coupled with an all-out bombardment of likely enemy
WMD capabilities and production facilities. If this opening phase
of the conflict is not totally successful, the allied operations should
be prepared to shift dramatically from the offensive to the defensive
mode, or take enormous risks that whole sectors of the allied forces
might be destroyed if not dispersed into a defensive mode.
Col John Warden, one of the air architects of the allied victory in
the 1991 Gulf War, postulates that future war will feature parallel
strikes aimed at all the key facets of an adversary's state and force,
that, if struck nearly simultaneously, will inflict strategic paralysis
and quick defeat on the adversary. Airpower, he argues, is the
instrument of choice for such "parallel war."
Such simultaneous, parallel strikes are a fine example of the value
of retaining the offensive initiative in warfare, and the paralysis
such strikes inflicted on Iraq in 1991 shows their value in keeping
an adversary from taking the offensive himself. Simultaneous,
parallel, in-depth attacks throughout the battle space is likely to
remain as part of US military doctrine into the foreseeable future.
For example, the US Army's "Force XXI Operations" study states:
Future American operations will induce massive systemic shock to
an enemy. These operations will be meant to force the loss or deny
the enemy any opportunity to take the initiative.18
Similarly, US air doctrine emphasizes the use of new technologies
such as stealth aircraft, stealthy cruise missiles, and precision
guidance to give the advantages of surprise and offensive initiative
to their possessor since these weapons are difficult to detect and
allow airpower to go where it wishes without major losses in
pursuit of strategic or tactical targets.19 Indeed, "aerospace power
can quickly concentrate on or above any point on the earth's
surface. Aerospace power can exploit the principles of mass and
maneuver simultaneously to a far greater extent than surface
forces."20
However, unless the initial offensive in such hyperwar and parallel
war renders inoperable the enemy's ability to strike back with
weapons of mass destruction or with his most capable advanced
conventional weaponry, then the conflict may feature a parallel war
air blitzkrieg coupled with the pullback and dispersal of allied
ground and naval forces to provide less inviting targets to possible
massive enemy counterattacks spearheaded by WMD targeted on
US and allied power projection forces in the region.
If total allied dominance of weapons of mass destruction is not
achieved, the endgame of a conflict will be extremely risky. Will
the enemy escalate at the end or will he be deterred from launching
NBC fusillades as his regime goes under? Will he use some WMD
and threaten more use still in an attempt to achieve a better end-war
settlement?
Or should allied forces keep out of range until such enemy WMD
can be destroyed or until the enemy leadership is killed or
replaced? If this is not possible, what then? It is possible that the
better part of valor might be to accept a compromise peace that
leaves the adversary regime and his military in place rather than
demanding total surrender as required of Nazi Germany or Tojo's
Japan in 1945. If this option is rejected, the allied side risks
massive casualties, perhaps numbering in the millions, before
victory could be achieved against a regional foe so heavily armed.
As in the 1991 Gulf War, the location of the enemy leadership and
his weapons of mass destruction may be unknown. There will be a
temptation at the inception of any such conflict to target the enemy
leader or leaders to create disorganization and a regime change.
However, the closer such counter-leader strike attempts come to
success without accomplishing the task, the greater the possibility
that the enemy regime will counter with desperate measures that
might include launching a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons
attack, even if they face a clearly superior allied nuclear force that
enjoys escalation dominance.
How do you achieve victory or a measure of victory in regional
combat with such an enemy, and how do you, at the same time,
limit the damage inflicted on allied forces and allies in the region
of operations? Further, how do you limit damage to the continental
United States and allied countries during such regional conflicts?
Until effective US and allied theater or strategic defenses are
developed and deployed in the regions where foes developing or
deploying WMD are located, efforts to counter such threats will
have to rely upon deterrence of the adversary or on allied
conventional offensive capabilities.
While it would be the very rare contingency when the United States
or allied states could successfully identify, locate, target, and
destroy the force of a hostile radical state on the verge of using
WMD against the American homeland, US and allied forces in the
region, or allied countries, there may be a few opportunities where
allied intelligence can pinpoint such preparations and strike a blow
to disarm such an adversary with high confidence.
Nor is it wise to use all the military potential the United States
possesses, since the use of US nuclear arms to strike the enemy
WMD targets would likely entail too many political, economic,
diplomatic, legal, and moral negatives.21
In some cases, this imperative to use conventional weapons only,
would make it impossible to disarm an adversary arming itself with
WMD since conventional weapons may not be capable of:
destroying deeply buried and hardened bunkers containing WMD
assets; area targeting of widely dispersed but "soft" mobile enemy
WMD assets; burning enemy biological weapons ingredients that
were otherwise likely to be spread across the region if impacted by
conventional bombing.
For these and a number of other reasons, reliance on conventional
offenses alone to end the WMD threat would be unwise, because
the penetration of allied defense by even a single enemy nuclear,
biological, or chemical warhead might be lethal across a wide area.
Theater missile defenses are also needed.
Only the combination of offensive suppression strikes coupled with
defensive interception capabilities could provide any possibility of
the regional "astrodome" protection needed against such
unforgiving weapons, where even a single enemy warhead "leaker"
through the defenses could devastate a port, base, airfield, naval
convoy, massed army, or population center.
What makes the damage limitation enterprise even thinkable, once
war has begun, is that the enemy may possess only a half dozen or
so of such weapons at the time of a conflict, few enough so that it
is possible for an allied offense-defense combination to neutralize
the threat.
The Principle of Unity of Command in Warfare
Another principle of war laid out by Gen J. F. C. Fuller is that of
the requirement for unity of command. Maintaining good
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) could
become much easier in future MRCs as a result of the ongoing
revolution in information technology available to allied
commanders. This information revolution will provide more
information earlier, and in far greater detail about the opponent's
capabilities, locations, and activities than known in previous wars.
Moreover, such a communications revolution will lead to flatter
organization structures and to greater force-wide awareness of
allied and enemy dispositions in real time. This will enhance the
control of central commanders while, at the same time, permitting
wider dispersal of friendly forces. The US Army's "Force XXI
Operations" report states that
advances in information management and distribution will facilitate
the horizontal integration of the battlefield functions and aid
commanders in tailoring forces and arranging them on land....
Units, key nodes, and leaders will be more widely dispersed leading
to the continuation of the empty battlefield phenomenon. 22
The challenge to effective command, control, and communica- tions
in a major regional conflict could be immense. If the adversary has
the capability of decapitating the US or allied military commands,
of decapitating regional allied govern- ments, of targeting the US
National Command Authority, or of "leveling the playing field" by
knocking out most allied communications with a high-altitude
nuclear explosion emitting a destructive electromagnetic pulse
(EMP), it could destroy the unity of command of the allied forces
in the region.
If the regional adversary was at a severe disadvantage in NBC
weapons, he might still make effective use of his limited capability
by atmospheric nuclear bursts of EMP that could play havoc with
allied telecommunications, navigation, radar, aircraft, missiles,
automated guns, APCs, tanks, trucks, and any microchips or
electrical circuits that are not protected against EMP.
The enemy WMD threat might even extend beyond the theater of
war to the capitals of allied countries, including even Washington,
D.C. It may be possible that the adversary has aircraft or missiles
capable of reaching such capitals. Even if this was not technically
possible, it is conceivable that nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons could be delivered against such cities by unconventional
means via saboteurs smuggling them in the allied countries and
detonating them or threatening to do so to achieve favorable
diplomatic concessions at the end of the conflict.
Unfortunately, most allied capitals are highly vulnerable to WMD
threats. For example, Washington, D.C., has long been a vulnerable
target and will remain so in the foreseeable future.23 A clandestine
nuclear detonation in the city would likely doom the US president,
the vice president, Cabinet members, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
members of Congress who were there at the time. The chaos that
such an attack would cause would be difficult to overstate. One of
the more difficult questions to answer in the hours after such a
NASTI decapitation attack would be "who is in charge here?"
This chaos would be compounded if the headquarters housing the
US regional CINC and his staff also were to suffer a similar
decapitation strike at the same time. It is possible that the national
leadership and the regional military forces of the United States
would be plunged into chaos for sometime.
The threat of communication disruption and command disable-
ment in conflicts with NASTIs leads to several conclusions
regarding the preservation of unity of command in such conflicts:
Command unity may have to give way to subcommand dispersal
under a preset unified contingency plan; Military units may need
to be more autonomous and dependent on prewar planning of
operations; Unit commanders will need simpler, less frequent
updates from central headquarters; Alternative commanders in
mobile and hardened com- mand posts will be needed for all
regional and supporting CINCs, with trained backups in reserve
several layers deep, ready to assume command if and when the
CINCs are targeted, killed, or isolated from their forces; Military
forces may have to be guided and organized similarly to distributed
computer networks, with greater autonomy, independence of action,
and ability to operate independent of central command while still
following command guidelines.
The Principle of Clear Obtainable Objectives in Warfare
Wars, like chess matches, are generally characterized by opening
moves, both offensive and defensive, by a middle game exchange,
and by a decisive endgame.24 Central and theater commanders
should begin each phase of the conflict with the desired end in
mind, with each phase designed to move the situation forward
toward the goal. The United States Army Field Manual FM 100-5
states that commanders ought to "direct every military operation
towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."
In the Persian Gulf, President Bush defined the US and allied
objective simply as the freeing of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and
the establishment of agreed borders between Iraq and Kuwait. Once
beaten in the field of battle, the regime of Saddam Hussein was
allowed to remain in power, although restrictions were placed upon
Iraqi military units, UN inspectors were sent into Iraq to locate its
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well as its ballistic
missiles for the purpose of destroying them. Iraq was prohibited
from most international trade or exports, and was especially limited
from profiting from oil exports until it was deemed to be in full
com- pliance with peace terms negotiated at the end of the Gulf
War.
President Bush's decision to stop the fighting when he did was
controversial. Many thought he should have directed US and allied
forces to proceed on to Baghdad when he had the Iraqi military on
the run and in chaos, continuing the conflict so long as Saddam
Hussein and his cabinet controlled the Iraqi government and
military forces.
It has been argued that President Bush's decision was made in line
with the principle of war that says to direct every military operation
towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. First,
the decision to end the conflict once Iraqi troops were expelled
from Kuwait was a clearly defined objective. The war aim, as
agreed at the United Nations when the allied coalition was formed,
was not to occupy Iraq, replace the present Iraqi government, or
govern Iraq during a transition period to another regime.
President Bush complied with the United Nations resolutions
authorizing the collective security action and the limited goals
embraced by the whole US-led coalition. To go further might have
led to a split in the coalition and would have been on uncertain
legal grounds.
Second, despite the US decision to halt Desert Storm operations
short of a ground occupation of Iraq, the campaign was,
nevertheless, decisive in securing the liberation of Kuwait and in
inflicting a decisive defeat and surrender of all Iraqi forces
stationed outside of Iraq's borders.
Third, President Bush's objective in the Gulf conflict was quite
attainable. Not only was Kuwait liberated, but, after three years, the
Iraqi parliament has finally agreed to drop claims to Kuwaiti
territory and recognize the borders of Kuwait as legitimate.
President Bush's decision to keep to such clearly defined, decisive,
and attainable objectives was determined by the calculation that to
go further and invade Iraq would have gone beyond the UN
resolutions authorizing the collective action. Such action, it was
thought, would endanger the support of coalition partners needed
to legitimize the subsequent peace arrangements and whose support
the United States would need to guard its interests in future
dealings in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Further,
President Bush and his advisers understood the difficulties of
conquering Iraq, locating and capturing Saddam Hussein and his
subordinate leaders, subduing the remnants of the Iraqi military
throughout a country larger than Germany, and governing a hostile
population of almost 20 million while seeking to set up a friendly
regime.
The Bush administration was also eager to avoid further bloodshed,
having just won the victory in Kuwait at a human cost well below
what had been predicted for the ground campaign (150 US dead as
opposed to predictions that ranged up to 15,000). President Bush
and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney saw entry into Iraq as a
quagmire to be avoided and ended the fighting while the allies were
well ahead and had attained their immediate stated goals.
Realpolitik may also have been a factor in the United States's
decision to stop when it did. Prior to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait,
the United States had been more concerned with containing Iranian
power rather than Iraqi power in the region. After all, it was Iran
under the ayatollahs who seized American hostages at the US
embassy in Tehran in 1979, and who was seen as the chief exporter
of anti-American sentiments, and who was seen as the chief
exporters of terror worldwide. The fact that Iraq, if totally disarmed
by the allied coalition, could not offset the expansionist ambitions
of Iran was still another argument for not entering Iraq and totally
dismantling its military power in 1991.
Finally, it is likely that President Bush and his political advisors
also wished to reap the political fruits of an almost total victory in
Kuwait as opposed to entering the political minefield of an
invasion, extended military campaign, and occupation of Iraq. By
stopping when he did, President Bush received an unprecedented
93 percent approval rating in polls of the American public in the
aftermath of the war.
The decisive victory, stopped at its apex, also sent an unchallenged
message around the world about US military prowess and American
willingness to act decisively against aggression when it felt its vital
interests were at stake. This enhanced US reputation in the world
could be used to deter other would-be aggressors in places like
North Korea, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere. US credibility had
never been higher since the end of World War II, a recovery from
the years following the Vietnam War.
Given these arguments in support of President Bush's decision to
follow limited war aims in 1991, there is still controversy over
whether stopping short of Baghdad was an act of wisdom or short-
sightedness. Some believe that the allies should have finished the
regime of Saddam Hussein when they had the opportunity to act
decisively against him. Time has shown that he has a remarkable
ability to survive politically in Iraq, and Iraq has been able to
reconstitute much of its conventional military capability even under
the terms of the truce. Moreover, Iraq retains the scientific base,
foreign supplier contacts, potential wealth from its oil reserves, and
ambitions for future great-power status.
Once UN sanctions are lifted on Iraq, many believe that country
will be back in the WMD business full-scale. Indeed, resurrection
of its biological weapons stockpile should be simple since the
allies never found it and therefore did not destroy it. Iraq is given
two years of full scale effort before it could be at 1991 levels again
in its nuclear weapons research, and less than a decade after that
before it could join the nuclear weapons club.
Indeed, not to have deposed Saddam Hussein, when the chance
presented itself, may be to have defined the US and UN objective
too narrowly at the onset of the Gulf conflict since it is arguable
whether the US and allied limited actions achieved a lasting end to
the Iraqi threat or merely postponed the confrontation with an Iraq
armed with NBC weapons and the missiles to deliver them on
target.
The symptoms were treated and their effects mitigated, but the
disease persists that could be lethal next time to US interests and
allies in the Gulf region. One evidence of Saddam's persistent
malevolence was the Iraqi-sponsored attempt to kill former
President Bush on his visit to Kuwait in 1993. Leaving such an
opponent alive and in power is like allowing a rattlesnake to
continue to live in your house after it has attempted to kill you
once, because you have temporarily milked it of its venom, even
though you know it will inevitably produce more in time.
Permitting Saddam Hussein to remain in power to continue to
threaten his neighbors and US interests in the region, by stopping
at the Iraq-Kuwait border, is analogous to having allowed Adolph
Hitler to remain in control of Germany in 1945 because the Allies
decided to stop at Germany's borders once German armies had been
expelled from the lands that they occupied from 1939-1945.
Given the track record of Iraq, a state that has been at war with its
neighbors since its inception, and of Saddam Hussein, whose
regime has constantly used murderous violence against its
opponents inside Iraq and aggressive war against its neighbors
since he took power, there is a high likelihood that the Gulf War
will have to be repeated in the future, perhaps against an even more
dangerous enemy.
To conclude, as former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
once advised, "if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas,
we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish
those clearly defined objectives."25 This is a useful guideline, even
if it does not precisely tell you what to do and where to draw the
line on your prewar and postwar aspirations.
The Principle of Security in Warfare
Good security means the enemy cannot achieve strategic surprise.
Such good security increasingly depends on accurate and timely
intelligence information to assess the threat and give timely
warning of it in an era when hostile and radical opponents are
about to acquire the most destructive of weapons.
It has become increasingly difficult to predict the progress of
nonnuclear states as they approach obtaining an operational WMD
capability. Most of these regimes find it neither in their political,
economic, nor military interests to advertise their progress or
capabilities.
The international legal norm established by the NPT carries pledges
by the nuclear weapon states that they will not attack nonnuclear
signatories of the pact and that they will be subject to sanctions if
they violate that pledge. Aspiring proliferators might hide behind
their signatures on the NPT to gain legal protection against
intervention, particularly if the evidence of their developing WMD
is ambiguous.
Declared proliferators may also suffer unilateral cutoffs and
sanctions by triggering national legislation on the books in the
United States and among other states. These laws enforcing
international norms prohibiting proliferation also prescribe various
penalties for states that break from the ranks. Witness the Pressler
Amendment and the trade penalties inflicted on Pakistan as a result
of its nuclear weapons program.
Moreover, as Saddam Hussein learned in June 1981 when his
Osirak reactor was destroyed by Israeli warplanes, it does not pay
to develop WMD in high-profile, easily targeted facilities. Instead,
armed with great wealth from his oil revenues, Saddam from 1981-
1991 was able to move very close to a nuclear weapons capability
following a clandestine approach. This model is the more likely one
for aspirant states to follow, namely:
Pursuing multiple technical paths to NBC weapons; Disguising
and hiding WMD facilities, some underground; Providing
disinformation about WMD activities/locations; Joining the NPT
as a ruse while clandestinely cheating; Using third parties to
purchase WMD production technology; Purchasing dual-use
technologies allegedly for another purpose; Producing
indigenously as many components of WMD as possible; Getting
prospective contractors to fill gaps in WMD knowledge through the
bid and proposal process, sometimes not letting the contract
afterwards; Buying as much WMD technology and resources on
the open market as possible from contractors all too ready to help
in return for substantial profits; Hiring foreign NBC/missile
expertise where local expertise is lacking; and Purchasing WMD
technology subcomponents, rather than components, and
assembling them inside their country to reduce the audit trail.
Like the proverbial iceberg, just the tips of the North Korean and
Iranian nuclear weapons programs are visible, and they probably
indicate a much larger clandestine program operating out of sight.
The rate of progress may be accelerated by the possibility of
transfers of scientific knowledge, highly enriched uranium (HEU)
or plutonium (PL), weapons designs, missiles, and nuclear
technology from the newly independent states of the former Soviet
Union, which have a surplus of underpaid nuclear scientists and
technicians, hundreds of tons of HEU and PL, tens of thousands of
nuclear weapons, a need for hard currency, and an expanding
criminal element with some access to the widespread nuclear
facilities of the former superpower.
According to US military doctrine, the United States should
never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly
vulnerability to hostile acts, influence or surprise . . . . Thorough
knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and
doctrine and detailed staff planning can improve security and
reduce vulnerability to surprise.26
Vulnerability to surprise and attack can be reduced by a
combination of offensive and defensive measures. Security can be
maintained by a mix that includes:
Keeping allied escalation dominance to deter enemy escalation to
first use of WMD; Allied counterforce strikes to destroy or reduce
enemy WMD assets; Allied active defenses to intercept enemy
missile or aircraft attacks; Use of passive defenses to protect
friendly forces from the effects of nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapon attacks; Any other measures designed to present less
lucrative targets to enemy WMD such as dispersion, mobility,
maintaining forces outside of enemy missile or aircraft ranges, and
introducing supply and reinforcement means that are less
vulnerable to NBC strikes.
No single approach may neutralize the WMD threat, but taken in
combination, these measures may greatly reduce the vulnerability of
friendly forces to NASTI surprises.
Improved allied capabilities to remotely detect adversary nuclear,
biological, chemical and missile assets on the ground or en route to
target, would also enhance security and help avoid rude and
devastating surprises by the enemy.
The Principle of Economy of Force in Warfare
Another principle of war set out in US military doctrine is to
"allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts."27
In other words, it is recommended that the US commander should
concentrate the majority of his military power toward a clearly
defined primary threat rather than compromise the effort against
secondary priorities. This principle of war is based on the premise
that the CINC will not have unlimited resources and must accept
some calculated risks in secondary areas of importance in order to
achieve superiority in the priority area where the battle or conflict
may be decided.
On the grand strategic level, the United States has adopted a
strategy of preparing to fight two nearly simultaneous major
regional conflicts at the same time. Clearly, utilizing the prin- ciple
of economy of force, the United States would need to hold in
reserve enough force for a second MRC once the first one begins.
The principle of "economy of force" also would serve as a guide to
cutting back on secondary US military participation such as in on-
going UN peace operations in other regions--so long as US forces
are engaged in one or more major regional conflicts, or lack the
military power to predominate in both.
The principle of economy of force must be applied with a caveat
when an enemy is equipped with WMD. The allied commander
must avoid having his main thrust trumped by the employment of
enemy mass destruction weapons. Therefore, while resources must
be focused on the decisive weak points in adversary forces and
plans, they must simultaneously be adequately protected by
maintaining intrawar escalation dominance, and their employment
prefaced by an air campaign designed to substantially eliminate an
enemy WDM capability.
The main ground thrust against enemy forces must be adequately
protected by concentrating active and passive defense assets on
behalf of the main effort. Dispersion and continued mobility of key
force elements, combined with rapid supply and reinforcements
from diverse logistics pathways, all done with dispatch, air cover,
and secure and clandestine movements of troops, equipment, and
supplies, will help preserve the element of tactical surprise and
disguise where the main effort will be made.
As US Army and Air Force doctrine states, "economy of force
missions may require the forces employed to attack, to defend, to
delay, or to conduct deception operations."28
The Principle of Surprise in Warfare
US military doctrine teaches that commanders must attempt to
"strike the enemy in a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is
unprepared."29 Surprise can affect the outcome of battles,
campaigns, or even entire wars. Surprise can be achieved by speed
of attack and maneuver, taking unanticipated actions, using
deception, varying the tactics used from those previously employed,
maintaining operations security, gaining good intelligence and
insights into enemy thinking and doctrine, and applying new
technologies in ways that reduce enemy warning time, provide
capabilities he does not anticipate, or contribute to his confusion.
In the realm of new technologies to achieve surprise, note the
importance of stealth F-117 fighter-bombers in striking key targets
in the 1991 Gulf War and the use of precision- guided cruise
missiles with very small radar cross-sections. One of the architects
of the US air campaign in the 1991 Persian Gulf War has written
that
for the first time in the history of warfare, a single entity can
produce its own mass and surprise . . . . Surprise has always been
one of the most important factors in war--perhaps even the single
most important because it could make up for the deficiencies in
numbers. Surprise was always difficult to achieve because it
conflicted with the concepts of mass and concentration. In order to
have enough forces available to hurl enough projectiles to win the
probability contest, the commander had to assemble and move large
numbers. Of course, assembling and moving large forces in secret
was quite difficult, even in the days before aerial reconnaissance,
so the odds of surprising the enemy were small indeed. Stealth and
precision have solved both sides of the problem; by definition,
stealth achieves surprise, and precision means that a single weapon
accomplishes what thousands were unlikely to accomplish in the
past.30
Until the NASTI regimes acquire radars or other sensors capable of
detecting and targeting incoming stealth aircraft and cruise
missiles, the United States and its allies have a means of achieving
tactical surprise in any air strike or any cruise missile launch. The
ability to strike "out of the blue" without warning, provided by the
B-2, F-117s, future F-22s, and stealthy cruise missiles is limited
only by how successfully US and allied intelligence can identify
and locate significant enemy targets, and by the availability of
stealth aircraft or cruise missiles.
Technological surprise can also decide battles when one side first
employs a decisive new military technology which puts the
adversary at an unanticipated disadvantage. One of the most
dramatic illustrations of this was the decisive role of British radars
in helping the Royal Air Force win the Battle of Britain against the
German Luffwaffe. Although greatly outnumbered in aircraft, the
British were able to pinpoint the directions and numbers of German
aircraft as they took off in France and flew across the English
Channel toward Britain. Armed with this knowledge, British
Spitfires waited high in the clouds in ambush and concentrated
superior forces in the air battles they chose to fight. The result was
a British victory where bean counters would have predicted defeat.
Radar was the biggest difference in the two sides.31
The Principle of Simplicity in Warfare
US Army commanders are taught to prepare "clear, uncom- plicated
plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough
understanding."32 Simplicity of operational concepts and goals
should reduce misunderstandings of orders, reduce confusion, and
enhance the understanding of key audiences whose support is
necessary to conduct the war.
This simplicity of operation should be applied to all phases of
combat; during the opening phase of operations, in the main
campaign, and in the war-termination phase. The war plan should
be a continuation of politics by other means, keeping in mind the
national ends for which the conflict was begun, constantly relating
national ends to ongoing military means, and understanding the
unique limits on war termination imposed by the stark fact that the
adversary possesses weapons whose destructive magnitude exceeds
anything previously faced by other US commanders in previous
conflicts.
Of course, simplicity and clarity of goals, plans, and orders alone
do not guarantee a correct strategy or successful operation against a
heavily armed regional enemy. A CINC could choose a clear,
simple plan based on tried-and-true principles, but find that it
would not work in a future MRC where the adversary was equipped
with radically different capabilities well beyond those possessed by
enemies in the past.
Armed with WMD, such adversaries might follow an escalatory
strategy that could shatter the cohesiveness of an allied coalition,
could scare off potential allies, might inflict a political defeat on
the coalition by dissolving allied domestic support for the war, or
even cripple an allied expeditionary force by turning NBC and
missile assets against allied forces, ports, air bases, logistical tail,
or allied capitals in the region. In such a campaign, a NASTI attack
might conceivably inflict in a single day allied war deaths in excess
of what the United States suffered in Korea, Vietnam, or even in
World War II.33
The right operational plan will be essential against NASTIs on the
field of battle. Clarity and simplicity added to a sound approach
contribute to success. Of course, if added to a flawed concept of
operations, clarity and simplicity cannot avert defeat.
Additional Principles of War against Enemies with WMD
Military experience and recent technical innovations have spawned
some additional principles of warfare to add to the list supplied by
General Fuller in World War I. These new operating principles,
when combined with the original MOSSCOMES principles of war
may supply the decisive edge against radical hostile regimes armed
with WMD.
These new principles can be summarized by the acronym SLIP:
S-Simultaneity and Depth of Attack
L-Logistics
I-Information Dominance
P-Precision Targeting
Simultaneity and Depth of Attack
When battling a NASTI, it is best to strike fast and simul-
taneously at all key enemy assets to stun and paralyze his forces to
defeat them in the shortest time possible. Simultaneous strikes
throughout the entire battlespace may be enough to rob him of
much or all of his WMD capability, and reduce his offensive
potential.
As the US Army Training and Doctrine Command states in its
concept of operations for the early twenty-first century, "The
relationship between fire and maneuver may undergo a
transformation as armies with high technology place increasing
emphasis on simultaneous strikes throughout the battle space.
Maneuver forces may be massed for shorter periods of time." 34
Army doctrine also notes that "depth and simultaneous attack may
be a key characteristic of future American military operations.
These operations will redefine the current ideas of deep, close, and
rear."35 Indeed, such parallel war or hyperwar strikes blur the
distinction between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
operations and tend to blend them into one.
Recent effectiveness of simultaneous operations conducted across
the full length, breadth, and height of the battle space have led to
quick victories in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf. Desert Storm, for
example, showed that "deep battle has advanced beyond the
concept of attacking the enemy's follow-on forces in a sequential
approach to shape the close battle to one of simultaneous attack to
stun, then rapidly defeat the enemy." 36
Colonel John Warden III, one of the architects of the air campaign
that defeated Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, suggests that near-
simultaneous parallel warfare strikes against key enemy leadership,
system essentials, infrastructure, population centers, and fielded
military forces may impose strategic or operational paralysis on
him, leading to his rapid defeat.37 Warden notes the impact of the
fast-paced US parallel air strikes on the 1991 defeat of Iraq:
In Iraq, a country about the same size as prewar Germany, so many
key facilities suffered so much damage so quickly that it was
simply not possible to make strategically meaningful repair. Nor
was it possible or very useful to concentrate defenses; successful
defense of one target merely meant that one out of over a hundred
didn't get hit at that particular time. Like the thousand cuts analogy,
it just doesn't matter very much if some of the cuts are deflected. It
is important to note that Iraq was a very tough country strategically.
Iraq had spent an enormous amount of money and energy on giving
itself lots of protection and redundancy and its efforts would have
paid off well if it had been attacked serially as it had every right to
anticipate it would. In other words, the parallel attack against Iraq
was against what may well have been the country best prepared in
all the world for attack. If it worked there, it will probably work
elsewhere. 38
Thus, the experience of the 1991 Gulf War is that parallel warfare
can be decisive since regional adversaries are likely to have a
relatively small number of vital strategic targets, estimated by
Colonel Warden at "in the neighborhood of a few hundred with the
average of perhaps 10 aimpoints per vital target." 39 These enemy
assets "tend to be small (in number), very expensive, have few
backups, and are hard to repair. If a significant percentage of them
are struck in parallel, the damage becomes insuperable." 40
Of course, there may be counter-measures that an adversary might
take to offset the possibilities of simultaneous allied air strikes
across the battlespace of a major regional conflict.41 Efforts might
be taken to (1) disguise, diversify and "demassify" the key political-
military-economic assets to make them less lucrative targets, (2)
hide, harden, or put on mobile launchers, WMD assets to reduce
their vulnerability, (3) employ WMD against allied bases from
which parallel attacks are being launched, (4) attack allied C4I and
employ various forms of "info war" to confuse, disorganize, and
mislead allied commanders and "psychological warfare" to reduce
allied morale and influence the publics of the United States and its
allies to undermine political support for the war.
Logistics
When drafting the original list of principles of war, General Fuller
failed to identify the overwhelming importance of effective logistics
to the support of fighting forces as they mobilize, deploy,
maneuver, reconstitute, withdraw, and demobilize. Without proper
logistics it would be impossible to man, arm, fuel, fix, move, or
sustain the soldier, sailor, or airman and their equipment as they
enter and fight major regional conflicts. As one US Army general
has put it, "Forget logistics and you lose." 42 On more than 230
occasions, US forces have been sent to other countries and regions
of the world in the twentieth century alone. Logistics gets them
there, sustains them, and gets them home again.
Increasingly, logistics will play an important part in whether US
and allied forces get to the battle in time and whether they will
predominate when they arrive. This is especially true now that
fewer US troops are stationed abroad while still responsible for
standing ready to win two near-simultaneous major regional
conflicts (MRCs) and participating in a number of military
operations other than war (MOOTW) as well.
MRCs and MOOTWs both require a force-projection logistical
system that has "the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize,
deploy and operate anywhere in the world." 43 As a recent analysis
of the US Army in the Gulf War notes, logistics units do more than
sustain forces in the field. Indeed, "the strength of the logistics
engine determines the pace at which an intervening force makes
itself secure." 44
One student of that conflict has observed:
The Iraqi Army stood by and watched on television as the American
Army assembled a sophisticated combat force in front of them with
efficiency and dispatch. The act of building the logistics
infrastructure during Desert Shield created an atmosphere of
domination and a sense of inevitable defeat among the Iraqis long
before the shooting war began. In the new style of war, superior
logistics becomes the engine that allows American military forces
to reach an enemy from all points of the globe and arrive ready to
fight. Speed of closure and buildup naturally increases the
psychological stature of the deploying force and reduces the risk of
destruction to those forces that deploy first. In contrast, dribbling
forces into a theater by air or sea raises the risk of defeat in
detail.45
A successful buildup of US and allied forces and supplies at the
inception of a major regional conflict could, in turn, depend upon
the early deployment of an effective multilayered air and missile
defense and air superiority over the battle zone. As Col Warden has
warned, surface forces and logistical support units are fragile at the
operational level of war, especially against highly armed
challengers.
Supporting significant numbers of surface forces (air, land, or sea)
is a tough administrative problem even in peacetime. Success
depends upon efficient distribution of information, fuel, food, and
ammunition. By necessity, efficient distribution depends on an
inverted pyramid of distribution. Supplies of all operational
commodities must be accumulated in one or two locations, then
parsed out to two or four locations, and so on until they eventually
reach the user. The nodes in the system are exceptionally
vulnerable to precision attack.46
In short, while the United States and its allies may be able to
handle a NASTI regime such as Iraq in 1991, in the future it may be
dealing with adversaries that have mastered the building of accurate
ballistic missiles, nuclear warheads, chemically armed reentry
vehicles, and relatively cheap, hard-to-detect cruise missiles. At
that point, MRC forces and their logistics tails had better reduce
their vulnerabilities by application of deterrence, preemptive
strikes, defenses, deployment outside of enemy range, dispersion of
units, constant mobility, or diversity of supply paths in order to
avoid defeat.
Information Dominance
The importance of winning the information war should be a guiding
principle of wars of the future. A US Army study predicts that
"effective information operations will make battlespace transparent
to us and opaque to our opponents."47 Such, at least, is the goal.
One of the air commanders of the Gulf War also emphasizes the
importance of information at the strategic and operational levels.
He notes that
In the Gulf War, the coalition deprived Iraq of most of its ability to
gather and use information. At the same time, the coalition
managed its own information requirements acceptably, even though
it was organized in the same way Frederick the Great had organized
himself. Clear for the future is the requirement to redesign our
organizations so they are built to exploit modern information-
handling equipment. This also means flattening organizations,
eliminating most middle management, pushing decision making to
very low levels, and forming worldwide neural networks to
capitalize on the ability of units in and out of the direct conflict
area.48
The information lesson from the Gulf was negative; the coalition
succeeded in breaking Iraq's ability to process information, but the
coalition failed to fill the void by providing Iraqis with an
alternative source of information. Failure to do so made Saddam's
job much easier and greatly reduced the chance of his overthrow.
Capturing and exploiting the datasphere may well be the most
important effort in many future wars.49
Precision Targeting
Another principle of war flowing from technical innovations is the
dominance imparted by using precision guided weapons. Suddenly,
with great precision, nearly all important fixed targets can be
destroyed in a campaign. Instead of having to fire thousands of
bombs and missiles at targets, just a few will do the job today with
much greater certainty than the imprecise massed attacks of
yesterday.
Now "one bomb, one target destroyed" is more the norm instead of
"hundreds of bombs, perhaps few or no targets destroyed." This
helps in planning a successful campaign and in executing it. MRC
logistics are simplified since a finite number of precision weapons
can now be used to destroy a set <%1>of targets rather than the
massive quantities of "dumb" weapons that would otherwise be
needed to accomplish the same mission.
The combined advantages of stealth technology and precision
guided missiles can be seen by comparing a conventional bombing
attack in the 1991 Gulf War, against the same target, the Baghdad
Nuclear Research Center, with a stealthy precision attack two days
later. The conventional air attack failed to destroy the target even
though it used 32 bomb-dropping aircraft, 16 fighter escorts, 12
aircraft for suppression of Iraqi air defenses, and 15 tanker aircraft.
Two days later, this target was successfully destroyed using just
eight F-117 stealth fighter-bombers supported by just two
tankers.50
Conclusions
There are many other principles of war that might be formulated to
apply to different kinds of engagements. For example, war against a
NASTI is far different from participating in military operations
other than war such as UN peace operations. Further, low-intensity
counterguerrilla warfare is prosecuted differently than more
conventional battle, as fought in the 1991 Gulf War, and both
might be fought differently in future wars.
One scholar has listed over one hundred principles of war that have
been advocated by military thinkers since the time of Sun Tzu. 51
Indeed, in 1984 US Air Force doctrine recommended four
guidelines (timing, tempo, logistics, and cohesion) in addition to
Fuller's original list of nine principles of war. Some in the recent
past have argued for the inclusion of the concept of deterrence as a
separate principle of conflict management.52
A review of the principles of war that pertain to a future conflict
with an enemy equipped with advanced conventional arms and mass
destruction weapons can provide a better understanding of how to
operate on the future battlefield. However, such a set of principles
are not infallible guides to action. They cannot substitute for
judgment, improvisation, insights into the enemy, or initiative. Nor
can they be applied by rote or as part of a checklist.
Understanding of these principles can add to the commander's
understanding of how to conduct warfare, and a review of them can
remind him of fundamentals to observe, but such application of
these principles by themselves is not sufficient for victory. For one
thing they are somewhat abstract and require judgment in
application to specific cases.
In the end, the commander and his subordinates still must bring a
depth of experience, concrete mastery of details, and an
understanding of military affairs that reaches well beyond such
general principles. Nevertheless, these principles of war can be
useful ways to think about how to solve the problem facing a
commander whose force is opposed by a NASTI.
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Notes
1. Rogue states whose military forces are equipped with WMD and
means of delivering them on targets may interfere with highly
sophisticated new strategies and technologies developed by the
United States and its allies. WMD may level the playing field. For
example, a high-altitude nuclear EMP burst may destroy allied
communications, interfere with space-based reconnaissance,
impede the digitalization of the battlefield, blind allied precision
strike forces to new targets, and serve as a form of information
warfare in its crudest form. The RMA brought about by the
introduction of NBC and missile systems into a theater of war may
predominate over the effects of other strategies and technologies.
For a different view see the chapter on "The Revolution in Military
Affairs" by Jeffrey McKittrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage,
George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield, and Dale Hill in this volume.
2. J. F. C. Fuller, "The Principles of War, with Reference to the
Campaigns of 1914-1915," Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution, vol. 61, February 1916. Fuller cited seven principles of
war: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Surprise,
Security, Cooperation. Later, the US military dropped Cooperation
as a principle of war and substituted Simplicity and Command
Unity.
3. See Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of
the United States Air Force, March 1992, vol. 1, 1 and 2, Essay B,
"Principles of War," 9-15. See also, Appendix A, "Principles of
War," Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 1990 edition,
173-77.
4. Ibid., 174. The principle of mass can also be applied at the grand
strategic level. "In the strategic context, this principle suggests that
the nation should commit, or be prepared to commit, a
preponderance of national power to those regions or areas of the
world where the threat to national security interests is greatest." See
also AFM 1-1, 1.
5. The advantages of achieving local superiority, even if
outnumbered overall, is not a new idea. The same point was made
several thousand years ago by Sun Tzu. See Sun Tzu, The Art of
War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press,
1963), 98.
6. The Manhattan Project provided a fission weapon in 1945 that
was over a thousand times more powerful per unit weight than a
TNT warhead of equivalent weight. The H-bomb fusion weapons
that followed carried an explosive yield a thousand times more
powerful than the earlier A-bombs. This millionfold increase in
explosive capability between 1945 and 1950 was augmented by the
first-time capability to deliver such weapons across intercontinental
distances by aircraft and missiles. Massed local forces were now
targetable by WMD delivered across intercontinental ranges.
7. Gen Gordon R. Sullivan and Col James M. Dubik, USA, "Land
Warfare in the 21st Century," Military Review, September 1993,
22. Their chart on "The Expanded Battlefield" traces the density of
troop deployment, width of the battlefront, and depth of the battle
space in wars from antiquity to the 1991 Gulf War. The earlier
work done on wars of antiquity, Napoleonic wars, the American
civil war, World War I, World War II, and the October War was
found in Col T. N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare
(Fairfax, Virginia: Hero Books, 1980).
8. Michael Mazaar, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: A
Framework for Defense Planning," Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, June 10,
1994, 20.
9. Lt Col Edward Mann, USAF, "One Target, One Bomb: Is the
Principle of Mass Dead?" Military Review, September 1993, 33-
41.
10. Ibid., 16.
11. Ibid., 18.
12. Ibid., 21. Indeed, Mazaar notes, more broadly, that
"developments in warfare are reducing the role of major platforms--
heavy ground vehicles, large capital ships, and advanced aircraft."
See also Adm David E. Jeremiah, "What's Ahead for the Armed
Forces," <MI>Joint Force Quarterly<D>, no. 1 (Summer 1993);
32.
13. Mann, 37.
14. Army, FM 100-5, Appendix A, 1990, 173.
15. Army Chemical School, "Summary Evaluation: Report for
Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment (CANE)
Force Development Test and Experimentation, Phase 1, March
1986. This source was cited in an article by Maj Gen Robert D.
Orton, USA, and Maj Robert C. Neumann, USA, "The Impact of
Weapons of Mass Destruction on Battlefield Operations," Military
Review, December 1993, 66.
16. Ibid., 68.
17. Ibid., 68-71.
18. US Army, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), "Force
XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimension
Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First
Century," TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, August 1994, 3-21.
19. AFM 1-1, vol. 1.
20. Ibid., 5.
21. It would be inadvisable in almost all contingencies to use US
nuclear weapons in counterforce strikes against enemy weapons of
mass destruction. For a number of reasons, the preferred instrument
for disarming the adversary very likely should be advanced
conventional weapons. The worldwide reaction to the United States
using nuclear weapons on a regional enemy, particularly if used
first, would be negative in the extreme and could unhinge all other
US diplomatic and multilateral efforts to counter the spread of
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons in other regions of the
world. For one thing, nuclear strikes against a state that had signed
the NPT are illegal under the treaty, so such an action would be a
flagrant violation of international law. Indeed, any state that
violates this code would be taking a course diametrically opposed
to UN Security Council pledges to punish such violators. Indeed
this has historically been a US position at the United Nations to
punish nuclear first use against NPT members. Further, US nuclear
first use in a regional war, even against a NASTI, would
undoubtedly arouse world opinion against US policy, making the
United States a pariah state in many more quarters. It would not be
unexpected to see Americans and US property assaulted all around
the globe in retaliation. Moreover, US nuclear first use, even
against a NASTI, would shatter the nonnuclear international taboo
that the United States has attempted to foster with treaties and
diplomacy for decades. Finally, such a policy of nuclear first use
could also cause a collapse of US domestic support for the regional
war effort that would probably rival or exceed the antiwar activities
inside the United States during the Vietnam War period.
22. "Force XXI Operations," 2-8.
23. During the cold war, one fear of US strategists was the nuclear
decapitation strike from the Soviet Union, perhaps by an off-shore
sea-launched ballistic or cruise missile. See Barry R. Schneider,
"Invitation to a Nuclear Beheading," Across The Board, 20, no. 7
(July/August 1983): 9-16.
24. If the first engagement is decisive enough, the conflict may be
over almost before it has begun. This was true, for example, of the
United States's intervention against the Noriega regime in Panama.
25. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," text of
remarks by the secretary of defense to the National Press Club,
November 28, 1984. This is included in the appendix to
Weinberger's book, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the
Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990) 441.
26. FM 100-5, "Appendix A: Principles of War," 176. For a similar
commentary, see the June 1993 edition of FM 100-5, 2-4 to 2-6.
27. Ibid., 174-75.
28. Ibid., 175.
29. Ibid., 176.
30. John A. Warden III, "Air Power for the Twenty-First Century,"
in Karl P. Magyar, Editor in Chief, Challenge and Response:
Anticipating US Military Security Concerns (Maxwell AFB,
Alabama: Air University Press, August 1994) 328-29.
31. See Chester Wilmot, "David and Goliath," chapter 2, The
Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1952,)
33-55. Not realizing the potency and importance of British radar
stations, the German high command mistakenly abandoned their
early bombardment of them in the Battle of Britain because they
believed that the British would be able to repair them and put them
back into operation very quickly. Had the Germans persisted, they
may have won the air battle over England.
32. FM 100-5, 177.
33. In Korea, the United States was reported to have lost 35,000
troops killed
in combat; in Vietnam the number was 53,000 ; and in World War
II, 330,000.
34. "Force XXI Operations," 2-9.
35. Ibid., 3-11.
36. Ibid., 2-9.
37. Warden, 311-32.
38. Ibid., 325.
39. Ibid., 327.
40. Ibid.
41. Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, "Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is
Every Want a Weakness?" See elsewhere in this volume.
42. Gen Frederick M. Franks, Jr., as quoted in Col Michael S.
Williams and Lt Col Herman T. Palmer, USA, "Force-Projection
Logistics," Military Review, June 1994, 29.
43. FM 100-5, June 1993, 3-6.
44. Gen Robert H. Scales, USA, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in
the Gulf War (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and
General Staff College Press, 1994), 378.
45. Ibid., 376.
46. Warden, 328.
47. "Force XXI Operations," 3-21.
48. Warden, 329-30.
49. Ibid.
50. Mann, 38.
51. John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of the
Principles of War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).
Alger drew on the military writings of thinkers such as Sun Tzu,
Machiavelli, Jomini, Mahan, Rocquancourt, Steele, MacDougall,
Liddell Hart, Mao Tse-tung, Montgomery, as well as the British
army, French army, German army, and US Army and Air Force in
compiling his list of principles of war. These guidelines included,
for example, diverse maxims on the need for cooperation, shock,
favorable ground cover, vitality, fire superiority, flexibility, an
indirect approach, simultaneity, reconnaissance, local superiority,
air superiority, a will to win, readiness, pursuit, God's blessing, and
the moral high ground.
52. For a summary discussion see AFM 1-1, vol. 2, Essay B:
"Principles of War." 14. The original sources are Col Robert H.
Reed et al., "On Deterrence: A Broadened Perspective," Air
University Review, May-June 1975, 2-17, and John M. Collins,
"Principles of Deterrence," Air University Review, November-
December 1979, 17-26.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those
of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United
States Air Force or the Air University.
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