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Battlefield of the Future: Information War - Impacts and Concerns
by James W. McLendon
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Battlefield of the Future
Chapter 7
Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns
by Col James W. McLendon, USAF
Information has always been a critical factor in war. Clausewitz
said "imperfect knowledge of the situation . . .can bring military
action to a standstill," and Sun Tzu indicated information is
inherent in war fighting. Information warfare embodies the impact
of information on military operations.
The computer age gives us the capability to absorb, evaluate, use,
transmit, and exchange large volumes of information at high speeds
to multiple recipients simultaneously. Multiple sources of data can
be correlated faster than ever. Thus, the value of information to the
war fighter has been magnified to a new level.
Churchill used information warfare when he used the Enigma
machine to read German codes during World War II. He also used
information warfare through his elaborate network emanating from
the London Controlling Section, for its time a very complex
intelligence and deception operation.
Lessons from Desert Storm gave impetus to this fourth dimension
of warfare. It was in this conflict that the computer came of age,
and presented us with new challenges, both offensively and
defensively, that must be faced in the future. Not only do we have
opportunities to enhance our offensive capabilities manyfold, but
we must consider the additional vulnerabilities to our systems that
come with this added capability. The widespread availability of
information technology dictates that we carefully assess the
vulnerabilities of the systems we employ.
Information warfare adds a fourth dimension of warfare to those of
air, land, and sea. In this new dimension, we must stay ahead.
Information Warfare: Old Concept, New Technology
Given the wide realm of activities that might be included under the
heading of information warfare, one might conclude that it is not a
new concept but rather one that can be more aggressively employed
today with new technology. Had the term information warfare
existed in Churchill's day, he might have used it to describe his
activities involving Ultra. Given the availability of communications
and computer technology today, the potential for information
warfare seems limitless. Unlike nuclear weaponry, however, this
technology is not limited to a few nations. It is widespread and
available to any country, and, in most cases, to any individual or
group that wants it. It is for this reason that our pursuit of an
offensive information warfare capability must not overshadow our
appreciation of the need for a defensive capability.
This essay offers evidence of the need for a rigorous defensive
information warfare capability. It includes a case study from World
War II that demonstrates Churchill's creativity in using information
warfare against the Germans and proposes that history may not have
completely documented his activities in this endeavor. From World
War II, we move to the Persian Gulf War, where information
technology was embedded in virtually every aspect of Coalition
operations. Our dependence on information media during the Gulf
War is evident. This dependency may also equate to yet unknown
vulnerabilities, thus highlighting the need for the protection of
these media.
Information has always been a critical factor in war. According to
Clausewitz, "imperfect knowledge of the situation . . .can bring
military action to a standstill."1 Pick up any book on war, and the
value of information becomes clear. As indicated by Sun Tzu in
500 B.C., it is inherent in warfighting.2 It may be obvious that the
more an army knows about itself and its enemy, the stronger it will
be in battle. What is not so obvious are the uses that may be made
of information, and how knowledge can be manipulated to
reinforce the strength of an army many times over.
Information warfare embodies the impact of information, or
knowledge, on military operations. It is defined as "any action to
deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's information and its
functions; protecting ourselves against those actions; and
exploiting our own information operations."3 Additionally in this
context, information warfare "views itself as both separate realm
and lucrative target."4 While this definition is new, the concept
isn't. It is only as we come to terms with the benefits of the
computer age that we realize the potential in conducting the
operations described above.
The computer age gives us the capability to absorb, evaluate, use,
transmit, and exchange large volumes of information at high speeds
to multiple recipients simultaneously. Multiple sources of data can
be correlated faster than ever. Until recently, masses of information
were transmitted in the literal, or alphanumeric format, and had to
be read and manually manipulated to be of any use. This made it
difficult to sort the critical from the useful, and much of the
information went into the burn bag. Today, much of that same
information is transmitted to the war fighter digitally and presented
graphically. Little goes to waste. Thus, the value of information, its
uses, and our dependence on it have been magnified to a new level.
Duane Andrews, former assistant secretary of defense for C3I
(command, control, communications, and intelligence), describes
information today as a "strategic asset."5 The Tofflers go even
further. In their discussion on third wave war, they refer to
"knowledge warriors," describing them as "intellectuals in and out
of uniform dedicated to the idea that knowledge can win, or
prevent, wars."6
Maj Gen Kenneth Minihan, Air Force assistant chief of staff for
intelligence, describes information warfare in more objective terms,
which he says is really "information dominance."7 In describing
information dominance, he puts it this way:
Information dominance is not "my pile of information is bigger
than yours" in some sort of linear sense. It is not just a way to
reduce the fog of war on our side or thicken it on the enemy's side.
It is not analysis of yesterday's events, although proper application
of historical analysis is important to gaining information
dominance. It is something that is battled for, like air superiority. It
is a way of increasing our capabilities by using that information to
make right decisions, (and) apply them faster than the enemy can. It
is a way to alter the enemy's entire perception of reality. It is a
method of using all information at our disposal to predict (and
affect) what happens tomorrow before the enemy even jumps out of
bed and thinks about what to do today."8
The Navy presents the bottom line view: Information, in all its
forms, is the keystone to success."9
The Department of Defense and all of the services are doing more
than paying lip service to this new dimension. In addition to their
attempts to fund extended programs in this subject, senior military
leaders are taking strong positions in favor of this capability.
Unfortunately, while the United States holds the lead in
information technology today, other nations, including developing
nations, are rapidly gaining access to this capability. This is cause
for concern, and the answers are not simple.
Information Warfare in World War II: How Far Did Churchill Go?
World War II saw many firsts. Some of the more significant
examples were: large-scale air-to-air combat, strategic bombing-
both daylight and night-the use of naval carriers to project
airpower, and the first and only uses of atomic bombs during
hostilities. The following case study asserts that we also saw the
first widespread and well-orchestrated use of information warfare,
and presents a hypothetical model for interaction between
deception and cryptanalysis.
Many of us remain intrigued by the clandestine and covert
operations conducted by the Allies in WWII. This study discusses
two of those operations: deception and cryptanalysis based on
radio intercepts. It also, and more importantly, attempts to build a
model for an interactive relationship between the two that could
have synergistically improved the contributions of these operations
to the successful prosecution of the war. The model, though purely
hypothetical, uses facts to present a case for the potential of
maximizing misinformation through the integration of these two
disciplines. Said another way, this paper suggests that the Allied
leadership, specifically Winston Churchill, found cryptanalysis
necessary but not sufficient for victory. Cryptanalysis and
deception were both necessary and sufficient. Hence, the logic of
the model suggests that Churchill directed an offensive information
warfare campaign.
The Logic of the Model
The question posed is whether Prime Minister Churchill would, or
could, have selectively chosen to chance using the Enigma (the
machine used by the Germans to encipher high-grade wireless
traffic10) to encipher notional messages and intrude on German
wireless radio nets to misinform the Germans on Allied intentions
or otherwise disrupt German military operations.
Churchill's concern for the security of the Enigma, and the
knowledge that it was being used by the Allies, was considerable,
as will be shown later. The risk of compromising Allied use of the
Enigma was colossal, affecting many lives and the potential
outcome of many battles. On the other hand, successful deception
could be equally effective.
For Churchill to have taken this step would have been boldness
from "sheer necessity" in the strictest Clausewitian terms.11 The
risk in not doing so would have to have been greater than the risk in
doing so. The logic of the model is that if Churchill directed that
messages encrypted using Enigma be transmitted, he would only
have done so out of necessity- when Britain was in dire straits.
"Deception is as old as war itself."12 Although this statement is
from WWII, it was clearly not a revelation of fact. Sun Tzu
included deception as one of his tenets of warfare when he said,
"All warfare is based on deception."13 The modern complexities of
war and the ensuing technological advancements enhance the
means through which deception can be employed, and WWII was
no exception. The use of deception during WWII has been widely
publicized. At least one book, The Man Who Never Was, was
published and a movie by the same title was made about a single
event.14
Deception and its implementation occur in both the strategic and
tactical spheres. The example documented above was strategic in its
support of the Normandy invasion. Tactical deception at that time
was thought to fall under three headings, visual, aural (or sonic),
and radio.15 While aural deception might apply in limited fashion
to specific engagements, it is logical that visual and radio deception
could be used for broader objectives at both the strategic and
operational levels.
It is not surprising that most information concerning deception
activities remained classified for many years after the war and is
only now coming to the attention of the public. It appears that
most, if not all, of the information concerning tactical deception
has been declassified. This is not the case with another stratagem
used against the Germans, that of intercepting radio
communications and using the Enigma machine to decipher the
message transmissions. While previously classified documents
concerning Ultra are now largely available to the public, a review of
the primary sources reveals that many still contain blank pages that
are marked "not releasable" while others contain portions that have
been blanked out with no explanation. Thus, even though we know
much more today than we did 15 years ago about these activities,
public access remains unavailable for much of it.
These continuing restrictions may well be the result of comments
made on 15 April 1943 by Col Alfred McCormack in a
memorandum to Col Carter W. Clarke. McCormack, then "Mr
McCormack," had earlier been appointed as special assistant to the
secretary of war to study the uses of Ultra and establish procedures
for making the best use of this source. At the time of the
memorandum, McCormack was deputy chief of the Special Branch
and worked for its chief, Colonel Clarke. The purpose of the
Special Branch was to handle signals intelligence. McCormack's
memorandum consists of 54 pages on the origin, functions, and
problems of the Special Branch, Military Intelligence Service
(MIS). In this memorandum, McCormack describes, in his view,
Ultra security requirements as follows:
One lapse of security is all that is necessary to dry up a radio
intercept source. Therefore, both on the officer level and below,
only persons of the greatest good sense and discretion should be
employed on this work. This consideration is basic since intercept
information involves a different kind of secrecy than does most
other classified information. It will make no difference a year from
now how much the enemy knows about our present troop
dispositions, about the whereabouts of our naval forces or about
other similar facts that now are clearly guarded secrets. But it will
make a lot of difference one year from now-and possibly many
years from now-whether the enemy has learned that in April 1942
we were reading his most secret codes. Not present secrecy, not
merely secrecy until the battle is over, but permanent secrecy of this
operation is what we should strive for.16
This secrecy was maintained throughout the war. Only carefully
selected individuals in Washington and in the field had access to
the information produced through these intercepts. The procedures
for use by field commanders and their personnel, including controls
established to protect the information and its source were laid out
in a letter to General Eisenhower from General Marshall on 15
March 1944.17 These procedures lasted at least through the end of
the war.
The Origin of Ultra
Ultra's origin begins with the delivery of a German Enigma
machine to the British by Polish dissidents. The history and
acquisition of the Enigma machine are quite lengthy and complex.
It is sufficient here to reflect that the Poles had established a
successful cryptanalytic effort against the Germans by the early
1930s, having begun their efforts in the early 1920s.18 Using their
own copy of the Enigma, they achieved their first successful break
in reading Enigma ciphers in December 1932 and January 1933.19
Between 1933 and 1939, successful reading of Enigma traffic was
purely a Polish achievement.20 Once the Enigma fell into British
hands, however, they took the lead and used it successfully
throughout the war.
Enter Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill had a profound interest in the Ultra traffic
produced from Enigma and required that all important decrypts be
provided to him.21 His interest in codebreaking is documented as
early as November 1924 when, as the chancellor of the exchequer,
he requested access to intercepts.22 In his request, he stated, "I
have studied this information over a long period and more
attentively than probably any other Minister has done. . . .I attach
more importance to them as a means of forming a true judgment of
public policy in these spheres than to any other source of
knowledge at the disposal of the State."23
Then in September 1940, after only four months as the prime
minister, he directed he be provided "daily all Enigma
messages."24 When this traffic became overwhelming in volume,
he backed off to receiving several dozen messages a day.25 During
a visit to Bletchley Park, the headquarters for the British
cryptanalytic organization, he spoke to a crowd of the station
managers and referred to them as "the geese that laid the golden
eggs and never cackled."26 After the war, Churchill reiterated his
faith in Ultra, describing it as his "secret weapon"27 and stating his
belief that "it had saved England."28
Churchill's concern for security of Ultra was paramount. He
directed that no action be taken in response to Ultra intercepts
unless cover could be provided,29 and he, in fact, repeatedly
allowed naval convoys to come under U-boat attack rather than risk
compromising Ultra security.30
Churchill was also directly involved in the conduct of deception
operations. He established the London Controlling Section (LCS)
in his headquarters specifically to plan those stratagems necessary
"to deceive Hitler and the German General Staff about Allied
operations in the war against the Third Reich."31
Not only did Churchill establish the LCS but he also personally
conceived the idea for this organization after a series of successful
uses of deception in the Libyan desert led to the defeat of Italian
forces. In one of those instances, a small British force of 36,000
men defeated an Italian force of 310,000 using deceptive measures.
Realizing he was outnumbered and about to be overrun, the British
commander used inflatable rubber tanks, field guns, two-ton trucks,
and prime movers to present the image of a larger force. He
employed crowds of Arabs with camels and horses to drag harrow-
like equipment to stir up dust storms, and he used antiaircraft
artillery to keep the Italian reconnaissance aircraft high-
precluding them from sorting out the actual order of battle on the
ground.
The Italians perceived a force on their right flank much larger than
theirs and tried to run. Using only two divisions, the British
captured 130,000 prisoners, 400 tanks, and 1,290 guns. Their
losses were minimal for the magnitude of the conflict-500 killed
in action, 1,400 wounded, and 55 missing in action.32 This
impressive event rocked London and gave credence to further
development of this capability. This action, and others similar to it,
convinced Churchill that deception needed an institution so it
could be applied on a broader scale. Thus, LCS was born.
The LCS was the first bureaucracy designed expressly to
deceive.33 It was "members of the LCS and those of other British
and American secret bureaus"34 who developed and executed LCS
activities, referring to their weapons as "special means."35 In this
context, "special means" is "a vaguely sinister term that included a
wide variety of surreptitious, sometimes murderous, always
intricate operations of covert warfare designed to cloak overt
military operations in secrecy and to mystify Hitler about the real
intentions of the allies."36
Back to Ultra-Its Contribution
Ultra proved its value as early as mid-July 1940 when it provided
forewarning of German plans to attack England. Intercepts at that
time revealed Hitler's directive outlining the planned invasion of
England. The invasion was to begin with an air campaign. These
intercepts continued, reaching a point of two-to three-hundred per
day-all being read at Bletchley Park. On 13 August, when the first
air raids began, the British were more informed of the plans than
were many of the Luftwaffe units.37
Clearly, Ultra intercepts provided the bulk of intelligence to the
Allies during the war. By June 1944, 90 percent of the European
intelligence summaries provided to Washington were based on
Ultra information.38 Ultra provided information on force
disposition and German intentions at both the strategic and tactical
levels. Ralph Bennett describes Ultra's contribution succinctly in
his preface to Ultra in the West:
For by often revealing the enemy's plans to them before they
decided their own, Ultra gave the Allied Commander an
unprecedented advantage in battle: since Ultra was derived from
decodes of the Wehrmacht's wireless communications, there could
be no doubt about its authenticity, and action based upon it could
be taken with the greatest confidence. So prolific was the source
that at many points the Ultra account of the campaign is almost
indistinguishable from the "total" account.39
Ultra information also has been described as "more precise, more
trustworthy, more voluminous, more continuous, longer lasting, and
available faster, at a higher level, and from more commands than
any other form of intelligence."40 It even provided information on
German intercepts and analysis of British and American radio
networks.41 Taking advantage of this latter knowledge, the Allies
established an elaborate communications network designed
expressly to transmit bogus traffic that would misinform the
Germans of their intentions and operations. What would have
prevented including encrypted Enigma messages directly to the
Germans in this bogus traffic?
Radio Deception
The British and Americans used manipulation through cover and
deception to target specific sources of enemy information. For
example, they released false information to the world press and
staged activities that "made the news." They deceived enemy air
reconnaissance through the maneuver of real troops, use of
controlled camouflage (both to conceal and intentionally show
indiscretions), dummy equipment, and "Q" lighting (the
positioning of lights to draw bombers to nonexisting airfields).
Aware that German radio intercept units were targeting their
transmissions, they used a three-pronged strategy against the
German listening stations. First, they prepared notional radio traffic
to be transmitted by special deception troops over nets established
solely for the purpose of deception. Second, they sent notional
radio traffic over authentic operational nets. Finally, they regulated
the genuine traffic passed on authentic operational nets, creating
dead time and peak traffic levels.42 Signal troops employed in
deception activities were specially trained in these operations43
and thoroughly indoctrinated on the sensitivities that accompanied
their efforts. The following statement was among the many
instructions concerning security provided to them:
You must realize that the enemy is probably listening to every
message you pass on the air and is well aware that there is a
possibility that he is being bluffed. It is therefore vitally important
that your security is perfect; one careless mistake may disclose the
whole plan.44
One of the most elaborate schemes employing radio deception was
used in support of the First US Army Group (FUSAG), a notional,
fictive organization headed by Gen George S. Patton, Jr.45
Conceived as a part of Bodyguard,46 the FUSAG was composed of
more than fifty "divisions" located in southeast England. Aware
that the Germans anticipated an Allied attack, the purpose in
establishing a nonexistent FUSAG was to persuade the Germans
that the attack would take place at Pas de Calais.47
The radio net supporting FUSAG represented the following units: a
Canadian army, a US army, a Canadian corps, three US corps, a
Canadian infantry division, a Canadian armored division, six US
infantry divisions, and four US armored divisions.48
The Case
Enigma traffic provided the tip-offs to the planned German invasion
of Britain well in advance. The speed with which Bletchley Park
was reading the German Enigma permitted the British cryptanalysts
to extract intelligence from several hundred messages a day, even
though the Enigma settings were complex and changed frequently.
The Enigma used wheels that had to be set in the proper order for
the decryption to take place. These settings were usually changed
every 24 hours with minor settings changed more often. Other
minor settings were made with each message. The tip-off to the
receiver for these latter settings was contained in the
transmission.49 The speed with which these messages were
deciphered could have provided the essential information required
by the British to use the machine to other advantages.
From the volume of intercept, it is obvious the British knew their
targets' organizations and frequencies. The traffic would have
provided them with information on message originators, addressees,
associated organizations, and formats-allowing them to
reconstruct necessary elements of the German radio
communications network. The German use of "standard phrases,
double encipherment. . . their lack of an effective, protective
monitoring program, and their unshakable-even arrogant-
confidence in Enigma"50 made it unlikely they would use
authentication devices in their messages. The Germans then clearly
were vulnerable to deception efforts using encrypted Enigma
messages broadcast by the nets serving the London Controlling
Section. Would Churchill have taken the risks associated with
exploiting this vulnerability?
Dire Straits
The Battle of Britain and the Normandy invasion were two of the
most significant events in WWII. The Battle of Britain, particularly,
represented a critical period for the British. The defeat of Germany
in that battle required the all-out effort by Britain. The battle began
with each side roughly equivalent in front-line fighters, but it was
touch and go until the Luftwaffe lost its ability to mount sustained
attacks.51 The dangers facing the British during the massive air
raids might have convinced Churchill at some point that it would be
worth the risk to use the Enigma to intrude on German radio nets.
Perhaps relying on the confusion and disorder he knew existed
among some of the Luftwaffe units,52 his assessment as to the
potential for success could have led to this risky decision.
From 13 August until mid-September, 1940, the Luftwaffe
conducted raids during daylight hours, and Ultra traffic revealed
most, if not all, the targets that were to be hit. Interestingly,
beginning in mid-September and lasting throughout October, the
raids were flown at night, and the only target references available
through Ultra were code names representing target locations. Had
something tipped the Germans their mail was being read?
On 14 November, Ultra revealed Coventry as a target and at least
one British official believed naming the town instead of using a
code word was a mistake on the part of the Germans.53 The use of
code words surely made Churchill nervous, giving him cause to
question if British use of Enigma had been compromised. This
concern could account for his widely reported decision to take no
action to evacuate Coventry other than to alert fire, ambulance, and
police units.54
The Normandy Invasion was the last critical juncture for the Allies.
A successful invasion would bring Germany and the Third Reich to
their downfall. In preparing for the invasion, Operation Bodyguard
had already been implemented.
The infrastructure for radio deception was in place and in use. This
infrastructure would also have made an excellent point of origin for
intrusion into German radio nets, using the Enigma to encipher
messages for transmission. Schemes could have been devised using
notional traffic sent over the deception nets, which were known to
be monitored by the Germans, to complement intrusion traffic
enciphered with Enigma. Bletchley personnel could prepare the
Enigma traffic and send it to the radio deception units to be
transmitted verbatim on specified frequencies. The personnel
employed in the radio deception were well trained for their purpose
and indoctrinated in the secrecy of their work.
If Churchill saw the invasion as the last big push to defeat
Germany, he may also have viewed selective use of intrusion as
justified and worth the risk. Given the increasing disruption that
occurs with the multiplying intensity of battle, the risk would have
gradually diminished with time during the course of the fight. As
the risk diminished, the opportunities would have grown. Greater
opportunities would have been enticing to Churchill, especially if
there were opportunities to shape the postwar world.
Much of the history of WWII may need to be rewritten because of
the revelations of Ultra contributions. Revelations include those
already made and those yet to be made. Considering what we now
know about Ultra operations, one can assume that credit for success
in a battle often went to the wrong party. The men and women at
Bletchely Park and other locations, who were involved in providing
advance warning and other information to Allied forces may never
get all the credit they are due. It is now well known that "Ultra did
indeed shape the character of strategy and operations-particularly
operations. In no other war have commanding generals had the
quality and extent of intelligence provided by Ultra."55
Whether Churchill actually used the Enigma offensively for the
purposes hypothesized here may never be known. If he did not,
maybe the cause was that it was too risky, or just too tough to do.
Maybe the Allies did not possess enough information on the keying
cycles necessary to exploit that avenue of deception. Or maybe the
Allies just missed a good opportunity. Absent further
declassification, we cannot know for certain. While logic suggests
Churchill would have exploited Enigma, the facts may prove
otherwise.
If he did use it in this manner, it would have been information
warfare at its best. Perhaps it was.
Impact of Information Technology on the Gulf War
Although the use and exchange of information have been critical
elements of war since its inception, the Gulf War was the stage for
the most comprehensive use of information, and information denial,
to date. New technologies in this conflict enhanced the Coalition's
ability to exchange and use information and highlighted the
imperative of denying the adversary his ability to communicate with
his forces.
While in large part these technologies were space-dependent, recent
advancements in digital technology permitted the rapid processing,
transmission, and display of information at all echelons, enabling
decision makers to respond rapidly to developing situations on the
battlefield. Some prototype systems, such as JSTARS, successfully
made their trial run during this conflict, earning their place in
history as contributors to the Coalition success in this war.
Architectures enabling connectivity between these many systems
were nonexistent when Iraq invaded Kuwait; however, they were
put in place during the buildup and supported Coalition forces for
the duration of the war. These architectures were clearly necessary
to effectively control the myriad activities operating simultaneously
in the battlefield.
For example, 11 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aircraft controlled 2,240 sorties a day, more than 90,000 during the
war, with no midair collisions and no friendly air engagements.
Satellite connectivity permitted this same air activity to be
displayed live in the Pentagon command center.
JSTARS tracked tanks, trucks, fixed installations, and other
equipment, even though this system had not met operational
capability status. Satellites, microwave, and landlines handled
700,000 phone calls and 152,000 messages a day. Coalition forces
avoided communications interference through successful
deconfliction of more than 35,000 frequencies. Any attempt to
describe the complexities of managing this system would be an
understatement.
The Joint Communications-Electronic Operating Instructions
(JCEOI), which was used to allocate frequencies, call signs, call
words, and suffixes for the Gulf War, was published in over a
dozen copies and weighed 85 tons in paper form.56 This system
was used for both space and terrestrial communications.
Gulf War Space Contributions
Space assets, both military and commercial, belonging to the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the USSR
provided the Coalition with communications, navigation,
surveillance, intelligence, and early warning, as well as offering live
television of the war to home viewers around the world for the first
time.
Using some 60 satellites, Coalition forces had access to secure
strategic and tactical communications in-theater and into and out of
the theater of operations.57 These satellites bridged the gap for
tactical UHF and VHF signals that heretofore had been limited to
terrestrial line of sight. Thus time-sensitive information could be
exchanged between ground, naval, and air units spread throughout
the theater. Without this capability, the communications required to
support the preparation and distribution of task orders and the
coordinated operations of AWACS, JSTARS, and conventional
intelligence collection in support of force packages in virtual and
near-real-time would have been impossible. Even though there were
still shortfalls at the tactical level in timeliness, precision, and
volume, commanders at all levels had access to unprecedented
communications capabilities.
There are some who credit the capabilities afforded by the
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) "as making the
single most important contribution to the success of the
conflict."58 Using a constellation of 14 satellites, Coalition forces
were able to locate and designate targets with remarkable precision,
navigate through the naked Iraqi desert better than the Iraqis
themselves, and find troops in distress faster than ever before. The
US Army used the GPS to navigate the Iraqi desert in the middle of
sand storms, surprising even the Iraqis, who themselves do not
venture across it for fear of becoming lost. GPS capability made
possible the "left hook" used to defeat Saddam Hussein's armored
divisions.
The use of GPS was, in large part, the result of off-the-shelf
purchases acquired by special contract arrangement; these were the
same systems that had been designed and marketed for recreational
boat use-thus, technically available to anyone.59 US troops
stationed in Saudi Arabia also received commercially purchased
GPS devices from their relatives.60 Access to GPS, and its
attendant capabilities, added tremendously to the morale of
Coalition forces.
More than 30 military and commercial surveillance satellites were
used for intelligence gathering during the war.61 These satellites
provided Coalition forces with imagery, electronic intelligence, and
weather data. While these systems provided precise targeting
information on enemy locations, movement, and capabilities, they
were also essential in meeting another Coalition objective-that of
minimizing collateral damage. Precision targeting combined with
the use of precision guided munitions significantly decreased
civilian casualties and left structures adjacent to targets intact.
Gulf War Intelligence
The rapid deployment of a variety of systems to the Persian Gulf in
response to the crisis there led to a number of stovepiped
organizations, resulting in a voluminous amount of unfused and
uncorrelated information being collected and disseminated. Also
many incompatible systems were deployed. This lack of integrated,
all-source information and the deficiency in compatibility often
placed a burden on recipients who had neither the personnel nor
the skills necessary to put it all together in one product.
Notwithstanding this limitation, the bulk of which involved
secondary imagery production, the evidence shows that timely,
quality intelligence was available to those units fortunate enough to
have access to the right terminal systems. To a large degree, the
impediment was the result of fielding prototype systems for which
there was little terminal capability.
One of the most prolific producers of information in this category
was the Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS), but a
limited number of terminals dictated that only key nodes could
have access to this product. Nevertheless, TIBS and its cousin,
Constant Source, provided timely updates of intelligence
information to various echelons, including wings and squadrons,
directly from collectors and associated ground processing
facilities.62
The RC-135 Rivet Joint, flying in coordination with its sister ships,
the E-3 AWACS and E-8 JSTARS, flew 24 hours a day to support
the war. Referred to as the "ears of the storm" in contrast to the
AWACS role as "eyes of the storm,"63 the RC-135 provided real-
time intelligence to theater and tactical commanders in the desert
and Persian Gulf areas. Specially trained personnel used on-board
sensors to identify, locate, and report Iraqi emitters that might pose
a threat to Coalition forces.
These systems are only a sampling of those deployed to the theater
to provide intelligence support. Reviews and action are ongoing to
resolve the problems resulting from stovepiping and incompatible
systems.
Iraqi Command and Control (Or Lack Thereof)
The Coalition not only recognized the value of information to its
efforts, it also saw the benefits of denying the Iraqi command and
control system its ability to function. The Coalition identified the
Iraqi leadership and Iraqi command, control, and communications
(C3) facilities as the key centers of gravity.64 While command of
the air was the initial key objective, C3 facilities received priority
in targeting.
The Coalition used massive airpower at the onset of hostilities to
accomplish this objective. Targeting strategic military, leadership,
and infrastructure facilities, the Coalition launched its attack on
Iraq on 17 January 1991. Early warning sites, airfields, integrated
air defense nodes, communications facilities, known Scud sites,
nuclear/ chemical/biological facilities, and electrical power
facilities were attacked by B-52s, Tomahawk land-attack missiles
(TLAMs), F-117s, and helicopter gunships. During the first two
days, the Coalition gave no slack while conducting the most
comprehensive air attack of the war.
After only the opening minutes of the war, Iraq had little C3
infrastructure remaining.65 The Coalition success was so
devastating that, as an Iraqi prisoner reported, "Iraqi intelligence
officers were using Radio Saudi Arabia, Radio Monte Carlo, and
the Voice of America as sources to brief commanders."66 What
little communications capability Iraqi tactical commanders did
have, they used improperly.
Apparently concerned over Coalition communications monitoring,
the Iraqis practiced strict communications security through near
total emission control (EMCON). While this did have a negative
effect on Coalition signals collection efforts, it also blinded Iraqi
tactical units. One Iraqi brigade commander, in reflecting his
surprise over the speed with which a US Marine unit overran his
unit in Kuwait, showed he had no idea the Marines were coming
even though another Iraqi unit located adjacent to him had come
under attack two hours before.67
Although leadership as a target was difficult to locate and survived
the conflict, the successful attacks against Iraqi C3 essentially put
her leadership in the position of having no strings to pull. Trained
to operate under centralized control, Iraqi forces did not know how
to function autonomously. Air defense forces became fearful of
emitting because of their vulnerability to antiradiation missiles.
Believing the army, not the air force, was the determining force in
battle, the Iraqis attempted to shield rather than use their aircraft.
The attempts they did make in defensive counterair proved rather
embarrassing.
Gulf War Conclusions
The Gulf War clearly demonstrated the need for accurate and timely
dissemination of information. Information was the hub of all
activity on the Coalition side, and the lack of it caused the failure
of the Iraqi military to employ its force. The communications
enhancements realized with the advent of new technologies also
brought about new vulnerabilities.
Building defenses to these vulnerabilities is considered by some to
be at odds with increasing the capabilities. The benefits enjoyed by
the Coalition's ability to communicate and the impact of attacks on
Iraqi C3 have been widely publicized and have to be assumed to be
well known by every potential adversary. We have to prepare for
similar attacks, or attacks of a different medium, against our own
information systems in the future.
What Does the Future Hold?
There is an information glut. There is a proliferation of modem-
equipped personal computers and local area networks in military
organizations, industrial facilities, and private homes around the
globe. And it does not stop there. For example, Motorola is
working on a 77-satellite constellation that will provide cellular
telephone service from any spot on earth within five years. With
fiber optics supporting these satellites, entire countries are being
wired. Turkey, for example, has moved into the information age in
one big leap.68
As the information glut continues to grow, along with systems to
accommodate it, vulnerabilities to surreptitious entry are certain to
increase. The amount of information being reported is doubling
every 18 months. And this growth is accelerating. Two years ago,
volume was doubling every four years; three years ago, it took four
and a half years.69 While our capacity to process information at
this growth rate seems limited, technology has a way of catching
up-but not necessarily in time to help for a given situation. It can
be particularly difficult to process large amounts of information in
a readily useable form during intense, crisis situations.
During the Gulf War, 7,000 personnel worked two days to produce
the air tasking order (ATO) for 2,000 aircraft sorties to be flown on
the third day. The ATO began as a 300-page document developed
for transmission to Air Force, Navy, and Marine aviation, but
difficulties at receiving organizations forced adjustments.
Even using dedicated communications circuits, it took the Navy
three to four hours to receive the ATO. Early on, there was a
70,000-message backlog, and flash-precedence messages were
taking four to five days to reach their destination-some never
made it. Additionally, the volume of traffic took an inordinate
amount of time to read, let alone respond to.70 It seems the greater
our capability to process information, the more information there is
to process.
Former vice-chairman of the JCS, Navy Adm David E. Jeremiah,
sees it this way: "Technology has fueled a change in
communication, [ushering in] an era of information dominance.
Global dominance will be achieved by those that most clearly
understand the role of information and the power of knowledge that
flows from it."71
The services are recognizing this change in communications, and
reacting to it. In the Air Force, information warfare techniques are
being intensively studied and incorporated at the Air Intelligence
Agency (AIA). AIA looks at information dominance in terms of the
Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop. The OODA loop
represents the decision cycle through which a warrior at any level
must go. As you go from the strategic level to the tactical level, the
time available for making a decision decreases. At the tip of the
spear, it is very short.
According to General Minihan, "As we compare friendly and
adversary OODA loops, it becomes a deadly game of compression
and expansion. We will use information warfare to expand the
adversary's and compress our own action loops. If you can't think,
can't hear, and can't see-and I can-you will lose every time."72
This concentration of effort in information technology will, and
should, have an impact on military doctrine.
Admiral Jeremiah has already considered this. He points out that "it
is time to come to grips with a different intersection, an intersection
of technology and strategic thought. . . . I think that in large
measure the product today, technology, drives doctrine and tactics,
and to a major degree drives strategy."73
We obviously are far from reaching full understanding of the
impact of information warfare on doctrine, tactics, and strategy.
However, the explosion of information on societies around the
world, and the associated technology, dictate that we find a way to
measure the impact, and look for ways to incorporate the right level
of emphasis on this topic into our thinking. One area of concern is
our propensity to stovepipe activities within our structures, and the
negative influences this can have on military operations.
Army, Navy, and Air Force senior leaders have voiced concern with
these vertical structures. It has become tradition, for example, to
stovepipe several functional areas such as intelligence, logistics,
and acquisition. Stovepiping often excludes the chain of command
from the decision-making process and impedes synergistic benefits
that are available from integrated operations.
The focus, then, should be on moving from vertical structures, or
stovepipes, to horizontally integrated systems. The expected result
is integrated functional areas, which should provide a better
structure for identifying needs and requirements, and determining
force projection priorities. In the information sphere, however, this
could increase vulnerabilities to unauthorized access because it
disperses the information base on a much wider scale. Some
members of the US military community recognize that "interdicting,
protecting, and exploiting these new pathways is what IW
(information warfare) is all about."74 As we place more emphasis
on this new dimension, we can expect other nations to follow.
Russia will probably be one of the first.
Russian senior military officials have already recognized that the
integration of information technology "could generate radical
changes in the organizational principles of armed forces."75 The
use of "intellectualized" weapons in the Gulf War by the Coalition
apparently sparked a move in the same direction in Russia. Russian
military experts now believe in "a new axiom to the body of
military art: For combatants contending in military conflict today,
`superiority in computers' is of precisely the same significance as
superiority in tube artillery and tanks was to belligerents in earlier
wars."76
Furthermore, "superiority in the MTR [military-technical
revolution] proceeds from superiority in `information weapons': 1)
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition systems, and 2)
`intelligent' command-and-control systems."77 Russian military
leaders believe the new "formula for success" is to "First gain
superiority on the air waves, then in the air, and only then by troop
operations."78 As the two former adversarial world superpowers,
who by and large supplied most of the weapons to other countries
around the world, pursue information warfare as a new realm of
combat, it is almost certain other nations will buy into the trend.
In what is probably only the beginning for nations in conflict, the
Internet has already provided a medium for information warfare
between two belligerent nations. During the recent border dispute
between Ecuador and Peru, Ecuador used the Internet to publish
government bulletins and excerpts from local media to tell its side
of the conflict. In retaliation, Peru Internet used a gopher site in an
attempt to neutralize Ecuadorian propaganda. [A gopher is an
information system residing on the Internet that knows where
everything is and, through an arrangement of nested menus, allows
a user to continue choosing menu items until the sought-after
subject is located.79] The resulting verbal skirmish left both
nations working to set up their own gophers.80
Global information systems will enable ordinary users to access an
extraordinary number of databases, far beyond the Internet
capability of today (which is more than a million files at databases
located at universities and corporate research centers). New
software technologies permit these accesses to be conducted
autonomously, using "self-navigating data drones.
These drones, referred to as "knowbots," are released into the
Internet and search for information on their own. They can roam
from network to network, clone themselves, transmit data back to
their origin, and communicate with other knowbots.81 Given this
capability, one has to wonder, and perhaps be concerned, about the
potential for unauthorized, or at least undesirable, access to certain
databases and computer activities.
Hackers routinely attempt to get into US military systems. During
the Gulf War, hackers from Denmark, Moscow, and Iraq tried to
penetrate these systems.82 Our awareness of these attempts does
not necessarily prove there were no successes of which we are
unaware. And, even if they failed during that conflict, can we
guarantee the security of our systems during the next war?
These vulnerabilities were revealed recently when a British teenager
using a personal computer at his home hacked his way into a US
military computer network, gained access to files containing
sensitive communications relating to the dispute with North Korea
over international inspections of its nuclear program, and, after
reading them, placed them on the Internet. His actions made those
files available to about 35 million people. Officials suspect he had
access to these computers for weeks, perhaps even months, before
he was caught. Interestingly, once it was known an intruder was in
the system it only took a week to identify him. Unfortunately, the
apparent difficulty was in detecting him. Officials added that he
had also breached other defense systems.83
Paul Evancoe and Mark Bentley, computer virus experts, have
documented their concerns over our vulnerability to computer virus
warfare (CVW) by other nations. They describe in detail the
vulnerability of computer systems to this danger, and claim that
"CVW is a powerful stand-alone member of the non-lethal
disabling technology family and is likely being developed by
several countries."84
They also point out that the intelligence community and policy
makers do not focus on these threats and generally do not possess
enough technical understanding to recognize CVW as a real
national security threat. They believe CVW remains an abstract,
nontangible concept to most intelligence analysts and
policymakers. Furthermore, they call for legislation outlawing
CVW development, classifying CVW as a weapon internationally,
and including it as part of nonproliferation treaties.
It is unrealistic to believe we could achieve the support of the
international community in this regard, and, with our lead in
technology, we probably do not want to do so. Even if we could
acquire this level of cooperation, and wanted to, enforcement
would be next to impossible. CVW development does not leave
traces as does chemical, biological, and nuclear development. And
our efforts to isolate those are not always met with success.
Some Americans believe there will be no big wars in the future
because there is too much destructive power, and nobody wins. The
interdependence of nations would likely result in as much damage
to an aggressor as to its adversary. Whether this is true or not, the
concept of national security is changing.85 Among the threats we
face today are terrorism-either state-sponsored or radical element,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, localized conflicts,
and aggressors that upset the world peace balance, intense
economic competition, and availability of food and water.
The US military may be called upon to react, in one way or another,
to any of these threats. US military operations can run the gamut,
from civil-military affairs assistance to forcible entry. More reliance
is being placed on communications and intelligence systems in
support of these activities, and as these systems become more
interoperable, they may become more vulnerable. "It is becoming
more and more difficult to distinguish C4 systems from intelligence
systems."86 While sophisticated antijam systems are being
developed and deployed, these systems are still computer based.
Disruption in one would affect others.
For example, for years we have needed a near-real-time intelligence
system capable of providing targetable accuracy information to
"shooters." The Army expects to have an airborne and ground-
based SIGINT/EW system capable of doing that by the end of the
decade.87
It seems logical that other existing and developmental systems
might also be interconnected. Some of these might include the Joint
Targeting Network (JTN), the Tactical Information Broadcast
Service (TIBS), Tactical Receive Equipment Related Applications
(TRAP), Senior Ruby, Constant Source, Quick Look, Over-the-
Horizon (OTH) systems, and air and ground-based radar systems.
The integration and wide dispersal of these systems increase the
number of vulnerability points where an adversary might intrude.
The GPS may be one of the most revolutionary systems in our
inventory when you consider the difference it can make in
navigation and geo-positioning of assets. It is available to the
public and anyone with a few hundred dollars can buy into the
system. The benefits, then, that we derive from this capability may
be offset somewhat by use of the system by an adversary. GPS has
improved our navigation and geo-positioning accuracy in multiples,
but we are not the only ones who can use it.
Conclusions
Even though the anticipated national security threats of the coming
decades involve less developed countries, the CVW threat and
other methods of intrusion and disruption are not necessarily
beyond their reach.
Opportunities to deceive and confuse through an elaborate
misinformation scheme along a myriad of information paths are
available to anyone. Information warfare provides a new avenue to
employ deception techniques through the use of multiple paths that
create the perception and validation of truth. These activities can
put new light on Winston Churchill's statement at Tehran in
November 1943 concerning Allied deception efforts, "In war-time,
truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a
bodyguard of lies."88
In this vein, General Minihan proposes the prospect of "an
intelligence analyst manipulating an adversary's command and
control system so that reality is distorted."89 Consider Marvin
Leibstone's projection, ". . . tomorrow's soldier will depend more
than ever on the very well known and trusted factors of mobility
and C3I.90 Imagine a scenario depicting a "left hook" in the Iraqi
desert that fails because the systems in use were successfully
attacked by CVW, or some other intrusion method, with the
resulting disruption putting US troops in a flailing posture-facing
the unknown and losing confidence in their operation. One thing is
sure. An Iraqi "left hook" will be difficult to repeat. We have to
assume Iraq, and others, will exploit the GPS to their own
advantage. Information warfare is coming of age!
World War II set the stage, but only with today's technology can
we expect action in this sphere of warfare on a grand scale.
Fortunately, the US military senior leadership is becoming
involved, and, in many cases, taking the lead on this perplexing
issue. With this emphasis, we must carefully assess the
vulnerabilities of the systems we employ. Systems proposals must
be thoroughly evaluated and prioritized by highest value payoff.
This needs to be accomplished through a more balanced investment
strategy by the US military that conquers our institutional
prejudices that favor killer systems" weapons.91 Offensive systems
will be at risk if we do not apply sufficient defensive
considerations in this process.
The electromagnetic spectrum will be our `Achilles heel' if we do
not pay sufficient attention to protecting our use of the spectrum
and at the same time recognize that we must take away the enemy's
ability to see us and to control his forces."92 We must also
interdict the opportunities for adversaries to intrude on our
systems. Other nations have realized the value of offensive
applications of information warfare; therefore, we must attack The
issue from two directions, offensively and defensively, with almost
equal accentuation.
Information warfare adds a fourth dimension of warfare to those of
air, land, and sea. When the Soviets developed a nuclear program
after World War II, the United States was caught by surprise. In
this new dimension, we must stay ahead. ?
Notes
1.Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 84.
2.Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York;
Oxford University Press, 1971), 84. 3.Information Warfare:
Pouring the Foundation, Draft, USAF/XO, 19 December 1994, i.
4.Ibid., 3. 5.Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at
the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.,
1993), 140. 6.Ibid, 139. 7.Craig L. Johnson, "Information
Warfare-Not a Paper War," Journal of Electronic Defense 17, no.
8, August 1994, 56. 8.Ibid. 9.John H. Petersen, "Info Wars," US
Naval Institute Proceedings, 119, May 1993, 85. 10.Peter
Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra (New York: Pantheon Books,
1980), 3. 11.Clausewitz, 191. 12.John Mendelsohn, ed., Covert
Warfare: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception
During the World War II Era 18 (New York: Garland Publishing,
Inc., 1989), 1. Note: This book is the last in a series of 18 volumes
on covert warfare edited by Mendelsohn. The content of the series
is primarily composed of declassified documents residing in the
National Archives. These documents included classifications up
through TOP SECRET ULTRA. The quoted material in this paper
from this series is usually taken from the copied material of the
original documents. 13.Sun Tzu, 66. 14.See Ewen Montagu, The
Man Who Never Was (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1954).
15.Mendelsohn, chap. 1, 1. 16.Ibid., vol. 1, Ultra Magic and the
Allies, chap. 8, "Origins, Functions, and Problems of the Special
Branch, MIS," 27. 17.Mendelsohn, vol. 1, chap. 4, "Synthesis of
Experiences in the Use of ULTRA Intelligence by U.S. Army Field
Commands in the European Theater of Operations," 4.
18.Wladyslaw Kozaczuk, ENIGMA (University Publications of
America, Inc., 1984) chapter 2. 19.Ibid., 20-21. 20.Ibid., 95.
21.Ibid., 165. 22.David Kahn, Seizing the ENIGMA: The Race to
Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939-1943 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1991), 184. 23.Ibid. 24.Ibid. 25.Ibid. 26.Ibid. 27.James
L. Gilbert and John P. Ginnegan, eds., U.S. Army Signals
Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History, Center of
Military History, United States Army (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1993), 175. 28.Ibid., 175. 29.Kahn, 276. 30.Gilbert and Ginnegan,
176. 31.Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York:
Harper & Row, 1975), 2. 32.Ibid., 50. 33.Ibid., 45. 34.Ibid., 2.
35.Ibid. 36.Ibid. 37.Kozaczuk, 156-66. 38.Mendelsohn, vol. 1,
chap. 3, "Use of CX/MSS ULTRA by the U.S. War Department,
1943-1945," 17. 39.Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West: The
Normandy Campaign 1944-45 (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1979), viii. 40.Kahn, 276. 41.Bennett, 42. 42.Mendelsohn,
vol. 15, Basic Deception and the Normandy Invasion, chap. 4,
"Cover and Deception, Definition and Procedure, Exhibit `3' of
C&D Report ETO," 1 and 2. 43.Mendelsohn, vol. 15, chap. 6,
"Cover and Deception Recommended Organization, 8 September
1944, Exhibit `5' of C&D Report ETO," 2. 44.Ibid., vol. 15, chap.
10, "Operations in Support of Neptune: (B) FORTITUDE NORTH,
23 February 1944, Exhibit `6' of C&D Report ETO," Appendix `C'
to SHAEF/18216/1/Ops dated 10th March 1944. 45.J¢zef
Garlinski, The Enigma War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1980), 159-160. After twice striking "shell-shocked" soldiers,
Patton had gotten into trouble.General Eisenhower needed a place
to put him, and, knowing the Germans kept track of his finest
generals, considered Patton the perfect choice for this notional
outfit. In Eisenhower's mind, placing Patton in charge would make
this concoction more believable to the Germans. 46.Brown, 10.
BODYGUARD was the cover name given to the deception plan
developed for NEPTUNE, the cover term for the Normandy
invasion.It was taken from Churchill's statement at Tehran, "In war
time, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a
bodyguard of lies." 47.Garlinski, 160. 48.Mendlesohn, vol. 15,
chap. 11, "Operations in Support of NEPTUNE: (C) FORTITUDE
SOUTH I, Exhibit `6' of C&D Report ETO," appendix B, pt. I.
49.Bennett, 4. 50.Diane T. Putney, ed., ULTRA and the Army Air
Forces in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force
History, United States Air Force, 1987), 97. 51.H.P.Willmott The
Great Crusade-A New Complete History of the Second World
War, (New York: Free Press, 1989) 108-9. 52.Kozaczuk, 166.
53.Ibid., 167. 54.Ibid., 167. 55.Putney, 35. This statement was
made by Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., in an interview conducted by Dr Richard H. Kohn, chief, Office
of Air Force History, and Dr. Diane T. Putney, chief, Air Force
Intelligence Service Historical Research Office. During WWII,
Justice Powell was one of a select group of people chosen to
integrate Ultra information into other intelligence. As an
intelligence officer in the Army Air Force, he served with the 319th
Bomb Group, Twelfth Air Force, and the Northwest African Air
Forces. He was on General Carl Spaatz's United States Strategic
Air Forces staff as Chief of Operational Intelligence, as well as
being General Spaatz's Ultra officer, towards the end of the war. He
made at least one visit to Bletchely Park where he stayed and
worked for several weeks. 56.David L. Jones and Richard C. Randt,
"The Joint CEOI," in The First Information War: The Story of
Communications, Computers and Intelligence Systems in the
Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press,
October 1992), 162. 57.Sir Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings,
"The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf
War," in Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War: The
Story of Communications, Computers and Intelligence Systems in
the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press,
October, 1992), 121. 58.Ibid., 127. 59.Peterson, 85. 60.Anson and
Cummings, 127. 61.Ibid., 130. 62.James R. Clapper, Jr., "Desert
War: Crucible for Intelligence Systems," in Alan D. Campen, ed.,
The First Information War: The Story of Communications,
Computers and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War
(Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, October 1992) 82.
63.Robert S. Hopkins III, "Ears of the Storm," in Alan D. Campen,
ed., The First Information War: The Story of Communications,
Computers and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War
(Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, October 1992) 65.
64.Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power
Survey Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of
Defense, 1993), 40. 65.Alan D. Campen, "Iraqi Command and
Control: The Information Differential," in Alan D. Campen, ed.,
The First Information War: The Story of Communications,
Computers and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War
(Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, October 1992), 171.
66.Ibid., 172. 67.Ibid., 174. 68.Petersen, 88. 69.Ibid., 89. 70.Ibid.,
86. 71.John G. Roos, "InfoTech InfoPower," Armed Forces Journal
International, June 1994, 31. 72."Information Dominance Edges
Toward New Conflict Frontier," Signal International Journal 48,
no. 12, August 1994, 37. 73.Roos, 31. 74.Johnson, 55. 75.Mary C.
FitzGerald, The Impact of the Military-Technical Revolution on
Russian Military Affairs, vol. 2, Hudson Institute, submitted in
partial fulfillment of Contract #MDA903-91-C-0190, HI-4209, 20
August 1993, 98. 76.Ibid., 100. 77.Ibid. 78.Ibid. 79.Tom Lichty,
The Official America Online for Windows Tour Guide, 2d ed., ver.
2, 325. 80.Newsweek, 20 February 1995,12. 81.Peterson, 89.
82.Army Times, 54, no. 43, 23 May 1994, 28. 83.Baltimore Sun, 9
January 1995, 3. 84.Paul Evancoe and Mark Bentley, "CVW-
Computer Virus as a Weapon," Military Technology 18, no. 5, May
1994, 40. 85.Petersen, 90. 86.Darryl Gehly, "Controlling the
Battlefield," Journal of Electronic Defense, 6, no. 6, June 1993, 48.
87.Gen Jimmy D. Ross, "Winning the Information War," Army,
February 1994, 32. 88.Brown, 10. 89."Information Dominance
Edges Toward New Conflict Frontier," Signal, 48, no. 12, August
1994, 39. 90.Marvin Leibstone, "Next-Generation Soldier:
Ditched, or Digitized?," Military Technology 18 no. 7, July 1994,
59. 91."Army Plan Fosters Dynamic Information War Framework,"
Signal International Journal 48, no. 3, November 1993, 56.
92.Ross, 28.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those
of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United
States Air Force or the Air University.
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