Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Germ Warfare
by Robert P. Kadlec
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Battlefield of the Future
Chapter 9
Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare
Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, USAF
The United States military is entering "one of those rare historical
periods when revolutions happen in how wars are fought. The
revolution derives not from any single invention or idea, but from a
range of rapidly developing technologies."1 Some ten military
revolutions have occurred since the fourteenth century.2
Advances in sensors, communications, stealth technology, and
precision munitions have preoccupied those leaders planning how
the United States will wage future wars. The revolution in
biotechnology, however, has gone relatively unnoticed. The same
technology and expertise which has brought revolutionary medical
therapies and greater agricultural productivity is readily transferable
to the development of biological weapons.
Many technical barriers that once limited the effective use of
biological warfare (BW) are gone. A country or group with modest
pharmaceutical expertise can develop BW for terrorist or military
use. As the United States prepares itself for the national security
challenges of the twenty-first century, it must grasp the
implications of this silent revolution.
Nature has long waged its own form of biological warfare. The
epidemic of bubonic plague killed an estimated one quarter of
Europe's medieval population (25 million deaths) between 1347
and 1351. The introduction of smallpox into the New World by
European explorers decimated the population of Native
Americans.3 A pandemic of Spanish flu may have killed 50 million
people worldwide between 1918 and 1919.4 By the year 2000, 40
million people could be infected by the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) which causes the Acquired Immunodeficiency Disease
Syndrome (AIDS).5
Such events as these undeniably change biologic, economic, and
political systems. Governments, groups, and individuals who desire
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can use biotechnology to
achieve this goal. Skeptics mistakenly dismiss the military or
strategic value of biological weapons. These weapons represent a
credible threat to United States security and future economic
prosperity.
Biological warfare offers an adversary unique and significant
advantages because of its ease of production, potential impact of
use, and the ability to exploit US vulnerabilities. It is the only
weapon of mass destruction which has utility across the spectrum
of conflict. Using biological weapons under the cover of an
endemic or natural disease occurrence provides an attacker the
potential for plausible denial. In this context, biological weapons
offers greater possibilities for use than do nuclear weapons.
Biological warfare can include the use of bacteria, rickettsia,
viruses, and toxins to induce illness or death in humans, animals,
and plants. In the current public opinion, there is a significant
misperception that clouds BW discussions. Biological warfare is
often lumped together with chemical weapons. In BW, the types of
agents, physiologic effects, methods of protection and detection,
and methods of application are distinctly different from those of
chemical warfare (CW).
Chemical Warfare Versus Biological Warfare
Biological agents are many times deadlier, pound-for pound, than
chemical agents. Ten grams of anthrax spores could kill as many
people as a ton of the nerve agent Sarin.6 There are four distinct
types of chemical weapons: nerve, blister, blood, and incapacitating
agents. The effects from these chemical agents can occur within
seconds of exposure as in the case of nerve and blood agents or as
long several hours in the circumstance of low-dose blister agent
exposure such as mustard gas. The physiological and medical
effects of CW are limited to well-defined symptom complexes. The
outcome of each exposure is dose-dependent death or
incapacitation.
Of the four general types of biological warfare agents mentioned,
60 have been identified with potential weapon utility against
humans.7 The medical effects of biological agents are diverse and
are not necessarily related to the type of agent. Some cause
pneumonia. Others can cause encephalitis or inflammation of the
brain. Each one causes a different complex of symptoms, which can
either incapacitate or kill its victim.
The ineffective dose required to induce illness or death may be as
great as tens of thousand of organisms as in the case of anthrax, or
just a few as with tularemia. With the exception of exposure to a
toxin, a period of several days or even weeks may pass before the
onset of symptoms and the ultimate effect. This incubation period
is the time necessary for the microbe or viral agent to establish
itself in the host and replicate.
Toxins, on the otherhand, are a product of living organisms and
behave similar to chemical agents. Botulinum toxin is the most
toxic substance known to man. Without supportive care, inhalation
of nanograms (10-9 milligrams) of this agent will cause progressive
muscular paralysis leading to asphyxiation and death.
Hazards and Protection
The risk posed by chemical agents has two components: a vapor
and liquid hazard. An individual is protected from the vapor and
liquid hazard of CW with the combination of a protective mask and
the Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) suit. The United
States also possesses an array of chemical point detectors and
alarms which provide real time warning of exposure or attack.
In contrast, the hazard posed by biological agents is primarily an
inhalational one. The most effective means of delivering a BW
agent is via an aerosol in the one to five micron particle size.
Creation of this type of an invisible aerosol cloud may be
efficiently accomplished using an agricultural sprayer for example.
The current US military protective mask, when properly fitted and
donned, affords virtually 100 percent protection. Biological agents
generally do not pose a cutaneous hazard. A MOPP suit is not
required. When US troops deployed to Saudi Arabia during
Operation Desert Shield, they did not have an operational
capability to detect any biological agents.8
During Desert Storm, the United States fielded only a rudimentary
developmental detector system. This system could detect only two
of several possible Iraqi BW threats. In addition to the limited
scope of this detector, it took between 13 and 24 hours after the
attack to determine the presence and identify the BW agent. There
was no capability to provide any real-time or advanced warning of a
biological attack.9 During the Gulf War, the first likely indication
of an attack was ill and dying soldiers.
Biological Warfare Detection and Medical Protection
< font size=+2>Detection of biological agents is a complex
problem. Since World War II, attempts by the United States to
develop BW detection have met with frustration and only limited
success. Given the chemically indistinguishable organic properties
of biological agents, the methodology for detecting chemical agents
is not useful by itself. Each prospective BW agent requires a
specific assay to detect and identify. Advances in medical
diagnostics and biotechnology are allowing science to overcome
these technical obstacles. The number of potential agents, however,
and the demanding technical and developmental requirements make
the challenge of BW detection daunting.
In lieu of detection or advanced warning and the opportunity to don
protective masks, medical products such as vaccines,
immunoglobulins and antibiotics can mitigate the effect of
biological agents and the potential operational impact. All three
types of products can provide both preexposure and postexposure
protection to an infectious disease and therefore a BW agent.
Vaccines are active immunization measures whereby the host is
intentionally exposed to either an attenuated or inactivated form of
the disease causing agent. Vaccines prompt the body to produce
antibodies which can afford a high level of protection for many
years. The current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved
vaccine against anthrax has been shown to be protective against
inhalational agents in nonhuman primates.10
Like biological weapon detectors, vaccines are highly specific for a
potential threat agent. In addition, the time needed to develop a safe
vaccine product suitable for human use may be 10 to 15 years.
While several BW vaccines exist for known threat agents such as
botulinum toxin and tularemia, they remain in a status short of full
FDA approval known as an investigational new drug (IND).
Full FDA approval may be slow in coming if there is not sufficient
test data on human response to the vaccines or if there is a lack of
commercial demand or no perceived near-term public requirement
for its use. Vaccines against exotic infectious disease agents
associated with offensive BW fall under the purview of the
Department of Defense with the Army as research and development
executive agency.
The ability to provide IND products, which are shown to be safe in
humans and efficacious in animal studies, short of war or national
crisis is limited by the need to satisfy the human use or informed
consent requirements. These requirements specify the need to
inform the prospective recipient of possible known and theoretical,
short-term and long-term effects of the product. The stigma
attached with IND status may have limited the use of the vaccine
during Desert Storm. The controversy surrounding Persian Gulf
Illnes (PGI) further negatively effects perceptions of IND products
used for military purposes. To date the biological warfare vaccines
have not been associated with PI.
Once a vaccine is given, there is lag time before adequate protective
antibodies develop. The length of time and the number of doses of
vaccine required before protection is attained and its duration, are
unique characteristics of the specific product. Furthermore, a
sufficiently high dose of a BW or infectious disease agent can
overwhelm any vaccine. Finally, the protective level obtained for a
population is not uniform. There is individual variability.
Immunoglobulins are existing antibodies which can be harvested
from humans or animals. Like vaccines, they are protective for a
specific agent. Unlike vaccines, which stimulate active production
of antibodies by the host, immunoglobulins are considered passive
immunization. When injected into a host, they provide short-term
protection which usually lasts weeks or months. Immunoglobulins
are usually used to protect viral and toxin agents. The rigorous
FDA approval required for vaccines is also required for
immunoglobulins.
A well-known example of an immunoglobulin preparation is the
serum used for Hepatitis A. Immunoglobulins currently exist for
pre-exposure and post-exposure treatment of botulinum toxin
intoxication. Developments in monoclonal antibody technologies
offer the potential for rapid development of immunoglobulin
preparations for use in BW medical defense.11
Finally, the use of antibiotics for pre-exposure or post- exposure
treatment of bacterial or rickettsial BW agents offers the potential
for broad spectrum-agent protection. Antibiotics however do not
prevent or treat illness due to viral or toxin agents. There are further
practical theoretic limitations to the use of antibiotic. Certain
microbial infectious diseases and BW agents have a natural
resistance to different antibiotics. Furthermore, antibiotic
resistance among microbes occurs naturally or can be developed
deliberately. Deliberate resistance can be induced by exposing
cultures to serial exposures of ever-increasing doses of an
antibiotic or by transferring a piece of genetic material which
confers antibiotic resistance.12 It is possible to purposefully
develop a BW agent that is resistant to a range of different
antibiotics.
The duration of protection afforded by antibiotics depends on the
amount of antibiotic available and the compliance of the individual
to take them. For certain bacterial BW exposures, antibiotics may
have to be taken for more than 30 days to prevent illness and
possible death.13 A large enough infective dose of a bacterial or
rickettsial agent could, as in the case of the vaccine, overwhelm the
protection afforded by antibiotics.
The medical means to mitigate the effects of BW agents and attack
are imperfect. Even with reliable detectors which provide real time
or advanced warning, vaccines, immuno-globulins, and antibiotics
play a complementary role in the passive defense against BW. In
the absence of BW detection, medical products represent the
cornerstone of protecting US forces from the effects of BW.
Besides their medical benefit, their administration may deter an
enemy from using BW.
Role of Intelligence and Medical Defense
The need for a prior knowledge of BW agent threats for both
detectors and medical products has already been suggested. A great
deal is known about US offensive BW agents developed and
produced until 1969 (Table 2).
Table 2
US OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGENTS
PRODUCED
BETWEEN 1954-1969
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Antipersonnel
Anthrax
Brucellosis
Q Fever
Venezuelan Equine
Encephalitis (VEE)
Botulinum Toxin
Staphyloccal
Enterotoxin Anticrop
Wheat rust
Rye rust
Rice blast
------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are some classical BW agents which Japan, the United
States, and possibly the former Soviet Union and Iraq have
researched and developed as weapons.14 Anthrax and botulinum
toxin fall into this category. Among the 60 other potential BW
agents, "sound and complete intelligence data" will play a vital role
in ascertaining which ones proliferants will pursue.15 Robert
Gates, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
underscored the problem in January 1992, when he cited human
intelligence as being critical in assessing the proliferation of both
chemical and biological weapons in the third world.16
Congress has not missed the importance of intelligence in focusing
R&D. Congressional law mandates that BW defensive medical
efforts be funded and prioritized based on a threat list developed by
the US intelligence community.17
Two questions emerge from this process. The first is whether
adequate priority and resources have been focused on collecting
and analyzing BW-related intelligence and how successful these
efforts have been. The second is whether the process of creating a
threat list based entirely on intelligence assessments is adequate.
Assessing an adversary's current BW efforts may ignore
developments in biotechnology which may offer breakthrough
capabilities and novel agents.
Weaponizing BW
The final distinction between chemical and biological weapons
involves the methods of dissemination. Weaponizing of CW and
BW implies three essential elements: agent, munition, and delivery
system. Both can be "weaponized" into conventional munitions
such as artillery rounds, cluster bombs, and missile warheads.
Unlike CW, BW weaponizing implies the efficient aerosolization
of viable agents in a one-to-five micron particle size. Dissemination
of BW agents by conventional munitions pose certain technological
difficulties, because they are sensitive to environmental stresses.
Excessive heat, ultraviolet light, humidity and oxidation decrease
their potency and persistence.18 The United States overcame these
difficulties in the late 1960s to produce, weaponize, and stockpile
several BW agents.19
Weaponizing BW includes some unconventional delivery systems
which may put the United States at risk.20 In contrast to chemical
agents, biological agents could also be easily adapted for use with
commercially available agricultural sprayers. This dissemination
method lends itself to both covert and clandestine applications and
possible terrorist use.21 Unmanned remotely piloted vehicles
(RPVs) with spray tanks represent another low-observable means
of BW delivery.22
A common characteristic shared by both chemical and biological
agents is their dissemination on ancient meteorological conditions.
The prediction and control of the environmental dispersion of BW
agents represents the greatest uncertainty about their use. Ideal
conditions would occur at night, with favorable mild to moderate
winds. The relative coverage of 1,000 kilograms of nerve agent
Sarin is 7.8 square kilometers under these meteorological
conditions. Attacking a major metropolitan city like Washington,
D.C., would result in an estimated 3,000 to 8,000 deaths. A similar
attack using 100 kilograms of anthrax under the same conditions
would cover 300 square kilometers and result in 1 to 3 million
deaths.23 Anthrax, under favorable meteorological conditions,
could kill as many people as a comparably sized nuclear device.24
The Current Biological Warfare Threat
A recently published Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
document, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Assessing the Risks,25 had three major findings.
1. The states most actively working to develop WMD, although
limited in number, are for the
most part located in unstable parts of the world-the Middle East,
South Asia, and the on Korean Peninsula.
2. WMD proliferation poses dangers to all nations. It poses
particular problems for the United States.
3. The breakup of the Soviet Union presents immediate threats to
the global nonproliferation regimes.
The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and
ballistic missiles creates a pall over the potential achievement of a
stable global environment. It also raises the risks of escalation of
regional conflicts. Proliferants understand the value of these
weapons for deterrence, coercion, and war fighting.
The consequences of their use have unfortunately been recorded in
recent history. The horrific images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
leave little to imagination regarding the death and destruction that
occur with a nuclear detonation. Similarly, the television images of
dead Kurdish villagers and incapacitated Iranian soldiers during the
Iran-Iraq War reveal the grisly and inhuman effects of chemical
weaponry. The psychological impact of Iran's Scud missile attacks
on Israel and Saudi Arabia was enormous.
Nowhere in recent history, however, has the use of BW been
similarly documented. The suspicion that "Yellow Rain" or the
mycotoxin tricothecene was used in Indochina has never been
conclusively proven, to the embarrassment of the Reagan
administration. Similar suspicions have proven inconclusive during
the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan. The former Soviet
Union has only recently admitted the truth about an accident at a
biological agent production facility in Sverdlovosk in 1979. Boris
Yeltsin, himself, recently disclosed Russia's violation of the
Biological Weapons Convention in 1992.
During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Iraq was suspected of having an
extensive BW capability, but subsequent UN inspections failed to
find any definitive proof. However, under the pressure of economic
sanctions, Iraq admitted that it had a biological warfare R&D
effort. For example, Iraqi officials have now disclosed that between
1985 and 1991 Iraq produced two germ warfare agents, baccilus
anthracix and botulinum toxin.26
In some measure, BW has attained the stature of the "bogey man of
WMD"-terribly feared but never seen. That fear and the threat,
however, are real. According to the commander of the US Army
Chemical and Biological Defense Agency (CBDA), the biological
threat has been recently singled out as the one major threat that still
inflicts catastrophic effects on a theater-deployed force.
Desert Storm solidified the perception in the United States, in the
Congress, and among our military leadership that biological
weapons were something that third world nations considered a
potential equalizer.27 Had Iraq used anthrax or botulinum toxin,
enormous casualties would have resulted which would have
overtaxed the Army's theater medical system.28
Certain findings of the OTA assessment relating to BW are
noteworthy. The ease and cost of developing and producing BW is
much simpler and cheaper than developing nuclear weapons.
Biotechnology allows small facilities to be capable of producing
large amounts of biological agents. Ten million dollars allows a
proliferant to produce a large arsenal.29 The scientific and
technological knowledge needed to develop and produce offensive
agents in significant quantities is readily available and relatively
unsophisticated. The equipment required is widely available and is
dual-use, having legitimate commercial applications. Finally, and
probably most importantly, the use of BW could be difficult to
prove in some cases since outbreaks of endemic or naturally
occurring disease happen.30
Eight nations have been implicated in developing offensive BW
capabilities: Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, China, Libya, Syria,
and Taiwan.31 A ninth, Russia, admitted to developing an
offensive program in violation of the Biological Weapons
Convention, although it has reportedly ended such activities. The
aforementioned list may not be all inclusive. Given the ability to
produce militarily significant quantities of BW agents (kilograms)
in small legitimate facilities, a committed proliferant with a
"modestly sophisticated pharmaceutical industry" could develop a
credible undetected clandestine offensive BW capability.32
Genetic engineering is not expected immediately to herald the
development of new or exotic BW agents. Instead, its impact may
enhance the environmental stability of existing BW agents. It has
also been speculated that cloning DNA segments from toxin-
producing organisms may allow for the mass production of these
agents. Production of protein molecules such as human insulin has
been demonstrated and is commercially available technology.
Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Policy
The fall of the Soviet Union signaled the end of the superpower
rivalry and created an opportunity to establish an international
system that seeks to ensure political stability, economic
opportunity, and collective methods of conflict resolution. The
United States has prioritized its national security objectives to
enhance economic growth and development; to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and to
resolve regional conflicts.
Nevertheless, among aggressive third world states, WMD
proliferation is occurring, and there are strong incentives to pursue
BW versus nuclear or chemical weapons. Proliferants obtain
significant capabilities with minimum economic costs and political
risks. The 1991 Gulf War highlights this point.
The United States and United Nations claimed after the war that
Iraq had an advanced BW program, although public proof was
lacking and Iraq initially denied this. During the war, Iraq
capitalized on the coalition bombing of a "baby milk facility" for
propaganda purposes. Despite US official claims that the Abu
Gharyb infant formula plant was a dual-use facility capable of
producing biological weapons, CNN's Peter Arnett's visit to the
site and report raised public doubts about whether this was a
legitimate allied target, when, in fact, it was. Following the war,
intrusive on-site visits by UN inspectors failed to uncover any
irrefutable evidence of an offensive BW program, although the
Iraqis later admitted they had procured large quantities of a
biological agents-anthrax and botulism toxin.
The Iraqi experience shows that biological warfare programs can
exist and be hidden within legitimate facilities. Even with direct
on-site visits the likelihood of discovery may be small unless the
visitors know precisely where to go and are permitted entry. The
existence of such programs can be enhanced with tight security and
deception.
Recent events in the former Soviet Union concerning possible
proliferation of nuclear materials also add greater uncertainty to the
BW proliferation calculus. The potential impact and availability of
scientists and technicians associated with the former Soviet
offensive BW program should be considered. Aspiring proliferants
may see them as lucrative recruiting targets. Unlike the complex
technological requirements for nuclear weapons, one or two
individuals with experience in BW agent production and
weaponization could provide breakthrough assistance to a fledgling
program.
The challenge for the United States is to develop a coherent and
coordinated strategy to limit BW proliferation. If this fails, the
United States must be prepared to deter, preempt, and defend
against it. On the basis of the several incentives presented earlier,
the likelihood of preventing further proliferation or rolling back
existing BW-capable nations seems unlikely. The simple arithmetic
of the number of countries suspected of offensive BW activities is
at nine and likely to increase by the end of the century.
Recommendations For The Future
How do we meet the BW threat in the twenty-first century? What
policies will help solve the likely BW challenges? How should the
United States counter-BW programs be prioritized and integrated?
Intelligence
Incomplete or absent intelligence about a suspected proliferant's
BW program is a likely source of trouble. Not having specific
information about the status of a BW program, or locations of
production and storage, or methods of delivery, or the specific
agents could result in an incomplete assessment. This could
directly impact the development of United States strategy, policy,
and capabilities to meet the threat.
A comprehensive anti-BW intelligence effort must collect
information relating to the basic science, medical, and
bioengineering capabilities of a potential proliferator. Short of
having reliable human intelligence with direct access to an
adversary's BW program, this type of information is required to
assess the biological capability of that nation.
Intelligence collection and analysis are critical for future United
States BW counter-proliferation efforts. Determining the intent to
develop BW, locating suspect facilities, and assessing the nature of
the offensive program are essential elements of the intelligence
effort. The importance of specific BW agent intelligence for
medical and detection capabilities deserves emphasis. Even if the
intelligence community collects and validates this information,
there may be a significant lag time, years or even decades, before
safe, effective counter-measures can be developed and fielded.
Intelligence about the anticipated means of delivery and its doctrine
of use is also important. This information allows development of
US active defense capabilities to interdict and destroy delivery
vehicles. Facility-related intelligence also allows for identification
and targeting of production and related facilities for
counteroffensive strikes.
The ability to identify BW-related organizations and proliferants is
important to optimize the utility of export controls and the ability
to interdict shipments of related equipment destined for suspected
BW countries or organizations. The ability to focus limited
diplomatic and economic resources to dissuade, pursue arms
control, and bring international pressure on suspected proliferants
is, therefore, also intelligence-dependent.
The likelihood that national technical means can identify any or all
of the three key BW intelligence components- intent, location,
and nature-is small. Dual-use facilities may not emit characteristic
signatures, but still be capable of producing military significant
quantities of biological agents. As alluded to earlier, the
availability of human-source intelligence will be a critical element
in providing information related to BW proliferation. Assessment
of BW-related information requires trained personnel experienced
in matters relating to biology, biotechnology, medicine, and
agriculture. Balancing the technical component of the intelligence
analysis process is the need to integrate the expertise and
experience the intelligence system.
Because of the greater relative intelligence challenges and the
myriad of related areas associated with BW versus nuclear
proliferation, adequate resources must be applied to the problem.
Increasing collection priorities should also necessitate a
concomitant increase in the analysis resources devoted to the
problem. There should be an assessment and if necessary a
redistribution of assets to reconcile the disparity between the effort
against nuclear proliferation and that of BW.
Policy and Strategy Development
Beyond the collection and assessment of intelligence, policy
development and integration of the many functions are required to
respond to BW proliferation. The domestic vulnerability to covert
or clandestine acts of BW terror should be assessed. There must be
executive-level interest and involvement to oversee the development
of a crisis response system to domestic BW incidents. While the
federal response to terrorist acts is well delineated, the time-
sensitive health care demands created by an act of biological terror
must be assessed. It is beyond the scope of the single agency
identified in the Federal Emergency Response Plan, the
Department of Health and Human Services, to mount the necessary
reaction to deal with the health consequences and prevent
unnecessary loss of life.
A historical example illustrates the scale of the effort required to
respond to an act of BW terror in a major metropolitan area. In
1947, an American business man traveled to New York City from
Mexico City. During his bus ride, he developed a fever, headache,
and rash. Though ill upon his arrival in New York, he went sight-
seeing. Over a period of several hours, he walked around the city
and through a major department store. His illness, smallpox,
progressed and he died nine days later. As a result of this single
case, 12 other cases of smallpox and two deaths occurred. Because
of smallpox's ability to be transmitted from person to person, this
handful of cases was deemed so serious by public health officials
that 6,350,000 persons in New York City alone were vaccinated in
less than a month.33
Unlike 1947, Americans have not been routinely vaccinated against
smallpox since 1980. A significant proportion of the US population
is susceptible to this virus. The number of cases expected to occur
as the result of a deliberate act could be in the thousands or tens of
thousands. Even though the World Health Organization declared
smallpox eradicated, North Korea has been identified as one
possible country retaining cultures of this virus to use as a
biological weapon.34
Even if a noncontagious agent were used, the public health
consequences could be overwhelming. If several kilograms of an
agent like anthrax were disseminated in New York City today,
conservative estimates put the number deaths occurring in the first
few days at 400,000.35 Thousands of others would be at risk of
dying within several days if proper antibiotics and vaccination were
not started immediately. Millions of others would be fearful of
being exposed and seek or demand medical care as well. Beyond
the immediate health implications of such an act, the potential
panic and civil unrest created would require an equally large
response. Local law enforcement agencies would be overwhelmed
and would need the assistance of state and federal agencies. The
complete vulnerability of the United States if exposed to this type
of terrorism would prompt other terrorists to attempt the same type
of attack for extortion or additional terror impact.
Prior to a domestic incident such as this, a capable, practiced, and
coordinated response mechanism must be in place. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides this
coordination function, but its actual familiarity and practice
associated with biological terrorism is not known. The health-
related support functions found in the Departments of Health and
Human Services, Veterans Affairs, and Defense would have to be
integrated into a single response plan.
Stockpiles of necessary antibiotics, immunoglobulins, and vaccines
would have to be procured, maintained, and be readily available to
administer within hours after recognizing an incident. An
additional critical element of this response would be the
management of information to allay fears and avoid unnecessary
panic. The effort required to respond to a biological act of terror
rivals that needed for an accidental or deliberate detonation of a
nuclear device.
Arms Control
The BWC clearly represents the "lock which keeps the honest man
honest." It serves a vital function by establishing an international
norm against BW proliferation. Efforts should be made to provide
both disincentives and incentives for current states to comply with
the BW treaty. Nonsignatories should be leveraged to participate in
the convention. Strengthening the BWC by enhancing transparency
of biological activities is stated US government policy. Measures
identified in the third review conference are being examined for use
in a possible formal protocol. Like the warning to consumers-
caveat emptor, subscribers to the convention must understand that
complete verification is not just elusive but impossible.
During the original proposal of the BWC by the United Kingdom,
the Soviet military strongly opposed any limitation on offensive
BW. The Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko felt that, for
propaganda purposes, a prohibition on biological weapons would
be useful. Without international controls, the Politburo and the
Soviet military both endorsed the "toothless" convention in
1972.36 The Soviet Union was one of the three depositories of this
treaty. Recent disclosures by President Boris Yeltsin regarding
former Soviet and Russian violations of the Biological Weapons
Convention highlight the limits of that treaty.
The opportunity to strengthen the regime must also be tempered by
events in Iraq since the Gulf War. Despite intrusive inspections, no
concrete evidence of its offensive BW program has been uncovered,
although Iraq has admitted to an R&D effort prior to the war. The
continuation of the US sanctions is now solely dependent on Iraq's
refusal to detail their BW program. Public statements by senior US
intelligence and government officials indicates that Iraq retains its
offensive BW capability. Indeed, there is a strong suspicion that
Iraq may not have destroyed its BW agents as it has claimed.
A disturbing prospect for strengthening the BWC is that the 21
measures identified in the third review conference were utilized in
Iraq including such actions as monitoring, sample collections,
short-notice visits, record reviews, and interviewing of key
personnel. These measures have yielded no conclusive evidence to
date about the present Iraqi BW capability or its past program.
Diplomatic Measures and International Pressure
Current DOD counterproliferation policy emphasizes use of public
diplomacy, positive and negative security assistance, and
identifying the economic, political and military costs of
proliferation. Denial of certain equipment or technologies used in
BW is problematic. Export controls, interdiction, or disruption of
supply networks will have limited impact given the dual-use
legitimate nature of the biological materials and equipment.
Diplomatic efforts to prevent or control BW proliferation will have
similar limits. States that are parties to the BWC, but are
committed eventually to developing secret offensive biological
weapons capabilities, can do serious BW research and development
legally for a time within the current treaty framework. Nations who
are not signatories can refuse entry and pursue offensive programs
as well. Given the low likelihood of detecting violations,
nonsignatories could take advantage of economic incentives or
foreign assistance programs for joining the BWC, yet pursue
clandestine offensive BW programs. There are reasonable
indications that diplomacy alone can do little to prevent BW
proliferation.
Nevertheless, diplomatic and economic pressure can serve a useful
purpose in inhibiting a proliferant's activities by invoking
sanctions, export controls, or publicly disclosing violations. One
must realize that invoking these measures depends on timely and
accurate intelligence. Diplomatic measures which try to control
proliferation may, in the short run, delay a proliferant's efforts. In
the long term, they may motivate determined proliferants to conceal
or deceive their true intent and activities. Of course the perfect
solution to proliferation is correcting the underlying reasons why
nations choose to develop biological or nuclear weapons. Clearly,
BW is a symptom of a deeper security need.
Countermeasures
Once proliferation occurs and an adversary attains an offensive BW
capability, the focus changes to mitigating its perceived advantage
and deterring its use. The range of counteroffensive capabilities and
strategies must include deterrence, preemption, and destruction.
During Desert Storm speculation occurred regarding the implicit
use of nuclear weapons in response to BW attack. Both President
George Bush and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney publicly
stated that any attack on US forces with chemical or biological
weapons would be met with "massive retaliation." The accuracy
and credibility of this policy option are subject to much debate.
Determining the culpable party after a covert or clandestine BW
attack has occurred may be impossible. The circumstances
following the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 highlight the
potential difficulties of a forensic investigation following an act of
terror. Before implicating Libyan intelligence operatives, both Iran
and Syria and several terrorist groups were suspected. Finding a
"smoking gun" and proving who is responsible for a future covert
biological warfare attack could be difficult or impossible.
There will be times in the future when the US president may have
to consider military preemptive strikes against a terrorist state or
group to protect the United States and allied governments against
BW attacks. Preemptive activities or anticipatory self-defense can
range from efforts that occur during nonhostilities to open armed
conflict. The recent interception and attempted interdiction of
precursor CW materials bound for Iran from China (Yin He
incident) present a recent example. The 1981 bombing of the Iraqi
Orisak nuclear reactor by Israel is representative of using overt
military force during instances short of open armed conflict. On the
other hand, the US air campaign sought to destroy Saddam
Hussein's WMD capabilities in the opening days of the Gulf War.
Destruction of the means to produce, process and deliver biological
weapons is the final element of the counteroffensive strategy. There
is a potential risk of collateral damage when striking BW-related
facilities or delivery systems. Theoretically, a downwind hazard
could occur if bulk storage of BW agents were struck when
meteorological conditions were favorable to their dissemination.
While no specific confirmed reports of collateral damage were
documented during Desert Storm, there was one news report that
implicated the occurrence of illness and death in Iraqi guards at an
unidentified BW facility south of Baghdad after coalition
bombing.37
Another partial answer to the BW threat would be to deploy theater
ballistic missile defenses capable of intercepting enemy BW
warheads while enroute to their targets. Ideally, interception and
destruction would occur during early boost phase of the enemy
missile launch to lower the risk of friendly casualties. Good
ballistic missile defenses are not enough, since the United States
and its allies must also respond to the challenge posed by future
enemy cruise missiles equipped with biological weapon warheads.
Of course, such missile defenses are defenses of the last resort. The
greatest probability of minimizing collateral damage would be
realized if special forces or other means of preemption allowed the
United States or its allies to destroy the enemy BW capability prior
to an adversary filling the weapon or launching the attack.
Biological Defense
The last element of the BW counterproliferation strategy is medical
and nonmedical passive defensive measures. The importance and
problems of BW detectors have already been identified. A priority
effort exists to develop and field a BW detector which can provide
stand-off warning and real-time detection of attack.
Another nonmedical defensive measure that deserves emphasis is
the employment of collective protective systems. Hardened shelters
and work areas for rear-echelon troops as well as filtered over-
pressurized systems for combat vehicles, ships, and planes could
minimize the effects of both chemical and biological weapons.
Medical measures to protect against biological threats include
short-term and long-term methods of protecting US military forces.
Even when detectors become available, medical measures will play
an important role in both protection and treatment against BW
attack.
Efforts should be focused first on developing, testing, and
producing Food and Drug Administration-approved vaccines to
immunize soldiers against the most likely BW threat agents. The
availability of suitable vaccines and other medical products must
remain a priority.
On 26 November 1993, Undersecretary of Defense William Perry
signed the DOD immunization policy for BW threats. It establishes
the requirement for both peacetime and contingency use of vaccines
against validated BW threats. Each theater commander-in-chief
(CINC) is required to determine the regional threat and provide the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs with requirements. Integral in meeting
the regional CINC's requirements is the development of a DOD-
dedicated vaccine production infrastructure.
The liability concerns of the US pharmaceutical industry have
affected development and production of public health vaccines. The
controversy associated with the liability risk of immunizing
children against Pertussis is illustrative. Congress mandated a
government-subsidized fund to defray court awarded damages
resulting from severe neurologic sequelae from the Pertussis
vaccine. The rationale behind this effort was to protect the vaccine
companies from large cash awards resulting from litigation, so to
preserve their profitable production of important public health
vaccines.
The commercial or public need for vaccines against biological
warfare agents short of an act of terror is virtually zero. Yet, should
a high-confidence warning of an attack on our population occur,
substantial amounts of these products would be necessary to
respond to minimize illness and death. The peacetime military need
exists as result of the DOD immunization directive.
The ability and desire of the pharmaceutical industry to commit its
facilities for dedicated vaccine development are questionable in
light of profit and liability concerns. A US government vaccine
facility has value for both BW and public health considerations.
Such a facility should remain a high priority project in developing
capability to respond to BW proliferation.
Besides the actual protective effect gained by BW vaccines, certain
elements of deterrence can be garnered by minimizing the effect of
an adversary's BW agent. Immunizing US forces and having the
ability to protect others will minimize an enemy's ability to coerce
the United States and its allies. They will also lessen the potential
impact of a BW attack on the United States or its allies.
Therefore, the perceived or actual benefit derived by the BW
proliferant will be lessened. Finally, vaccines and medical
countermeasures can contribute the means to maintain the war-
fighting capability of US military forces as well as providing for the
survival of US citizens.
Conclusions
The proliferation of biological warfare weapons offers less
developed nations a capability as lethal and potentially devastating
as a nuclear device. The ease and relative low cost of BW
production, coupled with spread of dual-use legitimate
biotechnology, will facilitate and accelerate BW proliferation in the
short-term and well into the twenty-first century.
Biological weapons can be employed in noncombat settings under
the guise of natural events, during operations other than war, or can
be used in open combat scenarios against all biological systems-
man, animal, or plant. Deliberate dissemination of BW agents may
be afforded possible denial by naturally occurring diseases and
events. The low probability of detecting the development and
production of terrorist and militarily significant quantities of BW
agents lessens the effectiveness of diplomatic measures such as
dissuasion, denial, and international pressure.
The limitations associated with treaty verification leave little
optimism for the long-term effectiveness of the Biological Weapons
Convention. Ascribing to the BWC may offer further potential of
plausible denial if proliferants sought to use membership as a cover
for their prohibited efforts.
Expectations for preventing BW proliferation must be grounded in
reality. The likelihood of preventing or deterring a determined
proliferant from obtaining biological weapons is relatively small.
The outlook for the future of biological weapons proliferation is
discouraging. "Brain drain" from the former Soviet Union may
create volatile opportunities for breakthrough proliferants.
Future US policies against BW proliferation need to be based on
integrated government policies and capabilities to deter, preempt
and defend against this threat. No single element of the program is
adequate to deal with the BW problem. Together, however, these
elements can lower the risk and mitigate the potential impact of
BW.
In addition, the problem of biological warfare cannot be narrowly
focused on its ability to kill or render people ill. Biological
warfare's potential to create significant economic loss and
subsequent political instability with plausible denial exceeds any
other known weapon. Germ warfare at the end of the twentieth and
inception of the twenty-first century directly threatens the security
of the United States and the achievement of a peaceful, prosperous,
and stable post-cold war era.
Notes
1. Bradley Graham, "Battle Plans for a New Century," The
Washington Post, 21 February 1995, A1.
2. Ibid., A4. See also, Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to
Computer, The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National
Interest, No. 37, Fall 1994, 30-42. These 10 revolutions in military
affairs were identified as the infantry revolution, the artillery
revolution, revolution of sail and shot, the fortress revolution, the
Napoleonic revolution, land war revolution, naval revolution,
mechanization revolution, aviation revolution, information
revolution, and the nuclear revolution.
3. William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor
Books, 1977).
4. Joseph D. Douglas and Neil C. Livingstone, America the
Vulnerable (Lexington Mass. Lexington Books, 1987) ,2.
5." World AIDS Day December 1 1993" Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report (Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control, 19
November 1993), 1.
6. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1993), 3.
7. Stanley L. Weiner and John Barret, Trauma Management for
Civilian and Military Physicians (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders,
1986), 519.
8. General Accounting Office, Chemical & Biological Defense:
U.S. Forces Are Not Adequately Equipped to Detect All Threats
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1993) 1.
9. Ibid., 3.
10. Arthur Friedlander, et al., Post-exposure Prophylaxis against
Experimental Inhalational Anthrax (Frederick, M.D.: Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1990).
11. Jonathan Lasch, "Human Monoclonal Antibodies for
Biological Warfare Defense," (La Jolla California: The Scripps
Research Institute, 19 November 1993), 1.
12. George F. Brooks, et. al., Medical Microbiology, (Norwalk,
N.C.: Appleton and Lange, 1991), 162-163.
13. Friedlander.
14. Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing
(New York: Noonday Press, 1982), 76. Also Defense Intelligence
Agency, Soviet Biological Warfare Threat (Washington, D.C.:
USGPO, 1986), 2. Another good source is Michael R. Gordon,
"CIA Foresees Iraq Biological-Weapon Capability in Early `91,"
New York Times, 20 September 1990, 1.
15. David L. Huxsoll, "The U.S. Biological Defense Research
Program," in Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future? ed.
Brad Roberts (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic &
International Studies, 1993), 60.
16. Robert Gates, McNeil and Lehrer News Hour, 20 January 1992.
17. General Accounting Office, Biological Warfare: Better
Controls in DOD's Research Could Prevent Unneeded
Expenditures (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1990), 5.
18. Office of Technology Assessment, 39.
19. Army, U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare
Programs, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), D 2, 3.
20. Ibid., 51.
21. Office of Technology Assessment, 39. See also, Robert H.
Kupperman and David M. Smith, "Coping With Biological
Terrorism," in Roberts, 41.
22. Office of Technology Assessment, 41.
23. Ibid., 54.
24. Ibid., 8.
25. Ibid.
26. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Had Program for Germ Warfare," The
Washington Post, 6 July 1995, 1.
27. George Friel, quoted in "Chem-Bio Defense Agency Will
Tackle Last Major Threat to a Deployed Force," Armed Forces
Journal, 1992, 10.
28. General Accounting Office, 1.
29. Office of Technology Assessment, 11.
30. Ibid., 39.
31. Ibid., 80.
32. Ibid., 38.
33. Theodore Rosebury, Peace or Pestilence: Biological Warfare
and How to Avoid It (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949),
60.
34. John J. Fialka, "CIA Says North Korea Appears Active in
Biological, Nuclear Arms," The Wall Street Journal, 25 February
1993, 16.
35. Kupperman and Smith, 42.
36. Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 174.
37. "Biological Plant Bombed," London: Reuters Wire Service, 3
February 1991.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those
of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United
States Air Force or the Air University.
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