Battlefield of the Future: Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare
by Robert P. Kadlec
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Battlefield of the Future
Chapter 10
Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare
Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, USAF
The final decade of the twentieth century has positioned the world
at the threshold of tremendous opportunity. The collapse of the
Soviet Union has dissolved the bipolar world and created the
opening to forge a new international security environment. The
preeminence of politico-military competition is slowly giving way
to politico-economic competition. As Shintaro Ishihara predicts,
"The twenty-first century will be a century of economic warfare."1
While military power remains important, its context and type are
changing. The focus of many developing nations is to seek weapons
of mass destruction (WMD)-nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons-to meet regional security concerns. The parallel
emergence of economic competition and its likely accompanying
conflicts with the proliferation of WMD raises the possibility of a
new form of warfare. This includes the development and use of
biological warfare (BW) against economic targets.
Using BW to attack livestock, crops, or ecosystems offers an
adversary the means to wage a potentially subtle yet devastating
form of warfare, one which would impact the political, social, and
economic sectors of a society and potentially of national survival
itself.
Agriculture
FFor both developed and developing nations, nonfuel commodities
present an important source of national security and prosperity. In
the United States alone, the agricultural sector is an $800 billion
industry. Besides providing for the nourishment of the US
population and a significant portion of the world, agriculture
generated approximately $67 billion in export revenues in 1991.
This revenue represents approximately 15 percent of the total US
exports for that particular year.2 Agricultural exports have been an
important source for redressing the US trade deficit. Moreover,
agriculture is now one of but a handful of sectors that generates a
trade surplus for the US. In 1992 it created an estimated $18-billion
surplus.3
Lesser developed and developing nations and other nations whose
economies are in transition have significant agricultural sectors that
provide important contributions of food and revenue to their
economies. This observation is especially true of nonoil producing
nations. Yet, even with productive agricultural systems, most if not
all nations in the world are food importers.
Trends in agricultural systems, particularly food production,
indicate that fewer numbers of people and hectares are involved in
agricultural production. In developed market economies, the
percentage of the economically active population in agriculture
declined by 31.2 percent from 1980 to 1992.4 A similar, yet not as
dramatic, decline was noted in developing countries, where the
numbers of people involved in agriculture declined by 11.3 percent
during the same period.5 Despite that decline, the overall
agricultural productivity in both the developed and developing
worlds increased by 45.3 percent and 25.2 percent respectively.6
This increase in productivity has resulted from the spread of
modern farming technology, high-yield crop varieties, and potent
fertilizers and pesticides. The goal of many developing and
developed nations is to become self-sufficient in food and other
agricultural products.7 Competition has become intense.
Efforts to remove trade-distorting domestic subsidies and limits to
market access to agriculture were objectives of the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. Market access-
limitation policies essentially maintain domestic prices above world
prices and isolate domestic producers from competition and the
volatility of the world market.8 While included on the Uruguay
Round's agenda, tremendous resistance was encountered from
several important nations. The United States wanted to protect
dairy products, sugar, cotton, and peanuts. Japan wanted to prevent
rice imports. Despite efforts to settle differences on issues of
market access, internal supports, and export competition, agreement
on many items was not reached.
Biotechnology
Part of the economic revolution in the world today is the explosion
of biotechnology. Biotechnology has been a significant reason why
agricultural systems are much more productive. As alluded to
earlier, the development of higher-yield crops results partly from
genetic recombinant engineering, which takes genes coded for
greater productivity and resistance to disease and drought and
inserts them into a particular species of crop.
Besides enhancing the productivity and heartiness of food or cash
crops, methods of biological control are increasingly relied upon to
provide an environment-friendly means of controlling economically
significant pests and diseases. Bacillus thuringiensis (B.t.). is a
well-known example of a naturally occurring sporulated bacteria
which effectively controls caterpillars, particularly tomato worms.
A variant of B.t., called B.t. israelensis or B.t.i., has shown its
effectiveness in controlling malaria-bearing mosquitoes and
blackflies which carry the parasite that causes river blindness.9
Efforts are now under way to insert the gene from B.t. into such
plants as cotton. Initial research indicates that this procedure
enables cotton plants to resist the boll weevil (anthonomus
grandis). This particular pest caused an estimated $50-billion loss
in US cotton revenues from 1909 to 1949.10
In California's Imperial Valley the pink bollworm caterpillar has
caused the amount of land planted with cotton to drop from
140,000 acres to only 7,000 during the past 17 years.11 Today US
cotton farmers spend $500 million on pesticides.
Nature of the Biological Warfare Threat
Harmful bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, or toxins that incapacitate or
kill humans, animals, or plants have an unsettling value in waging
economic warfare. In 1925 Winston Churchill envisioned a context
for BW when he wrote about "pestilences methodically prepared
and deliberately launched upon man and beast . . . Blight to destroy
crops, Anthrax to slay horses and cattle . . . ."12 This discussion
narrows the definition of BW to consider only its utility against
such economic targets as animals and plants.
Historical Context and Evolution
Investigators have argued that German agents intentionally infected
horses and cattle with anthrax and glanders before they were
shipped from the United States to Europe during World War I.13
During World War II, the United States, fearful of perceived efforts
by both Japan and Germany to develop BW, engaged in a large and
ambitious retaliatory offensive and defensive BW research and
development effort. While never fielding or using a BW weapon,
they did develop several BW agents, including rinderpest, glanders,
wheat rust, rye rust, and rice blast to use against animals and
plants.
Anecdotal reports suggest US officials had considered using rice
blast agents to destroy Japan's rice crop during the closing months
of the war to force its surrender. The realization that the United
States would have to supply food to Japan once the war ended and
the availability of the atomic bomb, dissuaded US officials from
pursuing this option.
In 1972, an international treaty, the Biological Warfare
Convention, specifically prohibited the research, development,
production, or use of biological agents for offensive use. While 162
countries have signed this treaty, no verification means are
available to ensure compliance. Reportedly, up to 20 nations are
suspected of pursuing offensive BW capabilities. Significant on the
list are Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel, North Korea, and
Taiwan.14 No specific mention is made of any suspect nation
seeking development of anti-animal/ anti-crop agents. Note that the
United States during its offensive program first developed and
fielded an anti-crop bomb. The United States discontinued its
pursuit of several anti-agricultural agents in the mid-1950s since
they lacked military utility.
Biological Weapons: Cost-effective WMD
Compared to other mass destruction weapons, biological wea- pons
are cheap. A recent Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report
places the cost of a BW large arsenal as low as $10 million.
This estimated cost stands in stark contrast to a low-end estimate of
$200 million for developing a single nuclear weapon. The high-end
cost estimate for a nuclear weapons could be 10 to 50 times
higher.15 Not only is BW more affordable, but militarily
significant quantities of BW agents (kilograms) in legitimate
biological laboratories make BW production easy to accomplish
and conceal. Any nation with a moderately sophisticated
pharmaceutical industry can do so.
Nature at Work: Whiteflies and Plausibility
Biological economic warfare likely would involve the intentional
dispersion of a harmful agent or pest against a high-value cash crop
or food source. The US Department of Agriculture recently
identified 53 animal diseases which are nonindigenous or foreign,
which, if introduced into this nation, would adversely impact the
livestock industry.16 Recent naturally occurring events highlight
this potential.
The Imperial Valley produces a large variety of food and produce.
In the summer of 1991, an infestation by the sweet potato fly or
whitefly destroyed much of the crops in this area and caused a
$300-million loss. A related but different strain of whitefly caused
$100 million in losses in southeastern California in 1981. The US
agricultural system is a $800-billion industry. The Imperial Valley
infestation represents a natural event where a harmful agent
(whitefly) encountered a susceptible host (crops) in a conducive
environment (the Imperial Valley). The investigation of this natural
outbreak, however, reveals just how a deliberate act of BW
economic warfare could be engineered.17
The poinsettia strain of the whitefly is not found naturally in
California. In the circumstance of this outbreak, the whitefly could
have accompanied a shipment of poinsettia plants from Florida.
While the exact place the poinsettia strain originate remains a
mystery, other similar strains originate in Russia, mainland Asia,
and Africa.
In its natural habitat, the whitefly has a certain homeostatic
existence. Balanced between natural conditions, competitors,
pathogens, and predators, the impact it has on the environment is
usually limited. When this fly or any other pest is placed in an
environment where natural controls are missing, uncontrolled insect
breeding may cause subsequent crop destruction. In the Imperial
Valley circumstance, however, the culpable insect represented more
than simply a pest translocated to new fertile fields. This particular
type of whitefly was a distinct new strain. Its biological
characteristics made it an effective agent of destruction. Its appetite
was voracious. Unlike other known strains of whiteflies, this one
consumed many times its body weight in vegetation and dined on a
great variety of plants. Second, it had an unusual resistance to
chemical and naturally occurring pesticides. DNA analysis of the
genetic makeup showed a unique strain of this particular insect.
Finally, besides its direct effects, the whitefly carried other harmful
agents like fungus. Thus, it also inflicted disease on already
weakened plants.
Naturally occurring genetic events of mutation and selection
reasonably explain this occurrence. It is also possible that such
insects could be bred for nefarious purposes. In the context of a
deliberate act of BW, a nation could select from several native
occurring or endemic pests. Selective management and breeding
could develop a "super" pest. The selection of this pest could be
highly specific for a particular crop that an economic competitor or
regional adversary relies on for economic prosperity or national
survival. To provide better cover for a clandestine or covert BW
attack, pests endemic to the target nation could be similarly
obtained and could enhance its resistance through such laboratory
manipulation as nonindigenous pesticide exposure. Infiltrating and
disseminating perpetrator insects is then dependent on the mode of
transportation and the level of plausible denial desired.
United States Vulnerabilities
The threat of this type of insect-borne BW attack on the United
States remains theoretical. A recent OTA report on the United
States addressed the threat from harmful nonindigenous species
(NIS). The report indicated that the intentional (noncriminal) or
unintentional importation of plants, animals, or microbes has major
current and future economic consequences for US agriculture,
forestry, fisheries, water use, utilities, and natural areas.
Importation of harmful nonindigenous species costs the United
States billions of dollars annually.18 From 1906 to 1991, 79 NIS
caused documented losses of $97 billion (Table 3). This table
detailed only a small percentage of the large number of
economically and environmentally costly agents, so their true
impact is not known.
Table 3
Estimated Cumulative Losses to the US from
Selected NonIndigenous Species, 1906-1991
CategorySpecies Analyzed
(number)Cumulative Losses
($ millions, 1991)Species Not
AnalyzedPlantsa*15603-Terrestrial
Vertebrates6225>39Insects4392,658>330Fish3467>30Aquatic
Invertebrates31,207>35Plant Pathogens5867>44Other4917
*Excludes most agricultural weeds.
Source: M. Cochran, Non-Indigenous Species in the U.S.
Economic Consequences, prepared for Office of Technology
Assessment, March 1992.
US losses between 1987 and 1989 to the Russian wheat aphid
(diurahis noxia), for example, exceeded $600 million.19 The
Mediterranean fruit fly caused $897 million in damage and lost
revenue. Each year $7.4 billion is spent on pesticide applications,
with a significant amount spent on controlling NIS insects.
Nonindigenous weeds, with both direct and indirect effects, caused
a loss of somewhere between $3.6 and $5.4 billion per year. If
herbicides were not used to control them, weed loss would hover
around $19 billion yearly.
Another recent example cited in the OTA report described how NIS
gain entry into the US. The Asian tiger fly (anopheles albopictus)
mosquito does not naturally live in the US. It is normally found in
Southeast Asia where it is the vector or carrier for the human
diseases dengue and malaria.
In 1985 a freighter carrying containers of old tires imported this
mosquito into the United States via the Port of New Orleans. This
mosquito is an aggressive human biter and a prolific breeder.
Because of its behavior, the Asian tiger fly poses a greater risk of
endemic or naturally occurring mosquito-borne disease
transmission. With no geographic barriers, the tiger fly has spread
to 22 states and is creating a public health concern because of the
increased occurrence of Western and Eastern equine encephalitis
and the reemergence of dengue fever in the United States.
The impact and magnitude of the tiger fly will not result in billions
or millions of dollars of lost productivity or tens of thousands or
thousands of deaths. Clearly, the United States has a well-
established public health system with surveillance, rapid
identification, and management if an epidemic or outbreak occurs.
Nations of the third world, however, are not as fortunate and do not
have an existing infrastructure nor adequate resources to mitigate
the impact of similar events. This shortcoming was recognized in an
epidemic of yellow fever in Nigeria in 1991. A shipment of used
tires from Asia was implicated in the introduction of this insect.20
Similar modes of NIS infiltration have been described as a result of
airline travel and flushing ballast tanks on ships.
A contemporary theoretical example of a third world BW economic
scenario is represented by an actual situation in Malaysia, the
world's third largest producer of rubber behind Thailand and
Indonesia. In 1991, it exported $971.9 million of natural rubber.
Along with other Southeast Asia nations, Malaysia is trying to keep
the South American leaf blight (microcyclus ulei) from affecting its
rubber tree industry. This fungus was first detected in Brazil at the
turn of the century and infects the stems of young trees and leaves
and significantly decreases the output of sap.
No known cure for microcyclus exists. This blight is the main
reason a viable rubber industry no longer exists in South America.
The immediacy of airline travel, especially directly from Brazil to
Malaysia, makes possible the unintentional entry of this fungus.
Estimates by Malaysian Agricultural Department officials predict
that should this fungus enter into its country's rubber trees, it
would decimate the trees within two years. Fighting off this fungus
is considered vital to sustain Malaysia's economic boom at its
projected 7-8 percent growth rate.21
In the spring of 1993, an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease
occurred in Italy. This contagious virus led to the destruction of
4,000 head of cattle. After authorities linked the source of this
outbreak to a live cattle shipment from the former Yugoslavia, the
European Community (EC) sparked a "cow war" when they banned
bovine products from all 18 countries of Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. Bovine meat exports from eight East Europe
countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, and a portion of the former Soviet Union) totaled
$103 million in 1991. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Bulgaria reacted by banning the EC's own meat exports. Eastern
European officials say EC markets remain almost as closed to them
in 1993 as to their former communist regimes.22
While the governments of Eastern European countries have large
agricultural infrastructures with the potential for large exports, they
lack money and do not conform to the EU's common agricultural
policy. The cow wars restrict their access to agricultural markets
and economic capital which could finance greater economic and
political reforms.
The reappearance of the screwworm along the Mexico-Texas border
has worried US cattlemen. Its return resulted from importation of
an infected herd from Central America in November 1992. Infection
of US cattle would result in "severe economic losses."23 This pest
eats the flesh of cows, destroying their hides, and kills newborn
calves. During the past four decades, over $400 million has been
spent on US-Mexican screwworm eradication programs. A major
concern created by lowering trade barriers during the North
American Free Trade Agreement negotiations was how this treaty
would facilitate the spread of agricultural pests like the screwworm.
Illustrative Scenarios
Thus, naturally occurring events where the agent, the susceptible
host, and the environment converge can result in disease, economic
loss, and national or international repercussions. No evidence
indicates that any nation or group willfully caused the events cited.
However, we may not be so lucky in the twenty-first century. It is
all too possible to construct a scenario which would offer plausible
denial and possible gain to a potential adversary.
Scenario One: Corn Futures
The US Department of Agriculture estimates that the 1994 corn
harvest would plunge 31.4 percent from record summer rains and
flooding. It was expected the cost of a bushel of corn would soar to
three dollars. The February 1994 price of corn, the nation's number
one crop, was the highest in a decade.24 The resultant increase in
cost increased operating expenses of companies "that handle[d]
everything from corn-based ethanol fuel to livestock."25
"We are vulnerable in 1994 . . . right on the edge," said Keith
Collins, acting assistant agriculture secretary for economics. The
fall 1993 harvest was too small to supply both domestic processors
and exporters. US stockpiles are expected to be at their lowest
levels since the food scare of the mid-1970s. A slight acceleration
in food inflation was expected in 1994. Food inflation in 1994 was
estimated at between 3.3 percent and 3.5 percent, up from 2.2
percent in 1993 and 1.2 percent in 1992. This is the first time in
about four years whereas food prices exceeded the general inflation
rate.26
A corn crop short of the 8.4-billion-bushel estimate would signal a
4 percent food inflation rate in 1995.27 Some additional disasters
such as a drought or loss of corn to blight, "would do considerable
economic damage to world food supplies."28 A 7.5-billion-bushel
corn crop would push prices to four dollars a bushel. Such a surge
would push inhibited exports and make hogs and cattle too
expensive for many farmers to feed, eventually driving up meat
prices.29
How could someone use biological agents to conduct economic
warfare by ruining a competitor's crop or product? Three more
scenarios involving corn, wine, and cotton attacks can illustrate the
potential BW threat.
Scenario Two: Corn Terrorism
A second scenario might go as follows. China is the world's second
largest corn exporter.30 Recognizing the vulnerable situation of the
United States, China plans an act of agricultural terrorism.
Selecting a corn seed blight, fusarium graminearum, which grows
well at cool temperatures and in wet soil, they clandestinely spray
this hearty spore over the US Midwest from commercial airliners
flying the polar route to Chicago and Saint Louis. They disseminate
the spore in winter and early spring, and the blight is present in the
soil when spring planting occurs.
The United States, despite eliminating the corn set-aside
requirements and planting more than 80 million acres of corn,
suffers from a crop disaster. This unexpected Chinese-induced corn
seed blight decimates the US corn crop. The fall harvest is a full 30
percent below expected levels. The United States then imports corn
for the first time in its history to meet domestic needs. Food prices
rise sharply and cause higher-than- expected food prices and
inflation. China gains significant corn market share and tens of
billions dollars of additional profits from their crop.
Scenario Three: That's a "Lousy" Wine
The grape louse (phylloxera vastratrix) is ravaging the vineyards of
Napa and Sonoma counties in Northern California. It is estimated
that 60-70 percent of the 68,000 vine acres are being destroyed.
The louse does not affect the fruit of the vine but attacks the roots,
which slowly kills the plant. It is difficult to detect, and once in
place, it is a prolific breeder. The louse is carried by wind, water,
and mud and, once discovered, is likely to have spread already to
other areas.31
Infected vines may be treated by removing them and replanting
them with louse-resistant plants. The estimated cost to the Napa-
Sonoma wine industry will be about $1 billion or more over the
next few years. The expected impact will be heavier on the more
expensive Northern California wines, causing the disappearance of
some labels.
A hypothetical scenario could consist of a group of disgruntled
European winemakers who are jealous at the superior quality of
Northern Californian wines and desirous of recapturing the wine
market. Traveling as tourists, they slip into the United States with
tins of pat which conceal millions of the offending louse.
Traveling through the California wine country, they disperse their
deadly cargo.
Scenario Four: Sabotaging Pakistan's Cotton Crop
Pakistan is the world's third-largest producer of cotton behind the
United States and China. In 1991 the Pakistanis exported $420.4
million of raw cotton, some 36 percent of its primary commodity
exports (excluding fuels) in 1991.32 If textiles, yarn, and other by-
products are included, almost 60 percent of Pakistan's exports
depend on cotton.33 Due to an attack caused by an insect, the 1993
harvest will fall 15 percent below expected levels.
This crop loss will affect the country's overall economic
performance. Pakistan will produce only 10 million or so bales of
the 12 million bales targeted. In 1993, Ahmed Muktar (the minister
of state for commerce) said, "This definitely would be detrimental
to our economy, because the surplus ... would have added to our
meager foreign exchange reserves."34 The immediate economic
impact of the crop loss, however, may have longer-lasting effects.
Cotton farmers, fearful of experiencing a similar disaster next year,
are considering planting something else. Rice, wheat, and
sugarcane, which are significantly less profitable (cotton is 43
times more profitable than all other crops), appear more attractive
and safer than cotton.35 "Restoring the confidence of farmers, who
doubt their ability to generate profits from cotton, could become
one of Pakistan's toughest challenges."36
The open hostility between Pakistan and India is not hypothetical.
They are competing against each other in an arms race involving
nuclear and conventional weapons. The heavy reliance of Pakistan
on a single export cash crop is not unusual in the developing world.
The geographic proximity of Pakistan to its principal adversary
allows a fairly easy route of infiltration and introduction of a pest
against a high-value target like its cotton crop. The ability to inflict
economic loss on Pakistan has repercussions that affect the private
and commercial sectors, the military, and the society.
Implications of Economic Biological Warfare
The current US focus on BW limits consideration to the human
effects of such agents as anthrax, plague, and smallpox. Little or no
effort seems to be devoted in assessing the vulnerabilities of the
United States or any other nation's agricultural or ecological
infrastructures to BW attack. If the focus of international and
regional competition is transitioning to economic power, it is
prudent to assess the potential impact of this form of economic
warfare, develop a comprehensive sur- veillance or monitoring
system, and prepare countermeasures.
Developed countries with adequate economic reserves, agricultural
diversity, and the means to mitigate such occurrences would be
relatively resistant to such attack. Even developed countries,
however, could experience significant economic losses and
political and national security repercussions if other intervening
events could make certain target commodities more vulnerable or
magnify the impact of BW use.
Lesser developed or developing nations are in a much more
precarious position. If the target commodity was a principal cash
crop or food source, using BW may inflict a grave blow to that
nation's economy or society and possibly result in some political
impact. History has recorded the chaos and instability created by
such natural catastrophes as famines and epidemics. Using BW in
this fashion would have applications to waging low-intensity
warfare with strategic outcomes.
Addressing the Problem
Recent public debate about the appropriateness of the US
intelligence community's collecting economically relevant
intelligence did not mention the impact of BW proliferation on
economies. Any open-source discussion about proliferation of
biological weapons does not address its utility in waging economic
warfare.
As in other forms of weapons proliferations, however, intelligence
remains key. The foundation of intelligence assessment related to
BW directed against economic targets is based on human
intelligence. Collection activities must be focused on research and
development efforts of adversarial nations in areas relating to
endemic and nonendemic nonhuman diseases and pests. The means
to assess any information collected requires a truly
multidisciplinary effort involving veterinarians, ecologists,
horticulturists, botanists, entomologists, and intelligence analysts.
While there is a requirement to assess what potential adversaries
are doing in these areas, vulnerability and potential impact data
must be collected on US systems. This effort requires a coordinated
interagency process involving the Departments of Agriculture,
Interior, Commerce, and Treasury as well as the Environmental
Protection Agency. Besides sensitizing the federal government to
the potential problem, state and local governments should support
this effort. State and local governments should be educated on the
importance of reporting nonhuman outbreaks of disease or pests
with economic significance.
Local and federal agencies should investigate reports of nonhuman
outbreaks which occur in defined high-value commodities, involve
potential BW or nonendemic agents, or inflict a certain threshold
economic loss.
Similarly, some existing integrated governmental mechanism must
be mobilized quickly to contain and mitigate the impact of a BW
attack. The Federal Emergency Response Plan contains at least a
theoretical structure to begin to address this problem.
The real and hypothetical examples cited highlight the opportunity
offered by BW as a means to attack the agricultural infrastructure
of an adversary. The existence of naturally occurring or endemic
agricultural pests or diseases and outbreaks as described permit an
adversary to use BW with plausible denial.
The impact of such events would go beyond simply affecting a
nation's economy to potentially affecting its national security. The
United States gave up its antiagricultural biological weapons long
before it unilaterally renounced the use and development of
biological warfare in 1969.
The present concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction appropriately recognize the threat posed by BW against
our military and citizenry. The question is whether our government
is aware of, or prepared to respond to, acts of BW? Is our
intelligence community sensitized or tracking proliferant's efforts
to develop antiagriculture BW? Is there a mechanism whereby
federal, state, and local agencies report and respond to acts
affecting valuable economic resources or involving suspicious or
nonendemic agents?
In the post-cold war era and as we enter the twenty-first century,
the economy determines superpower status. The threat posed by
biological weapons deserves prudent consideration.
Notes
1.Shintaro Ishihara cited in C. Fred Bergsten, "Japan and the
United States in the New World Economy," in Theodore Rueter,
ed., The United States in the World Political Economy, (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 175.
2.UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook, (New York: United Nations Publication, 1993),2.
3.World Economic Survey 1993: Current Trends & Policies in the
World Economy (New York: United Nations Publications, 1993),
72.
4.Ibid., 155.
5.Ibid.
6.Ibid.
7.Ibid., 72.
8.Ibid., 71.
9.Thomas Y. Canby, "Bacteria: Teaching Old Bugs New Tricks," National Geographic, 184, no.2 (August 1993); 53.
10.U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Harmful Non- indigenous Species in the United States (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing
Office, 1993), 65.
11.Jon Thompson, "King of Fibers," National Geographic, 185, no. 6. (June 1994): 80.
12.Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (New York: Noonday
Press, 1982), 70.
13.Rexmond C. Cochrane, "Biological Warfare Research in the United States," in History of the Chemical Warfare Service in World War II (1 July 1940-15 August 1945) (Washington DC: US Army, 1946), 3.
14.Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993).
15.Ibid., 11.
16.Office of Technology Assessment, Harmful Non-indigenous Species in the United States, 301.
17.Raymond J. Gill, "The Sweet Potato Whitefly Problem in Southern California," California Department of Food & Agriculture Report (Sacramento, Calif.: 1991).
18.Harmful Non-indigenous Species, 5.
19.Ibid., 65.
20."Aedes albopictus Introduction into Continental Africa," Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Atlanta: Center for Disease Control, 6 December 1991), 836.
21."Malaysia Rubber Industry Fears Deadly Latin Fungus," Baltimore Sun, 18 April 1993. 22.
22.Eric Bourne, "Europe's `Cow War' Shows Persistence of Cold War Divides," Christian Science Monitor, 20 April 1993. See also, "Epidemic Hits Italian Livestock," Wall Street Journal, 16 March 1993.
23.David Clark Scott, "Pest Infestation Spurs Doubts Over Standards in Mexico," Christian Science Monitor, 16 January 1993.
24."The Outlook: As Food Prices Rise 1994 Crops Hold Key," Wall Street Journal, 7 March 1994, 1.
25.Scott Kilman, "Corn Prices Are Expected to Soar After Forecast of 31.4% Plunge in US Harvest From Last Year," Wall Street Journal, 9 November 1993.
26."The Outlook: As Food Prices Rise 1994 Crops Hold Key," 1.
27.Ibid.
28.Ibid.
29.Ibid.
30.World Economic Survey 1993.
31.Kathleen Sharp, "The Louse and the Grape," American Way, 15 September 1993 44.
32.UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook, 16.
33.Farhan Bokhari, "Cotton Farmers Face Big Setback," Christian Science Monitor, 29 December 1993, 8.
34.Ibid.
35.Ibid.
36.Ibid.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those
of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United
States Air Force or the Air University.
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