Normative- Empathetic Warfare
by Chris Lapp
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"Normative-Empathetic warfare" is the combat mode of the
twenty-first century. The method involves adopting an empathetic
view of the victim, parsing his value schemata, and then creating
a situation where his value schemata bias him in favor of an
action that can later lead to the victim's control by the
adversary, and/or ultimately his destruction.
For theory, it is based on the writings of Karl Mannheim and
Jurgend Habermas (_Sociology of Knowledge_, and _Knowledge and
Humand Interests_). For practice, it refines the art of "dirty
tricks" to an empirical science.
Let's take a practical example to illustrate how a
normative-empathetic attack on a three-letter intelligence
community employee might occur. Let's for the sake of argument
assume we don't know who the intelligence community employee is,
i.e. we have no idea of his name, his address, his personal
life, his income, etc. The only thing we know of are his values,
and the fact that he investigates "anomalies" in the political
and social life of say, the United States.
Here is how it would be approached.
1. Like any good war, the goals of the endeavor need to be
thoroughly planned out before the operation begins. Let's say,
for the purpose of this discussion, that the object is to produce
the forced retirement of a group of particularly effective
intelligence agents, as a purely internal disciplinary measure on
the part of the intelligence agency.
2. In order to do this, some knowledge of the internal auditing
and counterintelligence resources deployed internally in the
agency needs to be at least theoretically assumed. Since similar
operations tend to have similar controls, the adversary's
counterintelligence policies would do nicely as a model for the
victim's controls. The goal then, is to create enough of a
prima facie case against the agents that an internal audit and
counterintelligence effort is undertaken. The key is that a
one-time application of this approach is inadequate, rather,
using a variety of channels the prima facie evidence must appear
again and again, so that the more effort the agents expend in
trying to do a good job, the greater the investigative resources
the internal auditors will deploy against them.
3. Let's, for the sake of argument, design an attack against the
crews monitoring nuclear forces in the USSR. How would the USSR
discredit the Free World analysts of satellite data? Remember,
they don't know who they are, only what the analysts do. The
only advantage the USSR has is that it >controls< the input, i.e.
what the satellites see. The U.S. analysts must write about what
they see, and therein lies the rub.
4. Here's how a normative empathetic attack against Satellite
Analysts might proceed:
Day One: The phrase "WE PAY $20,000 TO YOUR ACCOUNT" is spelled
out using truck and missle equipment normally hidden in siberia,
in a message several hundred yards long. The satellite analysts
spot it and report it up the command chain.
Day Two: Twenty thousand dollars in cash suddenly turns up in
packets delivered to U.S. Embassies across the world.
Day Three: A satellite suddenly veers off course, and drops a
small parachuted package into a sparsely populated portion of
Colorado, near a strategic command center. The package has a
strong radio beacon attached to it. When the authorities find it
they discover it contains a bottle of high quality imported
scotch, with a U.S. price tag on it. It has the fingerprints of
the Secretary of State, and the President on it.
Day Four: All of a sudden, encryption on the Soviet Diplomatic
Communications Channels ceases, and arguments over the best
local restaurants, vodka, personal marriage problems, confessions
of loneliness, complaints about embassy food, apartments, furniture,
and clothing are broadcast in plaintext.
Day Five: A plainload of schoolboys from Moscow lands in
Washington D.C., each with a diplomatic passport. Their luggage
consists of a single attache case, with twenty-thousand dollars
in small, worn bills in it. They are hustled aboard a bus, have
lunch at the Soviet Embassy, and are put on the next AEROFLOT
flight back to Russia.
Day Six: Everything returns to normal. The events described above are not repeated. The fun begins.
5. The normal conceptualization and processing of intelligence
data would cease, and the experts would have to report a crisis
to their superiors. Because of the money, booze, and plaintext
messages, the U.S. would be forced to conclude that somebody with
access to this anomalous information had gone bad. A major
counterintelligence investigation would ensue, into the most
sensitive areas of the U.S. Government. Repeating this process
using different actions, timed and placed for different targets
would effectively throw the intelligence community into a loop!
Chris Lapp
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