Understanding Covert Repressive Action

by Christian Davenport

Understanding Covert Repressive Action: An Assessment of Political Surveillance and Anti-Red Squads in the United States

by Christian Davenport

Center for International Development and Conflict Management

University of Maryland

0145a Tydings Hall College Park, MD 20742

email: [email protected]: www.cdavenport.com

Understanding Covert Repressive Action

Abstract

Although overt protest policing has been studied extensively (e.g., mass arrests of protestors), there have been no rigorous investigations of covert protest policing ­ CPP (e.g., electronic and physical surveillance). To better understand the latter, I use information about Detroit "Red Squad" activity during the late 1960's and early 1970's directed against a Black Nationalist organization named the Republic of New Africa (N=3,136, by neighborhood-month). In line with existing research, evidence reveals that CPP responds to current as well as prior dissent and lagged repression. Differing from existing literature, evidence also reveals that CPP responds to residential patterns of dissident members and, most importantly, to the racial and economic characteristics of the neighborhood within which targets are located. In understanding covert activity, it thus matters less what you do or what has been done, than who you are and where you happen to be; Simply, context and profiling trump behavioral threat.

Most people are aware of the fact that police and government agencies engage in covert protest policing against those who challenge or threaten their authority - hereafter CPP (e.g., we know that authorities apply electronic and physical surveillance, read mail, send false letters, and plant informants as well as agents provocateur within targeted organizations for information and disruptive purposes).1Despite the widespread awareness of such activity, however, we generally do not know much about why such behavior occurs, across time and across space (i.e., the same region, country or in the case of this study city). Occasionally there will be some insight into the process and discussion about what is taking place.

For example, when information about the counterintelligence program in the U.S. (COINTELPRO) came to light during the 1970's, many were astounded to find out about what the Federal Bureau of Investigation was doing to dissident organizations that were deemed "threatening" to the state as well as what they were doing to citizens, seemingly uninvolved with protest behavior but, who were frequently sympathetic to challenges and challengers. Comparable responses could be found after the fall of communism with the release of information about the KGB (in the former Soviet Union) and the STASI (in East Berlin) as well as when information was distributed about the SAVAK of Iran, the UBEK in Poland, and the NISA of the Philippines. All of these disclosures sparked discussion about freedom and state power ­ albeit for relatively brief moments. Similarly, after the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, individuals again began to discuss and reflect upon covert activity and state power (e.g., Johnston and Von Natta 2001; Sikkink 2001). Amidst discussions about the failure of this action to identify the threat beforehand, many individuals in the U.S. began to wonder about what covert state authorities might do to "root out" terrorism in the future as well as what aspects of life might be impacted for terrorists, individuals of Middle Eastern descent and for everyone else who did not fall into either of these categories but who shared their national borders. Wondering no doubt continues after the passage of the U.S. anti-terrorism legislation - a measure that granted extensive covert powers to police and intelligence organizations.

What accounts for the variance in covert activity? Different explanations exist. Quantitative analyses of overt protest policing2(OPP), lead us to focus on three factors:

1) protest or the "challenge" (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Ziegenhagen 1986; Gurr 1993; Davenport 1995; 2000; McCarthy et al. 1996; King 1998; Moore 1998),

2) prior repression or "coercive tendencies" (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1996), and

3) facilitative political-economic factors or simply "context"3(e.g., Hibbs 1973; Ziegenhagen 1986; Franks 1989; Lopez and Stohl 1989; Gurr 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 1999; McCarthy et al. 1996; Moore 1998; King 2000).

Each of these has been found to increase OPP across a wide range of cases/databases, methodologies and substantive interests. When one considers the qualitative literature relevant to covert activity, however, they are lead in a different direction. This work compels us to focus less on the challenge and more on the "challenger" ­ identifying specifically who is involved in confronting authorities, where they live and so forth (e.g., Churchill and Vander Wall 1990). Research on police routines leads us to focus on "cues" and "profiling" (e.g., Donner 1990) ­ the use of descriptive characteristics such as race and class in order to identify individuals that may or may not be associated with the target group.

Finally, urban riot literature (e.g., Fogelson 1968; Bergeson 1982) as well as research on social control (e.g., Liska 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1992) leads us to highlight the process of "contextualization", whereby the position of authorities, targeted individuals and bystanders within a political-economic structure determines what is done and to whom. Here, factors such as race and class are not just believed to influence the likelihood that CPP is employed, but they are expected to shape the vary manner in which state power is used across diverse segments of the population as they impact the substantive meaning of such behavior across relevant domains.

To investigate the determinants of CPP, assessing the relative importance of both sets of explanatory variables, the article begins with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of existing quantitative research on OPP. Following this, I detail what qualitative literature tells about the topic, something that is generally ignored by the more quantitative approach. Some initial tests of the propositions generated by combining both areas of research are then conducted.

For this, I utilize a database of anti-radical ("Anti-Red"), covert activity undertaken by 11 police and intelligence organizations in Detroit, Michigan between 1968 and 1973, which are analyzed by the neighborhood-month (N=3,136). Results disclose that the use of wiretaps as well as electronic and physical surveillance is influenced by dissent (contemporaneous and contiguous), prior repressive activity (both covert as well as overt), and residential concentration in dissidents. Most importantly, results disclose that the specific relationships themselves vary across neighborhoods in accordance to race and class. Context is not just some backdrop against which state-dissident contentious interactions take place; rather, it animates these phenomena (Flint et al. 2000), influencing who and what is targeted as well as where such targets are deemed "threatening" and worthy of state sanction. Based on these findings, the conclusion outlines several new areas for research relevant to the topic of protest policing/repression and political freedom.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF STATE REPRESSION (OR, OPP 101)

Empirical research on overt protest policing4has grown significantly over the past 30 years. One may define such behavior as those actions taken by authorities against individuals and/or groups that directly challenge its leaders, policies, and practices or appear to pose some form of "threat" to them, for the purposes of neutralizing and eliminating said threat (Goldstein 1978). Relevant actions include restricting the behavior and/or beliefs of those challenging the existing political-economic system through the imposition of negative sanctions (e.g., applying curfews, conducting mass arrests, and banning political organizations). It is also possible that authorities violate personal integrity (i.e., they use torture, disappearances and mass killing).5The theoretical framework most frequently utilized to explain this behavior is rather straightforward. It is believed that repression results from some decision-calculus undertaken by political authorities (e.g., Dahl 1966; Walter 1969; Stohl and Lopez 1983; Simon 1994), where they weigh the costs (e.g., decreased legitimacy, spent resources, and increased resistance) against benefits (e.g., increased legitimacy, longevity, and decreased resistance) of taking such action. If the benefits exceed costs, then OPP is expected; if costs exceed benefits, then OPP is not anticipated. The essentially rationalist framework should not be accepted wholeheartedly, however, as there are elements of culture and habit that pervade the decision-making process. For example, it is expected that cultural norms within repressive organizations as well as between authorities and dissidents (and citizens) influence OPP by impacting what is deemed necessary and acceptable (e.g., Gurr 1986a;b; Della Porta 1995).

Adopting this rationalist-culturalist explanation, all of the quantitative literature relevant to the topic has been engaged in the systematic assessment of diverse explanatory variables, which are alternatively classified as either costs or benefits. In an effort to understand covert repressive activity, it makes sense to begin our inquiry with identifying what this literature tells us is most important. This is done below.

THE USUAL SUSPECTS: CHALLENGES, COERCIVE TENDENCIES, AND CONTEXT

There are basically three types of variables used to account for variance in OPP. These have been utilized within all analyses of the topic. With regard to the first variable, it has been found that dissent (the challenge) compels authorities to respond with some form of political sanction (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Ziegenhagen 1986; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; Franklin 1997; King 1998; Moore 1998). The perceived benefit of using OPP is simply the elimination of domestic threats and an increased chance of political survival for leaders, policies and existing political-economic relations.6Not all dissent is expected to impact OPP in the same manner. The magnitude and type of state response has been found to vary in accordance to the frequency and type of protest confronted. For example, violent dissent tends to increase violent OPP (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 2000) and diverse types of dissident activity tend to increase state restrictions while less diverse forms tend to be ignored (e.g., Davenport 1995). Despite these differences, all findings move in the same direction: challenges increase repression. The second variable identified within the literature concerns the coercive tendencies of repression organizations or what others have referred to as "bureaucratic inertia" or the "law of the instrument". As stated by Gurr (1986a, 160): (t)o the extent that (specialized agencies of protest policing) exist, the levels and intensity of coercion by a regime tend to remain high... Once such structures are in operation, elites are likely to calculate that the relative costs of relying on coercion are lower... These strategic considerations tend to be reinforced by habituation; in other words, the development of elite norms that coercive control is not only necessary but desirable. Moreover, a bureaucratic "law of the instrument" may prevail: The professional ethos of agencies of control centers on the use of coercion to restrain challenges to state authority. Their directors may therefore recommend violent "solutions" to suspected opposition, or use their position to initiate them, as a means of justifying the agencies' continued existence. In this case, benefit is derived from maintaining a link with an organization's history.7This relationship has been supported in every empirical investigation of the subject (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 1999). The third explanation for repression used within the literature concerns the broader political-economic context within which state-dissident interactions take place (e.g., the level of political democracy present within the polity [e.g., Hibbs 1973; Ziegenhagen 1986; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 1999; Zanger 2000] or the level of economic development [e.g., Hibbs 1973; Ziegenhagen 1986; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 1996]). These variables are generally used in a manner whereby their presence influences the perceived costs and benefits of taking action. For instance, some research has found that the responsiveness of authorities to dissent varies in accordance to the amount of democracy present, as the regime attempts to maintain legitimacy within the eyes of their citizenry by tolerating certain forms of mass protest (e.g., Davenport 1999; King 2000).8The variables identified here differ from the two already discussed because they represent factors that do not directly involve the combatants themselves (i.e., the agents of contention). Rather, they serve more as the backdrop against which interactions between authorities and dissidents occur. Below I provide a diagram, which illustrates the basic explanatory model identified within the literature and the one that guides most of the research on the topic. (Insert Figure 1 About Here)

THE UNUSUAL SUSPECTS: EXPLORING NON-TRADITIONAL EXPLANATIONS

The three variables identified above are important for our understanding of how authorities use their power against dissidents. When one reflects on this work, it is clear that the basic story that emerges is both intuitive and somewhat commonsensical: challenges are perceived and when the context appears favorable, a certain form of state power is unleashed against deviants in an effort to compel their quiescence. At the same time, we must also acknowledge that all of the empirically rigorous work on the topic has concerned merely one form of state power - overt activity. When one considers covert state action, however, they are lead to question the applicability of the explanations identified above. Indeed, when one reads about CPP, they come to acknowledge that other dimensions of contention exist which are largely ignored by the other body of work; dimensions which, if addressed, would significantly alter our understanding of what is involved as well as how one should study the subject. These are addressed below.

CHALLENGERS

Perhaps the most glaring difference between OPP and CPP is the fact that within the context of the latter, authorities are more attentive to individuals who are identified as "challengers" (i.e., those actively attempting to confront authorities) and they are less attentive to discrete challenges being made against the state (i.e., specific protests or campaigns). This difference is largely determined by the different objectives being sought by the repressive techniques.

OPP, on the one hand, is directed against overt, public and collective challenges in an effort to counter overt, public and collective action where authorities show a public response to the challengers as well as the viewing public.

CPP, on the other hand, is directed against the private lives of individual challengers as well as collective groupings of them in an effort to understand what is taking place, who is involved and how mobilization can be undermined before it reaches the more public realm (e.g., Marx 1974; 1979; Wise 1976; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990; Koehler 1999; Cunningham 2002). The focal point of OPP is the street protest; the focal point of CPP is the place where dissent occurs but also the place where dissidents work, shop, worship, sleep, have sex and "hang out". The CPP orientation directly alters existing research because the work on OPP assumes that authorities:

1) wait for protest,

2) are caught within a matrix of bureaucratic inertia applying what has been applied before, and/or

3) are compelled by structural conditions to behave in certain ways.

The qualitative literature on covert repression challenges this view, however, forcing us to conclude that the first relationship is naïve, the second is missing the point and the third lacks any sense of complexity. Of course, this work would maintain, repression responds to dissent, habit and context.

Additionally, however, it is clear that states do not just wait around for something to happen on the "public" stage (i.e., out in the street) nor do they cease to try to eliminate dissent after individual challenges end and those involved in dissent go away (returning home, back to base-camp and so forth). Rather, authorities actively attempt to preempt things from happening in the first place, working on a more "private" stage (Marx 1974; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990; Koehler 1999; Cunningham 2002). Simply, covert repression alters existing scholarship for it does not privilege the observation of any one aspect of a challenger's life; instead, it considers all aspects at once. Now, who is a "challenger"? The identification of these actors is not as straightforward as one would believe.

According to literature on OPP, challengers are those who engage in protest (i.e., those involved in the demonstration or suicide bombing). According to covert literature, however, it is frequently unclear who is active in challenging authority and who is not; individuals may serve as direct participants, supporters or potential members. In many respects, the identification of these different categories is the main objective of the technique. As a consequence of this vagueness, the category of "challenger" employed in the application of covert activity is not exclusively limited to those directly engaged in dissent and observed during public incidents. Instead, covert action targets a wide spectrum of individuals; those directly involved in activity in the public domain as well as (involved and uninvolved) citizens in the "private" domain who might have a connection with the challengers in question or who might join the challengers in the future. CPP is not just concerned with "who was out there last time" therefore but also with "who might be out there next time".

For example, within literature on counterinsurgency (e.g., Klare and Kornbluh 1987) and urban riots (e.g., Fogelson 1968; Bergeson 1982; Myers 1997) one can find numerous references to the point that authorities, confronting these challenges, are very much concerned with targeting diverse groups of people in an effort to assess whether they are involved with a social movement or act of dissent and in what capacity. Combating terrorists, guerillas and protestors, authorities are relentless in asking the questions: Where do dissidents live? Who do they interact with? Who is likely sympathetic to their efforts? Where might they move? Where are they likely to strike next? In an effort to address these questions, "dragnets" or "searchlights" tend to be cast rather widely, engulfing many individuals/groups simultaneously. In the aftermath of 9/11, this is all incredibly familiar now.

CUES

The second explanatory factor identified within the qualitative literature concerns the "cues" that are used by political authorities in the application of CPP. The extensive discussion of racial profiling utilized by police organizations in the U.S. fight against crime and ethnic profiling in the context of the fight against domestic terrorism is illustrative for it reminds us about the difficulty in making judgments within a complex environment and how short cuts/rules of thumb are frequently used in navigating around/through these complexities. This becomes relevant to a discussion of covert repressive activity because, as identified above, targets/locales are not always pinpointed in an exact fashion. One is not simply able to send police into the streets of Seattle in order to break up the anti-IMF protests. Rather, it appears to be more of an inexact science; looking here and there for clues, assembling information, only to return again to another location. In short, covert repressive action appears to penetrate society out of ignorance and not wisdom about what is taking place and who is involved. Knowing a descriptive characteristic of the challenger (e.g., if they are of Arab descent or if they live in particular parts of a city) can thus serve as a quick reference to guide repressive agents in their targeting of individuals/locales. Similar to the previous discussion about challengers, paying attention to this factor alters existing thinking about state repression because it directs us to pay attention not only to what challenges do but also who challengers are. This element has always been neglected within the existing literature.

CONTEXTUALIZATION

Directly relevant to the last point, the third explanatory factor that I wish to discuss is labeled "contextualization". Within existing literature on OPP, diverse aspects of the political-economic context influence the decision to repress by altering perceived costs and benefits. Rather than view context as something that influences the interaction between authorities and challengers, however - something largely exogenous, I wish to suggest that context defines the relevant actors (authorities, challengers and third parties), as well as their interaction (protest and repression) - where it is largely endogenous; this is done in addition to defining the costs and benefits. Perhaps because of the way in which political historical accounts of covert activity are written, one frequently comes away from this work with a sense that place, time and locale culture matter; What Tarrow (1998) refers to as "eventful history".

For example, within the U.S. case, the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover has been consistently characterized as an individual who sought to infiltrate the civil rights movement with covert techniques because of a larger fear of global communism (brought on by the Soviet Union and the Cold War) but also because of an organizational stance against anti-government behavior and a personal dislike of African-Americans (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990). One cannot tell the story of the FBI accurately without paying attention to these factors. One could probably make similar arguments about other charismatic and influential leaders of repressive organizations. This element is also generally missing from the OPP literature.

The distinction drawn above between context and contextualization is important because I am not simply saying that the decision to police an organization with covert techniques, in different locales, is influencedby context. Instead, I am saying that the identification of who is an authority, who is a challenger, who is an "innocent" bystander, and what should be used by the police in diverse times and places is determinedby context. For example, with regard to class within the U.S. case, many have made the argument that protest policing was/is employed by the wealthy to protect them from the lower class, while simultaneously maintaining the support of the middle/working class (e.g., Goldstein 1978; Jacobs 1979; Donner 1990). Such a contextualization influences who is targeted, who is left alone as well as what strategies are used by authorities as the context (the presence of targets and bystanders) varies over time and space.

BUILDING A BETTER REPRESSION MODEL

The various relationships identified above have been placed together in the diagram below (Figure 2). Within this framework, covert action is determined by the challenge (dissent), coercive tendencies (prior covert as well as overt activity)9as well as context. Additionally, covert action is also influenced by the challenger (those who participate in overt challenge), cues (specific rules of thumb regarding who should be targeted), and contextualization (the overarching political, economic and cultural situation which provides meaning to authority-citizen interactions). The difference between two of these factors merits a brief discussion. With regard to cues and challenger designation, repressive behavior is influenced by factors such as race and class, but the relationships are similar across different neighborhoods varying only in terms of racial and class designation. For example, according to this perspective protest of an African American social movement in a neighborhood that has a large number of African Americans would have the same impact on CPP as protest of the same social movement organization in a neighborhood that was predominately white. With regard to contextualization, however, it is believed that different types of relationships would be found across contexts. Utilizing the same example as that above, it would be expected that within each of the two neighborhoods one would find distinct applications of CPP. As the costs and benefits would likely vary across the two contexts (given the potential for escalation and diffusion within the former and the potential trouble of being discovered within the latter as well as the general degree to which this targets the wrong audience), it is expected that different strategies of CPP would be found in each case, responding to distinct causal factors. Context thus determines what the challenge means as well as what the most appropriate response would be; it is not just a backdrop. (Insert Figure 2 About Here)

CONTENTION IN THE MOTOR CITY

To conduct my investigation, I rely upon data that was collected (citation withheld) concerning the policing of a protest organization in the United States named the Republic of New Africa(hereafter RNA). This diverse group10of black Americans, composed of individuals from all walks of life (the U.S. military, teachers, lawyers, machinists, barbers and so forth) explicitly challenged national, state, and local authorities during the period between March 1968 (the founding of the organization) and April 1973 (the last month of police activity reported in the files and when the organization shifted its' base of operation to Mississippi).

Although, RNA activities took place in numerous cities throughout the U.S. during this period (e.g., Detroit, New York, Chicago, and Mississippi), my research focuses only on their principal base of operation ­ Detroit. The primary goal of the RNA was to establish independence from the United States government. This objective was to be achieved through a threefold strategy:

1) the organization desired a plebiscite among blacks in order to determine the "national status" of the "New Afrikan population in North America,"

2) it sought land for the establishment of an independent country (specifically, the group sought five states: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, from the U.S. government)11and

3) it sought reparations for the treatment of blacks as slaves (Republic of New Africa 1968).

With these objectives in mind and personifying an interesting combination of civil rights and black power strategies, the RNA engaged in many legal forms of protest: rallies, petitions, political education courses, "self-defense" programs, food drives, lectures, conferences, and the publication of "independent" news letters/papers. The organization also engaged in numerous illegal and violent activities as well: robberies, shootouts with police, plots to bomb state and federal buildings, and even a plane hijacking.

The U.S. government did not sit idly by in the face of such activity. There were numerous authorities that were engaged in the policing of the RNA: Detroit Police Department (Special Investigations, Demonstration Detail, Detective Division, Homicide, Criminal Division, Public Complaints Division, and Tactical Reconnaissance), the Michigan State Police, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All of these organizations arrested members for various offenses, conducted electronic and physical surveillance, and had placed informants as well as agents provocateur within the organization for the purposes of obtaining information and disruption. The data within this study were compiled from the organization's "Red Squad" file ­ a collection of documents from police, state and national organizations regarding the RNA's activity and the authority's treatment of the group.12The files describe, in elaborate detail, hourly meetings attended by informants, surveillance reports from police officers at members' homes, meeting halls, places of worship, etc., and arrest reports.

The files also include the strategic planning efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation based in Washington, D.C. as well as periodic updates from field officers within Michigan. From this archive, an events-based data set of protest and protest policing activity in Detroit13was established. Regarding protest, I coded the following characteristics:

* The activity undertaken by RNA members (e.g., business meetings, fundraising efforts, food shopping, shooting practice, riots, being at home, demonstrations, social gatherings, political education courses, petitions, speeches, mock trials, and rallies);

* The identity of specific individuals attending events;

* The approximate number of individuals in attendance at each event;

* The geographic location of the activity by street, longitude and latitude;14

* The date - by day, month and year; and,

* The time - by hour and minute.

Regarding repression of the group, I coded the following information:

* The type of activity undertaken by state authorities (e.g., arrests, sentences, instances of physical and electronic surveillance, wire-tapping, and the forging of letters by authorities);

* The identity of the organization involved in covert action (e.g., Reconnaissance Division, Criminal Division, Special Investigation Bureau, Michigan State Police and the FBI);

* The number of agents involved in each activity;

* The geographic location of activities by street, longitude and latitude;

* The date - by day, month and year; and,

* The time - by hour and minute.

In the data set, all events were aggregated to the month and neighborhood where they occurred. This aggregation was utilized in an effort to approximate the real pace at which contentious behavior is being enacted15as well as to address the fact that policing routines were (are) based on spatial designations/jurisdictions (districts or neighborhoods in this case). With regard to the latter issue (space), such an approach also allows me to empirically investigate something that has been ignored within the policing/repression literature: the assumption that across the same territorial domain (countries or cities) that similar behavior patterns would be found. As there is no reason why different parts of a country or city would be comparable across political, economic or cultural characteristics and would be viewed or treated in the same way by political authorities, this type of analysis is much needed. As compiled, the data identify a total of 208 different RNA residences ("private" stage activity),16763 events of RNA activity at 152 addresses (including protest demonstrations, mock trials, meetings and political education courses) and 2,961 events of covert action directed against 502 addresses (including physical and electronic surveillance, as well as the receipt of false-letters).17 To assess the impact of diverse contextual factors, one other database was used. In 1965, the City of Detroit commissioned a series of demographic profile studies across 49 neighborhoods (TALUS 1968; City of Detroit 1971) ­ these are identified on Appendix 1. This data includes indicators of the percentage of blacks in residence and the average income for residents of the neighborhood in question.18These were used to address the influence of race and class.

In an effort to analyze causal relationships, I was very sensitive to the fact that the dependent variable was an event count (the number of covert actions taking place within a specific neighborhood and month) and sensitive to the fact that with data on 49 neighborhoods over a span of sixty-four months (total N of 3,136) this dataset was comparable to a cross-sectional, time-series database used within studies of repression in a more comparative context (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995a; 1999). As a result, this study relies upon a variant of negative binomial maximum-likelihood regression (Long 1997), which has been specifically created in order to deal with panel data ­ in particular, the "xtnbreg" command in STATA (STATA 2001, 386-394). For all other estimations (e.g., when the cross-sectional, time-series is parsed into quartiles) the negative binomial regression ("nbreg" procedure) was employed (STATA 2001, 383-392).19Although this approach deviates from much of the literature on protest policing, state repression and human rights that has come to rely upon some form of OLS regression model (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1999), in line with research by Krain (1997), I believe that the procedure adopted here is valid; this is especially the case given the way in which the data were compiled and given the questions that I seek to examine.

While careful about the claims made within this paper, it should be clearly understood about my hesitancy to generalize from this one case. In many respects one could argue that the Detroit "Red Squad" and their interaction with the RNA was unique: it was quite small relative to other "Red Squads" in the United States (Donner 1990), the degree of racial polarization in Detroit was rather high (perhaps exacerbating the importance of ethnicity within the conflict), the institutions were provided with large amounts of leeway for long historical time periods (allowing the development of a very insulated policing community), the RNA was one of the only secessionist organizations to emerge during the time, and the sixties were simply the "Sixties" (a context that is difficult to imagine approximating anywhere else). At the same time, I would argue that the issue of generalizability is occasionally secondary to one of understanding a phenomenon that has never been examined before and one that we do not understand very well. States have been using covert activity since their inception and given the benefits of knowing who is about to challenge, who is challenging, and who supports challengers, states will likely continue to use wiretaps/bugs, physical surveillance, informants and agents provocateur well into the future ­ this is especially the case within a democratic context where OPP and other manifestations of state coercion are deemed costly. In this context, as the RNA database is the only one available that addresses covert action, I would argue that any rigorous analysis of the subject would significantly advance our knowledge. While the analysis is exploratory, therefore, it is still extremely important.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF COVERT REPRESSION (OR CPP 102)

At this point, I return to the question asked earlier: what accounts for variation in covert protest policing? I begin to answer to this question with the basic explanatory model identified above, regressing covert activity on:

1) dissent (contemporaneous, lagged and contiguous),20

2) covert action (lagged as well as contiguous),

3) two dummy variables (identifying the impact of distinct phases in overt protest policing) and

4) with various contextual factors. Each is explained below.

The first set of variables measures diverse aspects of political challenge while the second concerns the impact of prior covert activity. While the variables are consistent with the discussion earlier, I have introduced a new element into the discussion with regard to operationalization that merits attention. From quantitative investigations on overt repression and qualitative research on covert action, it is consistently identified that authorities respond to protest and generally do what they have done before. Although research normally investigates delayed influences with a lagged variable, it is clear that this is inappropriate without some spatial designation.

A lagged variable does not identify where the relevant action took place and if the importance of bureaucratic inertia is accurate at all, then it is equally as important whattook place as well as wheresomething took place for actions occur at specific locations at specific times. As I believe that authorities are more likely to act either where they have acted before or very close to where they have previously undertaken activity I have introduced a measure of contiguous action. As a consequence, the impact of protest is 1) contemporaneous at the same spatial locale, 2) contiguous and 3) delayed; the impact of repression is 1) lagged and 2) spatially contiguous. The dummy variables regarding OPP attempt to identify distinct moments within the case under investigation where significant changes took place in the manner in which these activities were undertaken. The logic here is akin to that used with reference to cues. If overt behavior takes a particular form, then this would alter the perceived necessity for covert activity. The expectations vary.

On the one hand, if OPP is increased, then this may signal to covert organizations that more information is needed as the perceived threat has been increased. On the other hand, it may be the case that increased OPP reduces the necessity for information, as there are simply less social movement members and activities to monitor. In line with this discussion, there were two time periods within the RNA case that likely identify phase-shifts in the OPP approach.

The first dummy variable identifies a raid and arrest that took place on March 29, 1969 at New Bethel church (known as the "New Bethel Incident"). This involved a confrontation between the RNA and Detroit police department, which resulted in a shooting, standoff, and the single largest arrest of RNA members (approximately 100-200) for conspiracy to commit murder. The second dummy variable identifies a raid, shooting and arrest that took place on August of 1971 at an RNA residence in Jackson, Mississippi during which time one police officer was killed and 11 members (including the leader at the time) were arrested on charges of murder, assault with a deadly weapon and "waging war on the State of Mississippi" (Obadele 1995). As these events were deemed extremely important to authority-RNA relations, both of these variables were coded "0" before the event in question and "1" afterwards.21

In order to address the issue of context, several neighborhood characteristics are considered:

1) the number of RNA members in residence ­ which can be viewed as an indicator of challengers,

2) average income of the population ­ which can be viewed as a cue to authorities who believed that poorer individuals would be attracted to the RNA's variant of black radicalism, and

3) the percentage of blacks living in a neighborhood ­ which can be viewed as another cue given the fact that the RNA was exclusively African-American.22(Insert Table 1 About Here)23

Differing significantly from the quantitative literature on overt repression but clearly in line with more qualitative research and the argument put forth earlier, when the factors identified above are examined for their impact on CPP (Table 1), results disclose that covert action was not influenced by when and where dissent took place (either contemporaneously, delayed by one month or that took place within surrounding neighborhoods). Rather, the findings reveal that covert activity was positively influenced by what the police had done previously (coercive tendencies), what they were doing in the area surrounding the particular neighborhood in question (coercive tendencies), and how many RNA members lived in the particular neighborhood in question (the challenger designation).24The raids at New Bethel and Mississippi both decreased the amount of covert activity (coercive tendencies). Seriously undermining the effectiveness of the RNA and the will of the individuals to involve themselves with the organization, after large-scale, overt repressive actions, the necessity for wiretaps and physical surveillance was diminished. Concerning contextual factors, CPP was also influenced by various neighborhood characteristics.

For example, results disclose that the percentage of blacks and the average income of the neighborhood decreased the likelihood of surveillance, wiretaps, false letters, and so forth. This is interesting because it leads one to believe that neighborhoods with large numbers of African Americans and with higher incomes were less likely to experience covert activity. While these findings make sense in some respects, given the demographic make-up of the RNA, the ethnicity finding proves to be somewhat puzzling because it suggests that covert action concerning the black nationalist organization was diminished when the number of blacks living in a neighborhood increased. This strongly moves against my expectations for I believed that an organization that advocated black empowerment and separation would be perceived by authorities to be most threatening within the context of principally African American neighborhoods.

In an effort to counter any potential aftereffects of this behavior, it was anticipated that CPP would be applied throughout the target area. Simply, unable to figure out which blacks would support the RNA, it would be easier to assume that all would be sympathetic and as a result most blacks would be targeted. Evidently, it appeared to be more important to monitor neighborhoods that had less concentrated black populations. This reveals a strategy of CPP that is much more selective in nature; one more concerned with where resources are extended.

CONTEXTUALIZING CONTENTIOUS INTERACTIONS

Up to this point (and similar to existing literature on state repression) limited attention has been given to the fact that costs and benefits are perceived distinctly across contexts and that causal relationships may vary across neighborhoods. Within the RNA case, however, I would argue that class and race play an important role in the use of covert repressive techniques. In this section I wish to explore the matter in somewhat greater detail. When one reads about Detroit "Red Squads", the RNA and Detroit, it is clear that context is important. It is not inconsequential to the basic story that the authorities were principally white, serving a small but wealthy white community and that the RNA were exclusively black and largely poor (at least in relative terms).

Indeed, in many respects this is the story (e.g., Fogelson 1968; Locke 1969; Platt 1971; Bergeson 1982). This is something that is largely missed within a literature where neither dissidents nor authorities are given identities; generally, actors are merely examined as serving particular functions.25This more context-laden form of inquiry (like that employed by Tilly et al. 1975, McAdam 1982, Koopmans 1995), is probably the most appropriate way to investigate state-dissident interactions in the RNA case for as Donner (1990, 291) tells us about the case:

(A) number of cities, of which Detroit is a prime example, reflected in their police structures and target priorities a similar "urban pathology": a decaying black ghetto, widespread poverty, a city administration left fiscally impotent by the flight of the white middle class to the suburbs and ravaged by the corruption of politicians who retained power by exploiting the tension between black and white racial enclaves, the emergence of potentially violent black and white groups, and the development among white policemen of a "siege mentality" against the black community. Both before and after the ghetto riots of the late sixties, self help and violence inevitably came to be regarded in both camps ­ police and ghetto ­ as a vital means of survival. "Law and order" became a coded battle cry as the police were transformed into an army defending white power and the status quo. In this confrontation, the urban intelligence unit played a key role. Blacks ­ their organizations and activities ­ became prime targets for ongoing surveillance regardless of their political views....26This statement reveals elements of both class as well as race amidst the backdrop of the 1967 riot (Locke 1969), when blacks as "rioters" were pitted against whites as police ­ an event "in which forty-three were killed, hundreds wounded, and 7,200 arrested, not to speak of the millions of dollars of property damage" (Donner 1990, 292). In this context, the way to understand CPP is to move the study from what Tarrow (1989) refers to as "eventless" to "eventful" history; i.e., from ignoring when and where contentious interactions take place to directly incorporating such information into the study itself. I attempt this below.

CASH RULES EVERYTHING AROUND ME: COVERT ACTIVITY AGAINST CLASS-BASED TARGETS

Like all American cities, Detroit has always maintained something of a "durable inequality"; there were always wealthy and poor neighborhoods (e.g., Darden 1987), overlapping but distinct across class designations (e.g., Dawson 1994). The relationship of these different neighborhoods to the police was never quite comparable (those in Cadillac never interacted with the police in the same manner as those living in Cass for example). The poor always seemed to receive the sharper end of the stick. This was especially the case in the 1960s (e.g., Fogelson 1968; Locke 1969; Platt 1971; Bergeson 1982). Within this context, I would not expect comparable protest policing strategies across economic status. For example, one would expect that authorities would be more likely to use covert activity in middle-class neighborhoods in order to monitor the existence/development of supportive networks for the RNA and in an effort to monitor the organizational leaders who, possessing some education, income and employment, frequently came from and lived in these environments. In contrast, one would expect lesser amounts of covert activity to be applied within wealthier neighborhoods because of the potential costs to political legitimacy that would be paid if such activities were discovered. Additionally, it appears to be logical that the poor would be policed in a different manner for they would likely be interested in RNA beliefs and strategies of defiance to a degree not found within other contexts. Covert activity applied here would thus provide information about potential developments and it would be utilized by the police without much fear of reprisal (unlike within more wealthy neighborhoods).

Alternatively, it may be the case that CPP would be decreased in poor neighborhoods because the information obtained from individuals in this environment would be seen as unimportant. Indeed, authorities may believe that it is more useful to monitor RNA activities or individuals within more wealthy neighborhoods as only these individuals could possibly provide insight into the organization and the challenge that they presented.27(Insert Table 2 About Here)

To analyze this issue of distinct causal effects across economic contexts, I divided the database into income quartiles. When the neighborhoods of Detroit were separated in this manner (Table 2a), I find that within especially poor areas (the first quartile), the largest concentration of RNA members were housed and that this locale experienced the greatest amount of contiguous dissident activity (i.e., most protest took place outside of these neighborhoods). Areas of slightly larger income (the second quartile) experienced the greatest amount of covert activity and protest (in means as well as the single highest value identified). This supports the conventional argument that repressive agents chase dissent. The second quartile also displays the largest single value for contiguous covert activity, supporting the argument that authorities not only chase dissent but that they generally tend to chase themselves. Slightly higher incomes (the third quartile) display the largest mean for contiguous covert activity.

The most distinguishing characteristic of wealthy neighborhoods (quartile 4) is that there are no distinguishing characteristics. Given that the focus of the database is the RNA, this makes sense. Few RNA members lived in these neighborhoods, hardly any RNA protest took place in this context and RNA-related CPP within these locales was minimal. (Insert Table 3 About Here) Re-estimating the model above by quartile (Table 3a), one finds support for the class-oriented examination, as there are significant differences across contexts. Interestingly, the only equation that appears to be moderately efficient at accounting for variance in the dependent variable concerns slightly integrated neighborhoods (quartile 2). Generally, the models estimated here are not very accurate at explaining variance in covert activity. Additionally, when one allows for distinct causal effects across income levels, race is found to be unimportant. Several variables are consistently significant across models. Regardless of where RNA members lived, covert repressive action was directed against them.

Interestingly, according to the incident rate ratios, the impact of this variable is highest when members lived in wealthier neighborhoods (quartile 4). RNA members who lived in areas that were somewhat better off financially elicited greater response from repressive agents. Some variables were relevant in only three contexts. The raid in Mississippi decreased the amount of repression in all but the wealthiest quartile. Lagged covert activity was also found to be statistically significant for all contexts except those with the wealthiest Detroit residents. Several variables were only significant within one or two quartiles. For example, differing from the results of the aggregate analysis provided above, protest increases covert action within only the poorest neighborhood ­ quartile 1.

Authorities thus respond to overt contention with increased levels of political surveillance when they take place within environments where claims-making efforts might be well received. Contiguous and lagged protest have no impact in three out of the four quartiles, but dissident activity in surrounding neighborhoods was important in the second quartile. The police were therefore more attuned to dissident activity surrounding lower-middle income areas. Finally, the New Bethel incident was significant within 2 quartiles but in completely different directions. After the confrontation at the church, covert activity was decreased in the poorest of neighborhoods (quartile 1), but it was significantly increased within middle-income areas (quartile 3) ­ perhaps in an effort to put under the microscope the remaining elements of the organization where the largest number of RNA members lived.

IT TAKES A CITY OF HUNDREDS TO HOLD THEM BACK: COVERT ACTIVITY AGAINST ETHNIC TARGETS

Variability in protest policing as explained by income is only one form of contextualization worthy of consideration. It may also be the case that neighborhoods vary in CPP as a function of how many African Americans are in residence. As those neighborhoods with more African Americans may be perceived as presenting more of a threat to existing authorities (being particularly vulnerable to the claims-making efforts of the RNA and taking place within the aftermath of the racial battlefield of the 1967 riot), this is perhaps the most important contextual element that can be considered.

When the percentage of the Black population increases, the expected benefit of monitoring this community would go up relative to the costs. When the percentage decreased, the situation would be reversed. To address this possibility, I divided the data into racial quartiles (see Table 2b above). When the 49 neighborhoods of Detroit were divided in this manner, unsurprisingly I found that within principally white areas (quartile one), there is little protest and covert activity related to the RNA.

In the second quartile, one can observe a bit more protest activity and covert action. The highest amount of covert activity is observed where the percentage of blacks lied between 42.4 and 78% of the neighborhood (quartile three). This quartile has the largest single number of RNA member's in residence at one time (tied with the next quartile at 27) as well as the highest single value of contiguous covert action. With this one could make a case that repressive agents respond to the geographic concentration in protestors and to forces of habit in the form of geographic proximity.

Interestingly, the greatest amount of covert action is not applied where the greatest amount of dissent is found or where the largest number of members live ­ at least not when one considers the mean of all experience. Within black neighborhoods (in the fourth quartile), RNA-related contention is most common. Here, one finds the largest number of dissident events and the highest concentration of member's homes (in both the highest single value [tied with the third quartile] as well as the overall mean of the time period).

Additionally, one finds the largest amount of contiguous dissident activity (in both the highest single value and mean of the time period) and the largest amount of contiguous covert action (considering only the mean). Re-estimating the model identified by quartile (Table 3b above),28the empirical analysis reveals patterns that are generally different from what was identified above. Again, causal determinants vary across contexts supporting the contextualization argument. Within all neighborhoods, the residence of RNA members again increases the likelihood of covert activity and within three neighborhoods authorities were generally found to be responsive to prior covert activity. Covert activity responded to basically the same factors within the second and third quartiles, except for the significance of New Bethel Incident in quartile 3. Actually, most of the important differences exist at the extremes. Within white neighborhoods, the model is best able to account for the variance in covert activity. Authorities in this context were found to be responsive, but at marginal levels, to contiguous dissident action. Once protest arose in surrounding neighborhoods, authorities were more inclined to decrease their monitoring/protection of whites, probably in an effort to increase efforts elsewhere.

In African-American neighborhoods (i.e., the fourth quartile), it is found that when the RNA engaged in some form of collective action, police and intelligence organizations were more inclined to put these locales under surveillance. Such efforts were diminished after the incidents in New Bethel and Mississippi, which likely decreased the necessity of taking such action. Additionally, African American neighborhoods were the only neighborhoods within which class is identified as important. In these contexts, when all else is considered, increased income tended to decrease CPP. This suggests that amidst target rich environments, where large numbers of potential targets existed and where large amounts of resources could be expended searching for information, authorities differentiated among African American neighborhoods, targeting the poorest of these communities.

This also suggests that outside of these contexts, authorities are not inclined to differentiate among targets in accordance to income; the elements of race and class thus intersect but only in very specific ways and places. Of course, one must keep this all in perspective. According to incident rate ratios, within black neighborhoods, the authorities were far more responsive to protest. While there was some sophistication shown among CPP behavior, when the RNA engaged in activity in black neighborhoods larger numbers in the African American community came under the microscope.

CONCLUSION

This study attempted to expand the conception and understanding of state repression to the realm of covert behavior; what is perhaps one the most frequent as well as most invasive forms of state power, but the one that has not received any rigorous attention whatsoever within existing literature. What have we learned from the investigation? There are several things.

First, we have learned that covert repressive activity is best accounted for within an explanatory model that includes insights from existing quantitative literature on overt protest policing as well as from qualitative literature on covert activity, urban riots, and social control. Both areas provide useful insights, although the latter appears to carry the bulk of the explanatory weight.

Second, perhaps the most important conclusion that one could draw from the present analysis is that any approach/theory that characterizes repression as a series of isolated events in space, time, and context should be treated as suspect. This study reveals that covert repression is enacted by specific authorities, against specific subsets of a population, in a particular social-geographic space. Research investigating human rights violations during the "third wave" acknowledges some of this as well (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1996). Indeed, much effort has been spent on addressing temporal autocorrelation and context. Far too little effort however has been spent on the importance of place and diffusion across space in an effort to understand contentious politics (spatial autocorrelation and what I referred to as "contextualization").It is clear that this must be explored further.

One of the most important keys to improving our comprehension of protest policing appears to reside in better identifying the underlying logic of the repressive organizations themselves and placing these into context. For my case, the answer lied in understanding white agents involved in Red Squad activity (across different parts of one city) and their relationship to the African-American population/challenger across the city of Detroit. This is something not frequently addressed within a literature that tends to shy away from pinpointing actors/perpetrators and that is generally more interested in investigating events or conditions (e.g., genocide/politicide, mass arrests, the general application of torture) across a wide geographic area without disaggregating the spatial domain in question. Upon reflection, this position is somewhat unreasonable for no one would assume that in the wake of 9/11 that New York is likely to see the same type of protest policing against Al-Quaida or any dissidents as in Milwaukee.29 Similarly, moving to a comparative context, no one would assume that the Rwandan government would treat challengers/challenges in the distant city of Kibuye in the same manner that it would treat those within its central city of Kigali. By and large, the existing empirical research on state repression characterizes events as something of an agent-less enterprise where compelled by large-macro forces, things just happen (within my previous work, I am one of the biggest proponents of such a view [citations withheld]).

We can no longer treat repression as actorless and devoid of context however; as the present study reveals and as the 9/11 situation reveals quite profoundly, the who, the where and the when are essential to understanding the why. Following the suggestion above to focus on perpetrators, their motivations and context, this study also leads me to recommend that we focus more on the targets of protest policing as well. Without such information, we cannot understand the logic behind covert activity, including the depth, scope and intensity of such behavior across distinct parts of the population. In the U.S. case this would mean that we would be unable to determine the degree to which individuals of Arab descent were targeted relative to other groups and how long the targeting persisted; we would be unable to determine how extensive the protest policing efforts were directed against this community (e.g., if all age cohorts are targeted); we would be unable to determine whether or not all individuals who approximated the targeted group were subject to investigation (i.e., all "others" that fit the physical characteristics: Latinos, light-skinned blacks and so forth); additionally, we would also be unable to determine if covert activity worked (i.e., if it lead to activities that diminished terrorism undertaken by the relevant dissident organization). The issues identified here are not irrelevant for protest policing/repression, state power and democracy. Rather, they appear to be quite central to debates about state-authority relations for they alter the balance of power held between organizations within the U.S. political system and civil society that have been evolving overtime - by many accounts in a direction toward greater pacification and tolerance (e.g., Della Porta and Reiter 1998). The situation has now changed significantly. As but one example, in a recent New York Times article by David Johnston and Don Van Natta (2001) it was noted that "(s)ome officials are now saying they need broader authority to conduct surveillance of potential terrorists, no matter where they are" (e.g., homes, mosques, churches, meeting places). Such behavior, while potentially resolving certain problems (e.g., enhancing our capacity to monitor terroristic activity) may also raise others: e.g., it signals an enhanced capability and extension of state power which historically once initiated has only been decreased following a period of overextension, scandal and public outrage. In the RNA case, the Red Squad files were released only after a series of court cases brought by other individuals revealed specific patterns in "questionable" police behavior (the range of plaintiffs including an "attorney with activist clients, a professor, a labor leader, a radical political activist, a consumer protection advocate, a nonprofit alternative newspaper... an attorney for pro-Arab groups" (Donner 1990, 294) and later United Auto Worker (UAW) officials. This information prompted another series of lawsuits filed by diverse members of the RNA and other organizations in conjunction with mass protest activities that took place throughout Detroit, Michigan and the United States (Capos 1981). The disclosure left us with a decent understanding of what the police did to the RNA and to other citizens of Detroit, but only after about 20 years. While this is too late in many respects to address the behavior and abuses that existed at the time (on both sides), it does allow us to now reflect upon the impact of these interactions on those who lived within their midst (a subject not addressed here but something worthy of additional attention). Hopefully, we will have a greater commitment to monitoring and investigating covert protest policing in the present as well as understanding what it means for the state, the challengers and the citizens that all to frequently end up between the two.

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TABLE 1. Explaining Covert Repression, by Neighborhood-Months (N=3,087; Negative Binomial Regression) Independent Variables Dissent Activity .01 (.02) Lagged Dissent Activity .03 (.02) Contiguous Dissident Activity -.02 (.04) Lagged Covert Activity .02 (.00)** [1.02] Contiguous Covert Activity .10 (.04)** [1.12] RNA Homes .06 (.01)** [1.06] Income -.00 (.00)** [ .99] Percent Non-White -.00 (.00)** [ .99] New Bethel Incident -.29 (.12)** [ .74] Mississippi Incident -1.47 (.19)** [ .22] Constant .42 (.35) Legend = *P<.05, **P<.01; reported coefficients: "parameter estimates (standard error) [incident rate ratios]"

TABLE 2. Understanding the Varied Behavioral Characteristics of Detroit A) BY INCOME Average Income in 100'sCharacteristics of Interest (Quartile 1) 1 - Less than 5680 (N=808) (Quartile 2) 2 - Greater than 5681 and Less than 6940 (N=768) (Quartile 3) 3 - Greater than 6941 and Less than 8210 (N=801) (Quartile 4) 4 - Greater than 8211 (N=759) Dissident Activity .23; 0; 16 .56; 0; 24 .05; 0; 6 .02; 0; 9 Contiguous Dissident Activity .21; -1.03; 4.61 .04; -1.05; 5.95 -.03; -1.14; 4.84 -.18; -1.14; 3.83 Covert Activity 1.11; 0; 66 1.68; 0; 104 .19; 0; 13 .15; 0; 15 Contiguous Covert Activity .23; -.94; 4.29 .12; -1.09; 5.13 1.01; -1.01; 4.55 .79; -1.01; 3.65 Members Homes 5.08; 0; 27 4.43; 0; 19 5.40; 0; 27 1.92; 0; 6 Examples of Relevant Neighborhoods Algonquin, Cass, Ford Cleveland, Riverside, Vernor Chandler, Lawton, Springwells Conner, Couzens, Palmer, Schoolcraft B) BY ETHNICITY Percentage of Population Black Characteristics of Interest (Quartile 1) 1 - Less than 5% (N=800) (Quartile 2) 2 - Greater than 5% and Less than 42.4% (N=752) (Quartile 3) 3 - Greater than 42.4% and Less than 78% (N=792) (Quartile 4) 4 - Greater than 78% (N=792) Dissident Activity .00; 0; 2 .05; 0; 6 .27; 0; 17 .54; 0; 24 Contiguous Dissident Activity -.35; -1.14; 3.30 -.15; -1.05; 3.84 .14; -1.01; 4.29 .41; -1.03; 4.84 Covert Activity .04; 0; 7 .37; 0; 21 1.64; 0; 104 1.07; 0; 66 Contiguous Covert Activity -.37; -1.09; 3.31 -.13; -1.09; 3.91 .14; -1.01; 5.95 .49; -.91; 5.13 Members Homes .26; 0; 4 2.62; 0; 9 5.06; 0; 27 8.98; 0; 27 Examples of Relevant Neighborhoods Baby Creek, Denby, Warrendale Cass, Mackenzie, State Fair Algonquin, Indian Village, Livernois Center, Lawton, Mack Legend: values = mean for time period; lowest value; highest value; highest values underlined; highest means boldfaced.

TABLE 3. Explaining Covert Repression (Negative Binomial Regression) A) By Economic Context Independent Variables First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile Dissent Activity .32 (.14)** [1.37] .11 (.06) .10 (.56) .38 (.84) Lagged Dissent Activity -.08 (.13) .02 (.05) - .22 (.57) -.31 (.29) Contiguous Dissident Activity -.03 (.08) .24 (.09)** [1.27] - .31 (.19) -.17 (.36) Lagged Covert Activity .20 (.04)** [1.22] .06 (.01)** [1.02] .51 (.19)** [1.67] .26 (.29) Contiguous Covert Activity .14 (.10) .16 (.11) - .40 (.24) -.51 (.40) RNA Homes .06 (.01)** [1.06] .19 (.02)** [1.27] .09 (.03)** [1.09] .82 (.18)** [2.28] New Bethel Incident -1.88(.35)** [ .15] -.22 (.27) 1.26 (.62)** [3.55] -1.34 (.96) Mississippi Incident - .51 (.23)** [ .59] -1.99 (.47)** [ .27] -1.57 (.45)** [ .20] 1.17 (.67) Ethnicity (% Black) .24 (.20) .01 (.02) - .09 (.20) .01 (.01) Constant - .64 (.23)** -2.17 (.26)** -3.44 (.57)** -4.50 (1.04)** Pseudo R Squared .09 .17 .07 .11 Total N (Neighborhoods Encompassed) 791 (17) 751(22) 791 (23) 754 (16) B) By Ethnic Context Independent Variables First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile Dissent Activity NA .88 (.46) .09 (.11) .22 (.07)** [1.22] Lagged Dissent Activity NA -.21 (.52) .20 (.14) -.07 (.05) Contiguous Dissident Activity -3.59 (1.51)** [ .02] .03 (.19) .16 (.09) .07 (.09) Lagged Covert Activity .98 (.51) .40 (.12)** [1.50] .06 (.02)** [1.06] .17 (.04)** [1.16] Contiguous Covert Activity -.63 (.98) .09 (.18) .05 (.12) .08 (.09) RNA Homes .77 (.20)** [2.17] .20 (.07)** [1.15] .11 (.02)** [1.12] .05 (.01)** [1.08] New Bethel Incident -23.75 (40.00) -.75 (.41) -1.63 (.30)** [ .19] -1.09(.28)** [ .42] Mississippi Incident -.90 (.68) -.37 (.37) - .15 (.31) -1.12(.31)** [ .33] Class (Average Income) -.69 (.50) .21 (.45) .01 (.01) - .53 (.18)**[ .58] Constant -6.08 (1.09)** -1.84 (.37)** -1.12 (.32)** - .44 (.31)** Pseudo R Squared .26 .05 .10 .10 Total N (Neighborhoods Encompassed) 785 (15) 739 (17) 779 (18) 784 (15) Legend = *P<.05, **P<.01; "NA" = Not enough observations to estimate; reported coefficients: "parameter estimates (standard error) [incident rate ratios]"

FIGURE 1. THE BASIC MODEL OF OVERT PROTEST POLICING (OPP) Challenge Repression Coercive Tendencies: Prior RepressionContext

FIGURE 2. AN INTEGRATED PROTEST POLICING MODEL EMPHASIZING COVERT ACTIVITY (CPP) Challenger: Particular Individuals engaged in Overt Challenge by Overt Repression Coercive Tendencies: Prior Overt Repression Contextualization Covert Repression Coercive Tendencies: Prior Covert Repression Cue: Latent Challenge Presented by Particular Groups Context Challenge: Overt Challenge Legend: " " = variables influencing overt behavior; " "= variables influencing covert behavior.

APPENDIX 1. Neigborhoods in Detroit 1 = Algonquin 11 = Conner 21 = Indian Village 31 = Mt. Elliott 41 = Riverside 2 = Baby Creek 12 = Cooley 22 = John R. 32 = Mt. Olivet 42 = Schoolcraft 3 = Boulevard 13 = Couzens 23 = Lawton 33 = Northlawn 43 = Springwells 4 = Brightmoor 14 = Davison 24 = Livernois 34 = Oakland 44 = State Fair 5 = Burbank 15 = Delray 25 = Lodge 35 = Oakwood 45 = Tireman 6 = Cadillac 16 = Denby 26 = Mack 36= Palmer 46 = Vernor 7 = Cass 17 = Ford 27 = Mackenzie 37 = Park 47 = Warren 8 = Center 18 = Forest Lawn 28 = Marygrove 38 = Pershing 48 = Warrendale 9 = Chandler 19 = Fort 29 = McNichols 39 = Pinegree 49 = Wyoming 10 = Cleveland 20 = Harper 30 = Michigan 40 = Redford

ENDNOTES

1 An article appeared in the June 5, 2000 USA Today indicating that "Wiretaps Sought in Record Numbers". The article notes that, " `The increase (in spying and terrorist wiretaps) is troubling because of the lack of accountability in the secret process,' says author and electronic privacy advocate David Banisar." Additionally, it notes that "(t)he secret wiretap court was created by the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. It was designed to check the power of presidents who authorized wiretaps and searches that didn't require warrants based on possible threats to national security." The court has approved more than 13,600 wiretap requests in 22 years and has rejected one. What is meant by political intelligence must be clarified. Drawing on the work of Arthur Zuehlke (1980), one could divide the subject of political intelligence into 4 basic topic areas: collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. "Collection" refers to gathering information (from open, technical or human means). This is basically the topic of this research, although I will occasionally use the term "covert action" for this is a phrase more commonly used within popular discourse. "Analysis" refers processing information (e.g., sifting, screening, and comparing). "Counterintelligence" refers to protecting sources (e.g., taking appropriate security measures). "Counter-measures" refer to identifying, neutralizing and exploiting security threats. Finally, "covert action" refers to directly influencing events within a target group (e.g., through propaganda, political action, paramilitary action, or intelligence assistance).

2 This includes mass arrests, political bans, torture, and killings.

3 For example, economic underdevelopment (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 1999), trade dependence (e.g., Timberlake and Williams 1984; Alfatooni and Allen 1991), inequality (e.g., Ziegenhagen 1986) and authoritarianism (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 1999).

4 This is alternatively labeled "political repression", "state terror", "human rights violations" and "state coercion".

5 It should be clear ­ this could be applied either "reactively", where authorities respond to dissent, or "proactively", where authorities attempt to eliminate challengers before they arise (Snyder 1976).

6 I say "perceived" because these efforts are not always successful (see literature on the "conflict-repression nexus" [e.g., Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998]).

7 Here, we find that strict adherence to the rationalist framework is weakened as cultural norms and forces of habit move one away from a narrow conception of decision-making where exhaustive calculations and considerations are made and to a situation where quick rules of thumb and repetition are the most important factors involved.

8 Within this context, the application of repression is deemed to be costly in this context, thus reducing its use.

9 The latter assists agents in pinpointing appropriate targets as well as determining at what level they should be sanctioned.

10 The core membership of the group ranged between 50-200, but the number of individuals who engaged in dissent reached upwards of 2,000 individuals at times.

11 One would always hear RNA members declare "Land, Independence, and Self-Determination" or "The Struggle is for Land". Later, as the movement waned, they merely sought to purchase land for the establishment of a city-state (Obadele 1995).

12 This can be found at http://www... (citation withheld).

13 I should mention that the RNA had far-reaching plans. Internationally, the group's leaders were in contact with a number of African governments and were attempting to establish trade and exchange programs with foreign countries. They also planned to make contact with the governments of Cuba, China, and Vietnam. Within the United States there were national meetings in Chicago, New York and Washington D.C., as well as attempts to set up bases in Mississippi, California, and elsewhere. Attempts to police the group also involved casting a wide net. The U.S. Department of State, Internal Revenue Service and FBI were tracking RNA activity nationally, and even local Detroit police departments were coordinating their efforts with police departments in New York and California as well as with these national government organizations. To broaden the scope of the spatial domain to this extent would inhibit my ability to examine the local context of space and place; accordingly, I do not include these activities in my investigation except for a crackdown on the RNA in Mississippi during southern relocation.

14 The point merits mention that dissidents do not always live in the same place as where they meet or protest. The anti-IMF protests are clear examples of this, but even within the case of the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S. or the Black Power Movement individuals from different locales would often base themselves in cities other than the ones from which they were born and lived.

15 Future efforts will involve aggregating events to the week in order to examine discrete changes over time. For the purposes of this preliminary investigation, however, I am more interested in identifying more general patterns.

16 The number of addresses assigned to each neighborhood is the same across the full time period for I have not as yet pinpointed on a monthly basis which individuals were and were not active members in the organization. In its current formulation, I am provided with a rough approximation of how active different geographic locales were in the organization (when viewed in summary fashion).

17 In an effort to avoid a problem with endogeneity, I have not considered the existence of an informant/agent provocateur in a meeting as an instance of covert repressive activity. Rather, I have used this label only to refer to activities where authorities have directed some agent of the state (i.e., a police officer or a member of the intelligence community) to take some action (e.g., to follow an RNA member or to plant a microphone in someone's home). This avoids the problem that every time there was a meeting where an informant was present, there would be an instance of covert action. This, of course, ignores the role played by informants; a complex one in fact if one considers it. Informants might provide information to the police, which enables them to put a location or person under surveillance. Alternatively, there is no particular reason why a protest policing organization would not send an agent of the state to a location where there was also an informant present. There is no redundancy here as both serve different purposes and are granted different powers by the state (at least in principle). Within my research, I have found that authorities did not generally trust their informants (a fact identified by other scholars: Donner 1990; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990; Cunningham 2002); as a result, it is possible to view the two (the informant and the officer on surveillance) as independent from one another.

18 Pearson correlations do not exceed .65 (for one variable) and thus I do not consider multicollinearity to be problematic.

19 Neither is capable of addressing simultaneous relationships. Likelihood ratio tests were used to determine the appropriateness of the methodological technique.

20 "Dissident events" include all collective action undertaken by RNA members (e.g., meetings, practice, protests and so forth).

21 The "Red Squad" file provided more information on covert activities than overt actions. As a result, I was not able to well construct an events-based database comparable to the information available on covert activity. I was able to utilize the available information as well as the information about the case to more qualitative provide some type of assessment of what was taking place. All of the relevant literature relevant to the case identifies a sea-change in authority-RNA activities following the two events highlighted and thus I feel comfortable that while not comprehensive, I have addressed the most important aspects of OPP.

22 While the second is similar to the argument found within the existing repression literature, the first has no comparable indicator. The third could be seen as similar to the work of Tolnay and Beck (1992) and that put forward by Gurr (1993); both consider ethnic conflict and believe that concentrations of ethnic groups influence the likelihood of mobilization as well as the perception of threats from other groups.

23 A random effects model was estimated.

24 The particular variant of negative binomial regression for cross-sectional, time-series that I employed ("xtnbreg") does not report conventional "goodness of fit measures" such as an R squared. As a consequence, I focus attention on statistical significance and the direction of causal impacts.

25 Cross-National examinations are perhaps the greatest offenders here but they are also the ones most exempt. This work intends to identify patterns that exist, regardless of space and time; they are less interested in and less persuaded by the argument that local context and local identity matters. Those analyses where the sheer scope of the inquiry is more restrictive are more easily criticized on these grounds. For example when a few countries are examined that are purportedly similar to one another (e.g., Francisco's [1998] "European Protest and Coercion Data" database) or when a few countries are examined that are not similar (e.g., Moore and Lindstrom 1998).

26 Interestingly, even black police officers were subject to surveillance when it was "perceived' that they were sympathetic to the challenging organization (Donner 1990, 293).

27 The police clearly had access to this type of information about neighborhood and member's wealth for they had all forms of information on the RNA. Looking at the Red Squad files one can readily identify who the leaders were, where they lived, how much rent or mortgage they paid, where they worked, and what cars they owned.

28 The data is no longer a pooled cross-sectional, time-series as the division into quartiles occasionally interrupts the time series.

29 Some research has endeavored to do this: Ball et al. (1999), for example, have spent a tremendous amount of effort in identifying individuals responsible for and those victimized by Guatemalan state terror.