The Penatgon's War On Drugs: The Ultimate Bad Trip
by CDI
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The Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information, March 1992
Defense Monitor in Brief
--> The effectiveness of military antidrug efforts has not been
confirmed.
--> Congress continues to increase funding every year for state
National Guard antidrug activities--up about 400 percent since
FY 1989.
--> Congress forced a reluctant Pentagon to take on an antidrug
mission it did not want in 1988. Now the Pentagon finds it an
expedient justification for budget proposals.
--> The 1989 invasion of Panama by U.S. forces resulted in only a
temporary reduction in drug traffic and money laundering
there.
--> There is no evidence to date that U.S. military activities in
South American countries have diminished the introduction of
drugs to the United States.
--> Military assistance to South American countries for antidrug
programs strengthens the overall influence of the military in
those countries.
* * *
The Pentagon's greatest fear is to be without an enemy. That was
the situation it faced during the late 1980s as the ``evil empire''
began to crumble. In order to justify its existence and budget
requests a new villain had to be found quickly.
At the urging of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, along with
most members of Congress, drug trafficking has been designated
the newest national security threat. The Soviet commissars have
been replaced by Colombian drug lords. According to the Bush
Administration the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama was justified, in
large part, because Manuel Noriega had been indicted for drug
trafficking. To eliminate such traffic the Pentagon became the
ultimate antidrug ``Robocop.''
In fact, antidrug activity has become the routinely invoked
justification for almost all military programs and budget
proposals. The U.S. Navy even lauds its Trident nuclear missile
submarine for its value as a drug trafficking deterrent.
Yet such action flies in the face of both tradition and common
sense. Using the Department of Defense as law enforcement's ``800
lb. gorilla'' threatens the longheld policy of keeping the
military out of domestic affairs. As then-Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger wrote in 1985, ``Reliance on military forces to
accomplish civilian tasks is detrimental to both military
readiness and the democratic process.''
Impossible Quest
Using the military to fight societal ills is to embark on a mission
impossible. The problem of drug use in the United States is not
new. For centuries people have regularly experimented with legal
drugs such as alcohol and tobacco as well as illegal drugs. As long
as there is a demand for drugs there will be a supply. Using
military forces, whose primary mission is to kill people and
destroy things, will not change this.
What it will do, however, is divert resources from the truly
critical need: reducing domestic demand. It also threatens to
strengthen anti-democratic military forces in such countries as
Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia.
Furthermore, drug trafficking is a global problem. Building up a
massive U.S. antidrug force flies in the face of President Bush's
call for a ``new world order'' which should seek to solve
international problems through a revitalized United Nations and
strengthened multinational agencies.
Actually, growing reliance on the military is a tacit admission
of failure in antidrug efforts to date. As Lt. Gen. Stephen
Olmstead, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for drug
policy and enforcement says, ``In describing our current antidrug
abuse efforts I often hear the word `war.' I have a few years of
experience in war, and I don't think we're in a war. War, defined
by Clausewitz at least, is a total commitment of a nation. I
currently do not find that. What I find is: `Let's make the Army
the scapegoat. We don't know what the answer is to the drug
problem, so let's assign it to the Army and let them try and
solve it.'''
A report by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment
finds that ``[t]here is no clear correlation between the level of
expenditures or effort devoted to interdiction and the long-term
availability of illegally imported drugs in the domestic market.
However, given the profitability of drug smuggling, a worldwide
glut of drugs, and the view that the United States is the favored
market for drugs, interdiction alone will probably never result
in more than a short-term or relatively small reduction in drug
availability.''
Wrong Target
In large part, committing the military to drug interdiction
activities is based on a false premise. It is that the solution
to the American drug abuse problem lies in the hands of foreign
nations that produce the most important illegal drugs. While the
executive and legislative branches may argue over how much money
to devote to ``production control,'' unfortunately public officials
raise critical questions about the wisdom or effectiveness of it
as a basic strategy.
As Donald Mabry, a scholar at Mississippi State University,
testified before Congress, ``For almost a century American
antidrug policy has blamed foreigners for the American drug
disease, thus preserving the myth that Americans are naturally
good but corrupted by evil foreigners.'' Actually, the United
States is the largest market for South American cocaine, sells
the chemicals necessary to produce it and the firearms with which
the major cartels arm themselves.
The failure of a strategy which focuses on limiting supply is
inherent in the structure of the problem. Producer countries
jointly lack either the motivation or the means to reduce total
production. For the Andean countries in South America, cocaine is
merely the latest manifestation of their dependence on producing
export commodities for foreign consumption. Furthermore, even a
vastly more effective interdiction program will make little
difference with respect to such drugs as cocaine and, to a lesser
extent, heroin. This is because the price of cocaine does not
really rise until it is inside the United States.
The peasants who grow coca-leaf do not make any great profit.
Growers sell a metric ton of leaf to middlemen for about $600.
One ton produces about seven kilograms of finished cocaine. The
price, when it leaves Colombia is probably something between
$5,000 and $7,000 a kilo. Cocaine sells in Miami for about
$15,000 a kilo. The effective retail price is on the order of
$200,000 to $250,000 when it is broken down in one gram units.
One can seize an enormous amount of cocaine that costs between
$5,000 and $15,000 per kilo without making any major difference
to the $250,000 street price. Thus, the grower gets only .0003
percent of the eventual street value of his crop.
As Peter Reuter, a senior economist with the Rand Corp., testified
before Congress, ``The only thing that interdiction can do is raise
the price. It can't, at this stage, given the maturity of the
cocaine business, affect the amount that enters this country.
There's too much leaf capacity; there's too much production
capacity. There are too many experienced adaptive smugglers. . . .
Interdiction simply works on a part of the system, at least with
respect to cocaine, that is incapable of accounting for a large
share of the cost of cocaine, given the risks that are faced by
dealers within the United States.''
Expedient Policies
Governmental concern about drug use is frequently subordinated to
other foreign policy concerns. When the United States supported
Afghan guerrillas who were fighting the 1979 Soviet occupation of
their country it was also supporting the opium growers who produced
a flood of heroin that poured into this country. Similarly, during
the 1980s the rise in cocaine exports to the U.S. from Colombia
coincided with U.S. support for the contra guerrillas seeking to
overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.
The Medellin cartel of Colombia used contra supply channels to
smuggle cocaine into the United States. As Sen. John Kerry (D-
Mass.) said during an extensive investigation in 1988, ``Certain
elements of our government have perceived that there were higher
national security priorities, thereby frustrating legitimate law
enforcement efforts in the war against drugs.''
Past Anti-Drug Efforts
The Pentagon has been involved in drug interdiction efforts since
at least 1971. Its assistance prior to 1981, however, was sporadic,
uncoordinated and very limited. In 1981, Congress modified the
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, explicitly allowing the military to
support antidrug efforts. Prior to that, anyone who attempted to
use the military for law enforcement, unless specifically
authorized by Congress or the Constitution, was liable to a fine or
imprisonment. The new legislation permitted the Pentagon to assist
by providing information, equipment, facilities, training and
advisory services.
On April 8, 1986, President Reagan signed National Security
Decision Directive 221 on narcotics and national security which,
among other things, called for an expanded role for U.S. military
forces in supporting counter-narcotics efforts.
Between mid-July and early December 1986 U.S. military personnel
went to Bolivia to support Operation Blast Furnace. Working with
Bolivian police, U.S. Army helicopters and military personnel
sought to destroy coca-paste processing laboratories. It was the
first U.S. military anti-drug operation in the Andes. Long-term
effects of the operation, however, were negligible since drug
activities returned to previous levels soon after the operation
ended.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 called for a substantial increase
in military aid to those countries involved in U.S. antinarcotics
programs, waiving a 1974 ban on aid to foreign police.
New Mission
In September 1988 Congress passed legislation, as part of the FY
1989 National Defense Authorization Act, which marked the
Pentagon's formal emergence as an antidrug warrior. DoD was
required to undertake three statutory missions. These were: serving
as the single lead agency of the federal government for the
detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal
drugs into the United States; integrating U.S. command, control,
communications and intelligence (C3I) systems dedicated to the
interdiction of illegal drugs into an effective communications
network, and providing an improved interdiction and enforcement
role for the National Guard.
Shortly thereafter the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel issued an opinion stating that U.S. military personnel can
apprehend accused drug traffickers abroad--a power they do not have
in the United States. Even more ominous is the fact that the U.S.
military can act without host country consent.
When the U.S. invaded Panama on December 20, 1989, President Bush
released a memo stating, ``In the course of carrying out the
military operation in Panama which I have directed, I hereby direct
and authorize the units and members of the Armed Forces of the
United States to apprehend General Manuel Noriega and any other
persons in Panama currently under indictment in the United States
for drug-related offenses.
``I further direct that any persons apprehended pursuant to this
directive are to be turned over to civil law enforcement officials
of the United States as soon as practicable. I also authorize and
direct members of the Armed Forces of the United States to detain
and arrest any persons apprehended pursuant to this directive if,
in their judgment, such action is necessary.''
Narco-Bureaucracies
Even before Congress passed supporting legislation, Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney sent a message to the various unified
commanders in chief that reducing the flow of drugs to the U.S. was
a high priority national security mission. The U.S. is the only
country that assigns its military the mission of worldwide
intervention. To that end it has established unified commands.
These are geographically-defined commands that are made up of two
or more military services.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were assigned responsibility for
developing the necessary plans. Specifically, the Atlantic,
Pacific, Southern Commands, and the Forces Command a year later, as
well as the U.S. element of the North American Aerospace Defense
(NORAD) Command, were assigned the counterdrug mission. The
commands implemented the guidelines differently. The Atlantic,
Pacific and Forces Commands established Joint Task Forces (JTFs) to
conduct their operations. At SOUTHCOM and NORAD the new
mission was integrated into existing structures.
Besides the major unified commands and their subordinate task
forces there are a host of other military agencies involved in
antidrug efforts. The Defense Communications Agency is the single
Pentagon agency responsible for implementing the Drug Enforcement
Telecommunications Plan. It identifies specific secure telephone,
radio and satellite communications equipment needed to interconnect
voice, data and record communications among DoD and law enforcement
agencies (LEAs). As part of its mission to provide secure antidrug
communications systems the Pentagon has created a computerized
Anti-Drug Network (ADNET). This allows LEAs to share information
and access various databases.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is working on
numerous projects in cooperation with LEAs. These include
developing audio recording devices to aid in surveillance,
researching chemical detection devices to help locate drug
processing laboratories and detect drugs in transit, and using
artificial intelligence systems to detect money laundering and aid
in the analysis of surveillance and tracking data. Some systems are
already in prototype stage and have been provided for field test
and evaluation.
Researchers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, whose primary
mission has always been to design nuclear weapons, have made many
proposals for developing high-tech weapons to combat drug
trafficking. Many of the military's own research centers are trying
to develop sensors, night vision, and surveillance equipment.
Private contractors, sensing new opportunities, are also submitting
proposals to develop and manufacture equipment.
Numerous other Pentagon agencies are heavily involved in antidrug
efforts. The Defense Intelligence Agency has established a
Counternarcotics Intelligence Support Office. The Defense Security
Assistance Agency coordinates the distribution of military
weapons,equipment, and training to foreign militaries. The Defense Mapping
Agency has been busy developing maps of drug producing areas.
DoD has assigned intelligence analysts to the Drug Enforcement
Administration's intelligence center to organize and computerize
its intelligence files.
There is a fine line between legitimate intelligence gathering and
violation of basic civil liberties. Military actions to intercept
communications and examine financial records because they are
allegedly drug related are an increasing threat to the privacy of
American citizens.
Home Front Warriors
One growth area for Pentagon narco-warriors has been the
involvement of the National Guard. Their involvement began back in
the 1970s when the Army National Guard was called out to support
police in eradicating marijuana grown in Hawaii. The Guard, unlike
the active forces, has no restrictions under the Posse Comitatus
Act when acting in a non-federal status. They are not, however,
immune from liability arising from violation of constitutional
rights.
The Guard forces have generally responded enthusiastically to this
mission. In fact the Pentagon's National Guard Bureau had to
restrain the Oregon National Guard from sending military police out
in civilian clothes to help Portland police with drug busts and
surveillance. Gov. James Blanchard (D-MI) called for using Guard
troops to bulldoze crack houses in Detroit.
In accordance with the 1988 Congressional legislation the National
Guard Bureau established a national-level structure in its Office
of Military Support to coordinate drug enforcement operations. As
part of the process of obtaining funding for their anti-drug
missions all U.S. states and territories had to submit a plan
describing their proposed activities for approval in the Pentagon.
Using the Freedom of Information Act the Center for Defense
Information obtained copies of all the plans for FY89.
A review of these plans show a huge expansion of the Guard's anti-
drug efforts. Some activities described in the plans include
detection and monitoring of drug smuggling through aerial
surveillance, radar surveillance, aerial photography and other
imagery, long-range reconnaissance, and assistance in searching
containers. Others are expanded training of law enforcement
personnel, transportation of LEA personnel, equipment and seized
substances, and increased loans of military equipment. Guard
authorities are not above exaggerating the problem in order to
obtain support for their plans. For example, the Kansas National
Guard plan stated, ``More Americans are killed by drugs every 24
months than were killed in battle in Viet Nam. This figure is
estimated as 60,000 fatalities.'' In truth, according to the
National Institute on Drug Abuse the total number of drug abuse
deaths in 1988 and 1989 was 14,016.
Guard units work in various areas. In 1990 Guard units in 21 states
were working with the U.S. Customs Service to inspect commercial
cargo entering the United States via sea, air, and land. Eleven
states were working with the Border Patrol and the Customs Air
Service to identify and track illegal ground and air drug traffic.
In 1990 the National Guard established the National Interagency
Counternarcotics Institute in San Luis Obispo, CA, in order to
enhance cooperation between the Guard and federal, state, and
local agencies.
Although not used as extensively as the Guard, Reserve Forces have
also increased their antidrug activities. Marine Corps Reserves
have assisted both the Border Patrol and Customs Services. The
Naval Air Reserve flies surveillance missions while Naval Reserve
ships also participate.
Questionable Effectiveness
While the Guard has certainly benefitted from the drug war, seeing
its antidrug funding rising from $40 million in FY89 to $154
million in FY92, it is unclear how effective they have been. A DoD
Inspector General's report released in July 1991 found that Guard
components ``had not fully identified their counternarcotics
workload; sought feedback from the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA's)
on the Guard counternarcotics operations; measured the
effectiveness of the support provided; or conducted long-term
planning, programming and budgeting for counternarcotics
operations.'' It also found that the California National Guard did
not justify the requirement for the National Interagency
Counternarcotics Institute. The FY93 request, however, increases
the National Guard share of the DoD antidrug budget to $171
million.
Other Pentagon antidrug units have also come in for criticism.
Another Inspector General report found that ``JTF-5 duplicates
counternarcotics capabilities'' at other Pacific Command activities
and creates unnecessary operational overhead. Furthermore, its
location in California does not allow it to provide optimum support
to the law enforcement community.
In late 1991 the Pentagon Inspector General issued a comprehensive
report on Pentagon support to U.S. drug interdiction efforts. It
found that DoD's counterdrug program has not been adequately
coordinated with the law enforcement agencies at all levels to
achieve maximum effectiveness. The DoD intelligence structure is
not ideally designed to provide maximum support to the LEAs and
measures have not been instituted that adequately measure the
effectiveness of DoD's counterdrug support contributions.
Even the first major military anti-drug action, the invasion of
Panama, had no lasting effect. The State Department's 1991
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report found that ``large
seizures during 1990 indicated that traffickers continue to use
Panamanian sea, land, and airspace to tranship illegal narcotics--
especially cocaine--destined for the U.S. and elsewhere.'' A 1991
GAO report found that ``drug trafficking may be increasing and that
Panama continues to be a haven for money laundering.''
The Pentagon itself is reportedly having some second thoughts about
its role. According to one recent report it rejected a proposal by
the White House Office of Drug Control Policy that would have
created a unified military authority to coordinate most U.S.
counternarcotics operations in Latin America. This rejection
reportedly reflected a Pentagon wariness about becoming too closely
tied to a no-win cause.
Andean Strategy
Just like the old cliche that the best defense is a good offense
the Pentagon operates on the assumption that the best way to
interdict drugs is to do so in the country where they originate. To
that end President Bush directed that a 5-year $2.2 Billion
counternarcotics effort begin in FY 1990 to augment law
enforcement, military, and economic programs in Colombia, Bolivia,
and Peru. These three countries, located in the Andes mountains
region of South America, produce all the cocaine consumed in the
United States.
Although the State Department and the Drug Enforcement Agency
have been operating in South America for many years a large increase in
U.S. military involvement began in 1989. That year a candidate in
Colombia's presidential election was murdered by drug traffickers.
Subsequently Colombia started a crackdown against the organized
cartels. The U.S. responded by sending $65 million worth of surplus
military equipment to the Colombian military.
In late 1989 the United States planned to station an aircraft
carrier battle group off the coast of Colombia until it received
protests. In January 1990, at a summit in Cartagena, Colombia, the
U.S., Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia reached an understanding to allow
their military forces to be used to combat drug trafficking.
The Andean strategy occupies center stage in the Administration's
international drug control policy. Like its predecessors it assumes
the U.S. has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of
Latin American nations. Although about half the aid disbursed under
the strategy is for economic assistance the strategy itself marks a
sharp shift toward a military approach. Contrary to past policy,
the U.S. now views Andean militaries as essential to the antidrug
mission. This policy, in effect, supports internal security
missions for these militaries, the sort of mission which U.S.
troops are prohibited from conducting under the Posse Comitatus Act
in the U.S. To that end the Administration plans to provide $675
million in military aid to Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru during FY
1990 to 1994 - 75 percent of the military aid provided to all of
Central America from FY 1985-89. Many of these Latin American
militaries have been found guilty of gross human rights violations.
In order to counter public and congressional unease about aiding
such forces many U.S. officials have invoked the specter of an
alliance between drug traffickers and guerrillas.
As U.S. Special Forces commander John Waghelstein wrote in 1987,
``...the United States is faced with one aspect of insurgency in
Latin America that offers the greatest threat but one which may
provide us with a weapon with which to regain the moral high ground
we have appeared to have lost. There is an alliance between some
drug traffickers and some insurgents... A melding in the American
public's mind and in Congress of this connection would lead to the
necessary support to counter the guerrilla/narcotics terrorists in
this hemisphere.''
The problem with this theory is that it is a distortion of reality.
A careful examination of Pentagon documents leaves no doubt that
the Pentagon views its antidrug mission as just another form of so-
called ``low intensity conflict'' which can only be fought by using
counter-insurgency strategy and tactics. Thus U.S. policy now
targets drug traffickers as new enemies but specifically includes
old enemies--guerrilla groups alleged to have inseparable links to
the traffickers. This is the justification for providing Andean
militaries with weaponry and training to improve domestic counter-
insurgency campaigns which remain their top priority.
Colombia
In Colombia drug traffickers, as a result of their business, have
become wealthy landowners and businessmen. Given their economic
interests they have adopted conservative viewpoints and oppose
advocates of economic and social change. Consequently, the cartel's
paramilitary forces and death squads attack insurgents far more
often than they cooperate with them.
In Colombia the military has been fighting insurgent groups for
almost 30 years. Antidrug activity is not a priority for them. In
fact, the $65 million military aid package provided in 1989 was
heavily tilted toward conventional military equipment. The armed
forces received about 77 percent of the total package while the
Colombian National Police received only 16 percent. This pattern is
very disturbing since the police are responsible for 80 to 90
percent of all drug seizures.
Peru
The State Department's annual human rights report for 1991 stated
``There continued to be credible reports of summary executions,
disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and rape by the
military and police.'' The human rights situation in Peru is so bad
that Congress in 1991 had put a hold on a $35 million military aid
package while it reviewed the situation. Recently U.S. antidrug
operations stopped when a U.S. helicopter was shot down in January.
It was on an antidrug mission in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley,
where more than half the world's supply of coca is grown.
Bolivia
The U.S. has pressed Bolivia to use its army for antidrug purposes.
This makes even less sense than it does in Colombia and Peru. The
Bolivian Army was deeply involved in drug trafficking during the
1980-81 ``narco-dictatorship'' of Gen. Luis Garcia Meza.
Nevertheless, in 1991 U.S. special forces arrived to begin training
almost 10 percent of the Bolivian Army in antidrug operations.
Wrong Strategy
U.S. military involvement in anti-drug efforts is an inappropriate
mission. It is the demand by U.S. citizens which fuels drug
trafficking. When the demand drops drug traffic will dry up. As it
now stands the military is engaged in an endless and futile effort.
It is gearing up to intervene in Third World countries when the
real solution is to provide expanded education, prevention, and
treatment programs. Drug use in America is ultimately a health and
police issue, not a military one. Involving the military diverts
scarce money from the necessary demand-side programs. It also
threatens to undermine the wise policy of keeping the U.S. military
out of the law enforcement business.
* * *
Conclusions
--> The military has been ordered to conduct a war that cannot be
won: the objectives are not clear, the enemy difficult to
identify and engage, and progress cannot be measured.
--> Use of U.S. military forces to cut off drug trafficking is one
more step in making the U.S. the ``world's policeman.''
--> In many cases U.S. antidrug efforts directly strengthen
military establishments guilty of human rights abuses.
--> Use of military forces in counterdrug operations reverses the
longstanding policy of not allowing military participation in
domestic law enforcement.
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