Transcript of House Debate on Covert Operations

DEBATE ON BOXER AMENDMENT - TRANSCRIPT OF HOUSE DEBATE ON COVERT OPERATIONS [EXCERPTS] Christic Institute, Wednesday, October 22, 1990

[The following excerpts from the debate Oct. 17 in the House of Representatives on the Boxer Amendment, which would have required the President to seek the approval of the Congressional intelligence committees before initiating most covert operations, with the exception of operations to save American lives or rescue American hostages. The transcript includes a valuable summary of failed covert actions entered into the record by Rep. Don Edwards, Democrat of California. The 70 Members of Congress who supported the amendment are listed at the end of the document.]

MRS. BOXER: Mr. Chairman, my amendment gives the Intelligence Committees of Congress a more important role in covert activity decisions by requiring their approval before a covert activity is undertaken. In doing so, this amendment protects the American people from the possible abuses of an all-too-powerful or overreaching executive branch.

I would like to read to my colleagues from the Senate Committee on Intelligence report on the Iran-Contra affair. This is the Senate and the House committee report, starting on page 11.

"Findings and conclusions: The common ingredients of the Iran/Contra policies were secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law. A small group of senior officials believed that they alone knew what was right. They viewed knowledge of their actions by others in the Government as a threat to their objectives. They told neither the Secretary of State, the Congress, nor the American people of their actions. When exposure was threatened, they destroyed official documents, and they lied to Cabinet officials, to the public, and to elected representatives in Congress....

The United States simultaneously pursued two contradictory foreign policies, a public one and a secret one....

The Iran/Contra affair was characterized by pervasive dishonesty and inordinate secrecy. Secrecy became an obsession. Congress was never informed of the Iran or Contra covert actions....

Covert operations of this Government should only be directed and conducted by the trained professional services that are accountable to the President and to Congress. Such operations should never be delegated as they were here to private citizens in order to evade governmental restrictions....

The President is the principal architect of foreign policy in consultation with the Congress. The policies of the United States cannot succeed unless the President and the Congress work together."

MR. KASTENMEIER: [Referring to the Committee on Intelligence:] The problem is our constitutional limitation, our total inability to do anything more than to listen up in room H-405. When proposals are made by the executive branch, you listen to them. We cannot speak of them. We cannot effectively challenge them. There is no vote, normally, on those propositions, and there is no third party interest.

MR. WEISS: [Referring to allegations that members of Congress can not be trusted to keep sensitive matters secret:] Yes, it is possible that this is not the most iron-clad body, although historically what leaks have taken place have come not from the Congress, they have come from the executive branch of the Government, and this has happened consistently.

The only sure way to avoid a repetition of the Iran-Contra affair would be to eliminate covert actions altogether. But if we can not do that, we must, at least, ensure that such actions are strictly limited and scrupulously monitored by Congress.

MR. EDWARDS: In the 1970's we had so many scandals that we had to have select committees, select committees at great expense with special counsels, the Church committee in the Senate and the Pike committee in the House. The report was so scandalous when it came out and the House was so shocked that we voted not even to release it because we were so ashamed of what was going on with the intelligence agencies.

Just the other day I read a report of the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus that was issued back in 1984, and it described seven covert actions for a number of years.... Do my colleagues want to know something? Practically all of them had been very, very unsuccessful. They would have been much better had they not happened at all.

[Document submitted by Mr. Edwards:]

1953, Iran:

CIA covert operations and financing, masterminded by Kermit Roosevelt, succeeded in overthrowing popular but left-leaning Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, and in installing to power Shah Reza Pahlavi.

The Shah ruled for 26 years, when popular discontent, religious fanaticism and political upheaval against U.S. domination forced the Shah's exile, and replaced him with Ayatollah Khomeini.

1953, Philippines:

Under CIA auspices, Col. Edward Lansdale went to the Philippines in the early 1950's to aid in the defeat of local communist guerrillas (the Huks), and to help engineer the 1953 election of President Magasaysay.

Magasaysay, a progressive, was killed in a plane crash in 1957. After several moderate leaders intervened, Ferdinand Marcos was elected in 1965. He declared martial law in 1972.

1954, Guatemala:

The CIA is generally perceived and credited with masterminding and financing the coup which ended 10 years of progressive governments which had sought to promote labor unions, social measures, and land reform (a majority of the land was owned by the United Fruit Company). The CIA's rebels attacked from Honduras, and with the help of the Army, forced the President from office and set up a military government.

Political confusion and instability has continued since the 1950's, with both army and civilian governments in power. Since 1970, the government has been run by military leaders, amidst charges of fraudulent elections. The most recent coup d'etat (this month) raises further questions about the future of US- Guatemalan relations.

1950's, China:

The CIA supported, on its own and in cooperation with Chiang-Kai-shek, guerilla operations against China. Operations were reduced or eliminated after the shooting down in 1954 of two agents Richard Fecteau and John Downey.

Para-military operations against China were short-lived and without positive result. President Nixon visited China in 1972, paving the way to full diplomatic relations.

1955, Vietnam:

Agents had been present in Vietnam through the early 1950's, although not in paramilitary operations. Col. Lansdale (see above) is generally credited with eliminating the political rivals of Ngo Dinh Diem, and designing the election ballots which elected him in 1955.

Diem's victory and tenure lasted approximately eight years (see Covert Operations, 1963).

1958, Indonesia:

CIA agents and operatives sought to overthrow the government of President Sukarno; operations included B-26 bombing missions in support of insurgents on Sumatra.

Sukarno solidified power by defeating the insurgents, and balancing the Army and the Communist Party. He was replaced in 1965 by President Suharto.

1959-64, Tibet:

After the Chinese take-over of Tibet and the escape of the Dalai Lama to exile in India, the CIA secretly trained and equipped his troops, also in exile in India, for operations against the Chinese in Tibet.

Several raids into Tibet did yield the capture of important Chinese documents, but the Chinese hold over Tibet remains today. Serious destabilization efforts were abandoned by 1964.

1960, Guatemala:

While training Cuban exiles for the CIA's planned overthrow of Castro, the CIA used Guatemalan territory as its "jumping off point" for the Cuban operation. When a rebellion grew against the Guatemalan government, the CIA sent in B-26's to crush the insurgency and to ensure the secrecy of its operations. As noted above, Guatemala remains one of the most repressive nations in Central America, and continues to experience violence.

1960, Congo:

Two CIA officials were dispatched to assassinate Congolese leader Lumumba, who had threatened to bring the Congo under Soviet influence after independence. This particular attempt was never made, but Lumumba was killed in 1961 by the orders of CIA- supported Congolese officials.

Civil disorder, along with a secession movement by the Katanga province, followed in 1961. After UN troops restored order and a coalition government was formed and then deposed, President Mobutu took over.

Early 1960's, Laos:

One of the largest secret operations in CIA history was the "secret war" in Laos. Some 50 CIA agents and hired contractors recruited over 35,000 Meo and other Lao tribesmen into a secret "L'Armee Clandestine," and financed some 17, 000 Thai mercenaries, to oppose communism in Indochina.

The war in Laos eventually lost its "secret" nature, but the country remained a battleground between the U.S. and Vietnam for years. Vietnamese-supported forces eventually prevailed. Even now, turmoil continues amidst charges of the use of chemical weapons in Laos.

1961, Dominican Republic:

Dictator Trujillo was shot to death by Dominicans who had received weapons and support from the CIA, according to the Senate Select Committee report.

Efforts at economic development in the early '60's came to a halt in 1965, when President Johnson sent in U.S. troops. The peaceful transfer of power in 1978 to President Guzman has resulted in some progress in promoting civil and political rights, but poverty and unemployment remain.

1961, Cuba:

The Bay of Pigs operations against Castro, which had entailed massive planning, training, and financing, is generally regarded as the CIA's most notable failure.

The Bay of Pigs operation resulted in the departure of Allen Dulles as CIA director, and continued deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations.

1961-67, Congo:

After Lumumba's death, the CIA sought to influence politics with payments to candidates. By 1964, CIA B-26 aircraft were in bombing missions, with Cuban pilots on contract to the CIA.

President Mobutu's takeover, with CIA help, has lasted through the present, although charges of corruption and excessive authoritarianism recurrently threaten stability.

1963, Vietnam:

President Diem, elected in 1955 with CIA help, was overthrown and assassinated by a military coup about which the CIA knew, but in which they did not participate, according to the Senate Select Committee.

Diem was replaced by President Thieu and Gen. Ky, who remained in power until the communist takeover in 1975.

1960-65, Cuba:

The CIA concocted "at least eight plots" according to the Senate Committee, to assassinate Castro, involving exotic devices such as poison pens, pills and cigars, and powder designed to make Castro's beard fall out - thus "ruining his charismatic image." Sabotage raids against oil refineries and other industrial targets also existed in the early '60's.

All the assassination and covert plots failed, and Castro's image and standing in the Third World was enhanced, in the eyes of many.

Mid-1960's, Peru:

According to at least one former CIA agent, the CIA, at the request of the Peruvian government facing guerilla insurrection, financed construction of a major military installation in the jungle, furnished helicopters, arms, and other equipment, and provided training of forces by Green Berets on loan from the Army.

The Peruvian guerrillas were defeated by a government generally regarded as an oligarchy. In 1968, a coup installed a "revolutionary government of the armed forces," which has since become more moderate.

1965, Vietnam:

In a disinformation (but not paramilitary) campaign, according to a recent Washington Post story, the CIA allegedly planned to "con" public opinion by taking communist-made weapons from CIA warehouses, planting them in a Vietnamese battle, and calling in reporters to see the captured weapons as proof of communist weapons in South Vietnam.

This particular plan was not implemented in 1965, but the ex-agent making the claim in the Post suggested that the same concept might be being used in El Salvador today.

1960's, Vietnam:

CIA involvement in Vietnam continued with development and implementation of the Phoenix Program, which allegedly "neutralized" (killed) some 20,000 Viet- Cong. [Other later estimates have put the number of Vietnamese civilians (government clerks, teachers and other misc. civilians) killed during the Phoenix Program at over 100,000.]

The Phoenix Program apparently ended by 1970, but the war continued until the communist takeover in 1975.

1963-73, Chile:

For ten years, "extensive and continuous" CIA covert action aimed at influencing Chile's elections and overthrowing the government of popularly elected Salvador Allende. Although there were no paramilitary operations, some $3 million went into the 1964 election, resulting in the presidency of Eduardo Frei, and some $8 million opposed Allende after his 1970 election.

Allende's overthrow and death resulted in the succession of Gen. Pinochet in a military junta government.

1967, Bolivia:

The CIA provided aid to Bolivian President Barrientos to deal with rebel guerilla forces soon discovered to be being led by Che Guevara.

Che Guevara was killed by Bolivian forces. Barrientos' death in a plane crash was followed by two leftist military governments, and then by other military leaders.

1972-75, Iraq:

At the request of the Shah of Iran, the CIA provided arms to Kurdish rebels fighting for autonomy in Iraq.

Iranian and U.S. aid apparently ended in 1975, but the Kurds are generally perceived today as a potentially de-stabilizing element in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

1974-76, Angola:

Covert activities during transition to independence sought to help two factions. One of these factions, headed by Jonas Savimbi, is still seeking power.

Overt Cuban involvement helped shift the balance from South African and CIA- backed forces, and the Clark Amendment ended covert U.S. activities. Angola's government is now officially Marxist, but allows U.S. businesses to operate in its country.

MR. DELLUMS: ... During my service on the House Select Committee on Intelligence ... that investigated intelligence abuses 15 years ago, I received chilling documentation on the dangers and disastrous effects of American covert activities.

I oppose the destabilization of foreign governments through the actions of covert operatives.... I oppose so-called guerrilla movements operating under the rubric of "freedom fighters," whose aim is to overthrow foreign nations on behalf of the American people, using American tax dollars, without the knowledge of the American people.

MS. PELOSI: Mr. Chairman, the Iran-Contra scandal demonstrated that Congress must take a strong role in the oversight of United States intelligence activities and United States-sponsored covert action. To prevent abuses within the intelligence community, the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence must serve as an informed watchdog over United States covert actions.

MR. DURBIN: With the resources and prestige of the United States, the power and scope of covert action is substantial. It can define or defy our stated national security policy. It can lead us to war.

MR. DeFAZIO: There is always a friction between a constitutional, political system which requires the active consent of the governed, in this case the elected representatives of the governed, the Intelligence Committee and the Members of Congress, and inherently antidemocratic national security system built on secrecy and nonaccountability.

MR. EVANS: The abuses and excesses of our intelligence community in running covert operations are legendary. The Iran-Contra scandal was only the latest in a string of misadventures that stretch all around the world.... It is time we reformed our Nation's intelligence community and restored our Nation's reputation as a country that respects the rule of law.

VOTES FOR THE BOXER AMENDMENT:

Anderson, Au Coin, Bates, Bennett, Bonior, Bosco, Boxer, Bruce, Bryant, Clay, Collins, Conyers, DeFazio, Dellums, Dorgan (ND), Downey, Durbin, Dymally, Edwards (CA), Evans, Flake, Foglietta, Gibbons, Gonzalez, Hayes, Hertel, Hochbrueckner, Jacobs, Johnson (SD), Jontz, Kastenmeier, Lehman (FL) Lewis (GA), Lowey (NY), Markey, Martinez, McCloskey, McDermott, Mfume, Miller (CA), Mineta, Mink, Moody, Mrazek, Murphy, Oakar, Owens (NY), Panetta, Payne (NJ), Pelosi, Perkins, Rangel, Roybal, Savage, Scheuer, Schroeder, Serrano, Stark, Stokes, Swift, Torres, Towns, Traficant, Unsoeld, Washington, Weiss, Wheat, Wolpe, Wyden, Yates.

FATE OF BOXER AMENDMENT

CONGRESS: COVERT OPERATIONS CONTINUE DESPITE END OF COLD WAR

By ANDY LANG Christic Institute, Friday, October 26, 1990

The House and Senate Thursday voted for a new bill expanding Presidential power to conduct intelligence activities and covert operations in fiscal year 1991. Reportedly authorizing a record $30 billion dollars for America's spy agencies, the bill includes Title VII--a provision that gives the President new statutory authority to conduct a wide range of covert actions, including the use of private companies and foreign governments.

The bill passed in both houses on an unrecorded voice vote. Despite reservations about Congressional cuts of 10 percent in U.S. covert aid to the Afghan rebels, the President is expected to sign the measure into law.

Passage of the intelligence bill shows that both houses of Congress agree with the Bush Administration that covert actions will be a permanent fixture in U.S. foreign policy--despite the end of the Cold War. The bill has provoked a nationwide debate, however, largely thanks to the efforts of thousands of Christic Institute supporters who flooded Congress with letters, mailgrams and phone calls opposing Title VII.

Originally, Title VII was supposed to move quietly through the Senate and House without discussion or debate. The original Senate measure was approved by the Senate at 3:30 a.m. Aug. 4 on an unrecorded voice vote. No newspaper reported the following day that the Senate had just authorized the President to use private companies and foreign governments to conduct and pay for covert operations, and to spend money from any government department to finance a covert operation--even if the funds had not originally been appropriated by Congress for that purpose. The Senate, in other words, had given the President almost unlimited powers to finance covert actions from any source, compromising the "power of the purse" which is one of the few powers Congress still retains to check abuses by the Executive Branch.

The House version of the intelligence authorization bill did not include similar language. Late this summer it seemed almost inevitable that the Senate language would be inserted into the final version of the bill by a House-Senate conference committee meeting behind closed doors. The bill would then return to the two chambers to be passed by a voice vote under a "closed rule" prohibiting amendment. Members of Congress who doubted the wisdom of handing over new statutory powers to the President would have no chance to debate Title VII on the floor of the House.

Thousands of Christic Institute supporters, however, made it impossible for Members of Congress to remain silent on provisions that a few weeks before had been considered so uncontroversial that no Senator spoke out against them. A debate was assured when Congresswoman Barbara Boxer of California introduced in September an amendment to the House version of the intelligence bill which specifically would have prohibited the use of private companies and foreign governments to conduct and pay for covert actions--a key abuse in the Iran- contra scandal and one of the powers conceded to the President by Title VII. The Boxer Amendment also would have bound the President to seek the approval of the House and Senate intelligence committees before a covert action begins. In exceptional circumstances, however, the President could initiate a covert operation or use a foreign government if the action was intended to rescue American hostages or save American lives.

Although the Boxer Amendment failed to win approval, 70 Members of Congress supported the measure. As a result, Ms. Boxer and her supporters prevented Congress from increasing the President's power to conduct covert operations with no public debate. The debate also showed that many leading Members of Congress are opposed to unrestricted covert operations, and set the stage for future efforts to prohibit lawless actions abroad.

Passage of the 1991 intelligence authorization bill is a warning to activists around the country that the end of the Cold War does not mean the end of covert operations. Cold Warriors have discovered new enemies and new arguments for policies that violate both United States and international law. However, supporters of the Christic Institute were able to score by forcing a debate on covert operations last week on the House floor. Now we face an uphill battle to educate United States citizens about the continuing dangers represented by of covert operations to their liberties--and to press for a foreign policy based on openness and respect for the law.

Selections from the Boxer Amendment debate were posted earlier on this conference.

Source:Chr.contragate 12:53 pm Oct 30, 1990