The Nefarious Activities of Pakistan's ISI

by VHP

The Nefarious Activities of Pak I.S.I.

INTER SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (ISI) 01

COVERT ACTION

Covert action is a regular instrument of Statecraft designed to achieve, through clandestine means, defined national objectives. Intelligence is not merely input into policy but an instrument of policy Introduction The ISI is to Pakistan what the KGB was to the erstwhile Soviet Union - powerful ubiquitious and a state within state. A detailed study of ISI in this paper will show how the agency has been Pakistan’s invisible government over the years.

Clout of the ISI grew significantly during the Afghan war. The agency became a household name in Bharat for its massive covert operations in Punjab in the early eighties and then in Jammu and Kashmir in late eighties. The ISI quickly spread its tentacles in large parts of Bharat, particularly the North - East and the South.

The arrest of a leading Pakistani banker Yunus Habib by the Pakistan government in March 1994 blew the lid off the ISI’s nefarious political activities within Pakistan. Habib came out with a stunning allegation that he had given Rs 140 million to the then Pakistan Army Chief, Gen. Aslam Beg, for use in elections. Habib said he had given the money to the General before the November 1990 elections when he was the head of the Sindh office of the Habib Bank.

Gen. Beg admitted that he had indeed received the amount but added that he had handed over the entire money to the ISI, which spent Rs 60 million for election purposes. The General also stated that the ISI had been receiving donations from within the country and outside.

Interestingly, he said that the ISI worked under the Prime Minister and the President and was very categoric that the Pakistan Army had nothing to do with it.

More disclosures followed. The ISI chief during the relevant period, Lt. Gen. Assad Durrani, confirmed in a sworn affidavit that he had received the amount and had used part of the money for funding the election campaign of Nawaz Sharif and other opponents of Benazir Bhutto.

The cat was out of the bag. The ISI had been openly and blatantly playing a political game and had clearly aligned itself with a particular political party. Bhutto had disbanded the Political Division of the ISI after she came into power in November 1988.

Obviously, the ISI had surreptitiously revived its abolished Political Division without the knowledgeof the political executive and continued to act as the country’s Big Brother.

Pakistan’s former Air Chief Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan, then wrote to his country’s Chief Justice, Sajjad Ali Shah. His contention was that by accepting contributions from private parties the ISI had tarnished the image of the armed forces. Pakistan Supreme Court Chief Justice treated Asghar Khan’s letter as a public interest petition and took cognisance of the matter. Gen. Beg said in his testimony before a full bench of the Supreme Court on June 16,1997 that the ISI’s Political Division was set up by the then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto by an executive order in 1975 and the ISI worked directly under the Prime Minister, without the Army chief having any control over it.

Gen. Beg’s contention raised many an eyebrow within the country, as the ISI’s Political Division had been functional from the days of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, if not earlier. Despite this, the ISI used to take orders from the Army, ignoring the chief executive of the country. However, there was an exception to this when Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir was the ISI chief. Lt. Gen. Nasir had a running feud with the then Army Chief General Asif Nawaz Janjua.

A Punjabi of Kashmiri origin like Nawaz Sharif, Nasir’s loyalties were with Sharif rather than Gen. Janjua. Sharif continued to extend his patronage to Lt. Gen. Nasir despite the fact that the Pakistani press was full of stories how the latter was an anathema to Washington. The United States was upset with Lt. Gen. Nasir’s close links with Egyptian terrorists operating from Pakistani territory. Secondly, Pentagon viewed Lt. Gen. Nasir as a major stumbling block in its efforts to buy back hundreds of shoulder-fired, surface-to-air Stinger missiles from the Afghan Mujahideen. Thirdly, it was an open secret how actively Lt. Gen. Nasir had been assisting such organisations as the Harkat ul-Ansar, which had been branded as a terrorist organisation by the US, and the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad.

This battle of nerves between the US and Lt. Gen. Nasir did not continue for long and the Americans finally humbled the senior Pakistani General. In January 1993, the US placed Pakistan in the watch list of such countries, which were suspected of sponsoring international terrorism. But this Damocles’ sword dangled over Pakistan for just about six months when the US removed Pakistan from the watch list in July 1993. The reason cited by the US was that Pakistan had taken certain remedial steps. It became known shortly afterwards what these steps were. The Washington Post reported on July 15,1993 that Pakistan had agreed to remove Lt. Gen. Nasir from the top post of ISI and undertake a total revamp of the ISI by removing Lt. Gen. Nasir’s hand-picked men from the ISI in exchange for taking Pakistan off the watchlist of suspected State sponsors of international terrorism.

Gen. Beg’s testimony focussed the world attention on the need to rein in intelligence agencies of the country, which had become extra-constitutional powers.

Two comments of Pakistan’s respected English daily The Nation during the relevant period are pertinent. The newspaper made an editorial comment on August 23, 1995 as follows: "Theoretically, the army has returned to the barracks, the GHQ has no role to play in the country’s politics and the Chief of the Army Staff is a state functionary subordinate in the legally constituted civilian authority. Nevertheless, we still hear of a troika meeting off and on to discuss urgent and priority matters of state policy and regardless of which party is in power; there is an undisguised endeavour by the elected representatives to stay on the right side of the Generals. Unfortunately, the country’s politicians look towards the army as the real power broker whose support, they think, is necessary, to acquire power or sustain it."

Then, on June 28,1997, the same paper commented as follows on the controversy generated by Gen. Beg’s testimony: "The case has re-focussed public attention on what is widely perceived to be a government within a government - the intelligence agencies and their virtual autonomous role in the political affairs of the country. The baneful influence of the intelligence agencies has spread its malign shadow over the political destiny of the country."

ISI’s DOUBLE GAME

The ISI, like most intelligence services across the world, has pursued a strategy of double games, double-cross and double-talk. A classic case of this was the November 19, 1995 bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad.

On that morning, a small car crashed through the Embassy gates and seconds later an explosion occurred on the front of the reception area where a crowd of visa seekers had gathered. But it was only a smaller explosion and meant to be a part of the diversionary tactics for a bigger and more effective one.

In this chaotic scene, a bigger vehicle, a Mazda van, speeded through the broken gates and exploded after hitting the main building. It was a suicidal operation and the van carried an estimated 400 to 500 Kg of plastic explosives. Eighteen people, apart from the suicide bomber, were killed in this explosion. The Islamic Jihad group of Egypt later claimed responsibility for the baffling attacks in the heart of Pakistan.

Yossef Bodansky, a respected military and threat analyst of the US and Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, has brilliantly analysed the hidden motives behind the Egyptian Embassy bombing in his book "Bin Laden - The Man Who Declared War on America" as follows:

"But the Islamists were guests in Pakistan - hosted and sponsored by the local intelligence service. Initially it did not make much sense that they struck out at the capital of a state that had been so hospitable to them and supportive of their cause. The facilities and camps of the Egyptians, just like those of all other international Islamists groups, were tightly controlled and supervised by Pakistani intelligence, the ISI. Very little could escape the notice of the ISI. The senior Egyptian commanders, many in Peshawar, Islamabad and Karachi for more than a decade now, had always had very close relations with the senior echelons of the ISI. It did seem unreasonable for the Egyptians to risk this relationship for a single bomb. And in fact, they did not risk it. The relationship of the Egyptians with the ISI dictated the selection of Islamabad as the site for a spectacular act of terrorism."

"Because of the ISI’s close relations with and tight control over the Islamists, it was virtually impossible for the Islamists to plan, much less carry out, such an operation without the ISI’s knowledge. With Pakistan under international pressure to close down the Islamist terrorist infrastructure, the Egyptian Islamists would not have made the lives of their friends and benefactors in the ISI, who fought for their survival and sought permission for them to remain in Pakistan, more difficult by embarrassing them. The explosion in Islamabad served to confirm at least tacit support from individuals within the ISI. So although the Egyptian Islamists had many good reasons to strike at Egypt, it was the interest of the ISI - based on the internal power struggles in Pakistan - that determined Pakistan and not a third country as the site for the bombings."

"The roots of the explosion in Islamabad can be found in the ‘legend of the coup’ against Benazir Bhutto. According to the official version, an Islamist group military coup was narrowly averted in late September 1995. On September 26, a routine customs check of an official car in Kohat, on the Afghan border, caught Brigadier Mustansir Billah and a Colonel in civilian clothes trying to drive a car full of AK - type assault rifles and RPGS into Pakistan. When stopped, Billah tried to call another Colonel in Lahore to confirm that the weapons shipment was authorised official business. The officers were arrested anyway. The investigation led to Major General Zaheer ul-Islam Abbasi, a former senior ISI officer recently nominated commander of the Infantry Training Centre at Rawalpindi. According to the official version, these two generals, along with Colonels Kiyalu, Zahid and Amjad were planning a coup for September 30. Using the weapons Billah was trying to smuggle, these senior officers would have tried to eliminate the high command and declare an Islamist state. More than thirty officers were arrested in connection with the alleged coup attempt."

"In reality, the ‘coup’ was a set up, a purge of current or former ISI elements who had actively sponsored terrorism against the US. Both Billah and Abbasi had cooperated with and supervised Harkat ul-Ansar, Hizb ul-Mujahideen, and other Islamist terrorist organisations. They were deeply and directly involved in Kashmir operations. If they had wanted to, they could have acquired all the weapons they needed from stockpiles of the Kashmiri terrorists on Pakistani soil rather than trying to smuggle them in from Afghanistan. Billah was arrested delivering weapons from the Taliban to be used in deniable international operations. All the weapons and explosives in Billah’s possession could be traced to US financed supplies to the DRA and not to purchases of the Pakistani government. If any of these items had been captured in the course of a terrorist operation, the Afghans would have been blamed, not Pakistan."

BACKGROUND OF ISI

The ISI was founded in 1948 by a British army officer, Maj. Gen. R Cawthorne, then Deputy Chief of Staff in Pakistan Army. The Australian born British Army officer had opted to serve with the Pakistan Army after the partition of Bharat in 1947. The ISI Directorate was formed through the bifurcation of the Military Intelligence Directorate.

Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan in the 1950s, expanded the role of ISI in safeguarding Pakistan’s interests, monitoring opposition politicians, and sustaining military rule in Pakistan.

The ISI was reorganised in 1966 and expanded in 1969. During the rule of General Yahya Khan, the National Security Council (NSC) was formed to coordinate the functioning of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. But the NSC is no more functional and the ISI is playing the role of coordinating the functioning of the country’s intelligence agencies.

In its initial years of formation, the ISI was seldom in limelight. Its main function was confined to interaction with the foreign Military Attaches accredited to Pakistan and supervising the working of Pakistani Military Attaches posted abroad.

It was with the growing involvement of the Pakistan Army during the days of Ayub Khan in Pakistani politics that the ISI’s role started expanding. The successive Martial Law regimes, beginning with that of Gen. Ayub Khan, strengthened the ISI to the detriment of other intelligence agencies, especially the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which was marginalised.

The ISI lost its importance during the regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was very critical of its role during the 1970 general elections, which triggered off the events leading to the partition of Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh.

The ISI regained its lost glory after Gen. Zia ul-Haq seized power in July 1977, in late 1979, when the Soviet Union intruded into Afghanistan, Pakistan became a frontline state for the US and the ISI got a never - before boost. As Bhutto decided to cooperate with the US and other Western countries to contain the Soviet intrusion, the ISI played a pivotal role in channelising assistance for the Afghan Mujahideen.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan a country of paramount geostrategic importance. In a matter of days, the US offered to reopen aid and military assistance to this "frontline state". For the remainder of Gen. Zia’s tenure, the US generally ignored Pakistan’s developing nuclear programme.

By now, the ISI had acquired a halo of Pakistan’s top national security agency. It monitored the activities of and provided advice and support to the Mujahideen and along with SSG commandos of the Pakistan Army helped guide the operations inside Afghanistan. The ISI trained about 83,000 Afghan Mujahideen between 1983 and 1997 and despatched them to Afghanistan.

This action of the ISI, however, did not pass off without harm to Pakistan. Afghan and Soviet forces conducted raids against Mujahideen bases inside Pakistan and a campaign of terror bombing and sabotage was unleashed in Pakistani cities. These terror campaigns, guided by Afghan intelligence agents, caused hundreds of casualties.

In 1987, nearly 90 per cent of the 777 terrorist incident—recorded worldwide took place in Pakistan alone. The ISI continues to actively participate in the ongoing Afghan Civil War, supporting the Taliban, which has ousted the Rabbani government and now controls nearly 90 per cent of Afghanistan.

The ISI is tasked with collection of foreign and domestic intelligence, coordination of intelligence functions of the three military services, surveillance over its cadres, foreigners, the media, politically active segments of Pakistani society, diplomats of other countries accredited to Pakistan and Pakistani diplomats serving outside the country. Besides, the other charter of duties of the ISI is interception and monitoring of communications and the conduct of covert offensive operations.

The ISI has become a state within a state, answerable neither to the leadership of the army nor to the President or the Prime Minister. As a result, there has been no real supervision of the ISI and corruption, narcotics and big money have all come into play, further complicating the political scenario. Drug money is used by the ISI to finance not only the Afghanistan war, but also the proxy war against Bharat in Punjab and Kashmir.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee deals with all problems bearing on the military aspects of the state security and is charged with integrating and coordinating the three services. Affiliated with the Committee are the offices of the Engineer-in-Chief, the Director General of Medical Service, the Director of Inter-Services Public Relations, and the Director of Inter-Services Intelligence. The ISI Directorate is of particular importance at the joint services level. Its importance derives from the fact that the agency is charged with managing covert operations outside Pakistan - whether in Afghanistan, Kashmir or farther afield.

The 1965 Indo - Pak war provoked a major crisis in intelligence. When the war started there was a complete collapse of the operations of all intelligence agencies of Pakistan as these agencies had been largely bogged down in domestic works such as tapping telephone conversations and chasing political suspects. Ayub Khan set up a committee headed by General Yahya Khan to examine the working of intelligence agencies.

Due to its deep involvement in domestic politics, the ISI has kept track of the incumbent regime’s opponents. Prior to the imposition of Martial Law in 1958, the ISI reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (C-in-C). When Martial Law was promulgated in 1958 all the intelligence agencies fell under the direct control of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, and the three intelligence agencies - ISI, IB and Military Intelligence - began competing to demonstrate their loyalty to Ayub Khan and his government. The ISI and the MI became extremely active during the 1964 Presidential election-keeping politicians, particularly the East Pakistanis, under surveillance.

The ISI became even more deeply involved in domestic politics under General Yahya Khan, notably in East Pakistan, where covert operations were mounted to ensure that no political party should get an overall majority in the general elections. An amount of Rs 2.9 million was spent for this purpose and attempts were made to infiltrate the inner circles of the Awami League. The operation was a complete disaster.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto promoted General Zia Ul-Haq partly because the then ISI Chief, Gen. Ghulam Jilani Khan, was actively promoting him. (Gen. Zia repaid the favour when after he seized the power, he retained Gen. Jilani as head of the ISI after his scheduled retirement.) Bhutto established the Federal Security Force and gave it wide ranging powers to counter the influence of the ISI, but the Force was abolished when the military regime of Zia Ul Haq seized power in 1977. When the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto regime was unpopular with the military and the President (as was Benzir Bhutto’s first government), the ISI worked in tandem with political parties to topple it.

The ISI became much more effective under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Hameed Gul. The 1990 elections are widely believed to have been rigged. The Islami Jamhoori Itehad (IJI) party was a conglomerate formed of nine mainly rightist parties by the ISI under Gul to ensure the defeat of Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in the polls. Gul denies this, claiming that the ISI’s political cell created by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto only ‘ monitored’ the elections.

ISI’s COVERT ACTION

Covert action is an integral part of State policy and constitutes an approved instrument of Statecraft where political and diplomatic options prove ineffective and military solutions are too hazardous or cost-ineffective. For civilised, democratic nations, covert action is incompatible with established norms and contravenes UN charter and accepted international practices.

The Afghanistan war and the ISI’s neck-deep involvement in it provided the Pakistani Secret Service a tailor-made opportunity to hone its skills in covert action.

During the Afghan war, the ISI officers got access to denied intelligence and technology, large quantities of surplus terrorist hardware and trained manpower adept in covert warfare. This was the time when the ISI developed strategic operational linkages on two different planes: with fundamentalist Islamic groups the world over, from where recruits and material help was drawn for the Afghan war; and with drug cartels, gun runners, underworld and smugglers in several parts of the world to finance covert activities.

With this, the ISI had pulled off a strategic and intelligence initiative which it was all set to demonstrate to Bharat with amazing results.**

It is not for nothing that an organisation of just 25,000 personnel inflicted a "thousand cuts" on Bharat and unleashed such a well-orchestrated terror campaign that a country of one billion people is still fighting a no-win battle even as the security forces are stretched to their limits for more than a decade and a half.

Unstinted support from Pakistan Army’s logistic support base, other security agencies and administrative departments as well as low benchmarks of deniability and accountability sharply enhanced the ISI’s covert action capabilities vis-a-vis Bharat.

There were numerous factors that led to the growth of Pakistani covert action programme against Bharat.

First and foremost was that the hitherto denied technology, equipment of Afghan war and terrorist hardware was made available to "frontline state" of Pakistan free of cost with the crucial advantage of deniability.

Covert action had been tremendously successful in Afghanistan and there was no reason to believe why it would not succeed in Bharat.

The US, too, had virtually accepted covert action as an instrument of State policy and there was no reason why Washington would adopt different yardsticks when Pakistan were to use this instrument in a much bigger way vis-a-vis India. The US had given extensive training in covert action techniques. Besides, the ISI had got a liaison leverage with intelligence agencies of the countries involved in the Afghan operation.

The Afghan crisis period also coincided with political, military and intelligence leadership of Pakistan slipping into the hands of hawks.

The clout of ISI had increased phenomenally in the aftermath of the Afghan war in which it had succeeded against a superpower.

The Pakistani strategists realising that they had already lost three wars to Bharat and they still were no match to Bharat’s military might, which precluded the option of going for a military solution to the perceived Kashmir problem. Therefore, bleeding Bharat white through an aggressive and sustained proxy war was an ideal option to undermine the growing economic and political pre-eminence of Bharat. Such a pre-eminence of Bharat was perceived by the Pakistani decision-makers as a threat to Pakistan’s integrity, which emphasised separateness.

Now Let us focus on the role of ISI in different Bharatiya states.

ISI ROLE IN PUNJAB - K1

It has been nearly two decades now since the ISI took up in a big way the task of training, guiding and arming the Punjab terrorists, dangling before them the carrot of the so-called "Khalistan". It is another matter that the militancy in Punjab died its natural death not because the ISI lost interest or for any other reason but because of the effective border fencing in Punjab.

Militancy continues to flourish in Kashmir and the Northeast, mainly because their terrain is such that the borders cannot be fenced there.

A number of Punjab terrorists, including members belonging to the First and Second Panthic Committees are permanently based in Pakistan and have been coordinating their activities of subversion in Punjab under the guidance of the ISI. Elaborating the ISI role in formeting terrorism in Punjab Gurdip Singh Sivia, a leader of the dreaded terrorist outfit, Babbar Khalsa, UK who surrendered in August 1992, revealed that in spite of regular interaction with the Punjab terrorist leaders, ISI officials took all precautions to conceal their identity. The ISI officials described themselves as Chaudharies - the seniormost would be referred to as "Bada Chaudhary", the juniormost would be referred to as "Munshis".

ISI’s active involvement in training and supply of arms and ammunition to the Punjab terrorists is evident from revelations made by arrested and surrendered Punjab militant leaders and recoveries of huge arms catches at their instance. Sivia admitted that he had arranged five successful infiltrations from Pakistan into Bharat of Punjab terrorists with weapons, sponsored by ISI during 1989. Before his induction into Bharat for coordinating smuggling of arms from Pakistan, Sivia was briefed by ISI about new routes along Gujarat border, which could be used for this purpose. ISI’s role in smuggling of arms and ammunition to the Punjab militants was also confirmed by the interrogation of a key arms smuggler, Karimbhai Hasanbhai. The smuggler, arrested in November 1992, admitted having brought as many as 22 arms consignments from Pakistan.

Then there is the famous case of Lal Singh alias Manjit Singh. This top terrorist was the coordinator of militants and was based in Pakistan. He and a top Pakistani spy, Mohammad Sharif, were smuggled into Bharat in November 1991 by the ISI in pursuance of a grand plan of Pakistan. The Plan—Kashmir Khalistan Front, codename K2-aimed at balkanisation of Bharat by forging strategic alliance among Punjabi and Kashmiri militants and Muslim fundamentalists to spread terror to other parts of Bharat.

The tasks assigned to them by the ISI included coordination of smuggling of arms from Pakistan, building up a network of hideouts and training of Muslim fundamentalist youth in association with activists of fundamentalist Muslim organisations like Students’ Islamic movement of Bharat (SIMI).

Pakistan has exploited the differences within the Punjab terrorists. Commenting on the split in the second Panthic Committee, Dr. Sohan Singh, who was himself a protégé of the ISI, said after his arrest on November 3, 1993 that the ISI played an important role in creating dissension among members of the second Panthic Committee. The promotion of groupism within the different militant groups by the ISI contributed to a large number of deaths of militants in inter-gang warfare.

With the departure of leaders of the second Panthic Committee from Pakistan and maintenance of low profile by Pakistan based Babbar Khalsa leaders, the First Panthic Committee of Wassan Singh Zaffarwal and Bhai Lakhbir Singh Rode had gained prominence. Latest intelligence reports say that the ISI now trusts Zaffarwal more than anyone else.

JEI continues to be a conduit for the inflow of funds to Punjab terrorists. The ISI takes extreme precaution in handling the Punjab terrorists on Pakistan soil by isolating them and keeping them in separate areas. Punjab militants’ handlers observe such restrictive security that they do not even disclose the ISI’s telephone numbers to even top terrorists such as Paramjit Singh Panjwar.

ISI ROLE IN KASHMIR - K2

After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan finally in 1987, the ISI had lots of free time and fertile brain. The ISI bosses opened a new insurgency front in Bharat when they turned to Jammu and Kashmir in the late eighties.

The process of subversion and brain-washing took place slowly and steadily, but its unhindered growth made sure that the Kashmir valley, which was known as "paradise on earth" became a breeding ground of bloody insurgency; where for more than a decade, children have been growing under the shadow of AK -47 rifles; where the people receive the news of militants killing security personnel or security personnel killing militants nonchalantly.

According to the documents prepared by Bharat’s Ministry of Home Affairs, the ISI has the following four broad policy objectives:

(i) Sustain Kashmir movement at minimal cost and force its settlement on terms acceptable to Pakistan.

(ii) To weaken Bharat’s potential strength and national will by hitting at its perceived "Fault lines" and to pursue the policy of "thousand cuts"

(iii) To prevent Bharat from emerging as a strategically dominant power in the region.

(iv) To render Bharat borders porous and bordering states vulnerable.

The ISI has drawn up an elaborate plan for action at different planes, such as political, propaganda, para-military and covert to achieve the above mentioned policy objectives.

Here is how the ISI has been acting to achieve its objectives:

Political Action:

Project existence of a vibrant "Freedom movement" in Kashmir by orchestrating activities of the terrorists, Pakistan - sponsored politico-religious organisations and media manipulation.

Bolster pro-Pak support groups, human right lobbyists, foreign Parliamentarians, academicians etc to promote secessionist cause.

Float and sustain an overgrown conglomerate, inclusive of political parties, subservient to Pakistan and project it as "third party" to the dispute representing "wishes and aspirations" of the Kashmiri people.

Cause disaffection and alienation among Kashmiris using the religious card, non-performance of the elected government and alleged atrocities of security forces.

Create and exploit pro-Pakistan "front organisations" among religious bodies, students, youth, government servant, judiciary, bar, intellectuals etc.

Organise agitations, bandhs and seminars both within Jammu and Kashmir and abroad to provide legitimacy to the secessionist ideology and achieve publicity mileage for the "cause".

Propaganda Action :

Build up assets in the local media and finance them to follow pro-Pakistan agenda.

Use terrorists to coerce into submission the otherwise recalcitrant journalists.

Use Media for intensive propaganda against Bharat and its security forces eulogising action of terrorists as "freedom fighters" and highlighting activities of over ground secessionist organisations.

Use Pakistan TV, Radio and special broadcasting stations like Sada-e-Hurriyat, and influence section of the international media to support the Pakistani position on Kashmir.

Para-military Action:

Recruit, train, motivate and coordinate covert actions of various terrorist groups.

Build up elaborate border penetration capabilities, raise guides/couriers and develop dumping and distribution mechanism to ensure uninterrupted supply of arms, ammunition, explosives, communication equipment and other terrorist hardware to the militants.

Build up channels for financial assistance to militants and subversive groups.

Control and direct activities of militant groups through an elaborate communication system with main controls in POK at Muzaffarabad, Kotli and Sialkot etc.

Identify anti-movement elements, particularly intelligence assets and former militants, now supporting the government to eliminate them.

With local recruitment nearly stopped, induct large number of foreign mercenaries.

Bring hitherto unaffected areas, particularly of Jammu region into vortex of militancy.

Use terrorist threat to seek acquiescence of moderate political leaders, government functionaries, media persons, religious leaders, social activists and academicians.

Engineer terrorist attacks aimed at communal divide and possible backlash.

COVERT ACTION:

Pursue the "Qurban Ali Doctrine" of the inevitable balkanisation of Bharat, identify the fault lines, carry out intensive operational intelligence research and build covert capabilities in targeted areas.

Carry out low-intensity warfare in different parts of Bharat with special emphasis on Jammu and Kashmir, North -East and Punjab.

Target VIP’s.

Forge operational and ideological alliance of Kashmiri militants and fundamentalist groups with covert networks in the hinterland and international terrorist outfits.

Use infiltrators from Bangladesh to destabilise North-East and cause disruption in other areas.

Push counterfeit currency in the country through various inlets and use hawala operators to finance covert action programme.

Embarrass Bharat by Internationalising Kashmir issue, projecting Bharat as violator of UN resolutions and charge it with dismal human rights record.

Emphasise strategic parity with Bharat as a guarantor of stability in the region.

Build and support anti-Bharat lobbies abroad among Parliamentarians, strategic opinion makers, think tanks and OIC leaders.

Emphasise commonality of strategic interests of powers like China and the US to support Pakistan and underplay its role in promoting international terrorism, drug trafficking, acquisition of strategic weapon capabilities through clandestine means.

Intelligence encirclement of Bharat by establishing covert networks in its neighborhood.

Diversion of substantial manpower and economic resources on security related tasks and making its battle against terrorism increasingly expensive.

Tie down Bharatiya security forces in large numbers on internal duties, thereby impairing their offensive capabilities.

Cause demoralisation among Bharatiya security forces through the casualties inflicted on them, pressure of human rights groups and strains and stresses of hazardous anti-terrorist duties.

Intensify security related espionage activities, cultivate agents in and around cantonments, defence establishments, defence production units and research facilities.

Establishment of high tech signal intelligence interception and intelligence communication facilities.

Promote and abet terrorism in Border States like Punjab, Kashmir, Assam and Nagaland etc and carry out subversive propaganda on fundamentalist and communal lines among sections of border population.

Establish intelligence networks in important cities like Jodhpur, Kota, Ahmedabad, Surat. Baroda, Bhuj, Jalandhar, Ludhiana, Pathankot, Jammu, Udhampur etc.

Patronise border smugglers and criminals and use them for intelligence activities as also smuggling of weapons and narcotics.

The Points very briefly mentioned above, in fact, sum up ISI’s strategy vis-a-vis Bharat, not just in respect of Jammu and Kashmir. These are being adhered to in letter and spirit by the ISI in Kashmir; first, because the tactics had been time-tested and fine tuned by the time the ISI spread its tentacles to Jammu and Kashmir and secondly, because this time the stakes were much higher.

Because of the higher stakes, ISI did in Kashmir what it did not do anywhere else: induct foreign mercenaries in a big way. To help Kashmiri militants, the ISI, with the assistance of fundamentalist organisations, recruited nationals of Afghanistan, Bahrain, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, apart from Pakistan. In 1992, the ISI inducted trigger-happy Arab Guerillas in the Kashmir proxy War Theatre.

The next course of the ISI is going to be induction of Taliban soldiers into the Kashmir valley under the Banner of Harkat Ul-Ansar. And this is going to be sooner rather than later.

ISI ROLE IN NORTH-EAST - K3

By the time the arm of the ISI octopus reached North-Eastern Bharat in 1990, the secret agency had become a past-master in the fields of subversion, sabotage and terrorism.

ISI bosses eyed the North-East to open a third front. K3 was the third proxy War Theatre planned in Bharat after the encouraging results from the K1 and K2 experiments.

They perceived that the North - East insurgents, particularly of NSCN (I) and ULFA, were in position to launch full-scale insurgent movements with some help. NSCN (I) was given assistance through the DGFI of Bangladesh (the Bangladesh authorities have their own reasons to provide assistance to the North-East insurgents) and anti-Bharat groups like the Freedom Party and the JEI. As ULFA was against the Bangladeshi immigrants, it was difficult for the ISI to contact them through the DGFI or anti-Bharat organisations mentioned above.

Therefore, initial contacts with ULFA were established through the Punjab extremists. In February 1990, Bhai Bhagwan Singh Mokhal was sent to contact ULFA militants in Assam. After establishing contacts with the ULFA militants, the ISI tried to bring the DGFI, the Freedom Party and the JEI closer to ULFA.

As ULFA was finding it difficult to procure weapons through the KIA, it was looking for alternative source of supply of weapons. Moreover, there was realisation among the top ULFA militants that Bangladesh could provide the much-needed sanctuary to the ULFA cadres.

Now let us see how the ISI began to assist the various North-East militant outfits from 1990 onwards:

ULFA

Munim Nabish, an important ULFA activist, who was later appointed as the resident agent in Bangladesh, visited Karachi and Islamabad during December 1990 and January 1991. He met an ISI officer named "Chaudhuri". At this meeting, arrangements for the visit of senior ULFA leaders to Pakistan were finalised. Nabish admitted to his visits to Pakistan during his interrogation after he was arrested by the Assam Police.

Chairman Arbindo Rajkhowa, Vice -Chairman Pradeep Gogoi, General Secretary Golap Barua and C-in-C Paresh Barua and Munim Nabish, the top brass of ULFA, went to Islamabad and the Afghan border during March-April 1991 to meet Afghanistan strongman Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who promised to supply arms to ULFA. Rajkhowa’s diary and other recovered documents confirmed this visit of ULFA activists.

The first batch of ULFA militants went to Pakistan in June 1991 to attend a two week-long training course in the use of mortars. Since then a number of ULFA batches have received arms training in Pakistan. This has been stated in the interrogation reports of surrendered / arrested ULFA militants like Sujit Das, Binod Das, Pranab Barua alias Laching Phukan, Vijay Bora and Abdul Hamid alias Dulal Hazarika. Col. Farooq of the Freedom Party has acted as a conduit between ULFA and the ISI. Bangladesh authorities provided fake passports to the ULFA cadres.

In August 1991, ULFA paid 4 lakh US dollars to Col. Farooq to procure sophisticated arms from Pakistan. The interrogation report of Kamakhya Prasad Rana alias Abdul Karim, who was arrested on the Indo-Pak border in September 1992, revealed this. ULFA had also received 12 VHF sets and eight binoculars as gifts from the ISI.

In 1992, the ISI put pressure on Paresh Barua, Arbindo Rajkhowa and others not to surrender to the Bharatiya authorities. In February that year, Robin Handique, a senior ULFA leader, went to Kathmandu and held a meeting with Pervez Afzal, a Counsellor in the Pakistani Embassy in Nepal. Afzal told Handique that the ISI would provide arms to ULFA through the Punjab terrorists. ULFA was told that weapons would have to be collected from Punjab.

At ULFA’s General Council meeting in February 1992, Siddharatha Phukan (of pro-talk faction) revealed that as a condition of help, the ISI had instructed ULFA to sabotage oil refineries, railways and other vital installations. In October 1993, Colonel Sajjid of ISI met the ULFA Vice Chairman, Pradeep Gogoi, at Shaiman Hotel in Chittagong. Thereafter, the two visited a new ISI training camp in the Chakma area.

At these and many other meetings with different ULFA leaders, the ISI promised to supply arms and ammunition to ULFA provided the outfit: (i) promised protection to minorities and attacks on the Bharatiya security forces, and (ii) agreed to hijack an aeroplane to gain publicity. Another condition laid down by the ISI for supplying arms and ammunition was that in the event of a communal flare-up, ULFA should side with the minorities.

NSCN (I)

In April 1990, NSCN (I) Chairman Issac Swu visited Pakistan to procure arms for his outfit. He travelled on Bangladeshi passports. He was contacted by the ISI through the Freedom Party.

In January 1991, NSCN (I) Finance Secretary, Khayao Hurey, was arrested by the Bharat security forces. He revealed during his interrogation that the NSCN (I) had received one million Takas from the Pakistani High Commission in Bangladesh.

The documents recovered from Kamakhya Prasad Rana alias Abdul Karim, mentioned earlier, revealed NSCN (I)’s connection with the ISI and the Freedom party. He also disclosed that both ULFA and NSCN (I) were receiving weapons from the ISI.

NSCN (I)’s weapons are smuggled from the Thai-Cambodian border. Intelligence reports indicate that the Pakistani embassy officials in Thailand are providing assistance to NSCN (I) and other North-Eastern insurgent groups in procuring weapons.

Another intelligence report indicated that Issac Swu and Th Muivah, General Secretary of NSCN (I) met an ISI official, Sajjad Ali, at the liaison office of the insurgent outfit at Bangkok in February 1994. In this meeting, NSCN (I) agreed to impart training to the Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) activists at NSCN (I) camps in North Cachar Hills of Assam and Garo Hills of Meghalaya.

PLA

The ISI’s nexus with the PLA also has come to notice. A document recovered in January 1991 from Biren Singh alias German, the Finance Secretary of RPF (the political wing of the PLA) revealed PLA’s connections with the ISI.

Two ISI operatives - Nasiruddin alias Mahiruddin alias Dilip and Yusuf Khan alias Pradeep, reached Imphal from Bangladesh with a group of PLA activists in February 1994. Both the ISI operatives were of the rank of Junior Commissioned Officers.

There were more intelligence reports of the blossoming ties between the ISI and the North-Eastern insurgents. A meeting was held at Chittagong (Bangladesh) on January 2, 1993 between Biku Sema of NSCN (K), K Basumatari of Bodo security force and Arbindo Rajkhowa of ULFA. . The ISI was represented at the meeting by Mohammad Salim. The discussions centred around increasing the cooperation level between the North-East insurgent groups and the ISI.

Col. Faruque of ISI met NSCN (I) and ULFA leaders in Hojai area under Nagaon districts in January 1994. Shortly afterwards, the ISI opened a new unit and selected educated young activists of ULFA (50), NSCN (I) (15) and Bodos (60) for the above unit.

As part of its policy to keep Bharat in a continuous state of ferment and open as many theaters of proxy war as possible, the ISI has been vigorously exploiting for nearly a decade the ethnic and regional susceptibilities of the people of the North-Eastern Bharat. It has been using NSCN (I), ULFA, PLA and Islamic Revolutionary Army of Manipur to create problems in the North East.

Suddenly, Muslim organisations have mushroomed like barbershops in the North-East and it is likely that these are getting support of the ISI. Intelligence reports indicate that the Joint Intelligence (Miscellaneous) of the ISI has been given the responsibility for providing assistance to the North-Eastern insurgent groups. The DGFI and the freedom Party are working in tandem with the ISI.

Col. Farooq Rehman of the Freedom Party has recently claimed that he had been working in association with the DGFI Major General Mohd Nasim to chalk out and implement a blueprint with the assistance of ISI to disintegrate North Eastern Bharat. The JEI is also associated with this plan.

At this stage, it is still not possible to quantify the amount in monetary terms of the ISI’s help to the North-Eastern insurgents. But one thing is clear. The ISI help has definitely raised their sagging morale and helped them in procuring sophisticated weapons and getting their cadres trained. It strengthened the resolve of the anti-talks factions to continue their armed struggle against Bharat.

The ISI factor has been instrumental in coordinating the activities of different insurgent groups in the North-East. There are reports of Pakistan army officers supervising training of the North-Eastern insurgents in Bangladesh. Nearly three-fourths of staff in the Pakistani high Commission in Bangladesh consists of intelligence officers of Pakistan.

Highly porous borders with Bangladesh, the unprecedented spurt in the infiltration and exfiltration of people from the Indo-Bangladesh border and the tardy pace of work of border fencing are some of the factors which have made available to the ISI a situation on the platter that has the biggest potential of serving the nefarious Pakistani plans of disintegrating Bharat. Unfortunately, the Bharatiya decision-makers, including the politicians, have so far failed to see the writing on the wall.

If the North-Eastern situation were to be allowed to deteriorate like this, by the next six or seven years, Pakistan would find itself on the verge of achieving in the North-East what it failed to achieve in Punjab and Kashmir.

ISI AND MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM

Political instability created by the assassination of former Bharatiya Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, and subsequent political activities within our country i.e. communal riots in various parts, the March 12, 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai and the like provided golden opportunities to the ISI to carry on with its subversive anti-Bharat activities with the sole aim of weakening and balkanisation of Bharat. The ground was fertile for the ISI to sow the seeds of communal divide.

This was the phase when the ISI proceeded with surgical precision to cultivate Muslim fundamentalists. The ISI took full advantage of the fact that a new generation of Muslim youth had emerged which was conscious of its numerical strength and political power, the perceived raw deal it had received in the Bharatiya Union and the alleged failure of the police to protect the lives and property of Muslims led a section of the Muslim community in Bharat to believe that the only way to survive was fight back.

The growth of fundamentalist organisations like the Students Islamic Movement of Bharat (SIMI), the banned Islamic Sevak Sangh (whose cadres have now been amalgamated in the newly formed People’s Democratic Party), the All Bharat Milli Council (AIMC) and the emergence of persons with pan-Islamic loyalties are a manifestation of this new awareness in the Muslim community.

In the late eighties, the ISI arranged an interface of Lal Singh alias Manjit Singh alias Iqbal - a top KLF militant - some Kashmiri militants and the Pakistan JEI in Lahore. The ISI had by then started brainwashing Punjab militants that their goal of creating "Khalistan" could not be achieved without the balkanisation of Bharat and that was possible only if they were to join hands with Kashmir militants and militant Muslim elements in Bharat. The disclosures of Lal Singh and Gurdeep Singh Sivia of Babbar Khalsa International clearly exposed the new offensive worked out by the ISI. Police and intelligence records show that it was decided at the Lahore meeting that SIMI would extend all cooperation to Lal Singh in his operation from Aligarh under an assumed Muslim identity. Lal Singh and Sivia were among the important cogs in the wheel of ISI to implement this new strategy.

Lal Singh established bases at Mumbai and Ahmedabad with the assistance of fundamentalist Muslim organisations. Bharat’s Western borders were extensively used for smuggling huge quantities of arms and ammunition during this period.

The interrogation of Tahir Jamal, ex-president of the Maharashtra unit of SIMI and his confidant Saqib Nachan, confirmed that prominent SIMI leaders had been tasked to provide all possible assistance to Punjab militants and raise trained squads of Muslim youths in the communally sensitive pockets. Police and intelligence records show that Bashir, a former President of SIMI, visited Lahore in January 1992 and finalised a plan to despatch Muslim youth from Bharat to Pakistan for a four week-long training course in the use of arms and explosives. These records showed that SIMI was also provided substantial funds through hawala transactions to finance this operation.

Around this time, another muslim youth, Shoab Mohammad Ebrahim Mullah, fell in the police net. His interrogation confirmed that Bharatiya muslim youth were sent to Pakistan for training in handling the latest armaments, including anti-aircraft guns.

The arrest of two Kashmiri Muslims in Hyderabad in November 1993 disclosed that Muslim youth from Hyderabad, Calcutta and Bhagalpur were sent to Pakistan for arms training through an agent in Calcutta. The agent, Shafqat Ali Siddiqui, was smuggling Muslim youth to Pakistan via Bangladesh and was paid by the Pakistanis for the job. The training in Pakistan included handling of AK-47 rifles and light machine guns and manufacture of bomb with RDX.

By the mid-nineties, the ISI extended its targeted section and roped in Dalits (backwards) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), along with Muslims and started training them for subversive activities against Bharat. The criminal mafia of Nepal, Mumbai and Dubai were some of the channels, which actively helped and funded such dubious organisations, promoting a nexus among Muslims, Dalits and OBCs at ISI’s bidding.

The ISI tried to target leaders, teachers, and students of such renowned Muslim organisations as Darul-Uloom, Deoband, Ahle Hadis, Darul Uloom Nadvatul (Lucknow) and the Tabligh Jammat. Certain Muslim political parties of Bharat are also vulnerable to ISI’s designs because of their financial dependence on pan -Islamic countries.

Pakistan’s deceitful, hostile, terrorist activities have made the year 1999 most violent. The concealed and undeclared war against Bharat is taking a heavy toll of innocent human lives, rendering people refugees in their own country; putting Bharatiya Army and para military forces under great strain and stretching them from Kashmir to Kerala and hit at strategic, vulnerable points to break the morale of forces and terrorise the people. It has made use of religion to instigate transnational military and terrorism in Bharat. The fundamentalists, the Mujahideens have a strangle hold on Pakistani army and civil administration. A sizeable portion of Pak army is highly indoctrinated in Islamic teachings. There is no distinction between Pak regular army personnel and Mujahideens. Both fight in the name of "Allah" to liberate his land from infidels i.e. all those who are not followers of Islam. Pak has used ideology and ethno-religious extremism to create conditions for violent action. The fundamentalists have gone to the extent of justifying use of biological weapons to defend Islam and have no respect for national boundaries and have a right to fight anywhere in the world where Islam is in danger. According to their ideology war must be total and terror must be used as an essential weapon of war.

Pakistan is pushing both Regulars and Mujahideens into Bharat equipped with sophisticated, lethal, man-portable weapons, which are easy to conceal and carry. There has been heavy influx of such weapons all over the country and as a matter of fact they have become the tools of terror causing death and destruction in Bharat. Pak has patronised hardened criminals for this purpose and these arms in their hands have pushed up violence and crime in Bharat disturbing peace and tranquility.

Pakistan is directly involved in infiltration and arms trafficking in Bharat. Funds to finance such activities are generated by drug peddling and smuggling. The largest movements of narcotics are from Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad airports.

Pakistan sponsored mischief against Bharat from across the border is going on unabated. The Lahore bus journey was undertaken by Shri Vajpayee to normalise relations between the two countries but Pak betrayed his trust and in the bargain was exposed and isolated all over the world.

Pakistan’s internal conditions are pathetic and by raising hate Bharat campaigns it wants to divert the attention of people from the real, internal issues. This mischief is costing very heavily to Bharat. Pak desires to destroy the economic base of Bharat by resorting to terrorist acts so that no FDI takes place, an environment of insecurity is created, vital installations are targeted and fake currency is pumped in. The resulting unemployment and discontentment will create hostile uprisings and weaken the Government. Internal conflicts in Bharat benefit Pak.

Thus, various facets of Pak terrorism are -proxy war, low intensity conflicts, communal disharmony; sub-conventional war and economic destabilisation.

In the recent Kargil episode, Pak has had to eat dust. The Bharatiya nation from Kanyakumari to Kashmir and from Mumbai to Imphal stood united like a rock. Soldiers from all the parts of the country valiantly fought for the integrity and honour of the country. Pak must realise that its subversive designs will never succeed in Bharat and that the Bharatiya have understood the challenges to their national security and way of life. U.S.A. and Russia have understood the Pakistani designs to become the cock of Central Asian walk of life and usurp the huge quantities of oil and natural gas available there.

We have not yet been able to fully deal with ISI. In fact we are only reacting to ISI activities and committing our security forces on ground thus tied down our forces in counter insurgency and aid to civil authorities roles. This has resulted in very heavy expenditure of funds to maintain these security forces.

The latest menace created by ISI is pumping of fake currency in our country through different routes even different neighbouring countries.

COMBATING OF ISI OF PAKISTAN

The ISI has, from its small and seemingly innocuous beginnings in 1948, steadily developed into the principal instrument of Pakistan’s State sponsorship of terrorism directed against Bharat. This sinister organisation today poses a grave and escalating threat not merely to Bharat’s internal security but to our very national fabric. While our existing security agencies have been engaged in countering the ISI threat in a highly professional and altogether commendable manner, the fact also remains that none of these agencies is in a position to focus exclusively on the ISI. Therefore, .a Think Tank comprising senior retired officers of the Army, Police and Intelligence organisations was constituted to suggest measures which could supplement the ongoing efforts of our security agencies in neutralising the ISI’s designs and activities.

Taking stock of the ISI’s capabilities, the Think Tank noted how the ISI had raised a force of nearly 80,000 Mujahidden during the Afghan War (1978 - 89) and thereafter created the fanatically fundamentalist Taliban. The ISI’s tentacles are not confined to Bharat and Afghanistan alone. Rather it has been systematically exporting terrorism even to faraway places such as Chechnya and Sudan. Within Pakistan the ISI has created politico-ideological fronts such as the Markaz - Dawat -Wal - Irshad and its militant wing the Laskhar - e - Toiba, which are working as extended arms of the ISI.

The Think Tank has taken note of proliferation of ISI network in the rest of the country like Western UP, Nepal - Bihar border, Siliguri corridor of West Bengal, Hyderabad and Kurnool areas of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat specially in Kutch area, Rajasthan, Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu and some parts of Kerala. In these areas, the ISI has managed to recruit locals through fundamentalist organisations like Laskhar-e-Toiba of whom many have been in Pakistan and Afghanistan for arms training. They have been usually found to communicate with their handlers in Pakistan on telephones (PCOs are preferred). Their precise headcount needs to be taken and brought on record. These agents, both locals and Pakistanis, are trained to "Strike and melt", into the crowd. The ISI agents often visit Bharat, Nepal and Bangladesh and remain mostly undetected because of various loopholes in the system.

The Think Tank has also taken note of three potentially explosive factors which are likely to further encourage the ISI towards achieving its ambitious plan of promoting trans - border terrorism and balkanizing Bharat through the medium of Sikh and Kashmiri militant organisations as well as the North Eastern Insurgent outfits. First, with their surrogates, the Taliban now controlling nearly 90 per cent of Afghanistan, the ISI is in a position to divert a very sizable number of highly committed and battle-hardened Mujahideens to the so-called "Jehad" (holy war) in Kashmir. In fact, such a diversion is not only operationally feasible, but also politically necessary for the ISI, given the destabilizing potential of a large mass of highly trained and motivated mercenaries floating idle within Pakistan itself. Secondly, in the wake of the humiliating defeat suffered by Pakistan in Kargil, the ISI could be expected to upgrade the level of the ongoing proxy war in Kashmir and other parts of the country. History bears ample testimony to this prognosis since Pakistan’s defeats in the 1965 and 1971 wars were followed by significant upswings in ISI sponsored violence and subversion in both Punjab and Kashmir. Ominously, the Pakistan former Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif before he was overthrown by the military coup on 12. October, had threatened that "there will be many more Kargils" unless the Kashmir problem is solved. The Pak Army Chief, Gen. Parvez Musharraf has gone a step further by stating that "Even if Kashmir problem is solved, confrontation with Bharat will continue". Another menacing dimension has been added by the "Jehad" call recently given against Bharat and US by the notorious Osama-Bin—Laden.

A review of the capabilities and objectives of the ISI leads to an inevitable conclusion that Bharat would have to live with an intractable and hostile Pakistan determined to wrest Kashmir from Bharat and disrupt Bharat’s domestic security by anointing various militant outfits in the North East and by promoting terrorism in the Punjab and other areas in the country. It is, therefore, imperative that Bharat gear herself fully towards meeting both the existing and the anticipated challenges posed by the ISI. The hardline anti-Bharat stance of the Pakistani army, which is now in power, is likely to escalate ISI’s subversive activities and provide fresh impetus to the Mujahideens. The recent events in Pakistan have very grave implications for Bharat’s external and internal security.

Taking the ground realities into account, the strategy for combating/neutralising the ISI will have to differ from region to region. In J & K. for example, the ISI has been sponsoring a proxy war on the Afghan model. In the North East, on the other hand, the ISI has taken advantage of ULFA, NSCN (1) and other secessionist groups to organise the creation of an Islamic state. Apparently, ULFA and other secessionist groups in North East are likely to be jettisoned once the ISI is able to create and consolidate outfits like Harkat-ul—Mujahideen, Muslim Liberation Front of Assam etc. by enrolling Muslim youths of Assam who have already been trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan. For the rest of Bharat the ISI has been building a network of active agents, both locals and Pakistanis, who engineer bomb blasts, massacres etc, which serve to enthuse secessionist cadres and demoralise Governments. It may be noted that many agents belonging to this category float around in large numbers without being detected. This category also includes a very sizeable number of those who act as "sleepers" ready to be activated when required.

The Think Tank’s members have mapped out a comprehensive strategy encompassing the operational, intelligence, administrative, psy-war and economic counter-measures for combating the ISI. This strategy, it, may be reiterated, does not envisage any systemic changes in the present security establishment, but focuses on tapping and mobilising the existing apparatus to deal with the ever-widening and deepening ISI infrastructure. The recommendations of the think tank are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Recommendations (Optional)

Bharat’s operational response ought to be hinged on two clearly discernible premises. First, with ISI-sponsored mercenaries now specially targeting Army campus, para military installations and killing uniformed personnel with impunity, there is an urgent need to prepare a Blueprint for anti-ISI operations with clearly defined objectives. Second, it needs to be recognised that in the context and dimension of the proxy war in Kashmir, the para-military forces have a limited role. Instead, the prevailing situation dictates that counter-ISI operations in Kashmir be entrusted to the Army which is better equipped both mentally and physically.

As a corollary of the above, the "Unified Command" concept, which was given a half-hearted trial in the past, and subsequently got bogged down on account of inter-Agency wrangles and rivalries, should be revived and implemented on ground. This concept presages that all counter-insurgency units work under the operational command of the Army, with complete coordination between the various civil, para-military and Army agencies involved. Ideally, the United Command set-up should be headed by an appropriately senior serving or retired Army officer who is not only familiar with local conditions but also enjoys the confidence of the Civil administration.

Para-military units deployed for counter-insurgency operations also need to be rejuvenated through better training, greater motivation and commitment. Filling up of a suitable percentage of posts, in the para-military forces by ex-servicemen would certainly give a cutting edge to the operational capability of these forces. Where reserved quotas exist for para-military forces, it would be worthwhile to examine whether these have been filled.

The NSG was created in 1986 to combat terrorist activities but is now being used extensively for VIP security-a role not envisaged under the NSG Act. The NSG’s original role should be restored so that this crack outfit may be used exclusively for combating extremist activities in J & K and North East in particular as well as in other parts of the country, whenever required. If this is not operationally possible, a VIP Security Force may be raised separately so that the NSG can perform the role for which it was created.

There is also a need for examining the feasibility of proactive and more aggressive counter-measures to neutralise the ISI’s activities. Such measures could include covert operations inside Pakistan, which would drive home to the ISI that Bharat is more than capable of paying Pakistan back in the same coin.