Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Intelligence

Some stuff that might prove interesting. Two telegrams concerning the inadequacies of UK intelligence handling (including a reference to a mishandled Bin Laden threat a year before 9/11) and one telegram (UK EYES ONLY) regarding a meeting in Whitehall to discuss Private Military Companies (mercenaries) and the legal constraints that the intelligence services are facing with regard to storing information.

Message 1:

CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY

Subject: MEETING OF THE WHITEHALL PMC GROUP: 16 NOVEMBER 1999

Those Present

Dr Wendy Wyver, UND, FCO
Mr John Andrews, DDI CPAC, DIS, MOD
Mr John Firmin, D1 1GT, MoD
Ms Liz Hebden, G3W/1, Security Service
Ms Cathy Gilhespy, Head Enforcement Unit XNP
Mr Roger Sanbrook, Criminal & Enforcement Policy, HMC&E
Mr Karl Livingstone, CHAD, DFID
Mr Barry Fletcher, HQ Sy(S&T)1d, MoD
Mr David Heard, Room L/3104, GCHQ
Mr R F Darling, Box 850, WLD(VC), FCO
Mr Nicholas O'Brien, Anti-Terrorism Operations, MPSB
Mr Phil Batson, Africa Command, FCO
Mr Alastair Totty, NEAPD, FCO
Ms Georgina Butler, LACD, FCO
Ms Nicole Davison, LACD, FCO

Message 2:

RESTRICTED

From: Keith Bloomfield, CTPD
Date: 20 September 2000
cc: William Ehrman
Mathew Kirk, ITSU
Lyn Parker, WLD
Michael Ryder, DICD
Tom Duggin, SSU
Louise Selvadurai, UND
R55, SIS
A24, GCHQ
To: David Manning

CTPD: DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

Message 3:

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Stephen Wordsworth, Head, EAD Date: 05 April 2001 cc: Alison Blake To: Heads of Section

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL/CIG DRAFTS

---

Message 1

CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY

DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT BELOW
Application: ARAMIS RTF
Descriptor:
CoveringPM:
CovDescriptor:
CovCaveat:
Finalised:
OfficialRecord:
DocumentStatus: Registered
CreatedBy: Migrated From ARAMIS
FolderReferenceType: POLICY FOLDER
DocumentStyle: MINUTE/SUBMISSION
ProtectiveMarking: CONFIDENTIAL
Caveat:
FromInd:
FromOrg:
ToInd:
ToOrg:
DocumentDate: 15/01/2000
RegisteredOn: 15/01/2000
SysDocumentDate: 15/01/2000
Subject: MEETING OF THE WHITEHALL PMC GROUP: 16 NOVEMBER 1999
Draft:
ARAMIS folder reference: UNG332/001/99
FolderReference: UNG332/001/1999
AdditionalText:
RegisteredBy: und17
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT ABOVE
STARTDOCUMENT:

.RE Changed to FINAL by und18 Date 15/01/00 Time 00:55
[.RE1][.RE2][.RE3][.RE4][.RE5][.RE6][.RE7][.RE8][.RE9]MEETING OF THE WHITEHALL PMC GROUP: 16 NOVEMBER 1999

1. The second meeting of the Whitehall PMC Group was held on 16 November 1999. At the outset, the draft record of the previous meeting was amended and agreed, and draft terms of reference for the PMC Group were discussed, amended and agreed. There was agreement that all departments would nominate two representatives, and would notify Sanctions Unit, FCO, in the event that neither was able to attend the monthly meeting of the Group. All representatives must have a minimum of STRAP 2 security clearance. There was agreement that the role of the Group should be to address the activities of private military companies as a whole, which can potentially undermine HMG's policy objectives in a number of ways. The focus should not be limited to mercenary activity. Sources of Information

2. Dr Wyver noted that the PMC Group could draw on a wide range of information, including the media, Sigint and information from the agencies. Mr Totty noted that Desk Officers would be able to turn to the group for advice and would pass on to it, in return, any relevant information from Posts. Legal Constraints

3. Ms Hebden noted the legal constraints on what the Security Service could record. There was a risk that inaccurate information would be recorded in the database. This was an area of cut-throat commercial competition, and companies could well spread damaging rumours about each other. The Group agreed that when information was entered, the originator should be made clear, with an indication of whether or not the allegations could be verified.

4. Mr Andrews noted that intelligence from the agencies could never, in any case, be quoted. The information on the database was not intended for public use. It would simply be fed into the normal analytical process. However, legal advice would certainly need to be taken on the implications of the Data Protection Act. It would be easier if one of the agencies could sponsor the database, to bring it under the Intelligence Services Act. Ms Hebden said this would not/not be possible.

Mr Heard noted that the incorporation of the ECHR into UK law was affecting the way that GCHQ could store information. An initial steer from lawyers on the legal admissibility of such a database would be essential.

Mr Sanbrook noted that a clear guarantee would be needed that the consent of the originator would be sought before documents were disclosed in court. Court cases would have to be dropped if potential evidence could not be disclosed to the defence team. A defendant might also plausibly argue that the Government had tacitly approved their activities if information on them had been stored on the database but no action taken. Parameters of the Database

5. Ms Butler asked whether an unofficial database existed already. Mr Andrews said that for historical reasons DIS maintained a small database on PMCs in Africa. But they had not previously stored information on the human rights record of PMCs. Mr Darling said that the current situation was unsatisfactory. There was a failure of joined-up government; Departments were not pooling their knowledge.

6. Mr Andrews noted that the software for a very effective database was already in place. But for it to operate effectively, other Departments would need to commit to automatically providing all available information. Taking the existing Africa database as a starting point, he proposed to input automatically the last 10 years of GCHQ reporting on the subject and the last 2 years of CX material, indicating the originator. He asked for permission to automatically copy all relevant FCO telegrams into the system from now on. (Dr Wyver agreed to seek FCO consent.) Information from the media could also be included. The database would be strictly UK EYES ONLY, and would only be accessible on behalf of officials with at least STRAP 2 security clearance. Requests for information would be made to the relevant DIS desk officer. These requests, and any response, would ideally be transmitted via the UKIMN/X400 system. But not all interested departments currently have this installed. The problem of access therefore requires further thought.

7. All participating Departments would need to:

(i) consult their legal advisers on the database proposal;

(ii) obtain ministerial approval to participate in the project;

(iii) commit themselves in writing to sharing information on PMC activities;

8. Mr Sanbrook noted that HMC & E would not/not be able to provide information for the database on activities of PMCs which are not illegal in the UK. They could only make use of their statutory powers to seek information from companies for specified purposes, eg securing Excise Duties and VAT.

9. It was agreed that the database should cover UK-registered PMCs, PMCs employing UK citizens and PMCs with a UK base. There should be a special emphasis on PMCs operating in Africa. UND should ask the JIC to include a generic requirement to report on the activity of PMCs in these categories. Mr Andrews noted that the agencies could not be tasked to look at the activities of companies registered in the territory of intelligence allies, eg the US. Nor would it deal with the activities of security sector companies who operated purely in the UK, or at companies who merely provided armed guarding services. What we were targeting were the providers of military services.

Interaction with the REU and the Sanctions Information Groups

10. Ms Gilhespy noted that the REU was responsible for addressing PMC activity where illegal arms proliferation was concerned. She would bring to its attention any relevant information from the PMC Group. Dr Wyver undertook to ensure that allegations of non-military sanctions busting by PMCs were brought to the attention of the Iraq Sanctions Information Group (SIG) and the Rest of the World SIG, also chaired by UND. HMG contacts with private security/military companies

11. Dr Wyver noted that the FCO had circulated to other departments its own guidance to staff on contacts with PMCs. She would be interested to hear what action other departments had since taken, and to receive copies of any guidelines drawn up by other Departments (since received from MoD). She suggested that Departments might consult the PMC Group before entering into contracts with companies in this sector, in order to benefit from the experience of others.

12. Mr Fraser Darling said that in the security sector it was crucial to know the names of the individuals involved. The boundaries between companies were often very fluid. In drawing up a contract it was important to ask who owned the company, who worked for it and who sat on the Board of Directors. If a company dodged answering these questions, that was in itself grounds for suspicion. The information could then be fed into the database, and HMG would build up, over time, a clearer picture as to who could and who could not be trusted. Mr

Fletcher asked whether the guidance on contacts with PMCs should also apply to mine clearance contracts. Dr Wyver said that this would be advisable. Mr Fraser Darling noted that demining workers had been implicated in covert intelligence activities in Kosovo.

Other

13. Ms Davison noted, for the record, that Task International had consulted LACD about a request from the Colombian government for them to deliver training in security sector work. A CTPD sponsored visit was also about to visit Colombia to advise on crisis management in kidnap situations. This might give rise to contract opportunities for UK firms.

14. There was a brief discussion of Chechnya, and allegations that British citizens were going to Chechnya to fight, inspired by religious convictions. But there was general agreement that this did not come within the PMC Group's remit. Our focus should be on the commercial provision of military services.

ACTION POINTS

All Departments: to seek Departmental legal advice on the proposed database and wherever they would be able to provide information. To report on the legal advice they have received at the next meeting of the Group.

@@
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

All Departments: to nominate two representatives, one of whom will normally attend meetings of the PMC Group.

To ensure that representatives have a minimum
of STRAP 2 security clearance.

UND, FCO: to ask JIC to include a reporting requirement
on PMCs.

UND, FCO: to seek FCO consent for reporting telegrams
to be automatically fed into the database.

@@
AAA

Those Present

Dr Wendy Wyver, UND, FCO
(Tel: 270-3838 Fax: 270-3753)

Mr John Andrews, DDI CPAC, DIS, MOD
(Tel: 2188-1092 Fax: 2188-9917)

Mr John Firmin, D1 1GT, MoD
(Tel: 2188-5641 Fax: 2188-9917)

Ms Liz Hebden, G3W/1, Security Service
(Tel: 2188-5461)

Ms Cathy Gilhespy, Head Enforcement Unit XNP
(Tel: 215-8399 Fax: 215-4325)

Mr Roger Sanbrook, Criminal & Enforcement Policy, HMC&E
(Tel: 865-5161 Fax: 865-4961)

Mr Karl Livingstone, CHAD, DFID
(Tel: 917-0056 Fax: 917-0502)

Mr Barry Fletcher, HQ Sy(S&T)1d, MoD
(Tel: 0171-218-5998 Fax: 0171-218-9078)

Mr David Heard, Room L/3104, GCHQ
(Tel: 01242-221491 x 3849 Brent: 01242-259012)

Mr R F Darling, Box 850, WLD(VC), FCO
(Tel: 0171-270-3800 Fax: 0171-270-0736)

Mr Nicholas O'Brien, Anti-Terrorism Operations, MPSB
(Tel: 230-3377)

Mr Phil Batson, Africa Command, FCO
(Tel: 270-4022)

Mr Alastair Totty, NEAPD, FCO
(Tel: 270-3263)

Ms Georgina Butler, LACD, FCO
(Tel: 270-2479)

Ms Nicole Davison, LACD, FCO
(Tel: 270-2608)

*************************************************
Additional Text Section
*************************************************

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und27

Action Taken:
PA

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
05/07/2000

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und22

Action Taken:
PA

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
02/02/2000

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
Distribution list: @(:@):
Action Officer(s):
und22
und27

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
15/01/2000

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
DRAFT DOCUMENT STATUS CHANGED
FROM DRAFT TO FINAL 00:55

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
15/01/2000

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 00:55

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
15/01/2000

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 00:25

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
15/01/2000

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 00:23

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
15/01/2000

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 17:20

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
30/12/1999

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 17:01

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
30/12/1999

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 16:58

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
30/12/1999

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 15:39

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
30/12/1999

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
DRAFT DOCUMENT EDITED 15:24

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
30/12/1999

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und18

Action Taken:
FINAL DOCUMENT REGISTERED 00:55

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
15/01/2000
[.RE10][.RE11]
Edited by und18 Date 15/01/00 Time 00:55
Edited by und18 Date 15/01/00 Time 00:25
Edited by und18 Date 15/01/00 Time 00:23
Edited by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 17:20
Edited by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 17:01
Edited by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 16:58
Edited by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 15:39
Edited by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 15:24
Created by und18 Date 30/12/99 Time 14:06
(C) 1996-97 Centreline 2000 TUDOR - Licensed to end user Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Document Conversion Number 207236 of 1000000 licensed

CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY

----------

Message 2

RESTRICTED

DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT BELOW
Application: ARAMIS RTF
Descriptor:
CoveringPM:
CovDescriptor:
CovCaveat:
Finalised:
OfficialRecord:
DocumentStatus: Registered
CreatedBy: Migrated From ARAMIS
FolderReferenceType: POLICY FOLDER
DocumentStyle: MINUTE/SUBMISSION
ProtectiveMarking: RESTRICTED
Caveat:
FromInd: BLOOMFIELD K
FromOrg: CTPD
ToInd: MANNING
ToOrg: N/A
DocumentDate: 20/09/2000
RegisteredOn: 20/09/2000
SysDocumentDate: 20/09/2000
Subject: CTPD AND FORTRESS: TESTED AND FOUND WANTING
Draft:
ARAMIS folder reference: UNF338/001/00
FolderReference: UNF338/001/2000
AdditionalText:
RegisteredBy: und13
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT ABOVE
STARTDOCUMENT:

.RE Edited by ctpd02 Date 20/09/00 Time 12:35
[.RE1][.RE2][.RE3][.RE4]

From: Keith Bloomfield, CTPD
Date: 20 September 2000
cc: William Ehrman
Mathew Kirk, ITSU
Lyn Parker, WLD
Michael Ryder, DICD
Tom Duggin, SSU
Louise Selvadurai, UND
R55, SIS
A24, GCHQ
To: David Manning

CTPD: DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

SUMMARY

1. Twelve months on, the consensus in CTPD is that FORTRESS has proved to be slower, less reliable, less practical, but more costly than the old paper distribution of intelligence. If the system cannot be improved we would prefer to return to paper distribution.

DETAIL

2. CTPD is a highly IT-literate department. We welcomed the prospect of FORTRESS - a system that (we were told) would give us quicker access to intelligence, an efficient retrieval system, the ability to create our own strap documents, and secure electronic links with the agencies.

3. Nevertheless, in the year since FORTRESS was rolled out, FCO departments have encountered substantial problems. These problems have been exacerbated for CTPD because we have attempted (but failed) to use FORTRESS not only as a mechanism to read reports but also in order to take action, particularly when the intelligence has indicated a threat to life.

4. The core problems of FORTRESS have been well documented in minutes from this department, in the WLD FORTRESS User Group, and during meetings with a succession of consultants. The problems have not been addressed. In brief, they are that:

- the system is less reliable and often slower than paper distribution: there have been a number of occasions when immediate threat intelligence arrived too late in CTPD, or did not arrive at all, because of technical hitches. We still receive intelligence well after most OGDs. Vital threat telegrams to our missions overseas have been delayed as a result, causing Ambassadorial consternation (as with the pre-summer UBL threat to Brussels);

- the printing constraints of the system make crisis management meetings unworkable (we prefer to have paper copies in front of us), routine "action on" impractical (it is difficult to discuss reports over BRENTs or telephones because we share terminals and cannot have reports in front of us when the call comes through), and participation in CIGs less than satisfactory (we often seem to be the only department which does not have paper copies of the relevant intelligence in front of us when we are discussing JIC assessments);

- the software is not in the least user-friendly which means we waste hours every week trying to access reports. CTPD receives almost 40 reports a day. We estimate that it takes us five times as long to process reports on FORTRESS than on paper: not a very efficient use of our time;

- I do not know how much the FORTRESS roll out has cost the office; I doubt that it is more cost effective than paper distribution.

5. We were promised that the core problems would be addressed. We now understand that there is no prospect that FORTRESS will be modified to meet our concerns. Faced therefore with a system which is less reliable, less practical and often slower than paper, CTPD would prefer to return to a paper distribution.

6. For separate, but no less serious, reasons FORTRESS could not be used as a replacement for the Secret capacity of ARAMIS once we have Confidential FIRECREST. Which means that, if we retain FORTRESS, we will have to work daily with three different terminals and five different retrieval packages (FORTRESS, FIRECREST, ARAMIS, paper, and BBC Media). The scope for work falling through the gaps will increase dramatically. SIS, I understand, have had one system covering all aspects of their work (CX, SIGINT, SIS t/gs, FCO t/gs, UKIMN email, BBC Media etc) for years.

7. I appreciate that the office's IT requirements are not driven by CTPD and that the Board of Management is seeking to optimise FCO systems across the board. But I felt you should be aware that, as far as we in CTPD are concerned information handling is progressively getting more, not less, difficult.

Keith Bloomfield
WH423
Tel: 020 7270 2581
Fax: 020 7270 3460

*************************************************
Additional Text Section
*************************************************

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und22

Action Taken:
DOCUMENT COPIED FROM SLAM 19:09

Action Protective Marking:
RESTRICTED

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
20/09/2000

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
und22

Action Taken:
DOCUMENT REGISTERED 19:09

Action Protective Marking:
RESTRICTED

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
20/09/2000
[.RE5][.RE6]
Edited by ctpd04 Date 19/09/00 Time 17:25
Edited by ctpd04 Date 19/09/00 Time 16:15
Edited by ctpd04 Date 19/09/00 Time 16:05
Created by ctpd04 Date 19/09/00 Time 14:13
(C) 1996-97 Centreline 2000 TUDOR - Licensed to end user Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Document Conversion Number 199702 of 1000000 licensed

RESTRICTED

-------

Message 3

CONFIDENTIAL

DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT BELOW
Application: ARAMIS RTF
Descriptor:
CoveringPM:
CovDescriptor:
CovCaveat:
Finalised:
OfficialRecord:
DocumentStatus: Registered
CreatedBy: Migrated From ARAMIS
FolderReferenceType: POLICY FOLDER
DocumentStyle: MINUTE/SUBMISSION
ProtectiveMarking: CONFIDENTIAL
Caveat:
FromInd: WORDSWORTH S
FromOrg: EAD
ToInd: N/A
ToOrg: EAD
DocumentDate: 05/04/2001
RegisteredOn: 05/04/2001
SysDocumentDate: 05/04/2001
Subject: INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL/CIG DRAFTS
Draft:
ARAMIS folder reference: EKP440/002/01
FolderReference: EKP440/002/2001
AdditionalText:
RegisteredBy: eau19
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES SECTION: DO NOT MODIFY TEXT ABOVE
STARTDOCUMENT:

.RE Changed to FINAL by eau13 Date 05/04/01 Time 12:25
[.RE1]

From: Stephen Wordsworth, Head, EAD
Date: 05 April 2001
cc: Alison Blake
To: Heads of Section

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL/CIG DRAFTS

1. I am a bit concerned that I am not seeing much CX/GCHQ material. I rely on Sections to forward to me on Fortress reports of interest - the only things I get direct are the daily GCHQ summary and a few other reports that are circulated on paper. Obviously I can't read everything; but from now on, please automatically forward to me immediately any reports that SIS rate at Category A or B. I leave it to you to decide whether to forward individual Category C ('building block') and GCHQ material.

2. I know Fortress is a pig, but somebody in each Section must go through the Section's material every day.

3. Please also make sure that, whenever possible (I know some come very late), I see all CIG drafts in time to feed comments to whomever is attending the CIG, and JIC drafts before Stephen Wright's pre-JIC meeting. I don't want to be caught out by being asked by EJP et al about papers I haven't seen!

4. Thanks.

[signed]

Stephen Wordsworth
Tel: 020.7270.3013
Fax: 020.7270.4187
[email protected]

*************************************************
Additional Text Section
*************************************************

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau73

Action Taken:
PA

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
11/04/2001

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau72

Action Taken:
PA

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
11/04/2001

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau09

Action Taken:
PA

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
10/04/2001

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau34

Action Taken:
PA

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
06/04/2001

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau06

Action Taken:
PA

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
06/04/2001

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau08

Action Taken:
PA

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
06/04/2001

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau66

Action Taken:
Forwarded to:
eau08
Sarah - I think one of us must look at Fortress each day, on alternate days. This note is mainly aimed at me! Chris

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
05/04/2001

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau24

Action Taken:
Forwarded to:
eau09
Alex - please forward to Liz - we need to keep a log of who gets on to Fortress when - lets discuss
JM

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
05/04/2001

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau13

Action Taken:
Distribution list: @(:@):
Action Officer(s):
eau24
eau66
eau06
eau72
eau73
eau34

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
05/04/2001

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau13

Action Taken:
DRAFT DOCUMENT STATUS CHANGED
FROM DRAFT TO FINAL 12:25

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
05/04/2001

************ Actions Section Below **************

Action Officer:
eau13

Action Taken:
FINAL DOCUMENT REGISTERED 12:25

Action Protective Marking:
CONFIDENTIAL

Action Caveats:

Action Date:
05/04/2001
[.RE2][.RE3]
Created by eau13 Date 05/04/01 Time 12:11
(C) 1996-97 Centreline 2000 TUDOR - Licensed to end user Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Document Conversion Number 220519 of 1000000 licensed

CONFIDENTIAL