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The Communications Security Establishment: An Unofficial Look Inside
by Bill Robinson
The Communications Security Establishment:
An Unofficial Look Inside Canada's Signals Intelligence Agency
Bill Robinson
Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario,
Canada N2L 3G6
(519) 888-6541 x264
[email protected]
What is the Communications Security Establishment?
The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is Canada's
national Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) organization. SIGINT, as
defined by the Canadian government, is ``all processes involved in,
and information and technical material derived from, the
interception and study of foreign communications and non-
communications electromagnetic emissions.''[1] Subcategories
include intelligence derived from communications, also known as
Communications Intelligence (COMINT), intelligence derived from
non-communications emissions such as radar, also known as
Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and intelligence derived from the
telemetry transmissions of missiles or other equipment undergoing
testing, also known as Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT). Note that
SIGINT is restricted to foreign emissions under the Canadian
government definition.
Strictly speaking, CSE is only part of Canada's SIGINT effort. A
civilian agency of the Department of National Defence, CSE
processes SIGINT, produces analyses, and disseminates reports to
Canadian and allied consumer agencies. The actual collection of
the SIGINT, however, is conducted by the Canadian Forces
Supplementary Radio System (SRS), a component of the Canadian
Armed Forces that operates under the direction of CSE.
CSE and the SRS in turn work in close co-operation with the giant
American and British SIGINT agencies, the National Security
Agency (NSA) and Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ), Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), New
Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB),
and a number of other SIGINT agencies in a global intelligence
alliance known informally as the UKUSA community. CSE
maintains permanent liaison officers at NSA HQ at Fort Meade,
Maryland (CANSLO/W) and GCHQ in Cheltenham, UK
(CANSLO/L). There are also NSA and GCHQ liaison officers at
CSE HQ (SUSLO/O and BRLO, respectively). For more
information about NSA, see the official NSA homepage or the
much more informative Federation of American Scientists NSA
homepage. For more information about GCHQ, see the official
GCHQ homepage or the IntelWeb GCHQ page. CSE and DSD also
have official homepages.
Overview and Brief History
CSE began existence as the Communications Branch of the
National Research Council (CBNRC). Authorized by Order-in-
Council 54/3535, dated 13 April 1946, it was the direct descendent
of Canada's wartime military and civilian SIGINT processing
operations, which also had worked in close co-operation with their
American and British counterparts.[2] Officially born on 1
September 1946, it began operations on 3 September 1946.
In 1947, CBNRC took on the additional responsibility of serving
as the Canadian government's communications-electronic security
(COMSEC) agency. Prior to 1947, the government's encryption
systems and keys had been provided by the United Kingdom. ``This
arrangement,'' the History of CBNRC noted dryly, ``did not
guarantee the privacy of Canadian government classified
communications.''[3] CSE continues to bear both SIGINT and
COMSEC responsibilities today (the latter responsibility is now
listed as the somewhat broader category Information Technology
Security (INFOSEC)). For more about CSE's INFOSEC mandate
and current INFOSEC activities, see the official CSE homepage.
On 1 April 1975, CBNRC was transferred from the National
Research Council to the Department of National Defence and its
name changed to the Communications Security Establishment. At
the time of its transfer, CBNRC/CSE had about 590 personnel. A
major buildup during the period 1981-1990 left CSE at its current
strength of about 900.[4]
Additional information about CSE's staff is located on the
employee strength and authorized establishment page.
The history of cryptanalysis (codebreaking) at CSE. More about
CSE's history.
The current Chief of CSE is A. Stewart Woolner. Under the Chief
are four Directorates (SIGINT Production; Technology; INFOSEC;
and Corporate Services), each headed by a Director-General. Each
Directorate, in turn, contains a number of Groups, each headed by a
Director. An approximation of CSE's overall organization is
depicted in this organization chart.
Budget
CSE's fiscal year 1997-98 budget is $115.7 million, down slightly
from the $117.1 million spent in FY 96-97. (These figures do not
include the budget of the Supplementary Radio System.)
CSE appears to have weathered the end of the Cold War
remarkably well. In May 1995, CSE Chief Stewart Woolner
testified that CSE's 95-96 budget (then estimated at $113 million)
was about ten percent lower in real dollars than its 90-91 budget,
implying that its 90-91 budget was about $116 million (i.e., about
$125 million in 1995 dollars). If this statement can be taken at face
value, it would appear that CSE's budget remains only about 10
percent below its Cold War peak level. CSIS's budget, by
comparison, is close to 30 percent below its Cold War peak.
In fact, CSE's budget almost certainly weathered the end of the
Cold War even better than these figures would indicate. Woolner
neglected to mention in his testimony that 1990 was the peak year
for CSE's spending on "Annie," the new wing of the Sir Leonard
Tilley building that was completed in 1992. The extra funding
added for this project may have boosted CSE's budget by as much
as 15 percent over its normal level during that year. Excluding
special projects such as this, CSE's budget probably remains at or
very near its Cold War peak.
This somewhat surprising conclusion is supported by the minutes
of the September 1994 meeting of the Cryptologic Resource
Coordination Group, which "observed that, although DND's budget
as a whole is decreasing, CSE's is holding its own." This meeting
also reported that CSE's budget was projected "to grow by about
7% over the next five years" (essentially enough to continue
covering inflation). This plan was noted to be subject to the
government intelligence review then underway, as well as DND's
own program review, but the 1997-98 budget suggests that this plan
remains essentially intact.
The same conclusion can be drawn from an examination of Annex
4B of DND's Defence Planning Guidance 1997, which shows that
DND expects the CSE-controlled budget to grow by about 9 per
cent between FY 1997-98 and FY 2001-02. [Note, however, that
the figures provided in Annex 4B do not include CSE's entire
budget. Statutory personnel spending (benefits, etc) is not
included. In addition, for reasons currently not obvious to me, some
percentage of operations and capital spending is not included.
Somebody, splain me this!]
It is undoubtedly true that CSE has faced real budgetary constraints
since the end of the Cold War. But the claim that CSE has suffered
significant reductions since the end of the Cold War appears to be
a myth. Reallocations from capital and operations spending have
enabled CSE to maintain a staff of 892 full-time equivalents
(FTEs), virtually the same as the 896 it had in 1990-91 and 50
percent more than it had in 1980. Since progress in automation
continues to reduce the number of staff in CSE's Communications
Centre and other support roles, the number of analysts at CSE is
actually likely to have increased since the end of the Cold War.
And, if the 1995-96 record is any indication (actual spending of
$123.9 million, compared to the $113 million originally estimated
by Woolner), funding for special projects continues to be available
when judged necessary.
Supplementary Radio System
Canada's SIGINT collection (as opposed to processing) has always
been conducted predominantly by military personnel. Small-scale
SIGINT collection for the British Royal Navy began in 1925, but
collection for Canadian processing began with the Second World
War. (The officially recognized birthday of Canada's SIGINT
collection service is 8 May 1938, the day the Minister of National
Defence approved the creation of a Canadian "Wireless Intelligence
Service".) All three services operated SIGINT collection facilities
during the war, and all three continued to collect SIGINT after the
war.
A unified collection organization, the Supplementary
Radio System (SRS), was created in 1966 as part of the unification
of the Canadian Armed Forces. The mission of the SRS is:
"To operate and maintain Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection
and geolocation resources in support of the Canadian cryptologic
programme;
"To operate and maintain Canadian Forces radio frequency
direction finding facilities in support of Ocean surveillance, Search
and Rescue and other programmes; and
"To provide Signals Intelligence, geolocation and Electronic
Warfare support to Military Operations, including tactical SIGINT
and Electronic Warfare (EW) support to commanders in the field."
As of the beginning of 1997, the strength of the SRS was reported
to be 1025: 112 civilians (mainly support staff at the SIGINT
stations) and 913 military personnel.[5] Approximately 785 of the
latter were members of the Communicator Research (291) trade,
i.e., the actual intercept operators. These numbers are down
significantly from the beginning of the 1990s, a result of the end of
the Cold War, the closing of the SRS intercept station at Bermuda,
and the conversion of three other intercept stations - Alert, Gander,
and Masset - to remote operations. Communicator Research
training takes place at CFB Kingston.
Policy, Operational and Administrative Control
Control over Canadian SIGINT activities is divided, with policy
and operational control exercised by Cabinet and the Privy Council
Office, and administrative control exercised by the Minister and
Deputy Minister of National Defence: ``The Chief of CSE is
accountable to the Deputy Minister of National Defence for
financial and administrative matters, and to the Deputy Clerk
(Security and Intelligence, and Counsel) in the PCO for policy and
operational matters.''[6]
In practice, policy and operational control is exercised by the
Deputy Clerk (Security and Intelligence, and Counsel) and the
Intelligence Advisory Committee, both of the Privy Council Office,
working under the direction of the Interdepartmental Committee on
Security and Intelligence (ICSI) and, ultimately, the Cabinet. ``The
ICSI maintains general policy control over all aspects of the
collection, processing and dissemination of SIGINT and exercises
this control through the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) for
national SIGINT, and the Canadian Forces for tactical COMINT
and ELINT.''[7] The Chief of CSE is an associate member of the
ICSI.[8]
Among its other duties, the IAC ``co-ordinates the Canadian
SIGINT program with other national intelligence activities and
formulates guidance, requirements and priorities for the provision
of SIGINT product.''[9] (Some user requirements are also provided
to CSE bilaterally by SIGINT customer departments.)
Administrative control is exercised by the Minister and Deputy
Minister of the Department of National Defence. ``The Minister
approves CSE's major capital expenditures, its annual Multi-Year
Operation Plan, and (with CCSI [the then-existing Cabinet
Committee on Security and Intelligence]) major CSE initiatives
with significant policy or legal implications.''[10]
The Minister of National Defence is the member of Cabinet
accountable to Parliament for CSE.[11] It is the responsibility of
the Deputy Clerk (Security and Intelligence, and Counsel), ``in co-
operation with the deputy minister of National Defence, to ensure
the Minister of National Defence [is] knowledgeable about matters
of CSE, and able to respond to any questions that would be put on
that subject.''[12] In practice, however, it is likely that few ministers
of National Defence ever obtain a detailed knowledge of the nature
and activities of CSE. Former Minister of National Defence Jean-
Jacques Blais has stated, for example, that ``my knowledge of the
Communications Security Establishment was very superficial
indeed when I was minister of defence.''[13]
Control over INFOSEC activities is organized similarly, except that
it is exercised through the Security Advisory Committee of the
PCO instead of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
Mandate
The formal mandate of CSE is a classified document, presumably
approved by the Cabinet; it has never been laid out in statute. As
demonstrated above, however, the general nature of CSE's mandate
is not secret. IAC SIGINT Memorandum No. 1 confirms that ``the
Communications Security Establishment (CSE) of the Department
of National Defence has been established as the Canadian National
SIGINT Centre, and has been given the responsibility for providing
SIGINT to meet the needs of the Federal Government.''[14] What
remains secret is the extent to which the communications of
Canadians are considered to fall within the SIGINT needs of the
Canadian government.
The Canadian public has been told on a number of occasions that
CSE's formal mandate restricts it to the collection of ``foreign
intelligence''.[15] The government's definition of SIGINT, quoted at
the beginning of this page, would appear to confirm this assurance.
It is almost certainly significant, however, that the government
definition of ``foreign'' communications has never been made
public; it was deleted in its entirety from the released version of
IAC SIGINT Memorandum No. 1. Depending on the precise
definition that the government uses, such communications might
include:
any communication that originates and/or ends in a foreign
country, regardless of the nationality of its participants; any
communication that involves foreign embassies, foreign-owned
businesses, or other foreign-related activities in Canada, regardless
of the nationality of its participants; and/or any communication
that involves at least one foreign participant.
There is reason to believe that the government's definition does
include at least some of these meanings. For example, then-
Solicitor General Robert Kaplan stated explicitly in his 1984
testimony that CSE could, under certain circumstances, ``intercept
signals that begin and end in Canada, that begin in Canada and end
abroad or the reverse.''[16]
It would appear, therefore, that CSE's ``foreign intelligence''
mandate does permit it to intercept many types of communications
that do involve Canadian participants. In fact, the Department of
National Defence has admitted that CSE occasionally intercepts
communications that involve or contain information about
Canadians: ``CSE targets only foreign communications, which, on
rare occasions, contain personal information about Canadian
citizens and landed immigrants.''[17] In addition, the government
has confirmed that CSE maintains a data bank, DND/P-PU-040,
``Security and Intelligence Information Files,'' that contains
``information concerning [Canadians] identified as potential risks
to national security.''[18] Nevertheless, the issue of how often and
how systematically CSE can and does intercept the
communications of Canadians remains unresolved. More on CSE
and Canadian communications.
CSE/SRS Facilities
CSE Headquarters, Sir Leonard Tilley Building, Ottawa (CSE also
has offices in the Insurance Building, three floors of the Billings
Bridge Tower (formerly SBI Building), and the ``warehouse'' on
Merivale Road) ``Kilderkin'' intercept site, Ottawa (monitors
Russian embassy) CSE intercept sites at Canadian embassies and
consulates (locations secret) SRS Headquarters, Tunney's Pasture,
Ottawa CFS Alert, Ellesmere Island, NWT (operates SIGINT
collection and Pusher high-frequency direction-finding (HF-DF)
antennae; intercepts mainly ex-Soviet air force, air defence force,
and other military communications) CFS Leitrim, Ontario (just
south of Ottawa; operates SIGINT collection and Pusher HF-DF
antennae; also four satellite monitoring dishes; intercepts
diplomatic communications in/out of Ottawa and some satellite
communications; also supports other SIGINT stations) CFS
Masset, BC (operates SIGINT collection and AN/FRD-10 HF-DF
antennae; intercepts mainly maritime military communications; part
of the US Navy's worldwide BULLSEYE HF-DF net 770
Communications Research Squadron, CFB Gander, Newfoundland
(operates SIGINT collection and AN/FRD-10 HF-DF antennae;
intercepts mainly maritime military communications; part of the
BULLSEYE net) 771 Communications Research Squadron,
located at CSE HQ, Ottawa SRS Detachment, NSA headquarters,
Fort Meade, Maryland, USA (formerly located at US Army Field
Station Augsburg, Germany) SRS Detachment, Medina Regional
SIGINT Operations Centre (RSOC), San Antonio, Texas, USA
CFB Kingston, Ontario: E Squadron, CF School of
Communications and Electronics (conducts SRS intercept operator
training, including Russian and other language training) and 1
Canadian Signals Regiment SRS members also serve on exchange
at various US Navy (Naval Security Group) BULLSEYE net sites
in the United States; a comparable number of USN personnel serve
at Canadian sites.
See also the complete list of postwar Canadian SIGINT sites.
New Targets?
The end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union have
made CSE's Soviet military targets less important than they once
were. As a result, CSE has almost certainly been under pressure
either to shrink or to find new targets. Some shrinkage has taken
place, but CSE/SRS appears to have survived the end of the Cold
War largely intact. This suggests that CSE has managed to
convince the government that SIGINT production remains at least
as important as it was during the Cold War. It is likely that Russia
remains CSE's predominant target, but the agency's gradual move
into embassy collection and the intercept of satellite
communications indicates that new targets have also been added
over the past decade, such as the often hyped, but in my opinion
almost certainly overblown, "economic" targets.
For obvious reasons, the identity of these new targets has not been
revealed. It is almost certain, however, that many of them are
located among the growing volume of civilian (non-governmental)
traffic. Traffic carried on the communications satellites that serve
Latin America is more likely to be the target of this expansion than
Canadian traffic is, but any step towards the more systematic
monitoring of civilian communications should be of concern. Who
will be targeted next?
Recent Steps Toward Oversight
Unlike CSIS, which has the SIRC, CSE has never had any form of
independent oversight organization to ensure that its invasive
powers are not abused. In recent years, the establishment of an
independent oversight committee has been recommended both by
the Special Committee on the Review of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act and the Security Offences Act and by the
SIRC itself.[19] The response of the Mulroney government was
that ``a broad accountability system for CSE is in place.''[20] This
``system,'' however, was no more than CSE's normal relationship
with the officials at ICSI and DND who have responsibility for the
SIGINT program. As the record of the RCMP Security Service, and
later CSIS, demonstrated, intelligence agencies cannot be relied
upon to police themselves.[21]
The Chretien government initially also maintained that CSE did not
require independent oversight. To its credit, however, on 21 March
1995 it permitted the passage of a motion by MP Derek Lee calling
on the government to "establish an independent external mechanism
to review the operations of the Communications Security
Establishment, CSE, similar to the role played by the Security
Intelligence Review Committee for the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service, and table a report annually in the House."[22]
The following day, Defence Minister David Collenette announced
that the government would indeed establish such a mechanism. He
did not, however, provide any details of the government's plans,
stating only that, "in principle, the government supports an
oversight mechanism for the CSE."[23]
Fifteen months later, on 19 June 1996, Collenette announced in the
House of Commons that the government "has appointed Mr. Claude
Bisson, former chief justice of Quebec, under part II of the
Inquiries Act, as the first commissioner for the Communications
Security Establishment. He will have full access to all materials,
records and documentation. He will make an annual report to me as
minister which I in turn will make to Parliament."[24] See the
government's news release for a few additional details.
The CSE Commissioner can be reached at:
Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner
P.O. Box 1984, [that's right, 1984]
Station 'B',
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1P 5R5
The Commissioner's first annual report was released in April 1997.
In it, Mr. Bisson reported that "I am of the opinion that CSE has
acted lawfully in the performance of its mandated activities during
the period under review. I am also satisfied that CSE has not
targeted Canadian citizens or permanent residents."[25]
This statement, unfortunately, almost duplicates the very carefully
worded statements made by the government on numerous occasions
- reinforcing concern that as much is being concealed by this
response as is being revealed. (See, for example, the following
statement by the Hon. Sheila Copps, made to the House of
Commons on 20 October 1994: "the activities of the CSE are
totally subject to Canadian laws, including the Criminal Code, the
Canadian Human Rights Act, the Privacy Act and the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, and they obey the law.") The invariable
emphasis placed on legality, in particular, seems to be
disingenuous, since a look at the laws governing eavesdropping
suggests that a wide range of activities that have the potential to
constitute incredible invasions of Canadian privacy could in fact be
conducted legally by the government, if it chose to do them. In this
respect, it is disquieting that the Commissioner's mandate is limited
explicitly to reviewing the activities of CSE "for the purpose of
determining whether they are in compliance with the law." Is this a
mandate to oversee or to overlook?
My view is that a truly effective oversight mechanism would
require:
an independent, non-partisan, and adequately-funded staff (along
the lines of the SIRC model);
statutory oversight powers affording full access to the personnel and
files of CSE, SRS, related agencies, and their activities;
the power to examine all SIGINT acquired by the Canadian government,
whether collected by CSE, SRS, other Canadian organizations, corporations,
or individuals, or foreign governments, corporations, or individuals;
the power to examine, and make recommendations on the reform of, the legal
and policy regime pertaining to SIGINT activities (i.e., not just to
examine compliance with the existing legal regime) in order to
provide the greatest protection possible for the privacy of
Canadians while not unduly limiting Canada's ability to collect
essential intelligence; and
the power to report to the Prime Minister and Cabinet whenever it deems
necessary, and to make an annual public report.
A number of other reforms also would be useful, including:
the establishment of an explicit, statutory mandate for CSE (and
for Canadian SIGINT activities in general), providing a legal
definition of foreign intelligence and prohibiting the collection of
non-foreign intelligence, except as mandated under the CSIS Act;
clarification and reform of the laws pertaining to the interception
of communications (including the establishment of a requirement
for judicial warrants for the interception of any communication
known to begin and/or end in Canada);
a legal prohibition on the receipt of any information that it would have
been illegal for the Canadian government itself to collect; and
the implementation of security measures (such as the use of bulk encryption)
to protect the communications of Canadians from interception by other
Canadian or foreign agencies, corporations, or individuals.
Endnotes
[1] Kevin O'Neill, ed., History of CBNRC, 1987, Chapter 2, Annex
G (IAC SIGINT Memorandum No. 1, CONTROL OF SIGNAL
INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) IN CANADA, 24 August 1977),
released in severed form under the Access to Information Act.
[2] For more information on Canada's wartime SIGINT activities,
see John Bryden, Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in
the Second World War, Lester Publishing, 1993.
[3] History of CBNRC, Chapter 17, p. 2.
[4] Ward Elcock, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Sub-Committee on National Security, 15 June 1993, p. 11:9;
Statement by Margaret Bloodworth, Deputy Clerk, Security and
Intelligence, to Standing Committee on National Defence and
Veterans Affairs, 2 May 1995.
[5] CANADIAN FORCES SUPPLEMENTARY RADIO SYSTEM,
Department of National Defence, 21 January 1997.
[6] On Course: National Security for the 1990s, Solicitor General,
1991, p. 54.
[7] History of CBNRC, Chapter 2, Annex G.
[8] Ward Elcock, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Special Committee on the Review of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act and the Security Offences Act, 24 April
1990, p. 27:9.
[9] History of CBNRC, Chapter 2, Annex G.
[10] On Course, p. 54.
[11] On Course, p. 54.
[12] Blair Seaborn, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence of the Special Committee on the Review of the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Act and the Security Offences Act, 20
February 1990, p. 16:9.
[13] Quoted in Peter Moon, ``Spy agency left minister in dark,''
Globe and Mail, 3 June 1991, p. A4. Elsewhere Blais has
commented that ``While I had responsibility for the estimates
presented to Parliament, that responsibility did not extend to the
exercise of ministerial control over the CSE. In practice the control
was bureaucratic, in my view short-circuiting the principle of
political accountability on which our democracy is founded.'' (Jean
Jacques Blais, ``Committee should be expanded to review other
agencies,'' Ottawa Citizen, 2 July 1992, p. A11.)
[14] History of CBNRC, Chapter 2, Annex G
[15] See, e.g., Minister of State (External Relations) Jean-Luc
Pepin, testimony, Proceedings of the Special Committee of the
Senate on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 22
September 1983, p. 19.
[16] Robert Kaplan, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs,
5 April 1984, p. 11:68.
[17] Letter from Commander F.B. Frewer, Director Public Affairs
Operations, National Defence, to Peter Moon, 15 April 1991.
[18] Personal Information Index 1988, 1988, p. 47- 3.
[19] In Flux But Not in Crisis, report of the Special Committee on
the Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and
the Security Offences Act, September 1990, pp. 152-3; Annual
Report 1988-89, Security Intelligence Review Committee, 1989.
[20] On Course, p. 55.
[21] There is little reason to expect that CSE has been any more
reliable in this respect. See, for example, the allegations in the
book Spyworld (Mike Frost and Michel Gratton, Spyworld: Inside
the Canadian and American Intelligence Establishments,
Doubleday Canada, 1994) concerning the interception of Quebec
government communications. In 1991, ``former CSE employees and
other sources,'' told the Globe and Mail that ``in the past the agency
routinely broke Canadian laws in the collection of intelligence
involving Canadians.'' (Peter Moon, ``Secrecy shrouds spy agency,''
Globe and Mail, 27 May 1991, pp. A1, A4.) This allegation has not
been proven, but a disquieting example of CSE failing to follow
appropriate procedures and respect the rights of one of its own
employees is on the public record in Muriel Korngold Wexler,
Record of Decision (file 166-13-17850), Public Service Staff
Relations Board, 12 March 1990. This document includes a
detailed description of the mistreatment and eventual unjust firing
of CSE cryptanalyst Edwina Slattery during the 1980s. It should be
noted that Ms. Slattery considers the Record of Decision's
description of the events surrounding her firing to be inaccurate in
many respects, notwithstanding the fact that it supported her claim
that she had been unjustly fired and recommended that she receive
compensation equivalent to two years' pay. Ms. Slattery continues
to pursue the case in the Federal Court of Canada.
[22] House of Commons Debates, 21 March 1995, pp. 10815-
10820.
[23] Tu Thanh Ha, ``Secretive agency to be more open, Collenette
says,'' Globe and Mail, 23 March 1995, p. A5.
[24] House of Commons Debates, 19 June 1996.
[25] Annual Report of the Communications Establishment
Commissioner 1996-1997, Office of the Communications
Establishment Commissioner, 1997, p. 10.
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