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Audit of the Pittsburg Police Department, Part 3
by Tom Flaterty
PERFORMANCE AUDIT
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
Part III
Report by the Office of the City Controller
TOM FLAHERTY
CITY CONTROLLER
Anthony Pokora, Deputy Controller
Kevin Forsythe, Esq., Management Auditor
Anabell Kinney, Esq., Assistant Management Auditor
Performance Auditors:
Gloria Novak
Joseph Chigier
Jeff Khadem
Woody Mudd
August, 1996
One possible explanation for this lies in the OPS practice of
initially distinguishing between serious and less serious citizen
complaints. Complaints deemed to meet an appropriate level of
seriousness were designated OPR¡s and assigned to OPS
investigators. Complaints deemed less serious were designated
DR¡s and sent out to zone commanders, who were then supposed
to look into the matter. A certain percentage of these DR¡s were,
apparently, left to languish on the desks of Public Safety
Management at various links in the chain of command. The longer a
complaint remains in this limbo state, the more difficult it may
ultimately be to impose discipline, even in those cases where
discipline would clearly be appropriate.
In addition to the problem of stale cases, these delays jeopardized
a crucial segregation of functions. OPS should have been allowed
to complete its role as independent fact finder. Public Safety
Management should then perform its role as the dispenser of
discipline. The inclusion of representatives of management in the
fact-finding stages compromises the integrity of the investigation.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 2:
To avoid unacceptable delays in the disposition of complaints, and
to safeguard the integrity of its independent fact finding function,
OMI should re-examine the practice of referring less serious
citizen complaints (DR¡s) to Public Safety Management for
investigation.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 3:
OMI should review all pending complaints for the years 1991
through 1994 in order to identify those cases in which no valid
reasons exist for the pending classification. These should be given
a final disposition and referred to management for discipline, where
appropriate.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 4:
If OMI decides to retain the practice of referring less serious citizen
complaints to Public Safety Management for investigation, strict
limits should be imposed on the amount of time a complaint is
allowed to stay at any level in the chain of command. We suggest
30 days.
III. Race, Gender, Age/Experience Analysis (Objective No. 3)
III. a. Race
To review, 1,674 complaints were filed by citizens over the 10-year
audit period (April, 1986 through March 4, 1996). We were able to
identify the race of the complainant in 1,507 (90%) of these cases.
We were able to identify the race of the accused officer in 1,529
(91%) of these cases. Reasons for lack of identification included
no entry in the database, obviously incorrect entries, and entries for
officer¡s name such as unknown, homicide, detective. In the
Table below, adding the number of known racial entries to the
number of unknown, still does not equal the full total. This is
because we also eliminated a very small number of racial entries
such as H (Hispanic; one Hispanic complainant and one Hispanic
officer in the whole 10 years), I (Indian; one Indian complainant
in the whole 10 years), etc.
Of 779 complaints known to have been filed by white citizens, we
can identify the race of the accused officer 730 times. Of these, 515
were filed against white officers; 201 were filed against black
officers.
Of 698 complaints known to have been filed by black citizens, we
can identify the race of the accused officer 637 times. Of these, 313
were filed against white officers; 317 were filed against black
officers. This is a noteworthy finding. Black officers (male and
female) currently comprise about 26% of the Police Bureau¡s sworn
strength. Yet in those cases we can identify, when black citizens
filed a complaint with OPS, 50% of the time they were complaining
about a black officer. [As the table on the next page shows, this
disproportion occurred in all years of the audit period, ranging from
a high of 63% in 1991 to a low of 37% in 1995].
We next repeated the above analysis for each of the years in the
audit period, to see if these ratios stayed roughly constant over time
or if noticeable deviations or trends appeared. The results of that
analysis are presented in the table below. W/W means a white
citizen complainant against a white police officer; W/B means
white citizen, black officer, and so on. Total White means the
total, for that year, of all complaints filed by white citizens in cases
where the race of the officer is known. Similarly, Total Black
means the total, for that year, of all complaints filed by black
citizens in cases where the race of the officer is known.
Looking first at the average for complaints filed by white citizens
(72% against white officers vs. 28% against black officers, over the
entire audit period) we note deviations from this rate falling
between 55% vs. 45% in 1993, and 83% vs. 17% in 1995. (It must
be kept in mind that the 100% vs. 0% for 1996 is just the first two
months of that year). The average for complaints filed by black
citizens was 50% against white officers vs. 50% against black
officers. This average rate deviated from 37% vs. 63% in 1991, to
63% vs. 37% (a complete reversal of the rate) in 1995.
With the exception of 1990, for each year from 1986 through 1992,
white citizens filed more complaints. Then in 1993, complaints by
black citizens outstripped those filed by whites 73 to 49. This trend
continued in the next three years: 116 to 72 in 1994; 96 to 78 in
1995; and 10 to 7 in (the first two months of) 1996.
1995 warrants particular attention. In that year, complaints by black
citizens against white officers reached both their highest absolute
number for the whole audit period, 60, and their highest deviation
from the 50%-50% average, i.e., 63% against white officers vs.
37% against black officers. A similar jump occurred in complaints
filed by white citizens. Their complaints against white officers
reached their second highest absolute number, 65 (surpassed only
by 1987¡s 75) and their highest deviation from the 72%-28%
overall average, i.e., 83% against white officers vs. 13% against
black officers. These 1995 figures show a year in which black
citizens filed more complaints against the police than white citizens
(for the third consecutive year) while at the same time complaints
by both black and white citizens against white police officers rose
(absolutely compared to white officers in the prior year and
relatively compared to complaints against black officers).
Thus, when viewed in summary fashion, against the backdrop of the
audit period as a whole, the finding that black citizens filed slightly
over 50% of their complaints against black police officers, tends to
negate a systemic racial interpretation. Nevertheless, the data for
the last three full years, and in particular 1995, could lend support
to the anecdotal perception of a recent deterioration in the
relationship between the citizenry (black and white) and white
police officers.
III. b. Gender
Of the 1,674 complaints filed by citizens over the audit period, we
were able to identify the gender of both the complainant and the
officer in 1,479 cases. This was 133 more cases than we were able
to use in the racial analysis above. Reasons for nonidentification
parallel those listed above. Of these 1,479 cases, 923 (62%) were
filed by males and 556 (38%) by females. These breakdown as
follows:
As we did in the racial analysis, we next broke down the gender
data for each year of the audit period to identify trends. In the
following table, F/F means female citizen filing a complaint against
a female officer, and so on.
The Police Bureau¡s 1995 sworn strength was 60% white male and
15% minority male, for a total of 75% male; 14% white female and
11% minority female, for a total of 25% female. This compares to
1991 figures of 65.5% white male, 13.9% minority male, 9.6%
white female, and 10.5% minority female.* Given these numbers,
and assuming deployment policies that would increase the
incidence of arrests by male officers, the numbers in the tables
above do not suggest any patterns of gender-based police
misconduct. Yet, in reviewing them for this purpose, we
inadvertently discovered a pronounced trend in another area.
From 1991 to 1992, male complaints against male officers jumped
from 78% to 91% (as a percentage of total complaints filed by
males). This rose again to 93% in 1993, then to a striking 97% in
both 1994 and 1995. In each of the years 1992-1995, the absolute
number of male complaints against female officers dropped. In both
1994 and 1995 this number was only four complaints, an all-time
low which amounted to only 3% of total complaints by males.
Between 1993 and 1994 the number of complaints filed by all
citizens increased from 196 to 280, then rose slightly to 292 in
1995. The respective figures for this gender analysis (due to
incomplete¡s, unknown¡s, etc.) are 1993 - 129, 1994 - 205, and
1995 - 205. The figures in the table above show that this
substantial rise in citizen complaints, starting in 1994, occurred
with twice the frequency among male citizens, and that it can be
attributed, exclusively, to male police officers. When read in
conjunction with the remarks on page 25 above, the evidence
mounts for the assertion that a growing number and increasing
percentage of these male police officers, were, particularly in 1995,
white, male police officers. This statement, in turn, must be
tempered by the finding that this increase in complaints against
white, male officers came from both white, male complainants and
black, male complainants, in roughly equal numbers.
III. c. Age of Citizen Complainant
Of the 1,674 citizen complaints in our modified database, 423 did
not have an entry for age of complainant, leaving 1,251 for this
portion of the analysis. The following table gives the year-by-year
average age for citizens who filed complaints against police
officers. We also include the number of citizen complaints in that
year which did have an entry for age of complainant; and the total
number of citizen complaints for each year.
Again, it should be noted that 1996 figures are for the first two
months only. Aside from 1996, the average age of citizen
complainants remains fairly constant over the audit period. We ran
this particular report to see if a lowering trend appeared in the most
recent three or four years. This might suggest an increase in
measures taken by police officers to address gang-related crime,
leading to a higher percentage of younger arrestees. The table above
provides no support for this hypothesis.
Yet, even if trends did appear, any conclusions drawn from this
data would have to be qualified, due to the disappointingly high
number of incomplete entries in the age of complainant field. This
problem, evident in every year, became exceptionally pronounced
in 1995. The year before, 236 citizen complaints were filed but 54
(23%)them did not have a usable entry for age of complainant. The
same number of citizen complaints, 236, were filed in 1995, and
this time 89 (38%) of them were incomplete in this category. These
are unacceptably high levels of data entry omissions or errors. In
the racial and gender analysis above, satisfactory explanations
existed for unusable records, namely that the police officer was
frequently listed as homicide, detective, or simply unknown by
the complainant. The same excuse cannot be made for age of
complainant.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 5:
OMI must strive for complete entries and higher accuracy levels at
both the intake and data entry stages, in the field of age of
complainant and all other fields.
III. d. Experience Level of Police Officers
Of the 1,674 citizen complaints in our modified database, 168 had
no entry for complaint date, or starting date of the police officer, or
both, leaving 1,506 for this portion of the analysis. The following
table gives yearly averages for experience level of the police
officers, in years. As in the age of complainant table above, we also
include the number of citizen complaints in each year which did
have entries for both complaint date and starting date of the officer;
and the total number of citizen complaints for each year.
These data show a pronounced drop, beginning in 1993, in the
average experience level of police officers who had citizen
complaints filed against them. They lend support to the view that
the upswing in citizen complaints which began in 1994, was
caused, in part, by an influx of newly hired police officers. From
January 7, 1991 to February 15, 1993 the City of Pittsburgh did not
hire a single police officer. Then, beginning in the closing months
of 1993 and continuing over the next two years, over 40% of the
police force retired. Thus, younger, new recruits came into the
ranks of the police in unprecedented amounts during 1994 and
1995. The factors which led to this are discussed in detail under
Objective No. 6 (see page 46). Here it remains to be said that lack
of experience is not a satisfactory excuse for police misconduct. As
a partial explanation, however, it is less intractable than racism, and
one which bodes better for the future.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 6:
Public Safety Management, the Law Department, OMI (or the
ultimate successor of OPS with respect to citizen complaints
against police officers), and the City Controller¡s Office should
design an on-going monitoring process, incorporating the key
indicators of this section¡s racial, gender and experience level
analysis. The underlying assumption of this monitoring scheme
would be that appropriate training, counseling, and disciplinary
measures should, over time, result in, 1) lower percentages of
complaints filed by all citizens against white, male officers, 2)
lower percentages of complaints filed by black citizens against
black officers, and 3) a moderating of the sharp drop in average
experience level of those officers against whom citizen complaints
are filed.
IV. Multiple Citizen Complaints Against an Officer (Objective No.
4)
Of the 1,674 citizen complaints gleaned from the database, 152 had
to be eliminated from this portion of the analysis. In these cases the
officer¡s name was either left blank, given as unknown, or as
homicide, detective, or some other unhelpful designation. In the
great majority of these cases, the citizen filing the complaint did
not know the name of the officer and subsequent efforts by OPS
staff did not identify the officer. This left 1,522 citizen complaints.
Over the 10 year audit period these 1,522 complaints were filed
against 678 individual police officers. The following table gives the
breakdown on all 678 police officers:
From virtually every conceivable vantage point, these figures
support the assertion that a few bad apples are causing a
disproportionate amount of the problem.
First of all, the numbers should be placed in perspective. The size
of the police force has fluctuated over the ten year audit period. The
Police Bureau¡s 1995 sworn strength figure is 1,170. But actually
a smaller number of police officers would be susceptible to citizen
complaints due to disability, desk duty with no interaction with the
public, etc. One would have to do a similar analysis for each year.
A very conservative yearly average would be 800. In other words,
we assume for purposes of discussion that for each year of the audit
period there were about 800 police officers whose duties could
subject them to the possibility of having citizen complaints filed
against them. If each of these 800 officers would have had only one
citizen complaint filed against them each year, it would lead to a
grand total of 8,000 citizen complaints filed over the course of the
audit period. This is almost five times higher than the actual
number of 1,674, and higher than the number we are forced to use
for this part of the analysis: 1,522.
If we start with our hypothetical 800 police officers in 1986 and
make a further assumption of a 10% yearly turnover rate (through
retirements, terminations and new hires) we arrive at an eligible
pool of 1,600 individual police officers who, during the 10 year
audit period, could have had a citizen complaint filed against them.
In fact, 678 did; or 42%. That leaves 922 eligible police officers
(58%) without a single citizen complaint against them.
Furthermore, of the 678 officers who did have citizen complaints
filed against them, over half (359, or 53%) had only one in the
entire 10 years. 140 officers had only two citizen complaints for the
entire 10 years. 90 had three; 30 had four; 49 had between five and
10; and 10 police officers had more than 10 citizen complaints filed
against them in the 10 year audit period. Three officers had 21, 28,
and 34 citizen complaints filed against them respectively. This is a
total of 83 or 5% of the working total of 1,522 citizen complaints;
filed against just three police officers out of 1,600 possible
candidates. The 10 officers with more than 10 complaints each,
accounted for 171 out of 1,522 complaints, or 11%. 59 officers
garnered five or more complaints in ten years adding up to 493 out
of 1,522 citizen complaints or 32%.
Thus, roughly one-third (493 out of 1,522, or 32%) of the citizen
complaints for which we can identify an officer¡s name, are
attributable to 59 police officers, or a mere 3.6% of the eligible
pool of 1,600 officers over the ten year audit period.
{The following recommendations should not be interpreted as
judgments, by the auditors, of any individual police officer¡s
culpability in a particular case, nor as comments on any individual
police officer¡s fitness to serve.}
RECOMMENDATION NO. 7:
OMI, Public Safety Management and the Law Department should
conduct a detailed review of the three police officers with 21, 28,
and 34 citizen complaints, as a way of highlighting the police
disciplinary system at its most questionable level of performance.
The review (like this audit for the bureau as a whole) should focus
on the types of misconduct alleged, the dispositions of the
complaints by OPS, the chain of command¡s recommended
discipline, the implemented discipline, whether anything in the
officers¡ deployment schedules could partially explain the high
incidence of complaints, whether any counseling or re-training was
recommended and/or received, whether any arbitration proceedings
were held, and their results. This review should seek to answer the
question: How, after 33 citizen complaints, could a police officer
possibly be in a position to attract a 34th?
RECOMMENDATION NO. 8:
Public Safety Management and the Law Department should strive,
in the next round of negotiations with the police union, to add a
provision to the collective bargaining agreement that would address
the issue of police officers with multiple citizen complaints. We
suggest a red flag approach, under which any police officer who
receives a certain number of citizen complaints over a certain time
period (for example, two complaints in one year) would be required
to take some mix of counseling and training. More frequent
complaints would lead to additional measures such as re-
assignment or suspension. The emphasis at this stage should not be
on determining culpability, but rather on increasing the awareness
and effectiveness of the officer. For this reason, these measures
should be taken regardless of the disposition of the complaints by
OMI.
We next took the 59 police officers, against whom five or more
citizen complaints had been filed over the ten year audit period, and
examined the disposition of those cases. Out of the 493 cases, 55
did not have a disposition, the majority of these 55 being pending.
This left 438 cases. The dispositions for these 59 officers are
summarized in the following table:
These rates for known dispositions on these 59 officers correspond
closely with the overall rates for all 1,674 citizen complaints:
Overall citizen complaint (OCC) sustained, 12% vs. bad apple
(BA) sustained, 14%; OCC not sustained, 46% vs. BA not
sustained, 50%; OCC closed, 19% vs. BA closed, 14%; OCC
exonerated, 11% vs. BA exonerated, 11%. Perhaps most interesting
in this regard is that citizen complaints against the bad apples
were disposed of as not sustained at a higher rate than citizen
complaints as a whole (50% as compared to 46%).
We found that nearly one third of these officers (19 out of 59,
32.2%) did not have a single complaint sustained against them.
There is no correlation between the number of complaints filed
against an officer and the number ultimately sustained. Officers
with the greatest numbers did not have the highest sustained rates.
For example, Officer Alpha, with 21 citizen complaints had only
three sustained. Officer Beta, with 28 complaints had seven
sustained. Officer Gamma, with 34 citizen complaints (the highest
amount in the entire audit period) had only five sustained. On the
other hand, Officer Delta, with four complaints had three sustained.
In Objective No. 3 we sorted the citizen complaints by race of
officer vs. race of complainant (see pages 23-24). We now
conducted a similar analysis on these 59 officers. This group
included 29 white officers and 29 black officers with the 59th
officer alternately identified as white and Hispanic. For 41 (69%)
of these officers (19 white and 22 black) the majority of the
citizens filing complaints against them were of the same race. This
is true of the three officers (one who is white and two who are
black) with the highest number of complaints (21, 28, and 34). For
each of these three, the majority of their complainants were of the
same race as the officer.
As we said with respect to the racial analysis in Objective No. 3,
here again the data do not support the notion of systemic, racially-
motivated police misconduct. Pittsburgh police, even the biggest
offenders, are, apparently, dispensing their misconduct with an
even hand. Statistics, however, can tell us nothing about a
particular case. It would be equally incorrect to conclude from this
data that racial animosity never figured into any of the 1,674 citizen
complaints.
The above analysis can present a good overall picture of the
multiple-complaint issue, but it is of limited value for assessing any
changes over time. This is because various reasons can account for
a low number of complaints filed against an officer. It may be
because the officer is doing an excellent job. But it might also be
because the officer was recently hired. To identify trends in this
area over time, we compiled a listing of all officers against whom
two or more citizen complaints had been filed in each of the years
1991 - 1995. This information is summarized in the following
table. The second column gives the number of officers who had two
or more complaints for the given year. The third column lists
officers in the second column with two or more complaints filed
against them in one of the other years between 1991 and 1995.
The number of police officers against whom multiple citizen
complaints were filed, in each year, more than doubled between
1991 and 1994; from 16 to 35.
Focusing on column three above, provides further evidence for the
bad apple theory. The total of 44 is, in reality, just 20 police
officers. 18 of them had two or more complaints filed against them
in two of the years from 1991-1995; and the other two officers had
two or more complaints in four out of those five years.
V. Evaluation of Disciplinary Measures (Objective No. 5)
This section of the audit focused on citizen and management-
initiated complaints, sustained by OPS for the years 1991-1995.
Summary data for these years are reprinted below from the table on
page 18. Asterisks indicate that the dispositions do not add up to
the total complaints filed for that year, due to pending cases. The
reader should review the tables on pages 17-18 and the
accompanying remarks on the differences in disposition rates
between citizen complaints and management-initiated complaints.
The sustained cases for 1991-1995 add up to 155.
The rest of our findings with respect to disciplinary measures do
not lend themselves well to a tabular presentation. Each case almost
had to be considered separately. A great number and variety of
things could happen once an OPS finding of sustained began to
wind its way up each step in the chain of command. Because of
this, none of the figures given below balance or tally into
recognizable sums. And so, the remainder of this section presents
the findings in a narrative style.
V. a. Overview
Of those 155 sustained cases in the OPS database for 1991-1995,
we were able to examine the actual OPS hard copy files for 154;
73 were management-initiated and 81 were filed by citizens. Based
on our examinations and on discussions with the person who
served as the Civilian Coordinator of OPS, we were able to say
with certainty that discipline had been given in 62 cases. Of these
62 cases in which discipline had been given, we found 38 oral
reprimands and 24 written reprimands.
In addition to those 62 cases, we found these final recommended
disciplines in the following cases: Nine one-day suspensions; five
three-day suspensions; five suspensions greater than three days;
and 13 terminations. These 13 terminations involved only nine
officers (because the City tried to terminate two of the officers
three times each). Of those nine officers, two were reinstated by
arbitrators; three retired or quit; two were finally terminated; and
two are terminated but awaiting a decision on their arbitration
appeals. Every one of these terminations involved a management-
initiated complaint.
The oral reprimands were given in cases with the following offense
codes: 23 for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer; three for Use of
Force/Arrest; two for Conduct Towards the Public; two for Failure
to Perform/Neglect of Duty; one for Firearm Discharge-No
Injury/Warning Shots/Mishandling; one for Abuse of Authority-
Self Assigned Investigation; one for Lost, Stolen,
Seized/Abandoned Property.
The written reprimands were given in cases with the following
offense codes: 13 for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer; two for
Theft; two for Firearm Discharge-No Injury/Warning
Shots/Mishandling; one for Use of Force/Arrest; one for Lack of
Sound Judgement-Obedience to Orders/Laws.
The recommended one-day suspensions were given in cases with
the following offense codes: five for Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer; one for Theft; one for Conduct Towards the Public; one
for Use of Force/Arrest; one for Lost, Stolen, Seized/Abandoned
Property.
The recommended three-day suspensions were given in cases with
the following offense codes: three for Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer; one for Abuse of Authority-Self Assigned Investigation.
The recommended suspensions greater than three days were given
in three cases for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer.
The recommended terminations (usually, a five-day suspension
pending termination) were given in cases with the following offense
codes: eight for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer; one for Use of
Force/Custody; one for Handling of Property-Prisoner/Personal
Property; one for Insubordination/Written Directions; one for
Firearm Discharge-No Injury/Warning Shots/Mishandling.
Counseling was required, sometimes on its own and sometimes in
addition to the other discipline given, in cases with the following
offense codes: two for Use of Force/Custody; one for Use of
Drugs/Alcohol; one for Lack of Sound Judgement-Obedience to
Orders/Laws; one for Racial, Religious/Ethnic Intimidation;
V. b. Chain of Command
We next looked at modifications and reversals within the chain of
command. These came about in the following way. After OPS made
a finding of sustained, the case was forwarded to the police
officer¡s Zone Commander who decided on an appropriate
discipline or rejected the OPS finding. This decision then went to
the Assistant Chief of Police who approved it, modified it (made it
harsher or easier), or reversed it. Then, once again, the process was
repeated with the Chief of Police, and then, finally, with the
Director of Public Safety.
We found the following in this regard: In seven cases the Assistant
Chief increased the recommended discipline; in three cases the
Assistant Chief decreased it. In six cases the Chief of Police
increased the recommended discipline; in nine cases the Chief
decreased it. In four cases the Director of Public Safety increased
the recommended discipline; in five cases the Director decreased it.
In 16 cases the Zone Commander rejected and ignored the OPS
finding of sustained (11 times changing the OPS finding from
sustained to not sustained and five times changing it to unfounded).
In two cases the Director rejected an OPS finding of sustained,
changing it to not sustained. To its credit, in all instances where a
representative of Public Safety Management sought to change
findings of sustained, OPS did not change the sustained finding in
its database, nor, to our knowledge, did OPS alter its final report.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 9:
In the future, it should be impermissible for a representative of
Public Safety Management to change or attempt to change a finding
of OMI. Recommending, accepting, rejecting, and modifying
discipline is a legitimate role for management. But changing an
OMI disposition of a particular case interferes with OMI¡s role as
independent fact-finder and compromises the integrity of the
investigation.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 10:
In the future all OMI files should have a complete record which
includes the findings and disposition of the fact-finder, all
recommended discipline through the chain of command, some entry
stating that the discipline has or has not been actually given, and,
where applicable, the record of any arbitration proceedings. This
would greatly aid Management and future auditors in evaluating
disciplinary measures.
V. c. Arbitration
We next looked at sample of 17 arbitration proceedings in which
Public Safety Management attempted to discipline police officers
(seven of these, as a result of sustained OPS complaints). Five of
the 17 are pending or awaiting a decision. We examined the
remaining 12. One of these was a recurring case in which the
officer won the first time but lost the second time, due to a
repetition of the proscribed conduct (drug use). So although there
were only 12 cases, there were 13 arbitration decisions. The City
won six times and lost seven times.
The City¡s Arbitration Losses
Of the City¡s seven losses, four involved attempts to terminate the
officer; two for drug use, one for over-time irregularities, and one
for what the City argued was rape, but what the arbitrator (in an
uncanny written opinion which tarnishes the reputation of the
American Arbitration Association) chose to view as sex on the job.
All four police officers were ordered reinstated (full reinstatement
with back pay for the over-time case; the drug users received no
back pay and had to undergo counseling and random drug testing;
the officer in the rape case received no back pay and a probationary
period).
Two of the City¡s seven losses involved disputes over whether the
officer should be required to return the over-time pay they had
received in the alleged infraction. The arbitrators felt the City had
failed to produce adequate evidence and ordered that the officers be
allowed to keep the money.
The last of the City¡s seven losses involved an attempted three day
suspension for excessive force. The arbitrators set aside the
suspension and directed that the police officer undergo counseling
instead.
The City¡s Arbitration Victories
Of the City¡s six victories, five involved suspensions; one for drug
use (unspecified number of days), three for unlawful strip searches
(all for one day), and one for over-time irregularities (two days).
The last of the six victories was a termination in the recurring case
mentioned above (the officer won the first time but was terminated
when another instance of drug use occurred).
Victories and losses aside, a number of things can be said about the
City¡s arbitration history in regard to this performance audit. The
first is that arbitration was infrequently used to resolve matters
which began as citizen complaints. Only four out of the 12
arbitration cases we examined (one excessive force and three
unlawful strip searches) would have begun as citizen complaints.
The rest were management-initiated investigations. This finding
parallels our finding on the marked differences in disposition rates
between citizen complaints and management-initiated complaints
(see pages 17-18). It also makes it difficult to argue that any
perceived short comings in the dispensing of discipline, for citizen
complaints, by Public Safety Management, are caused by the
arbitration system. There simply are not enough arbitration cases to
make that argument credible.
The second point we note is that the City tried four times to
discipline police officers who were using drugs. Two out of those
four times it attempted to terminate the officer and was forced by
arbitrators to reinstate the drug user with counseling and random
drug testing. One of these officers, as a result of a these random
tests, was caught again and successfully fired, which seems to
vindicate management¡s initial determination that firing this police
officer was appropriate. Once again, we are very concerned that an
organization as prestigious as the American Arbitration Association
could have recommended to the City and the police union,
individuals to serve as arbitrators, who have such a cavalier attitude
regarding illegal drug use by police officers sworn to enforce the
laws of this City and Commonwealth. Of the 2,494 total OPS
complaints in the database for the 10-year audit period, 74 had
offense code 26, use of drugs/alcohol (this number includes on-
duty and off-duty incidents). This is a serious offense and a serious
problem for Public Safety Management.
VI. Additional Statistical Analysis (Objective No. 6)
In this last Objective, we recap some of the more significant
findings of this performance audit, then present them against the
backdrop of crime statistics and other data on police activity during
the audit period.
VI. a. Recap of Significant Findings
I. Out of the total 2,495 complaints filed with OPS from April,
1986 through March 4, 1996, 1,980 were filed against police
officers. 306 of these were management-initiated complaints. This
leaves a total of 1,674 complaints filed against police officers by
citizens.
II. Striking differences appear in disposition rates between citizen
and management complaints. Overall, the sustained rate for citizen
complaints was 12%, while for management complaints it was
52%. The rate for not sustained citizen complaints was 46%,
compared to only 6% not sustained for management complaints.
11% of citizen complaints were exonerated. Less than 1% of
management complaints were exonerated.
III. Almost all of the 1996 citizen complaints were still pending at
the close of the audit period, March 4, 1996, and that is not
unusual. The number of pending 1995 citizen complaints is 82 out
of 292 (28%) and this does not seem an unreasonably high number.
But the further back one goes the less acceptable the pending cases
become: 38 in 1994; 31 in 1993; 26 in 1992; and 10 in 1991.
IV. Of 779 complaints known to have been filed by white citizens,
we can identify the race of the accused officer 730 times. Of these,
515 (72%) were filed against white officers; 201 (28%) were filed
against black officers. Of 698 complaints known to have been filed
by black citizens, we can identify the race of the accused officer
637 times. Of these, 313 (50%) were filed against white officers;
317 (50%) were filed against black officers.
V. With the exception of 1990, for each year from 1986 through
1992, white citizens filed more complaints. Then in 1993,
complaints by black citizens outstripped those filed by whites 73 to
49. This trend continued in the next three years: 116 to 72 in 1994;
96 to 78 in 1995; and 10 to 7 in (the first two months of) 1996.
VI. In 1995 complaints by black citizens against white officers
reached both their highest absolute number for the whole audit
period, 60, and their highest deviation from the 50%-50% average,
i.e., 63% against white officers vs. 37% against black officers. A
similar jump occurred in complaints filed by white citizens, whose
complaints against white officers reached their second highest
absolute number, 65 (surpassed only by 1987¡s 75) and their
highest deviation from the 72%-28% overall average, i.e., 83%
against white officers vs. 13% against black officers.
VII. The fact that black citizens filed slightly over 50% of their
complaints against black police officers, tends to negate a systemic
racial interpretation. Nevertheless, the data for the last three full
years, and in particular 1995, could lend support to the anecdotal
perception of a recent deterioration in the relationship between the
citizenry (black and white) and white police officers.
VIII. From 1991 to 1992, male complaints against male officers
jumped from 78% to 91% (as a percentage of total complaints filed
by males). This rose again to 93% in 1993, then to a striking 97%
in both 1994 and 1995. In each of the years 1992-1995, the
absolute number of male complaints against female officers
dropped. In both 1994 and 1995 this number was only four
complaints, an all-time low which amounted to only 3% of total
complaints by males.
IX. Between 1993 and 1994 the number of complaints filed by all
citizens increased from 196 to 280, then rose slightly to 292 in
1995. This substantial rise in citizen complaints, starting in 1994,
occurred with twice the frequency among male citizens, and can be
attributed, exclusively, to male police officers. When read in
conjunction with the racial analysis, the evidence mounts for the
assertion that a growing number and increasing percentage of these
male police officers, were, particularly in 1995, white, male police
officers. This statement, in turn, must be tempered by the finding
that this increase in complaints against white, male officers came
from both white, male complainants and black, male complainants,
in roughly equal numbers.
X. The average experience level of police officers who had citizen
complaints filed against them reached a 10-year high of 13.77
years¡ experience in 1988. It then dropped significantly from
1993¡s 9.20 years¡ experience down to 5.79 in 1995 and 4.10 for
the first two months of 1996. This lends support to the view that
the upswing in citizen complaints which began in 1994, was
caused, in part, by an influx of newly hired police officers.
XI. From virtually every conceivable vantage point, our multiple
complaint analysis supports the assertion that a few bad apples
are causing a disproportionate amount of citizen dissatisfaction
with the police. Of the 678 officers who did have citizen
complaints filed against them, over half (359, or 53%) had only one
in the entire 10 years. 140 officers had only two citizen complaints
for the entire 10 years. 90 had three; 30 had four; 49 had between
five and 10; and 10 police officers had more than 10 citizen
complaints filed against them in the 10 year audit period.
XII. Three officers had 21, 28, and 34 citizen complaints filed
against them respectively. This is a total of 83 or 5% of the working
total of 1,522 citizen complaints, filed against just three police
officers. The 10 officers with more than 10 complaints each,
accounted for 171 out of 1,522 complaints, or 11%. 59 officers
garnered five or more complaints in 10 years adding up to 493 out
of 1,522 citizen complaints or 32%. Thus, roughly one-third (493
out of 1,522, or 32%) of the citizen complaints for which we can
identify an officer¡s name, are attributable to 59 police officers, or a
mere 3.6% of the eligible pool of 1,600 officers over the ten year
audit period.
XIII. The 59 police officers with five or more citizen complaints
over the audit period included 29 white officers and 29 black
officers. For 41 (69%) of these officers (19 white and 22 black) the
majority of the citizens filing complaints against them were of the
same race. This is true of the three officers (one who is white and
two who are black) with the highest number of complaints (21, 28,
and 34). These data do not support the notion of systemic, racially-
motivated police misconduct. It would be equally incorrect,
however, to conclude from this data that racial animosity never
figured into any of the 1,674 citizen complaints.
XIV. The number of police officers against whom multiple citizen
complaints were filed, more than doubled between 1991 and 1994;
from 16 to 35.
XV. The 155 cases from 1991-1995 in which OPS made a finding
of sustained led to 38 actual oral reprimands; 24 actual written
reprimands; 13 attempts to terminate an officer (five successful, six
unsuccessful, and two more pending an arbitration decision); and
the following recommended disciplines: Nine one-day suspensions;
five three-day suspensions; five suspensions greater than three
days.
VI. b. Pittsburgh Police Bureau Statistics
Reporting Standard Number 3 of the General Accounting Office¡s
Yellow Book (Generally Accepted Governmental Auditing
Standards, revised 1994) indicates that a performance audit report
should contain a description of any significant noteworthy
accomplishments of the auditee. The following bar graphs
demonstrate such a significant and noteworthy accomplishment of
the Department of Public Safety, particularly police officers and
Police Bureau Management.
In 1995 Pittsburgh recorded its lowest crime rate since 1966. The
number of occurrences for every Part I offense declined compared
to 1994: Criminal Homicides down 6%, Forcible Rapes down 7%,
Robberies down 16%, Aggravated Assaults down 16%, Burglaries
down 17%, Larcenies down 10%, Vehicle Thefts down 37%,
Arsons down 22%.
Multiple-year comparisons in certain categories show even more
dramatic drops. Vehicle Thefts dropped 58% since 1992, from
8,124 thefts to 3,387. In other words, almost 5,000 less cars were
reported stolen in 1995 than in 1992. Robberies dropped 31%
since 1992, from 2,989 robberies to 2,077. Aggravated Assaults
dropped 51% since 1990, from 2,237 incidents to 1,096.
Of course, several things can combine to produce decreases of this
nature, including age patterns, population shifts, changing
economic and social conditions, etc. But even after taking these
into account, a significant portion of the drop in crime can still be
attributed to the activity of police officers, the Bureau of Police,
Public Safety Management, and the Administration.
From Public Safety Management we obtained arrest figures for the
years 1988 through 1995. In the following table we calculated
citizen complaints as a percentage of arrests for each of these years.
By way of preface, we note that over these eight years citizen
complaints, as a percentage of arrests, averaged less than 1%
(0.84%). However, our primary interest here was to see if the rate of
alleged police misconduct remained the same in those years (1994
and 1995) when the absolute number of citizen complaints rose
significantly. It did not. In fact, it rose from 0.79% in 1993 to
1.14% in 1994 and dropped slightly to 1.13% in 1995. This data
with respect to arrests would not support the claim that citizen
complaints rose because the number of arrests rose. Arrests, it is
true, did rise in 1994 from 20,299 to 20,688; and again in 1995 to
20,829. But, as the percentages show, this increase was not enough
to explain the increase in citizen complaints from 162 to 236.
Also from Public Safety Management we received figures on
dispatch calls for the years 1991 through 1995. A dispatch call is
a communication with the police bureau which results in a police
vehicle being sent to the incident. These, like arrests, are another
indicator of the level of police interaction with the public. The
following table presents citizen complaints as a percentage of
dispatch calls for this period.
Unlike arrests, the absolute number of dispatch calls did not
increase from 1993 to 1994; nor in the next year. This, combined
with the increase in citizen complaints accounts for the increased
rates in the fourth column for 1994 and 1995. As we said above in
the case of arrests, this data does not support the assertion that the
increase in citizen complaints was due to increased police contact
with the citizenry. It does, however, reflect favorably upon the
police bureau when one considers that, even at its highest rate,
about seven citizen complaints are filed for every 10,000 police
vehicle responses to a dispatch call; less than one in 1,000.
In addition to arrests and dispatch calls, this analysis could be done
with other indicators of police contact with the public, for example,
traffic stops.
VI. c. The Police Hiring Crisis Revisited
No discussion of the work of the Bureau of Police in the last five
years would be complete without taking into account the unique
challenge faced by the Murphy Administration since its first day in
office, January, 1994. In that month the City Controller¡s Office
released our Performance Audit of Police Officer Hiring for the
years 1991-1993. We quote at length from the Conclusion to that
report:
Throughout the audit period, 1991-1993, with the exception of
one quarter (third quarter, 1993), the Masloff Administration failed
to meet the budgeted figure for police officer positions. The
variances ranged from 11 below budget in first quarter 1991 to 89
below budget in fourth quarter 1992.
From January 7, 1991 to February 15, 1993, a period of 25 months,
the City did not hire a single police officer. The City did hire 243
police officers in 1993.
The corollary to this 25-month hiring freeze was a 14-month freeze
on the 75% early retirement incentive program. Police officers
retiring under this program finally started to leave the force in
November, 1993, the last two months of the Masloff
Administration. As of the close of 1993, approximately 390
officers are still waiting to retire under this program, roughly 32%
of the force; and all these must be allowed to leave by December
31, 1995.
In September, 1992, when early retirements could have begun, the
opportunity existed to stretch this exodus of seasoned officers (at
that time, 453, approximately 40% of the force) over a period of
three years, four months (September, 1992 - December, 1995).
Now, because of the actions of the Masloff Administration, the
entire problem has been shifted to the incoming Murphy
Administration, and the time span has been shortened from 40
months to 24 months; 24 months in which nearly 400 experienced
police officers (not to mention those reaching mandatory retirement
age plus all other leaves¡) will have to be replaced by new
officers. [emphasis added].
CONCLUSION
Unquestionably the in-coming Murphy Administration faced a
public safety crisis in early 1994, and met the challenge.
Furthermore, a credible argument can be made that the new police
officers (the majority of whom, have not had a single citizen
complaint filed against them) deserve a significant portion of the
credit for the recent drop in crime. Yet, this aggressive drive to
take back the streets has coincided with an upswing in citizen
discontent with the police and created a new, and perhaps even
more difficult, challenge.
The Administration, Public Safety Management, the Law
Department, the Fraternal Order of Police, and every sworn police
officer must now work together to win back the trust of ordinary
citizens. They must, in a sincere and convincing fashion, reject the
notion that increased citizen discontent is an inevitable by-product
of better crime fighting. On the contrary, they must demonstrate by
their actions that the opposite is true; that courtesy,
professionalism, cooperation with the community, respect for
rights, and seasoned restraint, are indispensable components of any
successful effort to guard the public¡s safety. The majority of the
police in this City already know this. Many practice it every day. It
is the sincere hope of the City Controller¡s Office that this audit
will enable them to do their jobs even better. We also hope it will
help provide Public Safety Management and the citizens of
Pittsburgh with the best possible system to receive, investigate,
monitor, render decisions on, mete out discipline for, and reduce
the frequency of, citizen complaints against the police.
* See, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Peter Flaherty, 760 F.
Supp 472, 478 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
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