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The Terrorist Connection - Iran, Islamic Jihad and Hamas


THE TERRORIST CONNECTION - IRAN, THE ISLAMIC JIHAD AND HAMAS
Elie Rekhess "Justice", Vol. 5 (May 1995)

Abstract of a lecture delivered in a colloquium on "Iran: Foreign
Policies & Domestic Constraints", held at the Moshe Dayan Center
for Middle Eastern & African Studies at Tel Aviv University on 3
April 1995, related to Iran's endeavours to export its revolution to
the Palestinian arena; Iran's ideological impact on Palestinian-
Islamic trends, and the practical aspects of Iranian-Palestinian
cooperation. Dr. Rekhess is a senior research fellow ,it the Moshe
Dayan Center for Middle Eastern & African Studies at Tel Aviv
University. The paper was jointly prepared with Meir Hatina, a
Ph.D. candidate at Tel Aviv University's School of History. The
export of the Iranian revolution in its first decade of existence was
restricted to the Shi'i movements in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf
Emirates. The Iranian version of fundamentalist Islam failed to
make significant headway in Sunni-dominated Muslim areas.
Against the background of what may be described as a general
Sunni hostility towards the Iranian revolution, the distinctive
Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization appeared in the late seventies
in the Gaza Strip, emerging as a militant Sunni movement steeped
in Sunni actions and traditions. yet inspired and emboldened by the
Shi'i revolution of Iran. During most of the eighties the Iran-Islamic
Jihad relationship was one-sided. It was the Palestinian movement
which responded to its spiritual mentor. Iran paid little attention to
the Palestinian movement. A change occurred in the late eighties.
Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran no longer restricted
itself to the Shi'i domains: instead. it opened itself up to a genuine
effort to export its revolution to Sunni-populated areas, such as
Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and the Palestinian arena. The
change in Iran's external policies coincided with the eruption of the
intifada which brought to the fore the saliency of Islamic militancy
in the form not only of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement but,
more forcibly, through Hamas. Following the deportation of the
Islamic Jihad leadership to Lebanon in 1988, Iranian involvement
with the organization was significantly enhanced. Concurrently,
and in line with its determination to export the revolution to Shi'i
dominated areas, Iran made strenuous efforts to widen its influence
to the Palestinian scene by strengthening its relations with Hamas,
the rival Islamic group in the Territories which, as noted, began to
emerge as a central Islamic element fomenting the intifada. The
Iranian endeavour, however, was met with limited success, as the
Muslim Brotherhood affiliated to Hamas was at pains at this stage
to distance itself from Iran. The situation changed again following
the Gulf War and the Madrid Conference, when Iran's interests and
the interests of Hamas converged. For Teheran, Hamas had several
advantages. It offered another vehicle to demonstrate Iran's Islamic
leadership; a channel for involving itself in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Moreover, Hamas seemed determined to fight. had the
potential to strike inside Israel, and attracted great public interest. It
totally rejected Israel's right to exist and was resolved to combat
Israel and imperialism. All these were in line with Iranian doctrines
and tactics and thus were worthy of Iranian support. The transition
in Iranian attitudes towards the mainstream Palestinian Islamic
trend was clearly demonstrated in a series of moves initiated by Iran
from 1990 onwards. A few landmarks: In late December 1990 Iran
convened an Islamic conference on Palestine in Teheran, to which
Hamas delegates were invited. A landmark in the Iranian-
Palestinian-Islam rapprochement took place in October 1991, when
Iran convened in Teheran the international conference to support
the Islamic revolution of the people of Palestine, an event which
emerged as a counter-conference to the Madrid Conference held at
that time. From that point onwards the cooperation and
coordination between Iran and the Palestinian Islamic movement
became tighter and more pronounced. Both parties, Hamas on the
one hand and the Iranians on the other, united in pursuing a joint
political goal, to foil the peace process. Iranian influence on the
Palestinian Islamic militants became more visible and salient. The
Ideological and Political Impact of the Iranian Revolution on
Palestinian Islamic Movements The Palestinian Islamic Jihad
movement was the group most profoundly affected by the Iranian
revolution. From its inception, the Islamic Jihad endorsed the
Iranian revolution as an ideal movement to be implemented in other
parts of the Muslim world, first-and foremost, of course, on the
Palestinian scene. It was the Iranian revolution, Islamic Jihad
spokesman argued, which brought home the old truth that "Islam
was the solution and Jihad was the proper means". They adopted a
central tenet of Khomeini's interpretation of the new Sh'ia, the
constant emphasis on jihad as a symbol of activism, thereby
contrasting it with the Muslim Brotherhood's approach. They
adopted the principle of sacrifice and martyrdom to an uninhibited
suicidal point. Fathi Shqaqi, leader of the Islamic Jihad, saw
Khomeini's greatness in his capacity to illuminate the great cultural
clash between the Islamic nation with its historical tradition, its
faith and civilization, and on the other hand the satanic forces of
the West represented by Israel. Shqaqi has quoted a fatwa issued by
Khomeini which spoke of the religious duty of bringing about the
elimination, izala, of the Zionist entity, and allocated the income
from alms for this purpose. The Iranian Jihad perception was
accommodated by the Islamic movement in the Territories to the
Palestinian scene. Iran, argued the Islamic Jihadists, was the only
country which truly took upon itself the Palestinian cause by
forming the Jerusalem Army, a force capable of waging a poplar
Islamic liberation war. There remain, nevertheless, unresolved
ideological contradictions in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad outlook.
These emerge in the attitude adopted by the Islamic Jihad
movement towards the Sunni-Sh'ia schism, the most difficult
challenge to the movement. Here the Islamic Jihad has taken up the
ecumenical tendency preached by the Iranian regime and has
stressed the latter's pan-Islamic orientation. Islamic Jihad
publications emphasize the harmony prevailing between Sunnis and
Shi'is. Over and over again they deny that the Shi'a is heretical.
They speak of it as an integral part of the world of Islam and
consider existing controversies as marginal matters. They cite with
approval the endeavours Hasan al Bana and Sheikh Mahmoud
Shaltut to bring the various schools of thought together. They
enlarge on Shaltut's famous fatwa of 1959 declaring the Twelve
Shi'a to be an orthodox school alongside the four other recognized
schools. It is doubtful whether the Islamic Jihad's endeavour to
reconcile Sunna and Shi'a has been successful. The Islamic Jihad
failed to establish a coherent consistent ideological system which
would capture the support of West Bankers and Gazans.
Politically, the Islamic Jihad's views regarding such issues as the
Iran-Iraq War and the peace process were and are a mirror reflection
of Iran's views on these issues. Thus, for example, unlike other
Sunni fundamentalist movements which sided with Iraq, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad expressed unqualified support for the
Iranian stand in the Iran-Iraq War. Similarly, the Islamic Jihad
negated the Madrid Conference, the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations, the Oslo agreement, and the Declaration of Principles,
in full accordance with the Iranian stance. Iran's ideological
influence on Hamas is totally different. Hamas was established in
the Territories in early 1988 as a military wing of the local branch
of the Muslim Brotherhood, and as such it displayed from the
outset a strong anti-Shi'i position. The Hamas covenant published
in August 1988 did not echo Khomeini type thinking and made no
mention of Iran. Ahmad Yassin, leader of Hamas, attacked at that
time Khomeini's regime. From its inception to this day, and in
direct contradiction to the Islamic Jihad, Hamas has not indulged in
attempts to bridge the theological discrepancies between Sunni and
Shi'a. Theologically, one may conclude that Hamas remains alien to
the notions of the Iranian revolution. With regard to its political
outlook, Hamas has maintained a much more independent stand
than the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Thus, during the Gulf War
Hamas adopted an ambivalent position, largely because its principal
rival, the PLO, so closely identified itself with Saddam's cause.
Concurrently, Hamas was careful not to alienate its benefactors in
the Gulf area, mainly Kuwait. The shared interests of Iran and
Hamas began to correspond following the Gulf War and the
beginning of the political process. Practical Aspects of the
Cooperation between Iran and the Palestinian Islamic Movement
The deportation in 1988 of Fathi Shqaqi and others to Lebanon,
and the transfer of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad headquarters to
Syria, thereafter, marked a turning point in the development of the
Iranian-Islamic Jihad relationship. From this point on, direct
contact was established between the Islamic Jihad activists and
their Iranian sponsors though Iranian embassies in Beirut and
Damascus, through the Revolutionary Guards stationed in Lebanon,
and through Hizbullah. The Iranian sponsorship of the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad was manifested politically, financially and militarily.
The State Department's office of counter-terrorism in its report on
international terrorism for the year 1993 clearly established that the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad received funding from Iran. In April 1993,
Fathi Shqaqi told a New York newspaper that his organization has
received Iranian funds since 1987. He did not specify how much
money was transferred but added that money and military
equipment were transferred to the Territories to fund terror
operations and to support the families of Palestinian Islamic Jihad
activists. It should be emphasized that the money is not being used
only for terror activity, but also for the establishment of new
mosques and a socioeconomic support system in the Territories.
The contact established between the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and
Hizbullah in 1988 had a particularly strong impact on the
movement's military capacity and activity. The Palestinian Islamic
Jihad was transformed into a paramilitary organization resembling
the philosophy and structure of Hizbullah. The Jihad organization
obtained arms through Hizbullah. In 1991 and 1992, members of
the Jihad were logistically supported by the Hizbullah in carrying
out at least three armed operations against IDF targets in the
security zone in southern Lebanon. Press reports concerning the
Jihad-Hizbullah-Iranian military connection continue to be
published regularly. The most recent report was published in March
1995 in Al-Watan Al-Arabi, a weekly published in Paris. Quoting
unidentified Western intelligence sources, the report alleged that
Iran together with Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, Hamas and other
radical Islamic movements have been making special efforts to
recruit young Muslims in Europe and to train them for suicidal
terror attack missions. Shqaqi himself is quoted in this report as
having declared that there exists a one-hundred strong special task
suicidal unit which will be activated not only against Israeli targets
but also against whoever is the enemy of Islam. The authenticity of
this report still needs to be verified. One should add parenthetically
here that much of the information published in overt sources
concerning Iranian-Palestinian relations is fabricated. False reports
are leaked to the press to serve the interests of at least four actors
involved in this business - Iran, the PLO, Israel and the Islamic
movements themselves. Some observers add Iraq and Syria to the
list. One must therefore be very careful in handling such
information or disinformation. Nevertheless, if the Al-Watan Al-
Arabi report is based on reliable sources, then there is definitely
reason for concern. What is known is that regular working meetings
between Islamic Jihad leaders and Hizbullah officials continue to
take place, with occasional Iranian participation. The most recent
such meeting reported in the press was held between Hasan
Nasrallah, the Hizbullah Secretary General and Fathi Shqaqi in
October 1994. The Hamas-Iranian Connection So far the Islamic
Jihad-Iranian connection has been explained. The political affinity
which was established between Iran and Hamas in late 1991 was
followed by a series of practical steps. In October 1992 the Iranian
Foreign Minister invited a Hamas delegation to Iran under the
leadership of Dr. Musa Abu Marzuk, who held meetings with
Khomeini and Foreign Minister Velayeti. Iran reportedly pledged
to support Hamas with a subsidy of $30 million a year and also
reportedly agreed to place 3,000 Hamas fighters in training camps
in Iran, Lebanon and Sudan. It also promised to help Hamas set up
a radio station. Hizbullah was said to have agreed to help Hamas to
mount operations against Israel, including joint attacks. The newly
established cooperation was reportedly formalized in an agreement
signed in late 1992 in the city of Kum. Iran allowed Hamas to open
an office in Teheran for political and propaganda activities,
subsequently referred to by both parties as an embassy. The
agreement, which declared Hamas to be the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinians, elicited an angry and aggressive
PLO response. Arafat, troubled by the PLO's loss of ground to
Hamas in the Territories, and ever wary of Iranian involvement in
Palestinian affairs, denounced Iran vehemently. Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf states also reportedly expressed resentment. Hamas was
quick to deny that there was any agreement. The Hamas spokesman
accused the PLO of fabricating the story in order to undermine
Hamas's standing in the Arab world. The Hamas spokesmen added
that the Iranian-Hamas connection was restricted to the political
level only. To what extent does this statement reflect actual reality?
The only article in the alleged agreement that was fully
implemented was the opening of a permanent Hamas representation
in Teheran, headed by Imad al-Alami, who was deported from the
Gaza Strip in 1990. It is also evident that the political contacts
between Hamas leaders and Iranian leadership have been
strengthened in the last two years. Political bureau chief Dr. Musa
Abu Marzuk, Ibrahim Ghawsha, Mohammad Nazal and other
leading Hamas leaders meet with Khomeini, Rafsanjani and
Velayeti regularly during their frequent visits to Iran. What is more
difficult to establish is the nature of the military and financial
relationship between Hamas and Iran. On the military level, it is
doubtful whether the report of guerrilla training for 3,000 Hamas
men in Lebanon and Iran is true. As Martin Kramer indicated, Abu
Marzuk, who denied the report, pointed out that it was logistically
impossible for Iran to train Hamas activists, and there is no strong
evidence to contradict or refute Abu Marzuk's claim. Similar
reports concerning Hamas training by the Revolutionary Guard
remain unconfirmed. The Hamas-Hizbullah Connection Hamas
cooperates with Hizbullah politically. Leaders of the two
organizations meet regularly in Lebanon. A recent such meeting
was held in October 1994 between Nasrallah and leading Hamas
leaders. While it is reasonable to assume that there exists some
measure of military cooperation between Hamas and Hizbullah,
especially following the deportation of the four hundred Hamas
activists to southern Lebanon, hard evidence proving such contacts
is lacking. It is questionable whether Hamas is in actual need of
external military assistance emanating from either Hizbullah or
Iran. Hamas has developed its own self-sustained terror network in
the Territories. It is well organized, well trained and well equipped.
There is no lack of arms supply in the Territories. Asked, following
the Afula operation in April 1994, whether those who planned and
implemented the operation received their training under Hizbullah
in southern Lebanon, Muhammad Nazal replied: "I think the Hamas
movement is able to develop its military and security capabilities
without having to seek outside help. The movement has an efficient
military body that gains experience day by day." This statement
reflects much of the reality as it Is. With regard to Iranian financial
aid for Hamas, a congressional report published in December 1994
states that: "While Iran has no presence in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, in 1992 it reopened its embassy in Jordan from which Hamas
activists can gain relatively easy access to the West Bank." The
report hints that there is financial aid coming from the Iranian
embassy in Jordan to Hamas. Spokesmen for Hamas admit that the
Iranian people have supplied certain assistance to the Palestinian
people in the Territories to help keep them steadfast, but deny
having received as much as $30 million from Iran. There are other
reports from the Lebanese press indicating the sum of $10 million,
presumably per year, coming from Iran to Hamas. Again these
reports are unconfirmed. The Iranian leadership is reportedly
divided over the extent of funds to be distributed to Hamas.
Another legitimate question in this context is whether Hamas itself
is keen to become totally dependent on Iranian financial support.
Such a development may be counterproductive from the Hamas
point of view. Full identification between Hamas and Iran could
harm the latter's interests, mainly in the sense that it would
facilitate Israel's effort to depict Hamas as an Iranian-sponsored
threat to the world order and it would legitimize harsh Israeli action
against Hamas. Concluding Remarks Two central questions must
be addressed. First, has the exportation of the Iranian revolution to
the Palestinian arena been successful? The answer is yes, but only
to a limited extent. From the ideological point of view - only the
relatively small Islamic Jihad organization has converted to the
Shi'i-inspired Iranian model. But, as indicated above, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad has not become a sweeping grass roots
movement in the Territories. The number of its hard core members
does not exceed 100-200 people. With regard to Hamas, Iran's
success is considerably smaller. Hamas remains a Sunni-oriented
Muslim Brotherhood movement which rejects the Iranian Shi'i
model. In total contradiction to the Islamic Jihad, which became an
Iranian satellite organization, fully financed, trained and backed by
Iran, Hamas preserves its independence vis-a-vis the Iranians. The
second question relates to the importance of the Palestinian-Islamic
connection in Iranian eyes. There has been an on-going debate over
this issue. Some analysts, notably Hooshang Amiramadi of Rutgers
University, concluded that despite its verbal criticism, Iran had not
taken any practical steps to foil the peace process. An opposite
view claims that Iran has inscribed the struggle for Palestine on its
flag, and that Iran, through its Palestinian Islamic clients, poses a
formidable Islamic threat to the stability of the Middle East in
general and to the peace process in particular. In any event, it is the
relationship between Iran and the Islamic Jihad which poses the
most danger. One should not underestimate Hamas, but Hamas acts
first and foremost according to its own narrow interests. The
Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a puppet in the hands of Iran. If and
when Iran decides to explode the peace process, one should be
aware that it has the tools to carry out this mission, namely,
through the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization. It is a fearless,
ruthless, fanatic, extremist organization which does not hesitate to
do whatever is ordered. Whether Iran indeed wants this to happen
is a question which remains unanswered. .

Israel Information Service Gopher
Information Division
Israel Foreign Ministry
 
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