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The Worldwide Threat to the US and Its Interests Abroad
by General James R. Clapper, Jr.
THE WORLDWIDE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INTERESTS ABROAD
Statement for the Senate Committee on Armed Services, January 17, 1995
Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
I testified before this Committee last year on threats to U.S.
interests and identified three principal concerns: North Korea;
political military developments in Russia; and the proliferation of
technology associated with weapons of mass destruction. These
three areas, as well as a myriad of lesser regional challenges, remain
of primary importance to the Defense Intelligence community as we
stretch our resources to cover these complex and sophisticated
intelligence targets. Before I get into the specifics of these threats,
however, or address the issues the Committee asked that I cover, I
want to mention a growing concern of mine.
In his Atlantic Monthly article entitled, "The Coming Anarchy",
Robert Kaplan says, "...a large number of people on this planet, to
whom the comfort and stability of a middle-class life is utterly
unknown, find war and a barracks existence a step up rather than a
step down." Certainly, we have seen ample evidence over the last
several years that much of the Third World rests on a bed of
kindling wood with unpredictable flash points. Dealing with these
"premodern" or "irregular" threats is a challenge that we in military
intelligence have just begun to confront systematically
I will address in more detail both traditional threats from a regional
perspective as well as some of the nontraditional problems we in
military intelligence are facing. I ask, however, that you bear in
mind the potential for this flash point warfare that could ignite
virtually anywhere and with little notice, but which has wide-
ranging implications for U.S. policy and military operations.
A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MILITARY THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS
ASIA
North Korea continues to be my major near-term military concern.
In my view, the nuclear framework agreement, coupled with the
leadership transition, offers the greatest promise of a significantly
more stable Korean Peninsula than I have seen in the last ten years.
I believe North Korea's leadership now recognizes its chances for
regime survival are better served by strategies emphasizing
economic improvement and political-economic accommodation
rather than those stressing implacable confrontation with the
outside world.
That said, even in the face of this potentially historic change, I
continue to focus on the realities on the ground. Thus far, we see
no significant changes in North Korea's conventional military
posture. Concentrated in the southern part of the country and able
to transition to war in a matter of days, the North's military
continues to significantly outnumber the combined ROK and U.S
forces.
To be sure, this military has shortcomings and vulnerabilities, but
the nuclear framework accord has done nothing to diminish the
North's current capabilities to conduct a war against the south.
Moreover, the North's military preparations continue apace, with
additional long range artillery and missile systems being moved
closer to the DMZ. In the future the key questions will be whether
the North follows through on the nuclear agreement, and whether,
finally, they begin to reallocate very scarce resources away from the
military. In any event, North Korea will remain a potentially very
unstable place for the next few years.
The other country in the Far East we watch carefully is China In
part this is because of its strategic nuclear capability: a small
deterrent force but with considerable reach; this force will grow in
the next decade. And, we are watching how China deals with its
rapid economic growth. As a result of defense spending increases,
the military is buying a small number of modern fighter aircraft and
air defense systems from Russia and is investing heavily to improve
its indigenous production capabilities. This is not necessarily
threatening; some force modernization is to be expected because
China has a large, old military. Over time, we will be observing the
degree to which China dedicates its national resources to the
military and the implications this has for the ways in which China
might use its military forces. We see signals, for example, that
Beijing intends to continue developing its military capabilities to
enable it to more effectively protect its interests close to its own
borders Such military improvements will undoubtedly cause
concern among its neighbors.
EURASIAN LAND MASS
The tragic events in the former Yugoslavia receive most of the
attention in Europe. Ultimately, a political solution is the only
answer for ending the conflict; unfortunately, I'm convinced intense
fighting will resume next spring even if the current cease fire holds,
and could then spin out of control, potentially spreading beyond
the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia and leading to greater
involvement of military personnel from NATO countries and
elsewhere.
Within NATO itself, I'm concerned about continuing tensions
between Greece and Turkey, as reflected by last fall's crisis in the
Aegean over territorial sea limits and each country's simultaneous
military exercises. The Alliance is weakened by this persistent
acrimony and I worry about a clash neither side wants growing out
of an inadvertent incident during such exercises.
Over the longer term, events in Russia remain the key to future
security on the Eurasian land mass. There is a growing perception
in Russia that President Yeltsin is increasingly isolated and there is
deepening political disarray in Moscow. Russia's very difficult
transition to a democratic government and a market oriented
economy is not assured. At the same time, the military has been
under extraordinary pressure; as Deputy Defense Minister
Kokoshin has said, "the military is fighting for its survival. A
precipitous decline in defense budgets has severely impacted the
military's ability to reform itself and we anticipate that continued
economic problems will adversely affect the military for a number
of years.
Strategic nuclear forces have been relatively the least affected, and I
am confident that they remain under the centralized control of the
Russian President and the General Staff. The conventional forces,
however, have been particularly hard hit.
It sometimes is alleged by some western observers that Russia's
military is in total disarray. This is clearly not the case. The General
Staff has orchestrated the largest strategic withdrawal in the history
of the world in an organized manner. The Russians are taking
logical cuts and their force development activities make sound
military sense. On the other hand, things beyond their control --
particularly budget cuts -- are taking a huge toll. By virtually every
objective standard used to measure military capabilities -- manning,
readiness, training, morale, logistics, and materiel maintenance --
the Russian military continues to suffer major problems. As a
result, it is currently only capable of conducting limited
conventional operations in and around the periphery of Russia.
And as we have seen in Chechnya, even that small-scale operation
has experienced profound problems.
While these degraded capabilities are likely to confront the Russian
military through at least the rest of this decade, we are still
concerned about a number of military related developments in
Russia. For example, we continue to note large investments in their
deep underground program -- a concern I know is shared by Senator
Thurmond. In addition, they maintain active chemical warfare and
biological warfare research and development programs. Politically,
moreover, we believe that START II ratification in the DUMA is
problematic, and the Russians are continuing to express intense
opposition to the flank limitations of the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe.
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
In the Middle East we continue to closely monitor the threat posed
by Iraq and Iran. In the case of Iraq, the military continues to suffer
from the results of Desert Storm. Only about 1/2 the size it was
during the Persian Gulf war, its military continues to be
constrained by UN Sanctions. Saddam is succeeding in rebuilding
some military capabilities, and, we believe, hiding missile and
WMD capabilities; but overall, large portions of the regular
military continue to suffer localized shortfalls in morale, readiness,
logistics and training. Nevertheless, the events of last October in
which the bulk of two Republican Guard divisions were quickly
moved to the Kuwaiti border remind us that Saddam retains
residual capability to project power; then, early warning by the
Intelligence Community enabled us to deploy a deterrent force in a
timely manner. The ability to limit Iraq's future offensive military
capability is directly related to two factors: first, continued
enforcement of the sanctions; and, second, the forward presence of
U.S. military power to deter, and if necessary, to defeat Iraqi forces.
Iran's military is also in the midst of rebuilding from the decade
long war with Iraq. But Iran has major economic constraints as well
that have slowed its weapons acquisition plans. Hard currency
shortages and a poor debt servicing record have limited TeheranOs
ability to acquire weapons systems in the international arms market.
Spending between 1 and 2 billion dollars a year on arms, Iran has
focused on missiles and WMD capability and some limited growth
in conventional capabilities. Some systems they are acquiring, such
as Kilo submarines and antiship cruise missiles could complicate
operations in and around the Persian Gulf; however, overall, both
the quality and quantity of arms they are purchasing remain
constrained by budgetary shortfalls. We expect that trend to
continue.
Degraded military capabilities of Iraq and Iran, as well as those of
Syria, coupled with progress in the peace process, mean that the
major near-term threat of conventional aggression against Israel
continues to be low. Beyond the immediate terrorist threat, I
believe the greatest threat to Israeli security over the midterm will
be from the increased numbers of long range surface to surface
missiles equipped with weapons of mass destruction warheads.
In South Asia, India and Pakistan remain a concern because of the
presence of very large forces in close proximity across the line of
contact, as well as their pursuit of ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction. We believe both Islamabad and Delhi are
preoccupied with internal problems and recognize that war is not in
the interest of either. However, as always, this remains a potential
flash point because of the danger of miscalculation and the
prospect for rapid escalation of a crisis.
TRANSNATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL FORCES
Because of the nature of your request I have focused principally on
the traditional military capabilities of major regional actors.
However, the lessons of the past few years are apparent: we must
also pay increased attention to forces at both the transnational and
subnational levels. We can, unfortunately, anticipate that conflicts
such as those in Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda will
be far more likely than the kinds of major regional aggression that
have confronted us in the past. Whether these kinds of conflict
impact on U.S. interests is not for me to say. But as a purely factual
matter, their numbers are increasing and, at a minimum, they will
confront the world with humanitarian disasters involving millions
of people. Thus far, these conflicts have had a relatively indirect
impact on the west's "interests" -- largely directed toward our
conscience and our urge to make things better. However, it will
only be a matter of time before the impact -- whether it is major
refugee movement or some other phenomenon directed against one
of our close allies -- is much more direct.
When the United States does choose to commit its military to these
kinds of operations, the challenges to the Intelligence Community
are immense. Now we must focus not on some geopolitical "big
picture" view of the threat but rather on the precise nature of the
actual threats to our deployed forces and the operational
environment in which they will deploy. Threat analysis must be
much more concrete and specific. Of course we still provide in
depth orders of battle, targeting data, and traditional military
capabilities analysis. But we must also provide the commanders on
the ground with detailed information regarding local customs,
ethnicity, biographic data, military geography and infectious
diseases. All of these can have a direct bearing on the threats posed
to our forces. A couple of examples:
- we provided detailed analysis on more than 40 clans and subclans
operating in Somalia
-- far more difficult than counting tanks and planes;
- our Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center anticipated the
need for preventive medicine countermeasures to avoid severe
outbreaks of malaria in Somalia; it also assessed the risk to our
forces from working in close contact with indigenous Somali
populations where diseases such as TB are rampant.
- we provided detailed infrastructure and geographic analysis to
support evacuation and relief operations in Rwanda/Zaire
- we assisted in tracking refugees from Cuba and Haiti.
- we supported our battalion in Macedonia with specific
information regarding Serb deployments opposite their positions
The information we provide regarding the operational environment
in which our forces will operate goes well beyond direct threats to
U.S. servicemen and women. Though the threat of contracting
AIDS by our deployed forces is very low, the disease is having a
tremendous impact on many third world countries -- whether that of
a country in which we might be conducting a Peacekeeping
Operation, or one that is participating with us in a multilateral
operation. Moreover, in countries where the HIV rate exceeds 50%
in the military, the long term impact on both the military as an
institution and the fabric of society is devastating.
A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MILITARY THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS
Having initially taken a regional approach, let me now briefly
address the nature of threats in a functional manner by examining
proliferation and weapons systems that could confront our forces.
As I indicated one of my major concerns is tracking the continued
proliferation of technologies associated with weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems. Approximately two dozen
countries have ongoing programs to develop or acquire weapons of
mass destruction. While it is possible to slow the proliferation of
these weapons, a country that is intent on gaining such a capability
will eventually do so. And in addition to the weapon itself, many
countries, particularly in the Middle East, are also gaining the
capability to build surface to surface missiles as delivery system.
By the turn of the century we could see many countries with the
capability to mate a WMD warhead (whether chemical, biological,
or nuclear) with an indigenously produced missile of 500 1000 km
or greater range. At the same time, however, we see no interest in,
or capability, of any new country reaching the continental United
States with a long range missile for at least the next decade.
With respect to conventional weapons systems development, the
picture is mixed. There are very advanced weapons systems under
development in all of the major industrial countries. At the same
time, however, declining defense budgets coupled with a very soft
international arms market is limiting the ability of countries to
develop, field and sell these systems. This is no more true than in
Russia. The defense establishment has been attempting to protect
the research and development of major systems despite a defense
budget that is less than a 1/3 of that of the Former Soviet Union --
and getting smaller. While R&D does continue on many advanced
systems, major difficulties are evident. The Russians themselves are
complaining that virtually every big ticket item -- including the
Navy's latest generation nuclear powered attack submarine, the Air
Forces' multi role fighter interceptor, and the Army's helicopter
program -- are having problems because of funding limitations.
This trend can be expected to continue and could get worse as
Moscow is forced to make very difficult procurement tradeoff
decisions.
In response to the needs of the acquisition and planning
communities to cope with a variety of foreign threats, DIA has
established the Department of Defense Futures Intelligence
Program. Key to this program is the development of a series of
mutually supportive analytical products and a force projections data
base -- looking forward 20 years -- that respond to a wide variety of
consumer requirements. These products, joint efforts with the
Services and Unified Commands, include global, regional and
major threat countries' military force assessments, as well as a
OFamily of Scenarios" specifically designed to support defense
weapons acquisition programs. The force projections data base is
the single authoritative data base for such information.
Finally, while we tend to focus on current and future high
technology big ticket items, its important to remember that the
world is already awash in weapon systems. These range from the
relatively simple small arms and mines, to more advanced hand held
surface to air missiles, to increasingly advanced anti ship cruise
missiles. Any country with hard currency can and will get these
systems. And while they won't lead to military defeat of U.S.
forces, they certainly hold out the prospect of casualties. As we
have seen in the past, this can have both a major impact on force
planning for peacekeeping operations and a significant domestic
political impact.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, I believe the issues of greatest concern to Defense
Intelligence are essentially the same as those I identified last year:
the Korean peninsula; political/military developments in Russia,
and the worldwide proliferation of technology associated with
weapons of mass destruction. Similarly I would emphasize two
additional factors that I highlighted last year; first, we face a high
degree of uncertainty regarding the nature of the threats that will
confront U.S. interests in the early 21st century; and second, the
world's major militaries are in a decade of transition, the end points
of which are not entirely clear. The end of the Cold War is still
playing itself out and as a result of decreasing threat perceptions
and generally declining defense budgets (China being a notable
exception), militaries are not enjoying the resource prominence
they once did. In the majority of countries in the world, friends and
foes alike, militaries are getting smaller and readiness is declining.
If these trends continue, the prospects for well trained, well
equipped major regional aggressors developing after the turn of the
century may be relatively low; even so, the likelihood of ethnic,
religious and sectarian violence both within countries and across
borders is likely to grow -- the world is not likely to be a stable
place. Moreover, continuation of these favorable trends is not
preordained; depending on the nature of political events,
particularly in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, we could see a
reversal in many of the gains of the last several years. Have the
major, direct threats to the security interests of the United States
declined over the last several years? Of course. But as I said last
year, there are mid-range dangers and long-range uncertainties that
continue to be at the forefront of U.S. national security policy. In
such an era, I remain convinced that we in Defense Intelligence will
play a critical role in providing accurate, timely data to both our
warfighters and policy makers to ensure the success of that security
policy.
As I close, I am compelled to say a word about the resource
implications of the range of issues I have just covered. This
Committee has often heard me talk about Omanaging riskO. As we
continue our drawdowns I'd ask that you too reflect on the range of
military threats, risks and concerns highlighted in the statement
(and then remember that I haven't even mentioned counterterrorism,
counternarcotics or counterintelligence, all of which are monitored
to some degree by Defense Intelligence). These are all issues,
against which I am called on to devote resources to collect, analyze,
and produce intelligence -- thus far, at least, I haven't had anyone
tell me I can start foregoing any of these issues.
On the high end of the threat spectrum, there are numerous
countries, all of which are capable to varying degrees of conducting
military operations that could impact on U.S. interests. For these
countries, the demand is that I can track the following kinds of
issues in some detail: political/military intentions, military
doctrine, strategy, and tactics, all the way down to basic order of
battle analysis -- and everything in between (training, readiness,
logistics, etc). And of course we must be technically versed in all
the weapons systems this country has in order to give our forces the
best chance to defeat those systems; this is getting increasingly
complicated as so-called "grey" systems are fielded and use the
technology of several countries. Ultimately, to defeat that foreign
force requires exceptionally fine grain analysis of the potential
enemy's infrastructure for targeting purposes (and again, this
information is only collectible over a very long period of time, in
advance -- if we wait until the crisis develops, its way too late).
Note as well that there is a time dimension to our intelligence
production; I have addressed the maintenance of a current body of
knowledge on all these potential threats. But, we have to look well
forward as well, out a decade or two in the case of support to the
weapons acquisition community; this obviously implies a whole
separate set of data requirements.
On the lower end of the threat spectrum, as I suggested earlier,
flash point warfare is a particular challenge for those of us in
military intelligence. Here the traditional tenets of military
intelligence, rooted in order of battle and combined arms warfare
analysis, are less and less relevant. Now we must be steeped in the
culture and ethnic makeup of multiple tribes and clans within the
same "country. How do they fight? What are they fighting over? Are
there centers of gravity? How are they making use of very low
technology weapons? Beyond the forces, what is the geographic
environment in which our forces might have to operate; what, for
example is the best route to evacuate our Embassy people out of
Kigali -- a critical issue we needed to address last year. These kinds
of data requirements are substantially different than those
demanded to support large scale conflict, but are equally complex.
As we face more and more of this new environment, clearly, we are
not standing still.
We have taken several initiatives within the military intelligence
community to help us better understand and deal with the growing
phenomena of flash point or irregular warfare: -- Dr Hans Mark of
the DIA Scientific Advisory Board is leading a study on urban
warfare;
-- My staff conducted a study on operations other than war at the
behest of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence that lays out well the
challenges we face in this area;
-- DIA has several analysts who have developed expertise in
providing the highly specialized intelligence products required for
use in both urban and tribal warfare;
-- We are working to develop a cadre of analysts who focus their
research on Third World instability and the implications for the
U.S. military; and,
-- I have extracted liberally here from the work of a DIA senior
Executive who may be the Community's preeminent expert on the
the implications of irregular warfare to intelligence.
The point of reciting the tremendous range of data requirements we
have is to reinforce the notion of Omanaging riskO. I can't in good
conscience tell you we are doing everything equally well against all
of these targets. Moreover, I can certainly say that, over time, as we
take more cuts, our collection and analytic elements will suffer. My
approach will continue to be to surge people from one crisis to
another, but that too has a cost; we will do so at the expense of
maintaining critical regional and technical expertise. I understand
the need for drawdown and will continue to see that it is
implemented in as rational a manner as possible. But it is
incumbent on all of us -- this Committee as well as the leadership
of Defense Intelligence -- to make every reasonable attempt to
minimize the risk inherent in still deeper cuts. This concludes my
statement.
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