Gulf War Syndrome Defined: Evidence, Conclusions and Coverup
by H. Lindsey Arison III
1st Edition: 1993, Uploaded: 27 Sep 96, Updated: 13 Sep 97
THE COVER-UP OF GULF WAR SYNDROME -- A QUESTION OF NATIONAL INTEGRITY
Dedicated to Gulf War Veterans - The Victims of Patriotism
CONTENTS
I Credentials
II Primary Sources
III Introduction
IV Bottom Line
V Conclusions
VI Evidence
VII Possible Reasons for the Cover-Up
VIII Selected Testimonies of GW Veterans Before Congressional
Committees
Key Links for Additional Research
I. CREDENTIALS
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve (Ret.)
B.S., West Point
M.S. Systems Management, USC
M.P.A., Harvard University
Ph.D. Candidate (Chemical Pollution), University of Wales, U.K.
Former Congressional Fellow, U.S. House of Representatives
Assisted with the U.S. Senate investigation
Top Secret Clearance
Disabled veteran from the Vietnam Era
Served in the Army Operations Center, Pentagon during the Gulf War
II. PRIMARY SOURCES
The primary source document for this paper is the May 25, 1994,
198-page, U. S. Senate Report "U.S. Chemical and Biological
Warfare-Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible
Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War" Link
to May 25, 1994 Senate Report -- A Report of Chairman Donald
W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs with Respect
to Export Administration. James J. Tuite, III, Professional Staff
Member and Special Assistant to the Chairman for National
Security Issues and Dual-Use Export Policies. Link to May 25,
1994 Senate Hearing Transcript
The May 25, 1994 Committee report and the subsequent October 7,
1994 report are contained in the document S.Hrg. 103-900, Hearing
before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on
United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact on the
Health of the Persian Gulf Veterans, May 25, 1994. Link to
October 7, 1994 Senate Report
"Report on the Fallout from the Destruction of Iraqi Chemical
Warfare Agent Research, Production, and Storage Facilities into
Areas Occupied by U.S. Military Personnel During the 1991
Persian Gulf War." James J. Tuite III, International Security
Consultant and Director, Gulf War Research Foundation,
September 19, 1996. Link to September 19, 1996 Report
Link to the Chronological Record of 24 Iraqi Chemical Warfare
Agent Facilities Bombed by Coalition Forces, 17 Jan - 21 Feb 91
Former U.S. Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (on right) and James J.
Tuite III
III. INTRODUCTION
(Endnotes are in brackets [ ] )
Since the Gulf War ended in 1991, the leadership of the
Department of Defense has affirmed to veterans and sworn to the
U.S. Congress that "there is no information, classified or
unclassified, that indicates that chemical or biological weapons
were used in the Persian Gulf" and that "there were no confirmed
detections of any chemical or biological agents at any time during
the entire conflict."
Caving in to Congressional pressure, most recently imposed by the
Honorable Chris Shays of Connecticut, late on the evening before
Rep. Shays' September 19, 1996 hearing on the exposure of troops
to chemical and biological agents, now five years after the war
ended, DoD admitted that more than 5,000 troops "may" have been
exposed to chemical weapons when a battalion of U.S. soldiers
blew up an Iraqi ammunition depot.
One month later, at the Pentagon's October 22, 1996 Background
News Briefing, this number was increased to 20,867. "That's not an
exact number, of course, but that's the best approximation we have
right now."
On June 26, 1997, the Pentagon increased the number to 27,000.
On July 24, 1997, the Pentagon increased the number to 98,900.
"An estimated 98,900 troops were in the path of a plume of nerve
gas unleashed when U.S. combat engineers blew up the Kamisiyah
ammunition depot in southern Iraq in March 1991, shortly after the
war. That represents almost one-seventh of all Americans who
served in the war."
The truth is:
When the air war started on 17 Jan 91, U.S. intelligence knew of 19
Iraqi biological bunkers. 19 (100% of the biological bunkers
known at that time) were bombed and destroyed. Two more
biological bunkers were discovered later -- too late to be bombed.
Of the 21 total biological bunkers, 95.2% (20 of 21) were in
southern Iraq; only one biological bunker was in northern Iraq.
U.S. intelligence knew of 31 Iraqi chemical bunkers. Only 77.4%
(24 of 31) of the chemical bunkers were bombed and only 17
(54.8%) were destroyed. The seven chemical bunkers not bombed
were located at Samarra -- Iraq's principal center for chemical
weapons production, 50 miles north of Baghdad. Of the eight
chemical bunkers at Iraq's main CW facility, only one was
destroyed.
Archived meteorological data, including visible and infrared
satellite imagery, illustrates irrefutably and conclusively that the
toxic debris from the bombed facilities traveled directly towards
U.S. military personnel.
14,000 chemical agent alarms deployed with U.S. forces in the Gulf
sounded three times each per day, on average, during the air and
ground wars, according to sworn DoD testimony before the U.S.
Senate. [1]
Chemical agents were present in areas where hundreds of
thousands of U.S. soldiers were massing for the upcoming invasion
of Iraq and liberation of Kuwait. [2]
It is estimated there are now more than 80,000 veterans suffering
from Gulf War Syndrome, many still on active duty. Reports from
the U.K. indicate there are thousands of British veterans with the
syndrome.
According to an official document published in August 1997 by the
Department of Veterans' Affairs, 8,200 Persian Gulf War veterans
had died as of the end of March 1997. Link to the Department of
Veterans Affairs August 1997 Press Release "America's Wars"
In many cases, Gulf War Syndrome appears to be transmissible. In
addition to the 80,000+ veterans who are sick, there are thousands
of spouses, parents, and children who are also suffering from the
same debilitating illnesses -- and in the case of a disproportionate
number of newborns, birth defects and physical abnormalities. Link
to LIFE Magazine's Nov '95 Special Investigation "The Tiny
Victims of Desert Storm -- Has Our Country ABANDONED THEM?"
IV. BOTTOM LINE
The Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the Department of Veterans Affairs have been lying to the U.S.
Congress, Gulf War veterans, and the American people about
coalition forces' exposure to chemical and biological agents during
the war.
This criminal, reprehensible, shameful, dishonorable, and egregious
act on their part has caused incalculable pain and suffering, caused
many who risked their lives for our flag to die, inflicted severe
financial hardships, caused many veterans' children to be born
deformed and disabled, caused many veterans' children to become
diseased, destroyed marriages and families, and eroded the trust of
the American people in the institutions they once revered.
Gulf War veterans are truly the victims of patriotism. What they
have suffered is the great American tragedy.
Those who have perpetrated and perpetuated this lie must be held
fully accountable.
As summarized by former U.S. Senator Donald W. Riegle:
"Our afflicted veterans are sick and suffering, and many have died.
Others are now destitute, having spent tens of thousands of dollars,
depleting their life savings, in an unsuccessful search for an
explanation for their ailments. The veterans of the Gulf War have
asked us for nothing more than the assistance they have earned. Our
refusal to come to their immediate assistance can only lead others
to question the integrity of the nation they serve." [3]
"It is clear that the CIA as well as the Defense Department has been
complicit in a stonewall, if not a coverup." - The Washington Post,
April 11, 1997
V. CONCLUSIONS
Gulf War Syndrome is not about a small group of veterans who
simply have muscle cramps, joint pain, headaches, and sleep
disorders -- which have been cavalierly dismissed as psychological
or PTSD-related. It was not caused, in part, by the "very fine sand"
or "lack of recreation" or "alcohol deprivation" -- as Dr. Joshua
Lederberg, Chairman of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Gulf War Health has suggested.
Gulf War Syndrome is the direct health consequence of prolonged
(chronic) exposure to low (non-lethal) levels of chemical and
biological agents released by direct Iraqi attack via missiles,
rockets, artillery, or aircraft munitions; fallout from the destruction
of Iraqi ammunition bunkers [such as Kamasiyah (the CIA has
known about chemical munitions at this site since 1984)]; and by
fallout from allied bombings of Iraqi chemical warfare munitions
facilities during the 38-day air war.
Bunker at Kamasiyah
Link to the Chronological Record of 24 Iraqi Chemical Warfare
Agent Facilities Bombed by Coalition Forces, 17 Jan - 21 Feb 91
The effects of these exposures were exacerbated by the deleterious
and synergistic side-effects of the unproven, experimental, and
toxicity-enhancing pyridostigmine bromide (PB) pills (nerve agent
pre-treatment pills which were administered involuntarily), the
investigational botulinum toxoid vaccines (which were also
involuntary), anthrax vaccines, depleted uranium residues
principally from battlefield vehicles damaged by depleted uranium-
tipped armor-penetrating munitions, the pesticide DEET, and to a
much lesser extent, other environmental hazards such as oil fire
contamination, other pesticides (with the exception of DEET which
increased its toxicity significantly when used in combinaton with
PB), petrochemicals, and electromagnetic radiation from radars and
communications equipment.
The infinite number of combinations and permutations of the
effects of chronic exposure to low, non-lethal levels of
cumulatively-effecting chemical nerve agents, to blister agents,
biological agents and "cocktails," coupled with the effects of nerve
agent pills, botulinum and anthrax vaccines, depleted uranium
(DU) dusts, DEET, and other environmental contaminants, has
produced the infinite variations in symptomatologies in Gulf War
veterans. Therefore, the "mystery illness." There is, however, one
principal cause.
NOTES:
The chronic and delayed physiological effects of toxic chemical
warfare agents were well known and documented long before the
Gulf War.
VI. EVIDENCE
1. Before the Gulf War, Iraq had a highly developed chemical
warfare program with numerous production facilities, stockpiled
agents and weapons, binary capabilities (utilizing two harmless
ingredients that upon combining form a lethal substance), multiple
and varied delivery systems, and a documented history of chemical
warfare agent use. [4]
A month before the war began, then CIA Director William Woolsey
estimated that Iraq possessed 1,000 tons of poisonous chemical
agents, much of it capable of being loaded into two types of
missiles: the FROG (Free Rocket Over Ground) and the SCUD B
(SS-1). [5]
On July 30, 1991, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Director of the United
Nations Special Commission on Iraq (the organization charged
with overseeing the elimination of Iraq's chemical and nuclear
arsenals), told the Security Council that U.N. inspectors found
chemical warheads armed with nerve gas and that some warheads
were already fitted onto SCUD missiles. [6]
Between 17 January and 21 February 1991, coalition forces
bombed at least 24 Iraqi chemical weapons storage, research, and/or
production sites. 17 tons of sarin were destroyed at the Muthanna
State Establishment (Samarra) facility alone. [7]
Chemical warfare munitions and agents which either survived the
allied bombings or were inventoried and returned to the Muthanna
facility for destruction included:
13,000 155-mm artillery shells loaded with mustard gas (H),
6,200 rockets loaded with nerve agent,
800 nerve agent aerial bombs,
28 SCUD warheads loaded with nerve agent Sarin (GB),
75 tons of nerve agent Sarin (GB),
60-70 tons of nerve agent Tabun (GA), and
250 tons of mustard gas and 153,983 liters of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor. [8]
U.N. inspectors concluded the Muthanna plant was capable of
producing two tons of Sarin (GB) and five tons of mustard gas (H)
daily. [9]
Chemical rounds were deployed to the front with the Iraqi forces
and Iraqi commanders had limited or pre-designated authority to
use them. [10]
There is substantial evidence to suggest that in the use of chemical
weapons, the Iraqi military adhered to, at least in part, Soviet
military doctrine. Soviet military doctrine suggested that chemical
warfare should be conducted with mixed agents. Mixed agents,
often referred to as "cocktails" are intended to enhance the
capabilities of nerve agents and defeat the precautions taken by the
enemy. Cocktails can be made by combining a wide variety of
biotoxins [11], nerve agents, vesicants [12], and some biological
agents -- such as bacteria and fungi. [13]
Iraq may have also acquired any one of a number of the Soviet
binary "Novichok" series of ultra-lethal toxins that, even in
microdoses, can be debilitating. In addition to inducing myosis,
vomiting, memory loss, involuntary motions, and internal organ
dysfunction, these toxins can have mutagenic [14] effects and have
no known antidotes. [15]
2. Iraq also had an offensive biological weapons program with
multiple research and production facilities, evidence of
weaponization experimentation, and a history of reported use. [16]
According to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, the
Iraqi biological warfare program was initiated in mid-1986. [17]
U.N. inspectors specifically uncovered evidence the government of
Iraq was conducting research on pathogen [18] enhancement on
biological warfare-related materials to include:
clostridium botulinum (the cause of botulism), A bacterial source
of botulinum toxin, which causes vomiting, constipation, thirst,
general weakness, headache, fever, dizziness, double vision,
dilation of the pupils, and paralysis of the muscles involving
swallowing. It is often fatal. [19]
Iraq admitted to making and storing nearly 5,300 gallons of the
bacterium, theoretically enough to kill 15 billion people. Inhalation
of one microgram (or about as much as would fit on a pinhead) is
enough to cause death by paralysis within hours.
bacillus anthracis (the causative agent of anthrax), A disease-
producing bacteria identified by DoD as being a major component
in the Iraqi biological warfare program. Anthrax is an often-fatal
infectious disease due to ingestion of spores. It begins abruptly
with high fever, difficulty in breathing, and chest pain. The disease
eventually results in septicemia (blood poisoning), and the
mortality is high. Once septicemia is advanced, antibiotic therapy
may prove useless. [20]
Iraq said it made about 158 gallons of the anthrax bacteria in
concentrated form, an amount U.N. officials say is enough to be
packed inside 40 to 50 bombs that could each kill tens of
thousands of people. The organism multiplies within the body after
inhalation and kills within a day or so by halting breathing.
clostridium perfringens (the most common causative agent of gas gangrene),
clostridium tetani (the causative organism of tetanus or lockjaw),
brucella abortis [causes brucellosis or undulant fever (fever
marked by alternating periods of abatement and increase of
symptoms, pain and swelling in the joints, and weakness) and is
contracted by contact with infected domestic animals or
consumption of their products; also the cause of contagious
abortion in cattle and other domestic animals],
brucella melentensis [causes brucellosis or undulant fever (fever
marked by alternating periods of abatement and increase of
symptoms, pain and swelling in the joints, and weakness) and is
contracted in the same manner as brucella abortis], and
franciscella tularensis (causes tularemia; transmitted to man by
the bite of an infected tick or other bloodsucking insect, by direct
contact with infected animals, by eating inadequately cooked meat,
or by drinking water that contains the organism. Symptoms may
appear from 1 to 10 days after infection and include headache,
chilliness, vomiting, aching pains, fever, sweating, loss of weight,
and debility.) [21]
In addition, U.N. inspectors revealed that biological warfare-related
stimulant research was being conducted on:
bacillus subtilis (causes conjunctivitis),
bacillus megatillus, and
bacillus cereus (an opportunistic invader of immunocompromised [22] patients). [23]
This suggests that the Iraqi government may have been
experimenting with e.coli [24] and recombinant DNA (rDNA) [25]
to create genetically altered microorganisms (novel [26] biological
warfare agents). [27]
Novel biological warfare agents, created by altering DNA plasmids
[28] and vectors [29], are specifically intended to avoid detection.
Several shipments of biological materials that may have been used
to carry out such a program were licensed for export from the
United States to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission. In such a
program, common intestinal flora such as e.coli could be altered to
produce viral, bacterial, or other toxins, and would be difficult to
treat. If Iraq was successful in developing such agents, diagnosis
will continue to elude physicians testing for traditional illnesses.
[30]
3. We, the United States, provided the government of Iraq with so-
called "dual use" licensed materials to develop their chemical and
biological programs. [31] These materials included chemical
warfare agent production facility plans and technical drawings
(provided as pesticide production facility plans), chemical warhead
filling equipment, chemical warfare agent precursors, and
biological warfare-related materials.
4. U.S. chemical masks and chemical protection suits were
ineffective (MOPP gear -- Mission Oriented Protective Posture).
[32] It has been fully documented by the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense; the National Security and International
Affairs Division (NSIAD) of the General Accounting Office, U.S.
Congress; and by independent Senate investigation, that U.S.
soldiers were not adequately equipped to conduct chemical
operations during Desert Storm and are not adequately equipped
now.
5. U.S. chemical detection alarms were ineffective. [33] The
principal chemical agent detection alarm used during the war, the
M8A1, was not sufficiently sensitive to detect sustained low levels
of chemical agent and to monitor personnel for contamination.
U.S. Army Material Safety Data Sheets indicate that chronic
exposure to levels of over one-ten-thousandth of a milligram per
cubic meter (.0001 mg/m3) to nerve agent Sarin (GB) is hazardous
and requires the use of protective equipment. It takes 1000 times
this danger level to activate the M8A1 automatic chemical agent
detection alarm commonly used during the war.
In spite of this fact, 14,000 chemical alarms in theater were going
off 3 times each per day, on average, during the air and ground wars
according to sworn DoD testimony before the U.S. Senate. And,
despite the fact that M8A1 alarms do not detect blister agents such
as mustard gas, during the air war, alarms were sounding so
frequently, many were simply turned off. [34]
Note: Claims were never made by DoD against the manufacturers
of the "faulty" chemical alarms and our troops are still using the
same "faulty" equipment today.
6. U.S. anti-nerve agent pills were investigational, not approved by
the FDA (Food and Drug Administration), unethically
administered, tactically ineffective, and potentially very hazardous
to soldiers' health.
Pyridostigmine Bromide (PB) does not protect against warfare
nerve agents when taken alone; it only works in combination with
other drugs. Similiarly, pyridostigmine administered after exposure
to a warfare agent is not effective. [35] Two antidotes to nerve
agents, atropine and pyridine-2-aldoxime methochloride (2-PAM),
are enhanced if PB has already been given. Atropine and 2-PAM
were included in he nerve agent antidote kits (Mark 1) which were
given to U.S. troops.
The Pentagon believes that all 695,000 U.S. troops in the Persian
Gulf War were issued PB and officials estimate that approximately
two thirds took the drug for varying periods of time.
DoD scientists who studied pyridostigmine and nerve agent sarin
(GB) concluded that PB should only be used when the chemical
warfare threat is nerve agent soman (GD). [36] Defense intelligence
knew well before the war that Iraq did not manufacture, stockpile,
or use GD. Iraq did, however, manufacture and weaponize large
quantities of sarin (GB). Pyridostigmine pre-treatment
unfortunately makes individuals more vulnerable to other nerve
agents such as sarin and VX. [37]
Moreover, Dr. James Moss, a former scientist at the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, found that when used in combination
with PB, a common pesticide called DEET became 10 times more
toxic than when used alone. Dr. Moss was fired from the USDA
because of his research.
In August of 1990, DoD scientists requested approval for a study of
four men to evaluate the effects of pyridostigmine on vision. This
study was deemed urgent because of the situation in Kuwait, and it
was approved quickly. It is important to note that this study, to be
conducted just prior to the Gulf War, gave medical exmas to the
men before giving the pyridostigmine. The researchers indicated
that PB should not be given to individuals who had bronchial
asthma, peptic ulcer, liver, kidney, heart disease, or hypersensitivity
to PB or related drugs. They informed study volunteers that
possible adverse side effects included nausea, increased salivation,
increased bronchial secretions, and pupil constriction. Other side
effects are weakness, muscle cramps, and muscle twitches. Because
of these potential side effects, all four subjects were admitted to
Lyster Army Hospital as in-patients so they could be closely
monitored.
In sharp contrast to the extensive precautions taken before giving
PB every 8 hours for 3 days to four volunteers, a few months later,
the same dosage was given for longer periods of time to over
400,000 U.S. soldiers, none of whom had been screened for any of
the diseases mentioned in the informed consent form given to the
four men, none of whom were warned about the risks associated
with the drug, and none of whom were given a choice of whether or
not to take it. Additionally, approximately 28,000 of the over
400,000 receiving PB were women, who were forced to take an
investigational drug that had never been tested on healthy women.
[38]
7. The United States did not have any biological agent detection
capability whatsoever during the Gulf War. [39]
8. After the air war started on January 17, 1991:
Chemical detection units from the Czech Republic confirmed
chemical agents,
French detection units detected chemical agents,
Chemical specialists from the British Army detected chemical agents,
Both Czech and French forces reported detections immediately to
U.S. forces,
U.S. forces detected, confirmed, and reported chemical agents,
and
U.S. soldiers were awarded medals for detecting chemical agents.[40]
Iraqi fatalities incident to the bombing of a biological warfare agent
production facility near Baghdad were reported in the international
press. As revealed in the CIA/Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) translation of an article in the 10 Feb 91 Moscow
TASS:
Following a coalition forces' air raid on a bacteriological weapons
producing facility not far from the Iraqi capital, 50 guards of the
plant died of an unknown and rapidly progressing disease, the
Cairo-based newspaper AL-HAQIQA writes with reference to an
Egyptian who worked at a Baghdad hospital.
The physician, who fled Iraq across the Syrian border, told the
newspaper's correspondent that about 100 servicement from among
the guards of the plant were brought to the hospital immediately
after the air raid. A half of them died shortly after being
hospitalized despite medical personnel's effort. The sufferers
sustained injuries of the lungs, the circulatory and intestinal
systems.
According to the physician, attempts to disinfect the hospital were
unsuccessful and the infection was spreading in Baghdad.
He maintains that the incidence of disease in Basrah, Mosul, and
Tikrit, where air strikes were delivered on chemical and
bacteriological facilities, was assuming a massive character and that
there was a point to speak of an epidemic.
"Cairo Paper Reports Raid on Iraqi CW Plant, Deaths"
Chemical warfare agents were even discovered in Kuwait after the
war. In August 1991, British and American forces confirmed
mustard gas leaking from a metal storage tank abandoned by Iraqi
forces. Mustard was confirmed in 21 consecutive tests, 8 of the
tests using mass spectrometers in two separate FOX vehicles.
Soldiers were injured and evacuated immediately for chemical
agent exposure.
In considering the consequences of the placement of troops in areas
downwind (where non-lethal exposure to chemical warfare agents
might be expected), it must be remembered that chemical nerve
agents, such as Sarin (GB) and Soman (GD), have CUMULATIVE
effects. After a single exposure, daily exposure to concentrations of
a nerve agent insufficient to produce symptoms may result in the
onset of symptoms after several days. Continued daily exposure
may be followed by increasingly severe effects. [41]
9. During the November 10, 1993 unclassified briefing for
Members of the U.S. Senate, in response to direct questioning, then
Under Secretary of Defense, and now Director of Central
Intelligence, (Chemical Engineer and Physical Chemist) Dr. John
M. Deutch said that the Department of Defense was withholding
classified information on the exposure of U.S. forces to biological
materials during the Gulf War. [42]
10. For five years, the Department of Defense has continued to
publicly claim, however, "there were no confirmed detections of
any chemical or biological agents at any time during the entire
conflict." [43]
In a letter to all Persian Gulf War Veterans (dated May 25, 1994 --
the same day as the Senate hearing), General John M. Shalikashvili
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and William J. Perry
(Secretary of Defense) also directly contradicted what then Under
Secretary of Defense Dr. John M. Deutch told U.S. Senators on
November 10, 1993. Both affirm: "There is no information,
classified or unclassified, that indicates that chemical or biological
weapons were used in the Persian Gulf."
VII. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE COVER-UP
1. THE INCALCULABLE COST OF TREATMENT AND COMPENSATION. The cost of providing
compensation and appropriate medical care to all afflicted veterans and (because of the syndrome's apparent transmissibility, in many cases) to their families, would be prohibitive. It would be impossible to determine exactly where the government's liability ends.
2. TO PROTECT POWELL. Admission now would cause serious
embarrassment for ("the darling of the Republican and Democratic
parties") General (retired) Colin L. Powell. If the National
Command Authorities did, in fact, "order" General Powell to deny
the occurrence of the Iraqi attacks, why didn't he stand up for his
soldiers? He knew of their vulnerability. This could be a very
serious question of personal integrity and loyalty.
3. TO PROTECT SCHWARZKOPF. Admission now would cause serious embarrassment for war "hero" General (retired) H. Norman Schwarzkopf, West Point, Class of 1956. "Duty, Honor, Country" is the Military Academy's motto.
4. TO PROTECT BUSH. Admission now would cause
embarrassment for the Bush Presidency. At the time of the attacks,
the decision to deny the occurrence of (and in effect cover up) Iraqi
use of chemical and biological weapons, would have to be made by
the National Command Authorities (The President and the
Secretary of Defense, Richard B. Cheney).
5. TO PREVENT ESCALATION OF THE WAR. In his letter to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq on January 5, 1991, President Bush wrote:
"...the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or
biological weapons. You will be held directly responsible for
terrorist actions against any member of the coalition. The American
people would demand the strongest possible response. You and
your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable
acts of this sort."
Official acknowledgment of Iraqi use of chemical and biological
agents during the campaign would have ignited public outrage and
"forced" the United States to follow through. The National
Command Authorities obviously decided not to put us in the
situation where we had to do what was threatened. In other words:
No need to follow through on a threat if the attack is unacknowledged.
Official acknowledgment could also have seriously threatened the
Middle East peace process. At 5 am, January 18, 1991, Iraq
attacked Israel with nerve gas. Israeli police confirmed the nerve
agent, at least three Israeli citizens were killed in the attack, and
Marine Corps General R. I. Neal authenticated this fact in a
military log which is now a public document. Official
announcement in the Israeli media of the fact that Iraq attacked
Israel with nerve gas during the Gulf War would have escalated the
war. It is believed by many that the billions of dollars the U.S. paid
to Israel immediately after the war was the "deal" struck to keep
them from retaliating and to cover up the attack.
6. TO PROTECT CLINTON. The GWS cover-up started during a Republican Administration (Bush) and is being continued under a Democratic Administration (Clinton). Therefore, both major political parties stand to lose if the truth is revealed. In this case, with the truth there are no winners. And the biggest losers, of course, are the veterans and their families.
The reason why Clinton will not expose Bush is because it was Bush who paved the way for Clinton to seek the Presidency.
When Bill Clinton was Governor of Arkansas, then Vice-President
Bush (who had been CIA Director) was looking for a clandestine
location to train Nicaraguan "freedom fighters" (pilots) for the
illegal shipment of weapons to the Nicaraguan Contras. Between 8
July 1984 and 25 August 1985, 34 pilots were secretly trained by
elements of the CIA at an airstrip in Nella, Arkansas (a 109-acre
property near the town of Mena) which was used as a practice drop
zone and training base. (Operation "Jade Bridge")
The Nicaraguans desperately needed skilled flight crews to
resupply ground troops engaged in a highly mobile guerilla war
where resupply could only be accomplished with air drops. This
"Contra Air Force" was also needed to reduce the CIA's exposure in
case one of the supply planes was shot down.
Nella, Arkansas was selected as the ideal training base because the
area was rural, under-populated, and had terrain similar to
Nicaragua's. The practice drop zone also had to be remote enough
to prevent unwanted FAA investigations. The CIA also needed a
state with the right political environment and political power base
that would view the Agency as a "welcomed industry" and a way to
enrich itself. Clinton and Arkansas were perfect.
All consumables (such as food) for the clandestine operation were
government issue and supplied from the U.S. Army's Fort Chaffee.
The Inter-Mountain Regional Airport in Mena (and specifically
Rich Mountain Aviation) was the base/hub for this operation, with
planes flying arms to the Contras in Nicaragua (Operation "Centuar
Rose") and returning from Central America with large sums of
money and drugs, which were then distributed throughout the
United States. (Funds were needed, in part, to compensate
Governor Clinton and his administration for facilities and services.)
Operations "Jade Bridge" (flight training and aerial delivery
techniques) and "Centuar Rose" (the transport of arms and
munitions from Arkansas to staging areas in Central America) were
conceived and implemented in direct and flagrant violation of the
U.S. Congress.
Governor Clinton's "deal" for his administration's complicity was
10% of the hundreds of millions of dollars in profits from arms and
drug sales, which Dan R. Lasatar laundered either through banks,
the Arkansas state retirement system, or the Arkansas Development
Finance Authority (ADFA), a state development agency that
Governor Clinton organized in 1985. Lasatar & Co. was handling
more than $300 million annually in preferred state bond activity.
The state was using the Rose Law Firm (in which Hillary Rodham
Clinton was a senior partner) as its bond counsel for much of its
activity.
7. MILITARY NECESSITY AT THE TIME. Official acknowledgment of Iraqi use of chemical and biological agents during the campaign would have created panic among coalition forces (the basic purpose and precisely the desired effect of
chemical warfare). We chose not to acknowledge.
8. TO NOT REVEAL A MAJOR READINESS VULNERABILITY.
Exposing the fact that our chemical suits and chemical detection
alarms are ineffective would reveal a critical military readiness
problem. DoD did not want Iraq (then) and does not want any
potential adversaries now (such as North Korea which is also both
chemically and biologically capable) to know just how gravely
vulnerable we are. Notwithstanding this very perilous risk, U.S.
troops were deployed to the Gulf.
9. TO NOT ERODE SOLDIERS' TRUST. Admission would
seriously erode soldiers' trust in their leadership. If soldiers learn
that their leaders will deliberately send them into battle with
worthless protection against chemical and biological warfare and
then turn their backs on them as soon as the fight's over, there will
be no one willing to fight -- especially when they know that
whatever biological agents they're exposed to will, because of their
communicability, injure their loved ones as well, once home.
10. TO AVOID SERIOUS POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT.
There is increasing concern that before the Gulf War, the U.S.
secretly provided Iraq with chemical weapons AND the technology
and materials to manufacture their own -- to use against Iran. A
Marine Corps EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) specialist
discovered and photographed chemical munitions with U.S.
markings and lot numbers in an Iraqi bunker. (Note: Five United
Nations reports have confirmed the use of chemical warfare agents
in the Iran-Iraq War.)
There is also concern that we, the United States, the principal
signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), had
chemical weapons in the Gulf and used them.
In his January 28, 1991 interview with Saddam Hussein, CNN's
Peter Arnett asked specifically about chemical weapons. (Note that
many attacks and confirmed detections made by Czech, French,
British, and U.S. forces occurred before this interview. The air war
started on January 16, 1991.)
This is the text verbatim from the CIA translation:
[Arnett] Will you use chemical weapons in a land war in Kuwait?
[Saddam] We will use weapons that match those used by our enemy
against us. I believe that you have had experience with us now. I
believe that you have now found out that we have done everything
we have said.
[Arnett] The multinational forces said they will not use chemical
weapons against you. Does that mean if they do not use them, you
do not use them?
[Saddam] I said: We will use the weapons that are equivalent to the
weapons used against us.
11. TO AVOID CONDEMNATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. DoD's failure to permit soldiers to refuse the unapproved, experimental, and investigational pyridostigmine bromide (PB) anti-nerve agent pills and the botulinum toxoid vaccine during Desert Shield/Desert Storm is a criminal violation of the
Nuremberg Code. Did not any of the Hippocratically-sworn military physicians administering the unapproved vaccine, for example, find it unethical? "Following orders" is no excuse for unethical conduct, even in combat. And how can the United States be the self-proclaimed global champion of human rights if it is so willing to conduct "research" on competent adults without their informed consent?
VIII. SELECTED TESTIMONIES OF GULF WAR VETERANS
BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
NOTE: These testimonies were given in 1993, 4 years ago.
Excerpts from the testimony of Sterling Syms, Petty Officer First
Class, U.S. Naval Reserve, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) Subcommittee on Force Requirements and
Personnel, 30 June 1993: (At the time of the attack, Petty Officer
First Class Syms was assigned to Naval Reserve Mobile
Construction Battalion 24 at Camp 13 in Al Jubayl.)
Around 2 or 3 in the morning there was a real bad explosion
overhead. The alarm went off. Everybody started hitting their
bunkers. There was a high odor of ammonia in the air that burned
your eyes. Whatever it was, it burnt and stung your skin bad. The
skin even burned after we got into our chemical clothing. We went
to full chemical gear, and were in that situation for about 2 hours
before it was passed down that there was an "all clear". But we
were told it was a sonic boom. To my knowledge, you do not get a
fireball from a sonic boom. We knew that there was something
wrong. We were told that it was a fireball. We have had men that
were ordered to shut up talking about it.
Excerpts from the testimony of Nick Roberts, U.S. Navy Reserve,
before a special hearing of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee,
9 November 1993: (At the time of the attack, Nick Roberts was
assigned to Naval Reserve Mobile Construction Battalion 24 at
Camp 13 in Al Jubayl.)
I was in perfect health until the night when we were hit. After
coming out of the bunker I was exposed to something. My skin
began to burn and sting, my lips were numb, there was a very
strange taste in my mouth, my nose run uncontrollably, and my eyes
watered quite a bit. Chemical detectors were sounding, radio
transmissions were coming in - "confirmed gas attack - go to
MOPP level 4" (the highest level of chemical protection). Marines
stationed around us were also sounding their warning signals and
screaming "Confirmed gas attack! Go to full chemical gear!"
As I was feeling my own symptoms, I saw my buddies and realized
that they were experiencing the same thing that I was, some even
worse. After a long day of questions and wondering what had
happened we were informed that we had simply experienced a sonic
boom. To my knowledge, sonic booms don't cause flashes and
cause reactions to skin and eyes. When I spoke with the
decontamination leader from our camp later on, he advised me that
his test kit detected mustard gas and lewisite.
NOTE: Lewisite vapors cause stinging and burning and irritation to
the eyes and upper respiratory tract. Its smell could be confused
with ammonia. The injurious effect of mustard gas is associated
with its ability to inhibit many enzyme systems of the body. This,
in turn, prevents the intra-cell exchange of chemicals and leads to
necrosis (death) of the tissue. Death is associated mainly with
necrosis of the tissue of the central nervous system. Mustard gas
has a period of latent effect (the first signs of injury appear after 2-
12 hours.)
Excerpts from the certified statement of Chief Warrant Officer 3 J.
P. Cottrell, U.S. Marine Corps, September 1993: Chief Cottrell
was Officer-in-Charge of one of the German-made FOX Nuclear-
Biological-Chemical (NBC) detection vehicles deployed in the
Gulf. The FOX accurately detects 60 known chemical agents
simultaneously using a highly sophisticated, laboratory-quality
mass spectrometer.
It is known to me that during the ground offensive of Operation
Desert Storm, chemical agent vapors were found by Task Force
Ripper (of the 1st Marine Corps Division) in the vicinity of N28
32', E47 52'. We detected blister agent at levels below
IMMEDIATE threat to personnel.
On the evening of the first day of the ground attack, we detected
Lewisite blister vapors in the vicinity of N28 50' E47 50'. I reported
the findings to Division Headquarters and requested directions in
regards to the chemical agent print-out. I was told to forward the
tape up the chain of command. (Tapes are the paper records of the
exact chemical breakdown of the liquid by the mass spectrometer.)
A report came back that our equipment was only activated by oil
smoke. Our computer, however, had separated the petroleum
compound from the chemical agent. The computer tape has
(conveniently) been lost.
Around the bunker complex in the vicinity of N29 14' E47 54' we
detected chemical vapors and reported it to higher headquarters.
Task Force Ripper was then ordered back to the division support
area and no further detection operations were carried out.
Excerpts from the statement of Sergeant Robert S. Maison, U.S.
Marine Corps, 22 September 1993:
On the second night of the ground war, while I was attached to
Task Force Ripper as a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Reconnaissance Team member, our team observed an artillery
attack to our northwest, at a distance of approximately four
kilometers. About five to six minutes later an alarm was sounded by
our detection equipment (a mass spectrometer) which is used
specifically for that purpose. Taking into account the wind speeds
that we were encountering (approximately 40 to 50 knots steady),
the reading would not be expected to last a long duration, as it did
not (approximately three minutes). The specific agent detected was
Lewisite in a concentration considered to produce casualties but
not death.
Excerpts from the testimony of Willie Hicks, Staff Sergeant E-6,
U.S. Army, before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)
Subcommittee on Force Requirements and Personnel, 30 June
1993: At the time of the attack, SSG Hicks was serving as the Non-
Commissioned Officer in Charge of ammunition movement, 644th
Ordnance Company.
It was around 2:30 in the morning. The chemical alarms went off.
As we were running to the bunker we started burning. Our faces
were burning. Some guy just dropped. And we went inside the
bunkers. About 10 minutes later the first sergeant came around and
told us to go to the highest level (of chemical protection) you can
go to. We stayed at that level for 24 hours.
About 2 or 3 days later a couple of guys started getting sick. I got
sick myself. I had discharge with my urine with blood in it. Some
guys had a problem with their rectums. The Commanding Officer
put out an order that nobody would discuss it. We were discussing
it anyway because I was in charge of ammunition movements and
the guys there, they knew it had to be chemical.
85 of the 110 guys who came back with the unit were sick. We also
had one guy that died by the name of Staff Sergeant Bell. And in
his case he was in good physical shape. He did not smoke or drink.
He came home one day feeling good, walked up the street, and
came back, and dropped dead.
We have a sergeant, Staff Sergeant Neal that is now nothing more
than a vegetable. I carry notebooks all the time now because my
memory is gone. I used to teach school. I had to quit my job
because I kept passing out or getting lost going to work.
Weight loss: I went from 170 down to 126 last month. I'm now up
to 150.
I have no income. I lost my car. I was getting desperate for funds to
support my family with. The VA tried to charge me $169 a day for
being in the hospital. I went up and questioned it. I said this is
service-connected. The lady said you have not proven it to be
service-connected, therefore, we are charging you $169 a day. I
said, I have no income. She said, it makes no difference.
I am also a veteran from the Vietnam War. I think this is Vietnam
all over again because I know how I was treated when I came back
from there. I have been completely forgotten. And I am sick and
unable to work because I served my country.
Excerpts from the testimony of Mrs. Hester Adcock, before a
special hearing of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee, 9
November 1993. Mrs. Adcock's son, Army Specialist Michael
Adcock, died at the age of 22 of multiple cancers. He was stationed
at Al-Jubayl on 20 January 1991, when his unit was chemically
attacked.
I am the mother of Army Specialist Michael C. Adcock, 22 year old
Gulf War veteran. Michael served in Desert Storm from January 18,
1991 till May 19, 1991. Exactly eleven months after returning from
the Gulf, Michael died of multiple cancers.
Prior to the Gulf War, Michael was physically fit, very healthy, a
four-year letterman in high school football, broke a weightlifting
record, worked out daily, and while serving in Germany, was a
boxer and a wrestler. Michael became ill as early as January 21,
1991 after being near Al-Jubayl on the night of January 20, 1991,
where three attacks occurred and chemical alarms sounded.
Michael reported to the Battalion Evacuation hospital on January
25, 1991 only to be told he probably had hemorrhoids. He was
given motrin. My son was never referred to a surgeon. He had
repeated rectal bleeding, rash, severe headaches, raspy voice, and
pain in his joints.
Upon return to the States, he, along with many in his unit, was
given a very limited physical examination with no chest x-rays, no
blood work, and sent on his way. He was told "if you need further
medical attention, go to your local VA hospital". Had Michael been
given proper diagnostic testing in the Gulf, my son would possibly
be alive today.
My son was a very patriotic young man. He loved his country,
family, and God. I ask you today: How much did my country
appreciate my son. He felt it his patriotic duty to serve in the
military. He wore his Army uniform proudly. He was a brave and
courageous soldier. My son died a senseless and very painful death.
When will I ever get an answer? My jewel is gone forever.
Michael's death bed wish was for me to fight for him and fight for
all of his comrades. After this request, a few short hours later,
Michael slipped into a coma. He died seven days later.
Our own military and government failed my son and are failing his
comrades.
ENDNOTES
1 U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Dual-Use Exports to
Iraq and Their Impact on the Health of the Persian Gulf War
Veterans, S. Hrg. 103-900, 25 May 1994, and
Tuite, James J. III, Report of the Fallout from the Destruction of
Iraqi Chemical Warfare Agent Research, Production, and Storage
Facilities into Areas Occupied by U.S. Military Personnel during
the 1991 Persian Gulf War, September 19, 1996, p. 23.
2 Tuite, p. 2, 25.
3 United States Senate, U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-
Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the
Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, A Report of
Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M.
D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs with Respect to Export Administration (James J. Tuite, III,
Professional Staff and Special Assistant to the Chairman for
National Security Issues and Dual-Use Export Policies), 25 May
1994, p. 10.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 17.
6 Ibid.
7 Tuite, pp. 3-4.
8 Senate, p. 22.
9 Ibid.
10 Tuite, p. 5.
11 A poisonous substance (toxin) produced by or found in a living
organism.
12 An agent that induces blistering.
13 Senate, pp. 23-24.
14 Mutation: A relatively permanent change in hereditary material
involving either a physical change in chromosome relations or a
biochemical change in the codons that make up genes.
15 Senate, p. 32.
16 Ibid., pp. 10, 23.
17 Ibid., p. 33.
18 A specific causative agent (as a bacterium or virus) of disease.
19 Senate, p. 37.
20 Ibid.
21 Senate, p. 48.
22 The condition of not having a normal immune system. This may
be due to a genetic or disease process or to drugs administered for
the purpose of inhibiting or inactivating the immune system.
23 Senate, p. 48.
24 Escherichia coli.
25 DNA prepared in the laboratory by breaking up and splicing
together DNA from several different species of organisms.
26 New and not resembling something formerly known or used.
27 Senate, p. 48.
28 An extrachromosomal ring of DNA that replicates autonomously
in bacteria.
29 An organism that transmits a pathogen.
30 Senate, p. 35.
31 Ibid., p. 11.
32 General Accounting Office, U.S. Congress, GAO/NSIAD-91-
197, Chemical Warfare: Soldiers Inadequately Equipped and
Trained to Conduct Chemical Operations, May 1991. Also,
GAO/NSIAD-96-103, Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis
Remains Insufficient to resolve Continuing Problems, March 1996.
33 Senate, p. 5.
34 Senate, pp. 5, 27-28 and Tuite, p. 23.
35 Sidell, F.R., Clinical Considerations in Nerve Agent
Intoxication, In: Chemical Warfare Agents, Academic Press, Inc.,
1992, pp. 155-194.
36 Ibid.
37 Koplovitz, I., Harris, L.W., Anderson D.R., Lennox, W.J., and
Stewart, J.R., Reduction by Pyridostigmine Pre-Treatment of the
Efficacy of Atropine and 2-PAM Treatment of Sarin and VX
Poisoning in Rodents, Fundamental and Applied Toxicology, 18:
102-106, 1992.
38 Extract from Preliminary Staff Findings from Drs. Diana
Zuckerman and Patricia Olson to U.S. Senator John D. Rockefeller
IV, " Is Military Research Hazardous to Veterans' Health? --
Lessons from the Persian Gulf", May 6, 1994.
39 Senate, p. 13.
40 Ibid., pp. 12, 88-96.
41 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
42 Ibid., p. 6.
43 U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Dual-Use Exports to
Iraq and Their Impact on the Health of the Persian Gulf War
Veterans, S. Hrg. 103-900, 25 May 1994, p. 92.
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