The Cuban Missile Crisis

by dopeman421

The Cuban missile crisis has been called the “paradigm of successful crisis management” in case studies prior to its occurrence [Chang/Kornbluh]. It is recognized as a pivotal point in the history of United States – Soviet relations, thirteen days in which the world “stared down the gun barrel of nuclear war”, in the words of Kennedy speech writer Theodore Sorenson [Chang/Kornbluh]. In the modern understanding of the events that occurred, with documents from both sides of the issue long declassified, it is clear that the Cuban missile crisis is much more than just thirteen days in October of 1962. Its causes date back to the US’s actions during and after the Batista regime in Cuba [Sierra] and the beginnings of the US’s aggressively anti-communist policy.

For the purposes of brevity and specificity, this paper leaves the history of US/Cuban/Soviet relations as given. Instead, this paper is an attempt to identify and analyze the actions taken by the involved states and perhaps elucidate their rationale. The analysis performed centers around the criteria of reason and power. Reason is necessary for any international action, as the implications of a world event are too widespread and affect too many lives to have a state act without it. Power, defined as a state’s ability to influence the actions of another state against its will, is important, especially in “realist” theory, because it is an official obsession for nearly all foreign policy.

A conservative estimate for the beginning of the crisis is 1957, when the US placed Jupiter missiles and the equipment to fire them in Turkey and Italy, with Russian soil well within firing range. The reasoning for this action was defensive, to deter invasion from the Soviet bloc, but the situation was very much analogous to the Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba. Undeniably, these missiles tipped the scales of power away from the USSR, in that they were constantly at gunpoint. It may be noted as surprising, then, that it took the Soviets five years to seek similarly threatening positions in the Americas. They got their chance starting in 1960, as Cuban/US relations were continuously souring. The new leader of this state, Fidel Castro, seemingly held a grudge against the US due to its support of the unconstitutional Batista regime that his replaced as well as its continued economic actions against his own regime, such as its refusals to buy Cuban sugar and refine Russian oil [Sierra]. Castro’s philosophy became increasingly socialist as he nationalized land ownership and oil refineries to maintain his assets away from American ownership. Cuba’s ties with the Soviet Union were solidified, despite the fact that they were not officially a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Meanwhile, the US did actively move to oust Castro from power and set up a more friendly, less communist regime. The CIA orchestrated a well known invasion at the Bay of Pigs using Cuban refugees, many of which had served under Batista, to mask their involvement, but it ended up a fiasco and an international embarrassment to President Kennedy. Cuba was not yet a threat to US population or power interests, but plans to invade remained on the horizon, as the island was seen as a foothold of communism in the Americas. It was seen by policy makers in Washington through post-Munich Agreement glasses: if one state was allowed to remain communist, others would soon follow. Castro recognized the threat of invasion as very real, and knew that he could not hold off serious military action for long.

While it is unknown where the initiative came from, the idea of Soviet missiles in Cuba sprang up. Indeed, between the 9th and 24th of August, 1962, cargo ships containing Soviet surface to air missile equipment, engineers to set it all up, and military personnel to train the Cubans on their use frequented the island (Abel, 17). In the beginning, American analysts and officials believed the development to be purely defensive. McGeorge Bundy, the Presidential assistant for national security affairs, stated on an ABC interview on October 14 (the first of the famed “thirteen days”) that the new developments were not a “mortal threat” to America, citing past military support such as the MIGs currently stationed there, unused [Abel, 13]. Over the course of the Russian installations, Soviet Premier N. S. Krushchev denied offensive intent, saying that the Cubans had the right to defend themselves [Abel, 19-20].

One of the first voices of dissent from passivism was intelligence chief McCone. His reasoning was that SAMs alone could not protect Cuba from an American invasion, and that Krushchev knew this. He postulated, therefore, that they must be protecting something else, perhaps offensive missiles [Abel, 18]. U2 spy flights over Cuba on October 14, 1962 returned film that, analyzed the next day, did indeed reveal further construction in several locations, with patterns suggestive of medium range ballistic missile launchers. It certainly would make sense for the Russians to take this action, no matter what their intent. Nuclear warheads in Cuba would solidify the state’s security; as long as they were operational, the US would not dare invade. Furthermore, having the US at gunpoint for a change would serve to even the playing field for their international relations.

Over the next several days, a select group of US officials was put together by President Kennedy to deliberate on how to rectify the situation. Initial ideas included immediately confronting Castro or Krushchev with their new information and demanding that the missiles be removed. The consensus among the group, however, was that both were deceivers and passive diplomatic action would be fruitless. Military alternatives were the bombing of the missile sites, the blockade of Soviet ships en route to Cuba that contained missiles, and a full-scale invasion of Cuba. Eventually, it was decided that bombing the missile sites would be unreliable, and, as the sites were manned by Soviet personnel, Krushchev might react impulsively [Abel, 53]. An invasion would most likely take enough time for the Cubans to retaliate with their newfound missiles, and this option was discounted. Indeed, in with the decision to provide these weapons to the Cubans, in a letter dated September 8, 1962, was the authorization to use them without further permission from the Kremlin in the event of an amphibious assault [Chang/Kornbluh]. By October 22, the blockade or “quarantine” was fully planned. The French and British governments were notified of this course of action and supported it. The crisis was brought to the public eye. The option taken seems to be the most logical for the US of the military choices, as it is not necessarily violent, but would provide the opportunity to impose further restrictions on passing Soviet ships for additional leverage. It would be justified in part by the Monroe Doctrine, which calls for the United States to protect the Americas from foreign influence. Kruschev’s initial reaction to the blockade was to order ships en route to Cuba to continue and ignore the American ships. The US Navy had orders to first hail an incoming vessel; then, if it did not respond, a warning shot was to be fired; if the ship still did not stop, as they wouldn’t under Krushchev’s order, a shot to immobilize but not sink the ship was to be fired. Later, as the ships actually approached the quarantine line on October 24, the decision was reversed, a realistic move by Krushchev. Krushchev also responded to the President’s statement of action by reaffirming that the weapons sent to Cuba are simply defensive and deterrent, and called for negotiations, but warned that if any Soviet ships are attacked, they will respond in turn [Chang/Kornbluh]. At this point in the crisis, it must be noted that national egos begin to interfere with the universal desire for peace. The idea of trading Jupiter missiles in Europe for those in Cuba had been brought up several times during the discussion of solutions to the crisis in Washington, but the executive committee instead opted to ask for an unconditional surrender of the missile bases. While, if that had occurred, the outcome would have been optimal for the United States, it is highly unrealistic to believe that one superpower would bend to the will of the other so compliantly. Directly after the blockade was signed and imposed, Kennedy did toy with the idea of having a summit with Krushchev, but dismissed it “until Kruschev ‘first accepted… US determination in this matter.’” [Chang/Kornbluh]. On October 25, the day after the blockade was imposed, several third parties made suggestions for peaceful resolutions to the crisis, including a simple one by the United Nations’ Acting Secretary General, suggesting that both nations “refrain from any actions which may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war” [Chang/Kornbluh]. Krushchev responded to this by denouncing the American blockade as “pirate action”, but also proposed a summit between leaders. Kennedy made no such statements. US low altitude recon flights over Cuba were increased at that point to give the impression that the missile sites may be bombed, adding pressure [Abel, 173]. At this point, the United States’ actions lose their justification; there was absolutely no reason to provoke the opposing states, which were ready to talk things out. The missiles in Cuba reportedly could have been ready to fire within hours of this decision, but there was no evidence to suggest that they would have. Decision makers in Washington imposed an enemy image on the USSR, assuming that they had some devious intent or ulterior motive. Some believed that they would use the missiles to blackmail their way to a favorable situation in Berlin, or that they simply wanted to harm Americans. These assumptions neglect the fact that the Russians, too, were rational actors whose actions, however adverse to America, had motives. Otherwise, October 26, 1962 was a day of secret and indirect negotiations. The head of KGB intelligence operations in the US, Alexander Fomin, proposed a deal to the state department in which the missiles would be dismantled by UN inspectors, Fidel would pledge not to receive offensive weapons in the future, and the US would pledge not to invade Cuba. The state department replied that it was interested. Krushchev himself also sent a secret message to Washington expressing his willingness to negotiate immediately, to very much the same end as Fomin had suggested. However, the very next morning, Krushchev sent another message, this time in public, modifying the terms of a peaceful resolution to include the dismantling of the Jupiter missile base in Turkey [Abel, 175-187]. To be entirely objective, the bases were analogous in political function (protection of a foreign ally from invasion), so the trade would be fair. The US’s pledge not to attack Cuba would be met with much disappointment in Washington, in that the US would have to use diplomacy to achieve their goals there. Objectively speaking, however, a victory for pacifism is a victory for all. At this time, the Russian surface-to-air missiles became operational, and one of the low altitude spy flights over Cuba was shot down, apparently not under Soviet orders [Chang/Kornbluh]. Cuba, being a state, had sovereignty in its skies, and was thus justified in protecting its own security. Any serious retaliatory action by the US would have been quite unjustified; when a state deliberately sends a plane through hostile airspace, it must clearly expect that risks are involved. At that point, sending spy planes at such a high rate that could be mistaken for bombers was simple provocation and a reckless act. The United States issued a statement to the USSR on that, “the longest, blackest day of the missiles crisis” [Abel, 192], October 27, 1962, that they were ready to negotiate and agree to Krushchev’s original terms involving only Cuba as soon as the construction of the missile bases, which could have been operational at any time that day, was halted. Finally, on Sunday, October 28, 1962, just when all 24 missile bases in Cuba had become operational, Krushchev ordered that they be dismantled. An enraged Fidel Castro proceeded to declare his state’s independence and demand that the blockade be removed and all aggressive actions by refugees of the Batista regime under US supervision cease. Castro, however, had lost his bargaining power with his missiles [Abel, 201-208]. Analysis of the Cuban missile crisis reveals several problematic trends in American foreign policy, many of which continue today. The United States obviously has no regard for the sovereignty of other governments that it deems unfit for whatever reason, and it expects them to bend to its will without retaliation. In this case, the subject state was Cuba. This hard-headed and egotistical approach to foreign policy is necessarily offensive and guaranteed to start conflicts. Furthermore, American politicians tend to demonize groups with a disagreement, be it ideological or political in nature. This imposes an enemy image on the second party, assuming it not to be a rational actor but a purely malevolent element, whose only goal is to undermine and destroy the United States. This leads to unnecessarily hostile reactions and policy. Communists were treated in this light; the US assumed that the development of Soviet missiles in Cuba was for offensive or blackmail purposes. In reality, documents from the USSR declassified forty years later make no mention of plans for attack nor the intent for the missiles to influence their situation in Berlin or Eastern Europe. Realizing the detriment these policies cause (i.e. learning from our mistakes) could help to prevent further misunderstanding and hostility toward the US in the future.

Works Cited Abel, Elie. The Missile Crisis. JB Lippincott: Philadelphia & New York, 1966.

Chang, Laurence/Kornbluh, Peter. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A Political Perspective After 40 Years. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/, 3/17/2003.

Sierra, Jerry A. History of Cuba. http://www.historyofcuba.com/cuba.htm, 3/17/2003.