The Iraq Study Group Report
by James A. Baker III, Lee H. Hamilton, et al
James A. Baker, III, and
Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger,
Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III,
Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta,
William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb,
Alan K. Simpson
Letter from the Co-Chairs
There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However,
there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation
and protect American interests.
Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation
in Iraq but with the state of our political debate regarding
Iraq. Our political leaders must build a bipartisan approach to
bring a responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and
costly war. Our country deserves a debate that prizes substance
over rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and sustainable.
The President and Congress must work together. Our
leaders must be candid and forthright with the American people
in order to win their support.
No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at
this point will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a
slide toward chaos. If current trends continue, the potential
consequences are severe. Because of the role and responsibility
of the United States in Iraq, and the commitments our government
has made, the United States has special obligations.
Our country must address as best it can Iraq's many problems.
The United States has long-term relationships and interests at
stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged.
In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq
Study Group present a new approach because we believe there
is a better way forward. All options have not been exhausted.
We believe it is still possible to pursue different policies that
can give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism,
stabilize a critical region of the world, and protect America's
credibility, interests, and values. Our report makes it clear
that the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people also must act to
achieve a stable and hopeful future.
What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous
amount of political will and cooperation by the executive
and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It
demands skillful implementation. It demands unity of effort by
government agencies. And its success depends on the unity of
the American people in a time of political polarization. Americans
can and must enjoy the right of robust debate within a
democracy. Yet U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure--as is
any course of action in Iraq--if it is not supported by a broad,
sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our
country toward such a consensus.
We want to thank all those we have interviewed and those who
have contributed information and assisted the Study Group,
both inside and outside the U.S. government, in Iraq, and
around the world. We thank the members of the expert working
groups, and staff from the sponsoring organizations. We especially
thank our colleagues on the Study Group, who have
worked with us on these difficult issues in a spirit of generosity
and bipartisanship.
In presenting our report to the President, Congress, and
the American people, we dedicate it to the men and women--
military and civilian--who have served and are serving in Iraq,
and to their families back home. They have demonstrated extraordinary
courage and made difficult sacrifices. Every American
is indebted to them.
We also honor the many Iraqis who have sacrificed on behalf
of their country, and the members of the Coalition Forces
who have stood with us and with the people of Iraq.
James A. Baker, III Lee H. Hamilton
Executive Summary
The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no
path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved.
In this report, we make a number of recommendations
for actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region.
Our most important recommendations call for new and
enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region,
and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq
that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat
forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations
are equally important and reinforce one another.
If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government
moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an
opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow,
stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and
America's credibility, interests, and values will be protected.
The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing
in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite
militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality.
Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability.
The Iraqi people have a democratically elected government, yet
it is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing
basic security, or delivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive.
If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences
could be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse
of Iraq's government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring
countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could
spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand
its base of operations. The global standing of the United States
could be diminished. Americans could become more polarized.
During the past nine months we have considered a full
range of approaches for moving forward. All have flaws. Our
recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly believe
that it includes the best strategies and tactics to positively influence
the outcome in Iraq and the region.
External Approach
The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly affect its
stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in
the long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are not
doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting
stability.
The United States should immediately launch a new
diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability
in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic effort should include
every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic
Iraq, including all of Iraq's neighbors. Iraq's neighbors and key
states in and outside the region should form a support group to
reinforce security and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither
of which Iraq can achieve on its own.
Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events
within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the
United States should try to engage them constructively. In
seeking to influence the behavior of both countries, the United
States has disincentives and incentives available. Iran should
stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq's sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi
Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. The issue of
Iran's nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the
five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with
Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in
and out of Iraq.
The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle
East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and
regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained
commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-
Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's
June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and
Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by,
and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept
Israel's right to exist), and Syria.
As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq
and the Middle East, the United States should provide additional
political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan,
including resources that might become available as combat
forces are moved out of Iraq.
Internal Approach
The most important questions about Iraq's future are now the
responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role
in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their
own destiny.
The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility
for Iraqi security by increasing the number and
quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way,
and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase
the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat
troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As
these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move
out of Iraq.
The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve
to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary
responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter
of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security
situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for
force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat
forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with
Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams,
and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and
search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue.
A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations
forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in
Iraq.
It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance
from the United States for some time to come, especially in
carrying out security responsibilities. Yet the United States
must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United
States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments,
even if the Iraqi government did not implement their
planned changes. The United States must not make an openended
commitment to keep large numbers of American troops
deployed in Iraq.
As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize
training and education of forces that have returned to
the United States in order to restore the force to full combat
capability. As equipment returns to the United States, Congress
should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment
over the next five years.
The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders
to support the achievement of specific objectives--or milestones--
on national reconciliation, security, and governance.
Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the
right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government
needs to show its own citizens--and the citizens of the United
States and other countries--that it deserves continued support.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the
United States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for
Iraq. His list is a good start, but it must be expanded to include
milestones that can strengthen the government and benefit the
Iraqi people. President Bush and his national security team
should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi
leadership to convey a clear message: there must be prompt action
by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward
the achievement of these milestones.
If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and
makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones
on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the
United States should make clear its willingness to continue
training, assistance, and support for Iraq's security forces and to
continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi
government does not make substantial progress toward the
achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security,
and governance, the United States should reduce its political,
military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.
Our report makes recommendations in several other areas.
They include improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system,
the Iraqi oil sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq,
the U.S. budget process, the training of U.S. government personnel,
and U.S. intelligence capabilities.
Conclusion
It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these
recommendations offer a new way forward for the United
States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and
need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should
not be separated or carried out in isolation. The dynamics of
the region are as important to Iraq as events within Iraq.
The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days
ahead. But by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region,
and the United States of America can emerge stronger.
Assessment
There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in
Baghdad and several provinces is dire. Saddam Hussein has
been removed from power and the Iraqi people have a democratically
elected government that is broadly representative of
Iraq's population, yet the government is not adequately advancing
national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering
essential services. The level of violence is high and
growing. There is great suffering, and the daily lives of many
Iraqis show little or no improvement. Pessimism is pervasive.
U.S. military and civilian personnel, and our coalition
partners, are making exceptional and dedicated efforts--and
sacrifices--to help Iraq. Many Iraqis have also made extraordinary
efforts and sacrifices for a better future. However, the
ability of the United States to influence events within Iraq is diminishing.
Many Iraqis are embracing sectarian identities. The
lack of security impedes economic development. Most countries
in the region are not playing a constructive role in support
of Iraq, and some are undercutting stability.
Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability, and is
critical to U.S. interests. It runs along the sectarian fault lines of
Shia and Sunni Islam, and of Kurdish and Arab populations. It
has the world's second-largest known oil reserves. It is now a
base of operations for international terrorism, including al
Qaeda.
Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing
how the United States is viewed in the region and around
the world. Because of the gravity of Iraq's condition and the
country's vital importance, the United States is facing one of its
most difficult and significant international challenges in
decades. Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by
American decisions and actions, the United States has both a
national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis
an opportunity to avert anarchy.
An assessment of the security, political, economic, and regional
situation follows (all figures current as of publication),
along with an assessment of the consequences if Iraq continues
to deteriorate, and an analysis of some possible courses of
action.
A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq
1. Security
Attacks against U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi security forces are persistent
and growing. October 2006 was the deadliest month for
U.S. forces since January 2005, with 102 Americans killed. Total
attacks in October 2006 averaged 180 per day, up from 70 per
day in January 2006. Daily attacks against Iraqi security forces in
October were more than double the level in January. Attacks
against civilians in October were four times higher than in January.
Some 3,000 Iraqi civilians are killed every month.
Sources of Violence
Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality. There
are multiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni Arab insurgency,
al Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias
and death squads, and organized criminality. Sectarian violence--
particularly in and around Baghdad--has become the
principal challenge to stability.
Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni
Arab insurgency. The insurgency comprises former elements
of the Saddam Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis,
and common criminals. It has significant support within the
Sunni Arab community. The insurgency has no single leadership
but is a network of networks. It benefits from participants'
detailed knowledge of Iraq's infrastructure, and arms and financing
are supplied primarily from within Iraq. The insurgents
have different goals, although nearly all oppose the
presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. Most wish to restore Sunni
Arab rule in the country. Some aim at winning local power and
control.
Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence
in Iraq, but that includes some of the more spectacular acts:
suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks on significant
religious or political targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely
Iraqi-run and composed of Sunni Arabs. Foreign fighters--
numbering an estimated 1,300--play a supporting role or carry
out suicide operations. Al Qaeda's goals include instigating a
wider sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni and Shia, and driving
the United States out of Iraq.
Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi
civilian casualties. Iraq is in the grip of a deadly cycle: Sunni insurgent
attacks spark large-scale Shia reprisals, and vice versa.
Groups of Iraqis are often found bound and executed, their
bodies dumped in rivers or fields. The perception of unchecked
violence emboldens militias, shakes confidence in the
government, and leads Iraqis to flee to places where their sect
is the majority and where they feel they are in less danger. In
some parts of Iraq--notably in Baghdad--sectarian cleansing
is taking place. The United Nations estimates that 1.6 million
are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 million Iraqis have fled
the country.
Shiite militias engaging in sectarian violence pose a substantial
threat to immediate and long-term stability. These militias are
diverse. Some are affiliated with the government, some
are highly localized, and some are wholly outside the law. They
are fragmenting, with an increasing breakdown in command
structure. The militias target Sunni Arab civilians, and some
struggle for power in clashes with one another. Some even target
government ministries. They undermine the authority of
the Iraqi government and security forces, as well as the ability
of Sunnis to join a peaceful political process. The prevalence of
militias sends a powerful message: political leaders can preserve
and expand their power only if backed by armed force.
The Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, may number
as many as 60,000 fighters. It has directly challenged U.S. and
Iraqi government forces, and it is widely believed to engage in
regular violence against Sunni Arab civilians. Mahdi fighters
patrol certain Shia enclaves, notably northeast Baghdad's teeming
neighborhood of 2.5 million known as "Sadr City." As the
Mahdi Army has grown in size and influence, some elements
have moved beyond Sadr's control.
The Badr Brigade is affiliated with the Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which is led by
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. The Badr Brigade has long-standing ties
with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Many Badr members
have become integrated into the Iraqi police, and others
play policing roles in southern Iraqi cities. While wearing the
uniform of the security services, Badr fighters have targeted
Sunni Arab civilians. Badr fighters have also clashed with the
Mahdi Army, particularly in southern Iraq.
Criminality also makes daily life unbearable for many
Iraqis. Robberies, kidnappings, and murder are commonplace
in much of the country. Organized criminal rackets thrive, particularly
in unstable areas like Anbar province. Some criminal
gangs cooperate with, finance, or purport to be part of the
Sunni insurgency or a Shiite militia in order to gain legitimacy.
As one knowledgeable American official put it, "If there were
foreign forces in New Jersey, Tony Soprano would be an insurgent
leader."
Four of Iraq's eighteen provinces are highly insecure--
Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. These provinces account
for about 40 percent of Iraq's population of 26 million. In
Baghdad, the violence is largely between Sunni and Shia. In
Anbar, the violence is attributable to the Sunni insurgency and
to al Qaeda, and the situation is deteriorating.
In Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and
Turkmen. In Basra and the south, the violence is largely an
intra-Shia power struggle. The most stable parts of the country
are the three provinces of the Kurdish north and parts of the
Shia south. However, most of Iraq's cities have a sectarian mix
and are plagued by persistent violence.
U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi Forces
Confronting this violence are the Multi-National Forces-Iraq
under U.S. command, working in concert with Iraq's security
forces. The Multi-National Forces-Iraq were authorized by
UN Security Council Resolution 1546 in 2004, and the mandate
was extended in November 2006 for another year.
Approximately 141,000 U.S. military personnel are serving
in Iraq, together with approximately 16,500 military personnel
from twenty-seven coalition partners, the largest contingent
being 7,200 from the United Kingdom. The U.S. Army has
principal responsibility for Baghdad and the north. The U.S.
Marine Corps takes the lead in Anbar province. The United
Kingdom has responsibility in the southeast, chiefly in Basra.
Along with this military presence, the United States is
building its largest embassy in Baghdad. The current U.S. embassy
in Baghdad totals about 1,000 U.S. government employees.
There are roughly 5,000 civilian contractors in the country.
Currently, the U.S. military rarely engages in large-scale
combat operations. Instead, counterinsurgency efforts focus
on a strategy of "clear, hold, and build"--"clearing" areas of
insurgents and death squads, "holding" those areas with Iraqi
security forces, and "building" areas with quick-impact reconstruction
projects.
Nearly every U.S. Army and Marine combat unit, and
several National Guard and Reserve units, have been to Iraq at
least once. Many are on their second or even third rotations;
rotations are typically one year for Army units, seven months
for Marine units. Regular rotations, in and out of Iraq or within
the country, complicate brigade and battalion efforts to get to
know the local scene, earn the trust of the population, and
build a sense of cooperation.
Many military units are under significant strain. Because
the harsh conditions in Iraq are wearing out equipment more
quickly than anticipated, many units do not have fully functional
equipment for training when they redeploy to the United
States. An extraordinary amount of sacrifice has been asked of
our men and women in uniform, and of their families. The
American military has little reserve force to call on if it needs
ground forces to respond to other crises around the world.
A primary mission of U.S. military strategy in Iraq is the
training of competent Iraqi security forces. By the end of 2006,
the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq under
American leadership is expected to have trained and equipped
a target number of approximately 326,000 Iraqi security services.
That figure includes 138,000 members of the Iraqi Army
and 188,000 Iraqi police. Iraqis have operational control over
roughly one-third of Iraqi security forces; the U.S. has operational
control over most of the rest. No U.S. forces are under
Iraqi command.
The Iraqi Army
The Iraqi Army is making fitful progress toward becoming a reliable
and disciplined fighting force loyal to the national government.
By the end of 2006, the Iraqi Army is expected to
comprise 118 battalions formed into 36 brigades under the
command of 10 divisions. Although the Army is one of the
more professional Iraqi institutions, its performance has been
uneven. The training numbers are impressive, but they represent
only part of the story.
Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition
and loyalties of some Iraqi units--specifically, whether
they will carry out missions on behalf of national goals instead
of a sectarian agenda. Of Iraq's 10 planned divisions, those that
are even-numbered are made up of Iraqis who signed up to
serve in a specific area, and they have been reluctant to redeploy
to other areas of the country. As a result, elements of the
Army have refused to carry out missions.
The Iraqi Army is also confronted by several other significant
challenges:
- Units lack leadership. They lack the ability to work together
and perform at higher levels of organization--the brigade and
division level. Leadership training and the experience of leadership
are the essential elements to improve performance.
- Units lack equipment. They cannot carry out their missions
without adequate equipment. Congress has been generous
in funding requests for U.S. troops, but it has resisted fully
funding Iraqi forces. The entire appropriation for Iraqi defense
forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion) is less than the United
States currently spends in Iraq every two weeks.
- Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a
month so that they can visit their families and take them
their pay. Soldiers are paid in cash because there is no banking
system. Soldiers are given leave liberally and face no
penalties for absence without leave. Unit readiness rates are
low, often at 50 percent or less.
- Units lack logistics and support. They lack the ability to sustain
their operations, the capability to transport supplies and
troops, and the capacity to provide their own indirect fire
support, close-air support, technical intelligence, and medical
evacuation. They will depend on the United States for
logistics and support through at least 2007.
The Iraqi Police
The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that
of the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Police Service currently numbers
roughly 135,000 and is responsible for local policing. It has
neither the training nor legal authority to conduct criminal
investigations, nor the firepower to take on organized crime,
insurgents, or militias. The Iraqi National Police numbers
roughly 25,000 and its officers have been trained in counterinsurgency
operations, not police work. The Border Enforcement
Department numbers roughly 28,000.
Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage
in sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention,
torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The police
are organized under the Ministry of the Interior, which is
confronted by corruption and militia infiltration and lacks control
over police in the provinces.
The United States and the Iraqi government recognize
the importance of reform. The current Minister of the Interior
has called for purging militia members and criminals from the
police. But he has little police experience or base of support.
There is no clear Iraqi or U.S. agreement on the character and
mission of the police. U.S. authorities do not know with precision
the composition and membership of the various police
forces, nor the disposition of their funds and equipment. There
are ample reports of Iraqi police officers participating in training
in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for
use in sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll but don't
show up for work. In the words of a senior American general,
"2006 was supposed to be `the year of the police' but it hasn't
materialized that way."
Facilities Protection Services
The Facilities Protection Service poses additional problems.
Each Iraqi ministry has an armed unit, ostensibly to guard the
ministry's infrastructure. All together, these units total roughly
145,000 uniformed Iraqis under arms. However, these units
have questionable loyalties and capabilities. In the ministries of
Health, Agriculture, and Transportation--controlled by Moqtada
al-Sadr--the Facilities Protection Service is a source of
funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army. One senior U.S. official
described the Facilities Protection Service as "incompetent,
dysfunctional, or subversive." Several Iraqis simply referred to
them as militias.
The Iraqi government has begun to bring the Facilities
Protection Service under the control of the Interior Ministry.
The intention is to identify and register Facilities Protection
personnel, standardize their treatment, and provide some
training. Though the approach is reasonable, this effort may exceed
the current capability of the Interior Ministry.
Operation Together Forward II
In a major effort to quell the violence in Iraq, U.S. military
forces joined with Iraqi forces to establish security in
Baghdad with an operation called "Operation Together
Forward II," which began in August 2006. Under Operation
Together Forward II, U.S. forces are working with
members of the Iraqi Army and police to "clear, hold, and
build" in Baghdad, moving neighborhood by neighborhood.
There are roughly 15,000 U.S. troops in Baghdad.
This operation--and the security of Baghdad--is
crucial to security in Iraq more generally. A capital city of
more than 6 million, Baghdad contains some 25 percent
of the country's population. It is the largest Sunni and
Shia city in Iraq. It has high concentrations of both Sunni
insurgents and Shiite militias. Both Iraqi and American
leaders told us that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq.
The results of Operation Together Forward II are
disheartening. Violence in Baghdad--already at high levels--
jumped more than 43 percent between the summer
and October 2006. U.S. forces continue to suffer high casualties.
Perpetrators of violence leave neighborhoods in
advance of security sweeps, only to filter back later. Iraqi
police have been unable or unwilling to stop such infiltration
and continuing violence. The Iraqi Army has provided
only two out of the six battalions that it promised in
August would join American forces in Baghdad. The Iraqi
government has rejected sustained security operations in
Sadr City.
Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both
the capability to hold areas that have been cleared and
the will to clear neighborhoods that are home to Shiite
militias. U.S. forces can ?clear? any neighborhood, but
there are neither enough U.S. troops present nor enough
support from Iraqi security forces to ?hold? neighborhoods
so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq.
Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. and
Iraqi military forces are fundamentally changing the conditions
encouraging the sectarian violence, U.S. forces
seem to be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end.
2. Politics
Iraq is a sovereign state with a democratically elected Council
of Representatives. A government of national unity was formed
in May 2006 that is broadly representative of the Iraqi people.
Iraq has ratified a constitution, and--per agreement with
Sunni Arab leaders--has initiated a process of review to determine
if the constitution needs amendment.
The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian,
and key players within the government too often act in
their sectarian interest. Iraq's Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders
frequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq's
national interest, and too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity
to govern effectively. The result is an even weaker central
government than the constitution provides.
There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international
agreement on the key issues confronting the Iraqi government:
national reconciliation, including the negotiation of a "political
deal" among Iraq's sectarian groups on Constitution review, de-
Baathification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, the future
of Kirkuk, and amnesty; security, particularly curbing
militias and reducing the violence in Baghdad; and governance,
including the provision of basic services and the rollback of
pervasive corruption. Because Iraqi leaders view issues through
a sectarian prism, we will summarize the differing perspectives
of Iraq's main sectarian groups.
Sectarian Viewpoints
The Shia, the majority of Iraq's population, have gained power
for the first time in more than 1,300 years. Above all, many Shia
are interested in preserving that power. However, fissures have
emerged within the broad Shia coalition, known as the United
Iraqi Alliance. Shia factions are struggling for power--over regions,
ministries, and Iraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding
together a broad and fractious coalition have led several
observers in Baghdad to comment that Shia leaders are held
"hostage to extremes." Within the coalition as a whole, there is
a reluctance to reach a political accommodation with the Sunnis
or to disarm Shiite militias.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has demonstrated an understanding
of the key issues facing Iraq, notably the need for
national reconciliation and security in Baghdad. Yet strains
have emerged between Maliki's government and the United
States. Maliki has publicly rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve
certain benchmarks, ordered the removal of blockades around
Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi security forces, and
resisted U.S. requests to move forward on reconciliation or on
disbanding Shiite militias.
Sistani, Sadr, Hakim
The U.S. deals primarily with the Iraqi government, but
the most powerful Shia figures in Iraq do not hold national
office. Of the following three vital power brokers in
the Shia community, the United States is unable to talk
directly with one (Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani) and
does not talk to another (Moqtada al-Sadr).
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani: Sistani is the leading
Shiite cleric in Iraq. Despite staying out of day-to-day
politics, he has been the most influential leader in the
country: all major Shia leaders have sought his approval
or guidance. Sistani has encouraged a unified Shia bloc
with moderated aims within a unified Iraq. Sistani's influence
may be waning, as his words have not succeeded in
preventing intra-Shia violence or retaliation against Sunnis.
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim: Hakim is a cleric and the leader
of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SCIRI), the largest and most organized Shia political
party. It seeks the creation of an autonomous Shia
region comprising nine provinces in the south. Hakim has
consistently protected and advanced his party's position.
SCIRI has close ties with Iran.
Moqtada al-Sadr: Sadr has a large following among
impoverished Shia, particularly in Baghdad. He has joined
Maliki's governing coalition, but his Mahdi Army has
clashed with the Badr Brigades, as well as with Iraqi, U.S.,
and U.K. forces. Sadr claims to be an Iraqi nationalist.
Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following
the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political
party that controls basic services within the government
and an armed militia outside of the government.
Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditional
position of power in Iraq. They are torn, unsure whether
to seek their aims through political participation or through violent
insurgency. They remain angry about U.S. decisions to
dissolve Iraqi security forces and to pursue the "de-Baathification"
of Iraq's government and society. Sunnis are confronted
by paradoxes: they have opposed the presence of U.S. forces in
Iraq but need those forces to protect them against Shia militias;
they chafe at being governed by a majority Shia administration
but reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see a Sunni
autonomous region as feasible for themselves.
Hashimi and Dhari
The influence of Sunni Arab politicians in the government
is questionable. The leadership of the Sunni Arab
insurgency is murky, but the following two key Sunni
Arab figures have broad support.
Tariq al-Hashimi: Hashimi is one of two vice presidents
of Iraq and the head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the
largest Sunni Muslim bloc in parliament. Hashimi opposes
the formation of autonomous regions and has advocated
the distribution of oil revenues based on population,
a reversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of Shiite
militia fighters from the Iraqi security forces. Shiite death
squads have recently killed three of his siblings.
Sheik Harith al-Dhari: Dhari is the head of the
Muslim Scholars Association, the most influential Sunni
organization in Iraq. Dhari has condemned the American
occupation and spoken out against the Iraqi government.
His organization has ties both to the Sunni Arab insurgency
and to Sunnis within the Iraqi government. A warrant
was recently issued for his arrest for inciting violence
and terrorism, an act that sparked bitter Sunni protests
across Iraq.
Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in presenting a united front of two
main political blocs--the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurds have
secured a largely autonomous Kurdish region in the north, and
have achieved a prominent role for Kurds within the national
government. Barzani leads the Kurdish regional government,
and Talabani is president of Iraq.
Leading Kurdish politicians told us they preferred to be
within a democratic, federal Iraqi state because an independent
Kurdistan would be surrounded by hostile neighbors. However,
a majority of Kurds favor independence. The Kurds have
their own security forces--the peshmerga--which number
roughly 100,000. They believe they could accommodate themselves
to either a unified or a fractured Iraq.
Barzani and Talabani
Kurdish politics has been dominated for years by two figures
who have long-standing ties in movements for Kurdish
independence and self-government.
Massoud Barzani: Barzani is the leader of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party and the President of the Kurdish
regional government. Barzani has cooperated with his
longtime rival, Jalal Talabani, in securing an empowered,
autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Barzani has
ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and raising of Kurdish
flags in Kurdish-controlled areas.
Jalal Talabani: Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan and the President of Iraq. Whereas
Barzani has focused his efforts in Kurdistan, Talabani has
secured power in Baghdad, and several important PUK
government ministers are loyal to him. Talabani strongly
supports autonomy for Kurdistan. He has also sought to
bring real power to the office of the presidency.
Key Issues
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. Prime Minister Maliki outlined
a commendable program of national reconciliation soon after
he entered office. However, the Iraqi government has not taken
action on the key elements of national reconciliation: revising
de-Baathification, which prevents many Sunni Arabs from participating
in governance and society; providing amnesty for those
who have fought against the government; sharing the country's
oil revenues; demobilizing militias; amending the constitution;
and settling the future of Kirkuk.
One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Constitution,
which created a largely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows
other such regions to be established later, perhaps including a
"Shi'astan" comprising nine southern provinces. This highly
decentralized structure is favored by the Kurds and many Shia
(particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim), but it is
anathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally Iraqi nationalists,
albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe they
should govern. Second, because Iraq's energy resources are in
the Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible
"Sunni region." Particularly contentious is a provision in the
constitution that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves,
while allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the
future to go to the regions.
The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-
drafting process, and acceded to entering the government
only on the condition that the constitution be amended. In
September, the parliament agreed to initiate a constitutional
review commission slated to complete its work within one year;
it delayed considering the question of forming a federalized region
in southern Iraq for eighteen months.
Another key unresolved issue is the future of Kirkuk, an
oil-rich city in northern Iraq that is home to substantial numbers
of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. The Kurds insisted that
the constitution require a popular referendum by December
2007 to determine whether Kirkuk can formally join the Kurdish
administered region, an outcome that Arabs and Turkmen
in Kirkuk staunchly oppose. The risks of further violence
sparked by a Kirkuk referendum are great.
Iraq's leaders often claim that they do not want a division
of the country, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders
have little commitment to national reconciliation. One prominent
Shia leader told us pointedly that the current government
has the support of 80 percent of the population, notably excluding
Sunni Arabs. Kurds have fought for independence for
decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, the leader of
the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and the
raising of Kurdish flags. One senior American general commented
that the Iraqis "still do not know what kind of country
they want to have." Yet many of Iraq's most powerful and wellpositioned
leaders are not working toward a united Iraq.
SECURITY. The security situation cannot improve unless leaders
act in support of national reconciliation. Shiite leaders must
make the decision to demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs must
make the decision to seek their aims through a peaceful political
process, not through violent revolt. The Iraqi government
and Sunni Arab tribes must aggressively pursue al Qaeda.
Militias are currently seen as legitimate vehicles of political
action. Shia political leaders make distinctions between the
Sunni insurgency (which seeks to overthrow the government)
and Shia militias (which are used to fight Sunnis, secure neighborhoods,
and maximize power within the government). Though
Prime Minister Maliki has said he will address the problem of
militias, he has taken little meaningful action to curb their influence.
He owes his office in large part to Sadr and has shown
little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi Army.
Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon
violent insurgency in favor of the political process. Sunni
politicians within the government have a limited level of support
and influence among their own population, and questionable
influence over the insurgency. Insurgents wage a campaign of intimidation
against Sunni leaders--assassinating the family members
of those who do participate in the government. Too often,
insurgents tolerate and cooperate with al Qaeda, as they share a
mutual interest in attacking U.S. and Shia forces. However, Sunni
Arab tribal leaders in Anbar province recently took the positive
step of agreeing to pursue al Qaeda and foreign fighters in their
midst, and have started to take action on those commitments.
Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take
on the militias; Shia politicians told us that the U.S. military has
to help them take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda. Each
side watches the other. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms
unless the Shia militias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm
until the Sunni insurgency is destroyed. To put it simply:
there are many armed groups within Iraq, and very little will to
lay down arms.
GOVERNANCE. The Iraqi government is not effectively providing
its people with basic services: electricity, drinking water,
sewage, health care, and education. In many sectors, production
is below or hovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and
other unstable areas, the situation is much worse. There are
five major reasons for this problem.
First, the government sometimes provides services on a
sectarian basis. For example, in one Sunni neighborhood of
Shia-governed Baghdad, there is less than two hours of electricity
each day and trash piles are waist-high. One American
official told us that Baghdad is run like a "Shia dictatorship" because
Sunnis boycotted provincial elections in 2005, and therefore
are not represented in local government.
Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure.
For instance, electricity transmission towers are
downed by explosives, and then sniper attacks prevent repairs
from being made.
Third, corruption is rampant. One senior Iraqi official estimated
that official corruption costs Iraq $5-7 billion per year.
Notable steps have been taken: Iraq has a functioning audit
board and inspectors general in the ministries, and senior leaders
including the Prime Minister have identified rooting out
corruption as a national priority. But too many political leaders
still pursue their personal, sectarian, or party interests. There
are still no examples of senior officials who have been brought
before a court of law and convicted on corruption charges.
Fourth, capacity is inadequate. Most of Iraq's technocratic
class was pushed out of the government as part of de-Baathification.
Other skilled Iraqis have fled the country as violence has
risen. Too often, Iraq's elected representatives treat the ministries
as political spoils. Many ministries can do little more than pay
salaries, spending as little as 10-15 percent of their capital
budget. They lack technical expertise and suffer from corruption,
inefficiency, a banking system that does not permit the transfer of
moneys, extensive red tape put in place in part to deter corruption,
and a Ministry of Finance reluctant to disburse funds.
Fifth, the judiciary is weak. Much has been done to establish
an Iraqi judiciary, including a supreme court, and Iraq has
some dedicated judges. But criminal investigations are conducted
by magistrates, and they are too few and inadequately
trained to perform this function. Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary
has been ruthless. As one senior U.S. official said to us,
"We can protect judges, but not their families, their extended
families, their friends." Many Iraqis feel that crime not only is
unpunished, it is rewarded.
3. Economics
There has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has
tremendous potential for growth. But economic development
is hobbled by insecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidated
infrastructure, and uncertainty. As one U.S. official observed
to us, Iraq's economy has been badly shocked and is
dysfunctional after suffering decades of problems: Iraq had a
police state economy in the 1970s, a war economy in the 1980s,
and a sanctions economy in the 1990s. Immediate and longterm
growth depends predominantly on the oil sector.
Economic Performance
There are some encouraging signs. Currency reserves are
stable and growing at $12 billion. Consumer imports of computers,
cell phones, and other appliances have increased dramatically.
New businesses are opening, and construction is
moving forward in secure areas. Because of Iraq's ample oil reserves,
water resources, and fertile lands, significant growth is
possible if violence is reduced and the capacity of government
improves. For example, wheat yields increased more than 40
percent in Kurdistan during this past year.
The Iraqi government has also made progress in meeting
benchmarks set by the International Monetary Fund. Most
prominently, subsidies have been reduced--for instance, the
price per liter of gas has increased from roughly 1.7 cents to 23
cents (a figure far closer to regional prices). However, energy
and food subsidies generally remain a burden, costing Iraq $11
billion per year.
Despite the positive signs, many leading economic indicators
are negative. Instead of meeting a target of 10
percent, growth in Iraq is at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation
is above 50 percent. Unemployment estimates range widely from
20 to 60 percent. The investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct
investment under 1 percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not
see tangible improvements in their daily economic situation.
Oil Sector
Oil production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq's
GDP, and more than 95 percent of government revenues. Iraq
produces around 2.2 million barrels per day, and exports about
1.5 million barrels per day. This is below both prewar production
levels and the Iraqi government's target of 2.5 million barrels
per day, and far short of the vast potential of the Iraqi oil
sector. Fortunately for the government, global energy prices
have been higher than projected, making it possible for Iraq to
meet its budget revenue targets.
Problems with oil production are caused by lack of security,
lack of investment, and lack of technical capacity. Insurgents
with a detailed knowledge of Iraq's infrastructure target
pipelines and oil facilities. There is no metering system for the
oil. There is poor maintenance at pumping stations, pipelines,
and port facilities, as well as inadequate investment in modern
technology. Iraq had a cadre of experts in the oil sector, but intimidation
and an extended migration of experts to other countries
have eroded technical capacity. Foreign companies have
been reluctant to invest, and Iraq's Ministry of Oil has been unable
to spend more than 15 percent of its capital budget.
Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that
150,000 to 200,000--and perhaps as many as 500,000--barrels
of oil per day are being stolen. Controlled prices for refined
products result in shortages within Iraq, which drive consumers
to the thriving black market. One senior U.S. official
told us that corruption is more responsible than insurgents for
breakdowns in the oil sector.
The Politics of Oil
The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country's
already fragile efforts to create a unified central government.
The Iraqi Constitution leaves the door open for regions
to take the lead in developing new oil resources. Article 108
states that "oil and gas are the ownership of all the peoples of
Iraq in all the regions and governorates," while Article 109
tasks the federal government with "the management of oil and
gas extracted from current fields." This language has led to
contention over what constitutes a "new" or an "existing" resource,
a question that has profound ramifications for the ultimate
control of future oil revenue.
Senior members of Iraq's oil industry argue that a national
oil company could reduce political tensions by centralizing revenues
and reducing regional or local claims to a percentage of
the revenue derived from production. However, regional leaders
are suspicious and resist this proposal, affirming the rights of
local communities to have direct access to the inflow of oil revenue.
Kurdish leaders have been particularly aggressive in asserting
independent control of their oil assets, signing and
implementing investment deals with foreign oil companies in
northern Iraq. Shia politicians are also reported to be negotiating
oil investment contracts with foreign companies.
There are proposals to redistribute a portion of oil revenues
directly to the population on a per capita basis. These
proposals have the potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in
the nation's chief natural resource, but it would take time to develop
a fair distribution system. Oil revenues have been incorporated
into state budget projections for the next several years.
There is no institution in Iraq at present that could properly
implement such a distribution system. It would take substantial
time to establish, and would have to be based on a well-developed
state census and income tax system, which Iraq currently lacks.
U.S.-Led Reconstruction Efforts
The United States has appropriated a total of about $34 billion
to support the reconstruction of Iraq, of which about $21 billion
has been appropriated for the "Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund." Nearly $16 billion has been spent, and almost
all the funds have been committed. The administration requested
$1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006, and received
$1.485 billion. The administration requested $750
million for FY 2007. The trend line for economic assistance in
FY 2008 also appears downward.
Congress has little appetite for appropriating more funds
for reconstruction. There is a substantial need for continued
reconstruction in Iraq, but serious questions remain about the
capacity of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.
The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense
Department, State Department, United States Agency for International
Development, and other agencies has been ineffective.
There are no clear lines establishing who is in charge of
reconstruction.
As resources decline, the U.S. reconstruction effort is
changing its focus, shifting from infrastructure, education, and
health to smaller-scale ventures that are chosen and to some
degree managed by local communities. A major attempt is also
being made to improve the capacity of government bureaucracies
at the national, regional, and provincial levels to provide
services to the population as well as to select and manage infrastructure
projects.
The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi
ministries, but it confronts problems with access and sustainability.
Moqtada al-Sadr objects to the U.S. presence in Iraq,
and therefore the ministries he controls--Health, Agriculture,
and Transportation--will not work with Americans. It is not
clear that Iraqis can or will maintain and operate reconstruction
projects launched by the United States.
Several senior military officers commented to us that the
Commander's Emergency Response Program, which funds
quick-impact projects such as the clearing of sewage and the
restoration of basic services, is vital. The U.S. Agency for International
Development, in contrast, is focused on long-term
economic development and capacity building, but funds have
not been committed to support these efforts into the future.
The State Department leads seven Provincial Reconstruction
Teams operating around the country. These teams can have a
positive effect in secure areas, but not in areas where their
work is hampered by significant security constraints.
Substantial reconstruction funds have also been provided
to contractors, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
has documented numerous instances of waste and
abuse. They have not all been put right. Contracting has gradually
improved, as more oversight has been exercised and fewer
cost-plus contracts have been granted; in addition, the use of
Iraqi contractors has enabled the employment of more Iraqis
in reconstruction projects.
4. International Support
International support for Iraqi reconstruction has been tepid.
International donors pledged $13.5 billion to support reconstruction,
but less than $4 billion has been delivered.
An important agreement with the Paris Club relieved a
significant amount of Iraq's government debt and put the country
on firmer financial footing. But the Gulf States, including
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, hold large amounts of Iraqi debt that
they have not forgiven.
The United States is currently working with the United Nations
and other partners to fashion the "International Compact"
on Iraq. The goal is to provide Iraqis with greater debt relief and
credits from the Gulf States, as well as to deliver on pledged aid
from international donors. In return, the Iraqi government will
agree to achieve certain economic reform milestones, such as
building anticorruption measures into Iraqi institutions, adopting
a fair legal framework for foreign investors, and reaching economic
self-sufficiency by 2012. Several U.S. and international officials
told us that the compact could be an opportunity to seek
greater international engagement in the country.
The Region
The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly influence its
stability and prosperity. No country in the region wants a
chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are doing little to help it, and
some are undercutting its stability. Iraqis complain that neighbors
are meddling in their affairs. When asked which of Iraq's
neighbors are intervening in Iraq, one senior Iraqi official
replied, "All of them."
The situation in Iraq is linked with events in the region.
U.S. efforts in Afghanistan have been complicated by the overriding
focus of U.S. attention and resources on Iraq. Several
Iraqi, U.S., and international officials commented to us that
Iraqi opposition to the United States--and support for Sadr--
spiked in the aftermath of Israel's bombing campaign in
Lebanon. The actions of Syria and Iran in Iraq are often tied to
their broader concerns with the United States. Many Sunni
Arab states are concerned about rising Iranian influence in Iraq
and the region. Most of the region's countries are wary of U.S.
efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and the Middle East.
Neighboring States
IRAN. Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq.
Iran has long-standing ties to many Iraqi Shia politicians, many
of whom were exiled to Iran during the Saddam Hussein
regime. Iran has provided arms, financial support, and training
for Shiite militias within Iraq, as well as political support for
Shia parties. There are also reports that Iran has supplied improvised
explosive devices to groups--including Sunni Arab insurgents--
that attack U.S. forces. The Iranian border with Iraq
is porous, and millions of Iranians travel to Iraq each year to
visit Shia holy sites. Many Iraqis spoke of Iranian meddling,
and Sunnis took a particularly alarmist view. One leading Sunni
politician told us, "If you turn over any stone in Iraq today, you
will find Iran underneath."
U.S., Iraqi, and international officials also commented on
the range of tensions between the United States and Iran, including
Iran's nuclear program, Iran's support for terrorism,
Iran's influence in Lebanon and the region, and Iran's influence
in Iraq. Iran appears content for the U.S. military to be tied
down in Iraq, a position that limits U.S. options in addressing
Iran's nuclear program and allows Iran leverage over stability in
Iraq. Proposed talks between Iran and the United States about
the situation in Iraq have not taken place. One Iraqi official
told us: "Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets
of Baghdad."
SYRIA. Syria is also playing a counterproductive role. Iraqis
are upset about what they perceive as Syrian support for efforts
to undermine the Iraqi government. The Syrian role is not so
much to take active measures as to countenance malign neglect:
the Syrians look the other way as arms and foreign fighters
flow across their border into Iraq, and former Baathist leaders
find a safe haven within Syria. Like Iran, Syria is content to see
the United States tied down in Iraq. That said, the Syrians have
indicated that they want a dialogue with the United States, and
in November 2006 agreed to restore diplomatic relations with
Iraq after a 24-year break.
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES. These countries for
the most part have been passive and disengaged. They have declined
to provide debt relief or substantial economic assistance
to the Iraqi government. Several Iraqi Sunni Arab politicians
complained that Saudi Arabia has not provided political support
for their fellow Sunnis within Iraq. One observed that
Saudi Arabia did not even send a letter when the Iraqi government
was formed, whereas Iran has an ambassador in Iraq.
Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals
within Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, even as those governments
help facilitate U.S. military operations in Iraq by
providing basing and overflight rights and by cooperating on intelligence
issues.
As worries about Iraq increase, the Gulf States are becoming
more active. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have
hosted meetings in support of the International Compact. Saudi
Arabia recently took the positive step of hosting a conference of
Iraqi religious leaders in Mecca. Several Gulf States have helped
foster dialogue with Iraq's Sunni Arab population. While the Gulf
States are not proponents of democracy in Iraq, they worry about
the direction of events: battle-hardened insurgents from Iraq
could pose a threat to their own internal stability, and the growth
of Iranian influence in the region is deeply troubling to them.
TURKEY. Turkish policy toward Iraq is focused on discouraging
Kurdish nationalism, which is seen as an existential threat
to Turkey's own internal stability. The Turks have supported the
Turkmen minority within Iraq and have used their influence to
try to block the incorporation of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan. At
the same time, Turkish companies have invested in Kurdish
areas in northern Iraq, and Turkish and Kurdish leaders have
sought constructive engagement on political, security, and economic
issues.
The Turks are deeply concerned about the operations of the
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)--a terrorist group based in northern
Iraq that has killed thousands of Turks. They are upset that
the United States and Iraq have not targeted the PKK more aggressively.
The Turks have threatened to go after the PKK themselves,
and have made several forays across the border into Iraq.
JORDAN AND EGYPT. Both Jordan and Egypt have provided
some assistance for the Iraqi government. Jordan has trained
thousands of Iraqi police, has an ambassador in Baghdad, and
King Abdullah recently hosted a meeting in Amman between
President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki. Egypt has provided
some limited Iraqi army training. Both Jordan and Egypt have
facilitated U.S. military operations--Jordan by allowing overflight
and search-and-rescue operations, Egypt by allowing
overflight and Suez Canal transits; both provide important cooperation
on intelligence. Jordan is currently home to 700,000
Iraqi refugees (equal to 10 percent of its population) and fears
a flood of many more. Both Jordan and Egypt are concerned
about the position of Iraq's Sunni Arabs and want constitutional
reforms in Iraq to bolster the Sunni community. They also fear
the return of insurgents to their countries.
The International Community
The international community beyond the United Kingdom and
our other coalition partners has played a limited role in Iraq.
The United Nations--acting under Security Council Resolution
1546--has a small presence in Iraq; it has assisted in holding
elections, drafting the constitution, organizing the government,
and building institutions. The World Bank, which has committed
a limited number of resources, has one and sometimes two
staff in Iraq. The European Union has a representative there.
Several U.S.-based and international nongovernmental
organizations have done excellent work within Iraq, operating
under great hardship. Both Iraqi and international nongovernmental
organizations play an important role in reaching across
sectarian lines to enhance dialogue and understanding, and
several U.S.-based organizations have employed substantial resources
to help Iraqis develop their democracy. However, the
participation of international nongovernmental organizations is
constrained by the lack of security, and their Iraqi counterparts
face a cumbersome and often politicized process of registration
with the government.
The United Kingdom has dedicated an extraordinary
amount of resources to Iraq and has made great sacrifices. In
addition to 7,200 troops, the United Kingdom has a substantial
diplomatic presence, particularly in Basra and the Iraqi southeast.
The United Kingdom has been an active and key player at
every stage of Iraq's political development. U.K. officials told
us that they remain committed to working for stability in Iraq,
and will reduce their commitment of troops and resources in
response to the situation on the ground.
5. Conclusions
The United States has made a massive commitment to the future
of Iraq in both blood and treasure. As of December 2006,
nearly 2,900 Americans have lost their lives serving in Iraq. Another
21,000 Americans have been wounded, many severely.
To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion
on the Iraq War, and costs are running about $8 billion per
month. In addition, the United States must expect significant
"tail costs" to come. Caring for veterans and replacing lost
equipment will run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Estimates
run as high as $2 trillion for the final cost of the U.S. involvement
in Iraq.
Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive
and the situation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot
now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of
the United States. Iraqis have not been convinced that they
must take responsibility for their own future. Iraq's neighbors
and much of the international community have not been persuaded
to play an active and constructive role in supporting
Iraq. The ability of the United States to shape outcomes is diminishing.
Time is running out.
B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq
If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences
could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region,
and the world.
Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and
inflict greater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse of
Iraq's government and economy would further cripple a country
already unable to meet its people's needs. Iraq's security
forces could split along sectarian lines. A humanitarian catastrophe
could follow as more refugees are forced to relocate
across the country and the region. Ethnic cleansing could escalate.
The Iraqi people could be subjected to another strongman
who flexes the political and military muscle required to impose
order amid anarchy. Freedoms could be lost.
Other countries in the region fear significant violence
crossing their borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries
to intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps
sparking a broader regional war. Turkey could send troops into
northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan from declaring independence.
Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern
Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil fields. The regional
influence of Iran could rise at a time when that country is on a
path to producing nuclear weapons.
Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that
they fear the distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across
the Islamic world. Many expressed a fear of Shia insurrections--
perhaps fomented by Iran--in Sunni-ruled states. Such
a broader sectarian conflict could open a Pandora's box of problems--
including the radicalization of populations, mass movements
of populations, and regime changes--that might take
decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads to the
other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could
lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm
the global economy.
Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al
Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald's." Left
unchecked, al Qaeda in Iraq could continue to incite violence
between Sunnis and Shia. A chaotic Iraq could provide a still
stronger base of operations for terrorists who seek to act regionally
or even globally. Al Qaeda will portray any failure by
the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured
prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region
and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to Osama
bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they will
seek to expel the Americans and then spread "the jihad wave to
the secular countries neighboring Iraq." A senior European official
told us that failure in Iraq could incite terrorist attacks
within his country.
The global standing of the United States could suffer if
Iraq descends further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and
strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities.
Perceived failure there could diminish America's credibility
and influence in a region that is the center of the Islamic world
and vital to the world's energy supply. This loss would reduce
America's global influence at a time when pressing issues in
North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand our full attention
and strong U.S. leadership of international alliances. And the
longer that U.S. political and military resources are tied down
in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in
Afghanistan increase.
Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization
within the United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans
disapprove of the government's handling of the war, and more
than 60 percent feel that there is no clear plan for moving forward.
The November elections were largely viewed as a referendum
on the progress in Iraq. Arguments about continuing to
provide security and assistance to Iraq will fall on deaf ears if
Americans become disillusioned with the government that the
United States invested so much to create. U.S. foreign policy
cannot be successfully sustained without the broad support of
the American people.
Continued problems in Iraq could also lead to greater
Iraqi opposition to the United States. Recent polling indicates
that only 36 percent of Iraqis feel their country is heading in
the right direction, and 79 percent of Iraqis have a "mostly negative"
view of the influence that the United States has in their
country. Sixty-one percent of Iraqis approve of attacks on U.S.-
led forces. If Iraqis continue to perceive Americans as representing
an occupying force, the United States could become its
own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny.
These and other predictions of dire consequences in Iraq
and the region are by no means a certainty. Iraq has taken several
positive steps since Saddam Hussein was overthrown:
Iraqis restored full sovereignty, conducted open national elections,
drafted a permanent constitution, ratified that constitution,
and elected a new government pursuant to that constitution.
Iraqis may become so sobered by the prospect of an unfolding
civil war and intervention by their regional neighbors
that they take the steps necessary to avert catastrophe. But at
the moment, such a scenario seems implausible because the
Iraqi people and their leaders have been slow to demonstrate
the capacity or will to act.
C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq
Because of the gravity of the situation in Iraq and of its consequences
for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world,
the Iraq Study Group has carefully considered the full range of
alternative approaches for moving forward. We recognize that
there is no perfect solution and that all that have been suggested
have flaws. The following are some of the more notable
possibilities that we have considered.
1. Precipitate Withdrawal
Because of the importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe,
and the role and commitments of the United States in initiating
events that have led to the current situation, we believe
it would be wrong for the United States to abandon the country
through a precipitate withdrawal of troops and support. A premature
American departure from Iraq would almost certainly
produce greater sectarian violence and further deterioration of
conditions, leading to a number of the adverse consequences
outlined above. The near-term results would be a significant
power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional destabilization,
and a threat to the global economy. Al Qaeda would depict our
withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave and Iraq descends
into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventually require
the United States to return.
2. Staying the Course
Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in
Iraq is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation.
Making no changes in policy would simply delay
the day of reckoning at a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are
dying every month. The United States is spending $2 billion a
week. Our ability to respond to other international crises is
constrained. A majority of the American people are soured on
the war. This level of expense is not sustainable over an extended
period, especially when progress is not being made.
The longer the United States remains in Iraq without progress,
the more resentment will grow among Iraqis who believe they
are subjects of a repressive American occupation. As one U.S.
official said to us, "Our leaving would make it worse. . . . The
current approach without modification will not make it better."
3. More Troops for Iraq
Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the
fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of
national reconciliation. A senior American general told us that
adding U.S. troops might temporarily help limit violence in a
highly localized area. However, past experience indicates that
the violence would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are
moved to another area. As another American general told us, if
the Iraqi government does not make political progress, "all the
troops in the world will not provide security." Meanwhile,
America's military capacity is stretched thin: we do not have the
troops or equipment to make a substantial, sustained increase
in our troop presence. Increased deployments to Iraq would also
necessarily hamper our ability to provide adequate resources
for our efforts in Afghanistan or respond to crises around the
world.
4. Devolution to Three Regions
The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous
regions with loose central control would be too high.
Because Iraq's population is not neatly separated, regional
boundaries cannot be easily drawn. All eighteen Iraqi provinces
have mixed populations, as do Baghdad and most other major
cities in Iraq. A rapid devolution could result in mass population
movements, collapse of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening
of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization of neighboring
states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate Iraqi regions.
Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division
would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the
United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state.
While such devolution is a possible consequence of continued
instability in Iraq, we do not believe the United States
should support this course as a policy goal or impose this outcome
on the Iraqi state. If events were to move irreversibly in
this direction, the United States should manage the situation to
ameliorate humanitarian consequences, contain the spread of
violence, and minimize regional instability. The United States
should support as much as possible central control by governmental
authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question of
oil revenues.
D. Achieving Our Goals
We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the
President: an Iraq that can "govern itself, sustain itself, and defend
itself." In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with a
broadly representative government that maintains its territorial
integrity, is at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary,
and doesn't brutalize its own people. Given the current
situation in Iraq, achieving this goal will require much time and
will depend primarily on the actions of the Iraqi people.
In our judgment, there is a new way forward for the
United States to support this objective, and it will offer people
of Iraq a reasonable opportunity to lead a better life than they
did under Saddam Hussein. Our recommended course has
shortcomings, as does each of the policy alternatives we have
reviewed. We firmly believe, however, that it includes the best
strategies and tactics available to us to positively influence the
outcome in Iraq and the region. We believe that it could enable
a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a chance
to pursue a better future, as well as serving America's interests
and values in the years ahead.
II The Way Forward -- A New Approach
Progress in Iraq is still possible if new approaches are taken
promptly by Iraq, the United States, and other countries that
have a stake in the Middle East.
To attain the goals we have outlined, changes in course
must be made both outside and inside Iraq. Our report offers a
comprehensive strategy to build regional and international
support for stability in Iraq, as it encourages the Iraqi people to
assume control of their own destiny. It offers a responsible
transition.
Externally, the United States should immediately begin to
employ all elements of American power to construct a regional
mechanism that can support, rather than retard, progress in
Iraq. Internally, the Iraqi government must take the steps required
to achieve national reconciliation, reduce violence, and
improve the daily lives of Iraqis. Efforts to implement these external
and internal strategies must begin now and must be undertaken
in concert with one another.
This responsible transition can allow for a reduction in
the U.S. presence in Iraq over time.
A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus
The United States must build a new international consensus
for stability in Iraq and the region.
In order to foster such consensus, the United States should
embark on a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international
support structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in
other countries in the region. This support structure should include
every country that has an interest in averting a chaotic
Iraq, including all of Iraq's neighbors--Iran and Syria among
them. Despite the well-known differences between many of
these countries, they all share an interest in avoiding the horrific
consequences that would flow from a chaotic Iraq, particularly a
humanitarian catastrophe and regional destabilization.
A reinvigorated diplomatic effort is required because it is
clear that the Iraqi government cannot succeed in governing,
defending, and sustaining itself by relying on U.S. military and
economic support alone. Nor can the Iraqi government succeed
by relying only on U.S. military support in conjunction
with Iraqi military and police capabilities. Some states have
been withholding commitments they could make to support
Iraq's stabilization and reconstruction. Some states have been
actively undermining stability in Iraq. To achieve a political solution
within Iraq, a broader international support structure is
needed.
1. The New Diplomatic Offensive
Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other
major regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To
put it simply, all key issues in the Middle East--the Arab-
Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic
reforms, and extremism and terrorism--are inextricably linked.
In addition to supporting stability in Iraq, a comprehensive
diplomatic offensive--the New Diplomatic Offensive--should
address these key regional issues. By doing so, it would help
marginalize extremists and terrorists, promote U.S. values and
interests, and improve America's global image.
Under the diplomatic offensive, we propose regional and
international initiatives and steps to assist the Iraqi government
in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones.
Achieving these milestones will require at least the acquiescence
of Iraq's neighbors, and their active and timely
cooperation would be highly desirable.
The diplomatic offensive would extend beyond the primarily
economic "Compact for Iraq" by also emphasizing political,
diplomatic, and security issues. At the same time, it would
be coordinated with the goals of the Compact for Iraq. The
diplomatic offensive would also be broader and more farreaching
than the "Gulf Plus Two" efforts currently being conducted,
and those efforts should be folded into and become
part of the diplomatic offensive.
States included within the diplomatic offensive can play a
major role in reinforcing national reconciliation efforts between
Iraqi Sunnis and Shia. Such reinforcement would contribute
substantially to legitimizing of the political process in
Iraq. Iraq's leaders may not be able to come together unless
they receive the necessary signals and support from abroad.
This backing will not materialize of its own accord, and must be
encouraged urgently by the United States.
In order to advance a comprehensive diplomatic solution,
the Study Group recommends as follows:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with
the Iraqi government, should launch the comprehensive New
Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and
of the region. This new diplomatic offensive should be
launched before December 31, 2006.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive
as it relates to regional players should be to:
i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq's
neighbors.
iii. Secure Iraq's borders, including the use of joint patrols
with neighboring countries.
iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond
Iraq's borders.
v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political
support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi
government from non-neighboring Muslim nations.
vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation
in Iraq.
vii. Validate Iraq's legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations,
where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in
Baghdad.
viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key
capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).
ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on
Kirkuk.
x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security,
political, and economic milestones, including better
performance on issues such as national reconciliation, equitable
distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of
militias.
RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic
offensive, and in addition to the Support Group discussed
below, the United States and the Iraqi government should
support the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of
the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab
League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national
reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic
presence in Iraq.
2. The Iraq International Support Group
This new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includes
the active participation of those countries that have a critical
stake in preventing Iraq from falling into chaos. To encourage
their participation, the United States should immediately
seek the creation of the Iraq International Support Group. The
Support Group should also include all countries that border Iraq
as well as other key countries in the region and the world.
The Support Group would not seek to impose obligations
or undertakings on the government of Iraq. Instead, the Support
Group would assist Iraq in ways the government of Iraq
would desire, attempting to strengthen Iraq's sovereignty--not
diminish it.
It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq's
neighbors are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a
unified Iraq that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity,
but not so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None
favors the breakup of the Iraqi state. Each country in the region
views the situation in Iraq through the filter of its particular
set of interests. For example:
- Turkey opposes an independent or even highly autonomous
Kurdistan because of its own national security considerations.
- Iran backs Shia claims and supports various Shia militias in
Iraq, but it also supports other groups in order to enhance its
influence and hedge its bets on possible outcomes.
- Syria, despite facilitating support for Iraqi insurgent groups,
would be threatened by the impact that the breakup of Iraq
would have on its own multiethnic and multiconfessional
society.
- Kuwait wants to ensure that it will not once again be the victim
of Iraqi irredentism and aggression.
- Saudi Arabia and Jordan share Sunni concerns over Shia ascendancy
in Iraq and the region as a whole.
- The other Arab Gulf states also recognize the benefits of an
outcome in Iraq that does not destabilize the region and exacerbate
Shia-Sunni tensions.
- None of Iraq's neighbors--especially major countries such as
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel--see it in their interest for
the situation in Iraq to lead to aggrandized regional influence
by Iran. Indeed, they may take active steps to limit Iran's influence,
steps that could lead to an intraregional conflict.
Left to their own devices, these governments will tend to
reinforce ethnic, sectarian, and political divisions within Iraqi
society. But if the Support Group takes a systematic and active
approach toward considering the concerns of each country, we
believe that each can be encouraged to play a positive role in
Iraq and the region.
SAUDI ARABIA. Saudi Arabia's agreement not to intervene
with assistance to Sunni Arab Iraqis could be an essential quid
pro quo for similar forbearance on the part of other neighbors,
especially Iran. The Saudis could use their Islamic credentials
to help reconcile differences between Iraqi factions and build
broader support in the Islamic world for a stabilization agreement,
as their recent hosting of a meeting of Islamic religious
leaders in Mecca suggests. If the government in Baghdad pursues
a path of national reconciliation with the Sunnis, the Saudis
could help Iraq confront and eliminate al Qaeda in Iraq. They
could also cancel the Iraqi debt owed them. In addition, the
Saudis might be helpful in persuading the Syrians to cooperate.
TURKEY. As a major Sunni Muslim country on Iraq's borders,
Turkey can be a partner in supporting the national reconciliation
process in Iraq. Such efforts can be particularly helpful
given Turkey's interest in Kurdistan remaining an integral part
of a unified Iraq and its interest in preventing a safe haven for
Kurdish terrorists (the PKK).
EGYPT. Because of its important role in the Arab world,
Egypt should be encouraged to foster the national reconciliation
process in Iraq with a focus on getting the Sunnis to participate.
At the same time, Egypt has the means, and indeed has
offered, to train groups of Iraqi military and security forces in
Egypt on a rotational basis.
JORDAN. Jordan, like Egypt, can help in the national reconciliation
process in Iraq with the Sunnis. It too has the professional
capability to train and equip Iraqi military and security forces.
RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New
Diplomatic Offensive, an Iraq International Support Group
should be organized immediately following the launch of the
New Diplomatic Offensive.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist
of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and
Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf
States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself.
Other countries--for instance, Germany, Japan and
South Korea--that might be willing to contribute to resolving
political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting
Iraq could also become members.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive
and the work of the Support Group should be carried out
with urgency, and should be conducted by and organized at
the level of foreign minister or above. The Secretary of State,
if not the President, should lead the U.S. effort. That effort
should be both bilateral and multilateral, as circumstances
require.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on
the participation of the office of the United Nations Secretary-
General in its work. The United Nations Secretary-General
should designate a Special Envoy as his representative.
RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the
New Diplomatic Offensive, should develop specific approaches
to neighboring countries that take into account the
interests, perspectives, and potential contributions as suggested
above.
3. Dealing with Iran and Syria
Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is
our view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its
adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences
consistent with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support
Group should actively engage Iran and Syria in its
diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions.
The Study Group recognizes that U.S. relationships with
Iran and Syria involve difficult issues that must be resolved.
Diplomatic talks should be extensive and substantive, and they
will require a balancing of interests. The United States has
diplomatic, economic, and military disincentives available in
approaches to both Iran and Syria. However, the United States
should also consider incentives to try to engage them constructively,
much as it did successfully with Libya.
Some of the possible incentives to Iran, Syria, or both include:
i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors
and the region.
ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the
Taliban from destabilizing Afghanistan.
iii. Accession to international organizations, including the World
Trade Organization.
iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United
States.
v. The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and
economic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocating
regime change.
vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated
between Israel and Syria, with U.S. involvement
as part of a broader initiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlined
below.
RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic
Offensive and the Support Group, the United States
should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to
obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq
and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and Iran, the
United States should consider incentives, as well as disincentives,
in seeking constructive results.
IRAN. Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state
of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Yet the United States and Iran
cooperated in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore
whether this model can be replicated in the case of Iraq.
Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United
States bogged down in Iraq, Iran's interests would not be
served by a failure of U.S. policy in Iraq that led to chaos and
the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran's population
is slightly more than 50 percent Persian, but it has a large Azeri
minority (24 percent of the population) as well as Kurdish and
Arab minorities. Worst-case scenarios in Iraq could inflame
sectarian tensions within Iran, with serious consequences for
Iranian national security interests.
Our limited contacts with Iran's government lead us to
believe that its leaders are likely to say they will not participate
in diplomatic efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute
this reluctance to their belief that the United States seeks
regime change in Iran.
Nevertheless, as one of Iraq's neighbors Iran should be
asked to assume its responsibility to participate in the Support
Group. An Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq
and the rest of the world Iran's rejectionist attitude and approach,
which could lead to its isolation. Further, Iran's refusal
to cooperate on this matter would diminish its prospects of engaging
with the United States in the broader dialogue it seeks.
RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran's nuclear programs
should continue to be dealt with by the United Nations
Security Council and its five permanent members (i.e., the
United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China)
plus Germany.
RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts within the
Support Group should seek to persuade Iran that it should
take specific steps to improve the situation in Iraq.
Among steps Iran could usefully take are the following:
- Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and
training to any group resorting to violence in Iraq.
- Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity
of Iraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty
of Iraq and its government.
- Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq,
to encourage national reconciliation.
- Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic
reconstruction of Iraq.
SYRIA. Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point,
both countries have important interests in the region that could
be enhanced if they were able to establish some common
ground on how to move forward. This approach worked effectively
in the early 1990s. In this context, Syria's national interests
in the Arab-Israeli dispute are important and can be brought
into play.
Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq's stability in
several ways. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends the
following:
RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support
Group should encourage and persuade Syria of the
merit of such contributions as the following:
- Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent
possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols
on the border. Doing so will help stem the flow of
funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.
- Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with
the Iraqis.
- Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation
with Iraq.
4. The Wider Regional Context
The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the
Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by
the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all
fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment
to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This
commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between
Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel's right to
exist), and particularly Syria--which is the principal transit
point for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah, and which supports
radical Palestinian groups.
The United States does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding
direct involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several
reasons, we should act boldly:
- There is no military solution to this conflict.
- The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being a
nation perpetually at war.
- No American administration--Democratic or Republican--
will ever abandon Israel.
- Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the Arab-
Israeli dispute because it is an axiom that when the political
process breaks down there will be violence on the ground.
- The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set
forth in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and
in the principle of "land for peace."
- The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace
such as Israel has achieved with Egypt and Jordan.
This effort would strongly support moderate Arab governments
in the region, especially the democratically elected
government of Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority under
President Mahmoud Abbas.
RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and
sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive
Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon and Syria, and
President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution
for Israel and Palestine.
RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include--as
soon as possible--the unconditional calling and holding of
meetings, under the auspices of the United States or the
Quartet (i.e., the United States, Russia, European Union, and
the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon and Syria
on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who acknowledge
Israel's right to exist) on the other. The purpose of these
meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the
Madrid Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks--
one Syrian/Lebanese, and the other Palestinian.
RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements
of that negotiated peace should be:
- Syria's full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution
1701 of August 2006, which provides the framework for
Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory.
- Syria's full cooperation with all investigations into political
assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik
Hariri and Pierre Gemayel.
- A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use
of Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons
and aid to Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel's
problem with Hezbollah.)
- Syria's use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah
for the release of the captured Israeli Defense Force
soldiers.
- A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the
democratically elected government of Lebanon.
- A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting
through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian
groups.
- A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment
of Israel's right to exist.
- Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and
in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis
should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee
for Israel that could include an international force on the
border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties.
RECOMMENDATION 17: Concerning the Palestinian issue,
elements of that negotiated peace should include:
- Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338 and to the principle of land for peace, which are the
only bases for achieving peace.
- Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
and the Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing
the way for negotiations with Israel.
- A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating
the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians
and the Israelis in November 2006.
- Support for a Palestinian national unity government.
- Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement
along the lines of President Bush's two-state solution, which
would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements,
Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict.
Afghanistan
At the same time, we must not lose sight of the importance of
the situation inside Afghanistan and the renewed threat posed
by the Taliban. Afghanistan's borders are porous. If the Taliban
were to control more of Afghanistan, it could provide al Qaeda
the political space to conduct terrorist operations. This development
would destabilize the region and have national security
implications for the United States and other countries around
the world. Also, the significant increase in poppy production in
Afghanistan fuels the illegal drug trade and narco-terrorism.
The huge focus of U.S. political, military, and economic
support on Iraq has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan.
As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq
and the Middle East, it must also give priority to the situation
in Afghanistan. Doing so may require increased political, security,
and military measures.
RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States
to provide additional political, economic, and military support
for Afghanistan, including resources that might become
available as combat forces are moved from Iraq.
B.The Internal Approach:
Helping Iraqis Help Themselves
The New Diplomatic Offensive will provide the proper external
environment and support for the difficult internal steps that
the Iraqi government must take to promote national reconciliation,
establish security, and make progress on governance.
The most important issues facing Iraq's future are now
the responsibility of Iraq's elected leaders. Because of the security
and assistance it provides, the United States has a significant
role to play. Yet only the government and people of Iraq
can make and sustain certain decisions critical to Iraq's future.
1. Performance on Milestones
The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to
support the achievement of specific objectives--or milestones--
on national reconciliation, security, and governance.
Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the
right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government
needs to show its own citizens--and the citizens of the United
States and other countries--that it deserves continued support.
The U.S. government must make clear that it expects
action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward
these milestones. Such a message can be sent only at the
level of our national leaders, and only in person, during direct
consultation.
As President Bush's meeting with Prime Minister Maliki
in Amman, Jordan demonstrates, it is important for the President
to remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi
leadership. There is no substitute for sustained dialogue at the
highest levels of government.
During these high-level exchanges, the United States
should lay out an agenda for continued support to help Iraq
achieve milestones, as well as underscoring the consequences
if Iraq does not act. It should be unambiguous that continued
U.S. political, military, and economic support for Iraq depends
on the Iraqi government's demonstrating political will and
making substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones
on national reconciliation, security, and governance.
The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces
units from the United States to Iraq should be influenced by
Iraq's performance on milestones.
The United States should also signal that it is seeking broad
international support for Iraq on behalf of achieving these milestones.
The United States can begin to shape a positive climate
for its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq,
through public statements by President Bush that reject the notion
that the United States seeks to control Iraq's oil, or seeks
permanent military bases within Iraq. However, the United
States could consider a request from Iraq for temporary bases.
RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership
of his national security team should remain in close and frequent
contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts must
convey a clear message: there must be action by the Iraqi government
to make substantial progress toward the achievement
of milestones. In public diplomacy, the President should
convey as much detail as possible about the substance of these
exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi
people, and the countries in the region well informed.
RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates
political will and makes substantial progress toward
the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security,
and governance, the United States should make clear its
willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for
Iraq's security forces, and to continue political, military, and
economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq becomes
more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself,
the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced.
RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not
make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones
on national reconciliation, security, and governance,
the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic
support for the Iraqi government.
RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that
the United States does not seek permanent military bases in
Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary
base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that
request as it would in the case of any other government.
RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that
the United States does not seek to control Iraq's oil.
Milestones for Iraq
The government of Iraq understands that dramatic steps are
necessary to avert a downward spiral and make progress. Prime
Minister Maliki has worked closely in consultation with the
United States and has put forward the following milestones in
the key areas of national reconciliation, security and governance:
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
By the end of 2006-early 2007:
- Approval of the Provincial Election Law and setting an
election date
- Approval of the Petroleum Law
- Approval of the De-Baathification Law
- Approval of the Militia Law
By March 2007:
- A referendum on constitutional amendments (if it is necessary)
By May 2007:
- Completion of Militia Law implementation
- Approval of amnesty agreement
- Completion of reconciliation efforts
By June 2007:
SECURITY (pending joint U.S.-Iraqi review)
By the end of 2006:
- Iraqi increase of 2007 security spending over 2006 levels
By April 2007:
- Iraqi control of the Army
By September 2007:
- Iraqi control of provinces
By December 2007:
- Iraqi security self-reliance (with U.S. support)
GOVERNANCE
By the end of 2006:
- The Central Bank of Iraq will raise interest rates to 20
percent and appreciate the Iraqi dinar by 10 percent to
combat accelerating inflation.
- Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleum
products and sell imported fuel at market prices.
RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated completion
dates of the end of 2006 or early 2007 for some milestones
may not be realistic. These should be completed by the first
quarter of 2007.
RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good
start. The United States should consult closely with the Iraqi
government and develop additional milestones in three
areas: national reconciliation, security, and improving government
services affecting the daily lives of Iraqis. As with
the current milestones, these additional milestones should be
tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible.
2. National Reconciliation
National reconciliation is essential to reduce further violence
and maintain the unity of Iraq.
U.S. forces can help provide stability for a time to enable
Iraqi leaders to negotiate political solutions, but they cannot
stop the violence--or even contain it--if there is no underlying
political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their
country.
The Iraqi government must send a clear signal to Sunnis
that there is a place for them in national life. The government
needs to act now, to give a signal of hope. Unless Sunnis believe
they can get a fair deal in Iraq through the political process,
there is no prospect that the insurgency will end. To strike this
fair deal, the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people must address
several issues that are critical to the success of national
reconciliation and thus to the future of Iraq.
Steps for Iraq to Take on Behalf of National Reconciliation
RECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of
the constitution is essential to national reconciliation and
should be pursued on an urgent basis. The United Nations has
expertise in this field, and should play a role in this process.
RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliation
requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab
nationalists into national life, with the leading figures of Saddam
Hussein's regime excluded. The United States should encourage
the return of qualified Iraqi professionals--Sunni or
Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd or Turkmen or Christian
or Arab--into the government.
RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues
should accrue to the central government and be shared
on the basis of population. No formula that gives control over
revenues from future fields to the regions or gives control of
oil fields to the regions is compatible with national reconciliation.
RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial
elections should be held at the earliest possible date. Under
the constitution, new provincial elections should have been
held already. They are necessary to restore representative
government.
RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous
situation in Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary
to avert communal violence. Kirkuk's mix of Kurdish, Arab,
and Turkmen populations could make it a powder keg. A referendum
on the future of Kirkuk (as required by the Iraqi
Constitution before the end of 2007) would be explosive and
should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the agenda
of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New
Diplomatic Offensive.
RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals
must be far-reaching. Any successful effort at national reconciliation
must involve those in the government finding ways
and means to reconcile with former bitter enemies.
RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women
and the rights of all minority communities in Iraq, including
Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians,
must be protected.
RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government
should stop using the process of registering nongovernmental
organizations as a tool for politicizing or stopping
their activities. Registration should be solely an administrative
act, not an occasion for government censorship and interference.
Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf of
National Reconciliation
The United States can take several steps to assist in Iraq's reconciliation
process.
The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest
in a national reconciliation dialogue. The point is not for the
United States to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an
approach that we oppose. The point is for the United States
and Iraq to make clear their shared interest in the orderly departure
of U.S. forces as Iraqi forces take on the security mission.
A successful national reconciliation dialogue will advance
that departure date.
RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S.
force presence must be on the table for discussion as the
national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion will
increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and
militia leaders, and thereby increase the possibilities for
success.
Violence cannot end unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue
must involve those who wield power, not simply those who hold
political office. The United States must try to talk directly to
Grand Ayatollah Sistani and must consider appointing a highlevel
American Shia Muslim to serve as an emissary to him.
The United States must also try to talk directly to Moqtada al-
Sadr, to militia leaders, and to insurgent leaders. The United
Nations can help facilitate contacts.
RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active
efforts to engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of
al Qaeda. The United States must find a way to talk to Grand
Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent
leaders.
The very focus on sectarian identity that endangers Iraq also
presents opportunities to seek broader support for a national
reconciliation dialogue. Working with Iraqi leaders, the international
community and religious leaders can play an important
role in fostering dialogue and reconciliation across the sectarian
divide. The United States should actively encourage the
constructive participation of all who can take part in advancing
national reconciliation within Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage
dialogue between sectarian communities, as outlined in
the New Diplomatic Offensive above. It should press religious
leaders inside and outside Iraq to speak out on behalf
of peace and reconciliation.
Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi government are an
important incentive in reconciliation talks and they need to be
generous. Amnesty proposals to once-bitter enemies will be
difficult for the United States to accept, just as they will be difficult
for the Iraqis to make. Yet amnesty is an issue to be grappled
with by the Iraqis, not by Americans. Despite being
politically unpopular--in the United States as well as in Iraq--
amnesty is essential if progress is to take place. Iraqi leaders
need to be certain that they have U.S. support as they move
forward with this critical element of national reconciliation.
RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must
not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the
legislative branch.
Militias and National Reconciliation
The use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and
necessary to stop militias that act as death squads or use violence
against institutions of the state. However, solving the
problem of militias requires national reconciliation.
Dealing with Iraq's militias will require long-term attention,
and substantial funding will be needed to disarm, demobilize,
and reintegrate militia members into civilian society.
Around the world, this process of transitioning members of irregular
military forces from civil conflict to new lives once a
peace settlement takes hold is familiar. The disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration of militias depends on national
reconciliation and on confidence-building measures among the
parties to that reconciliation.
Both the United Nations and expert and experienced
nongovernmental organizations, especially the International
Organization for Migration, must be on the ground with appropriate
personnel months before any program to disarm, demobilize,
and reintegrate militia members begins. Because the
United States is a party to the conflict, the U.S. military should
not be involved in implementing such a program. Yet U.S. financial
and technical support is crucial.
RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support
the presence of neutral international experts as advisors
to the Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration.
RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide
financial and technical support and establish a single office in
Iraq to coordinate assistance to the Iraqi government and its
expert advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize, and
reintegrate militia members.
3. Security and Military Forces
A Military Strategy for Iraq
There is no action the American military can take that, by itself,
can bring about success in Iraq. But there are actions that the
U.S. and Iraqi governments, working together, can and should
take to increase the probability of avoiding disaster there, and
increase the chance of success.
The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently
needed national reconciliation program to which it has already
committed. And it should accelerate assuming responsibility
for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi
Army brigades. As the Iraqi Army increases in size and capability,
the Iraqi government should be able to take real responsibility
for governance.
While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the
United States should significantly increase the number of U.S.
military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and
supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, we could
begin to move combat forces out of Iraq. The primary mission of
U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi
army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat
operations. We should continue to maintain support forces,
rapid-reaction forces, special operations forces, intelligence
units, search-and-rescue units, and force protection units.
While the size and composition of the Iraqi Army is ultimately
a matter for the Iraqi government to determine, we
should be firm on the urgent near-term need for significant additional
trained Army brigades, since this is the key to Iraqis
taking over full responsibility for their own security, which they
want to do and which we need them to do. It is clear that they
will still need security assistance from the United States for
some time to come as they work to achieve political and security
changes.
One of the most important elements of our support
would be the imbedding of substantially more U.S. military
personnel in all Iraqi Army battalions and brigades, as well as
within Iraqi companies. U.S. personnel would provide advice,
combat assistance, and staff assistance. The training of Iraqi
units by the United States has improved and should continue
for the coming year. In addition to this training, Iraqi combat
units need supervised on-the-job training as they move to field
operations. This on-the-job training could be best done by
imbedding more U.S. military personnel in Iraqi deployed
units. The number of imbedded personnel would be based on
the recommendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but it
should be large enough to accelerate the development of a real
combat capability in Iraqi Army units. Such a mission could involve
10,000 to 20,000 American troops instead of the 3,000 to
4,000 now in this role. This increase in imbedded troops could
be carried out without an aggregate increase over time in the
total number of troops in Iraq by making a corresponding decrease
in troops assigned to U.S. combat brigades.
Another mission of the U.S. military would be to assist
Iraqi deployed brigades with intelligence, transportation, air
support, and logistics support, as well as providing some key
equipment.
A vital mission of the U.S. military would be to maintain
rapid-reaction teams and special operations teams. These
teams would be available to undertake strike missions against al
Qaeda in Iraq when the opportunity arises, as well as for other
missions considered vital by the U.S. commander in Iraq.
The performance of the Iraqi Army could also be significantly
improved if it had improved equipment. One source
could be equipment left behind by departing U.S. units. The
quickest and most effective way for the Iraqi Army to get the
bulk of their equipment would be through our Foreign Military
Sales program, which they have already begun to use.
While these efforts are building up, and as additional
Iraqi brigades are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could
begin to move out of Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject
to unexpected developments in the security situation on the
ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection
could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq
could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in
rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training,
equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue.
Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even after the
United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we
would maintain a considerable military presence in the region,
with our still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air,
ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar,
as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces
would be sufficiently robust to permit the United States, working
with the Iraqi government, to accomplish four missions:
- Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order
to avoid its collapse and the disintegration of the country.
- Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq
using special operations teams.
- Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces.
- Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria
and Iran.
Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security
goals and to our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered
proposals to make a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000)
in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course
because we do not believe that the needed levels are available
for a sustained deployment. Further, adding more American
troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security
problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence is intended
to be a long-term "occupation." We could, however,
support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat
forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and
equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines
that such steps would be effective.
We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops,
because we believe that so much is at stake.
We believe that our recommended actions will give the
Iraqi Army the support it needs to have a reasonable chance to
take responsibility for Iraq's security. Given the ongoing deterioration
in the security situation, it is urgent to move as quickly
as possible to have that security role taken over by Iraqi security
forces.
The United States should not make an open-ended commitment
to keep large numbers of American troops deployed
in Iraq for three compelling reasons.
First, and most importantly, the United States faces other
security dangers in the world, and a continuing Iraqi commitment
of American ground forces at present levels will leave no
reserve available to meet other contingencies. On September
7, 2006, General James Jones, our NATO commander, called
for more troops in Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces
are fighting a resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban forces. The
United States should respond positively to that request, and be
prepared for other security contingencies, including those in
Iran and North Korea.
Second, the long-term commitment of American ground
forces to Iraq at current levels is adversely affecting Army
readiness, with less than a third of the Army units currently at
high readiness levels. The Army is unlikely to be able to meet
the next rotation of troops in Iraq without undesirable changes
in its deployment practices. The Army is now considering
breaking its compact with the National Guard and Reserves
that limits the number of years that these citizen-soldiers can
be deployed. Behind this short-term strain is the longer-term
risk that the ground forces will be impaired in ways that will
take years to reverse.
And finally, an open-ended commitment of American
forces would not provide the Iraqi government the incentive it
needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance
of quelling sectarian violence. In the absence of such an incentive,
the Iraqi government might continue to delay taking those
difficult actions.
While it is clear that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is
moderating the violence, there is little evidence that the longterm
deployment of U.S. troops by itself has led or will lead to
fundamental improvements in the security situation. It is important
to recognize that there are no risk-free alternatives
available to the United States at this time. Reducing our combat
troop commitments in Iraq, whenever that occurs, undeniably
creates risks, but leaving those forces tied down in Iraq
indefinitely creates its own set of security risks.
RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not
make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of
American troops deployed in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it
clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could
carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if
Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America's
other security needs and the future of our military cannot be
made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.
RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the
training and equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008,
as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006.
RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must
change, with the highest priority given to the training, equipping,
advising, and support mission and to counterterrorism
operations.
RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers
and military personnel should be assigned to the
imbedded teams, and American teams should be present with
Iraqi units down to the company level. The U.S. military
should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for
these officers and personnel.
RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support
more and better equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging
the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign
Military Sales requests and, as American combat brigades
move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment
for Iraqi forces.
Restoring the U.S. Military
We recognize that there are other results of the war in Iraq that
have great consequence for our nation. One consequence has
been the stress and uncertainty imposed on our military--the
most professional and proficient military in history. The United
States will need its military to protect U.S. security regardless
of what happens in Iraq. We therefore considered how to limit
the adverse consequences of the strain imposed on our military
by the Iraq war.
U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have
been stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments
in Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 dead
and more than 21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting,
and accelerated wear on equipment.
Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of
disarray, as supplemental funding winds down and reset costs
become clear. It will be a major challenge to meet ongoing requirements
for other current and future security threats that
need to be accommodated together with spending for operations
and maintenance, reset, personnel, and benefits for active
duty and retired personnel. Restoring the capability of our military
forces should be a high priority for the United States at
this time.
The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership
between the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense
and the uniformed services. Both have long benefited
from a relationship in which the civilian leadership exercises
control with the advantage of fully candid professional advice,
and the military serves loyally with the understanding that its
advice has been heard and valued. That tradition has frayed,
and civil-military relations need to be repaired.
RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense
should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations,
by creating an environment in which the senior military
feel free to offer independent advice not only to the
civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President
and the National Security Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-
Nichols legislation.
RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the
Pentagon leadership should emphasize training and education
programs for the forces that have returned to the continental
United States in order to "reset" the force and restore
the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for global contingencies.
RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the
United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds
to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next
five years.
RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation
with the relevant committees of Congress, should
assess the full future budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and
its potential impact on the future readiness of the force, the
ability to recruit and retain high-quality personnel, needed
investments in procurement and in research and development,
and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies involved
in the stability and reconstruction effort.
4. Police and Criminal Justice
The problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system
are profound.
The ethos and training of Iraqi police forces must support
the mission to "protect and serve" all Iraqis. Today, far too
many Iraqi police do not embrace that mission, in part because
of problems in how reforms were organized and implemented
by the Iraqi and U.S. governments.
Recommended Iraqi Actions
Within Iraq, the failure of the police to restore order and prevent
militia infiltration is due, in part, to the poor organization
of Iraq's component police forces: the Iraqi National Police,
the Iraqi Border Police, and the Iraqi Police Service.
The Iraqi National Police pursue a mission that is more
military than domestic in nature--involving commando-style
operations--and is thus ill-suited to the Ministry of the Interior.
The more natural home for the National Police is within the
Ministry of Defense, which should be the authority for counterinsurgency
operations and heavily armed forces. Though depriving
the Ministry of the Interior of operational forces, this
move will place the Iraqi National Police under better and more
rigorous Iraqi and U.S. supervision and will enable these units
to better perform their counterinsurgency mission.
RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police
should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police
commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.
Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged with a role that
bears little resemblance to ordinary policing, especially in light
of the current flow of foreign fighters, insurgents, and
weaponry across Iraq's borders and the need for joint patrols of
the border with foreign militaries. Thus the natural home for
the Border Police is within the Ministry of Defense, which
should be the authority for controlling Iraq's borders.
RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police
should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which
would have total responsibility for border control and external
security.
The Iraqi Police Service, which operates in the provinces and
provides local policing, needs to become a true police force. It
needs legal authority, training, and equipment to control crime
and protect Iraqi citizens. Accomplishing those goals will not
be easy, and the presence of American advisors will be required
to help the Iraqis determine a new role for the police.
RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should
be given greater responsibility to conduct criminal investigations
and should expand its cooperation with other elements
in the Iraqi judicial system in order to better control crime
and protect Iraqi civilians.
In order to more effectively administer the Iraqi Police Service,
the Ministry of the Interior needs to undertake substantial
reforms to purge bad elements and highlight best practices.
Once the ministry begins to function effectively, it can exert
a positive influence over the provinces and take back some
of the authority that was lost to local governments through
decentralization. To reduce corruption and militia infiltration,
the Ministry of the Interior should take authority from the local
governments for the handling of policing funds. Doing so will
improve accountability and organizational discipline, limit the
authority of provincial police officials, and identify police officers
with the central government.
RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior
should undergo a process of organizational transformation,
including efforts to expand the capability and reach of the
current major crime unit (or Criminal Investigation Division)
and to exert more authority over local police forces. The
sole authority to pay police salaries and disburse financial
support to local police should be transferred to the Ministry
of the Interior.
Finally, there is no alternative to bringing the Facilities Protection
Service under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior.
Simply disbanding these units is not an option, as the
members will take their weapons and become full-time militiamen
or insurgents. All should be brought under the authority
of a reformed Ministry of the Interior. They will need to be vetted,
retrained, and closely supervised. Those who are no longer
part of the Facilities Protection Service need to participate in a
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program (outlined
above).
RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior
should proceed with current efforts to identify, register, and
control the Facilities Protection Service.
U.S. Actions
The Iraqi criminal justice system is weak, and the U.S. training
mission has been hindered by a lack of clarity and capacity. It
has not always been clear who is in charge of the police training
mission, and the U.S. military lacks expertise in certain areas
pertaining to police and the rule of law. The United States has
been more successful in training the Iraqi Army than it has the
police. The U.S. Department of Justice has the expertise and
capacity to carry out the police training mission. The U.S. Department
of Defense is already bearing too much of the burden
in Iraq. Meanwhile, the pool of expertise in the United States
on policing and the rule of law has been underutilized.
The United States should adjust its training mission in
Iraq to match the recommended changes in the Iraqi government--
the movement of the National and Border Police to the
Ministry of Defense and the new emphasis on the Iraqi Police
Service within the Ministry of the Interior. To reflect the reorganization,
the Department of Defense would continue to train
the Iraqi National and Border Police, and the Department of
Justice would become responsible for training the Iraqi Police
Service.
RECOMMENDATION 55: The U.S. Department of Defense
should continue its mission to train the Iraqi National Police
and the Iraqi Border Police, which should be placed within
the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
RECOMMENDATION 56: The U.S. Department of Justice
should direct the training mission of the police forces remaining
under the Ministry of the Interior.
RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training
teams are imbedded within Iraqi Army units, the current
practice of imbedding U.S. police trainers should be expanded
and the numbers of civilian training officers increased so that
teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi Police Service, including
local police stations. These trainers should be obtained
from among experienced civilian police executives and supervisors
from around the world. These officers would replace
the military police personnel currently assigned to training
teams.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided personnel to
train the Criminal Investigation Division in the Ministry of the
Interior, which handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded
a large team within Iraq for counterterrorism activities.
Building on this experience, the training programs should
be expanded and should include the development of forensic
investigation training and facilities that could apply scientific
and technical investigative methods to counterterrorism as well
as to ordinary criminal activity.
RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative
and forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include
coverage of terrorism as well as criminal activity.
One of the major deficiencies of the Iraqi Police Service is its
lack of equipment, particularly in the area of communications
and motor transport.
RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should
provide funds to expand and upgrade communications
equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service.
The Department of Justice is also better suited than the Department
of Defense to carry out the mission of reforming
Iraq's Ministry of the Interior and Iraq's judicial system. Iraq
needs more than training for cops on the beat: it needs courts,
trained prosecutors and investigators, and the ability to protect
Iraqi judicial officials.
RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice
should lead the work of organizational transformation in the
Ministry of the Interior. This approach must involve Iraqi officials,
starting at senior levels and moving down, to create a
strategic plan and work out standard administrative procedures,
codes of conduct, and operational measures that
Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in
partnership.
RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department
of Justice to establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors,
and investigators; and to create institutions and practices to
fight corruption must be strongly supported and funded. New
and refurbished courthouses with improved physical security,
secure housing for judges and judicial staff, witness protection
facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts
of a secure and functioning system of justice.
5. The Oil Sector
Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the
Iraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help
Iraq maximize its capability.
Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore
oil production from existing fields to 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels a
day over a three- to five-year period, depending on evolving
conditions in key reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow,
oil production would decline unless current problems in
the oil sector were addressed.
Short Term
RECOMMENDATION 62:
- As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide
technical assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare
a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and
local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework
for investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract
investment.
- The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government
to accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well
work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase production,
but the United States should no longer fund such
infrastructure projects.
- The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military
and with private security forces to protect oil infrastructure
and contractors. Protective measures could include a
program to improve pipeline security by paying local
tribes solely on the basis of throughput (rather than fixed
amounts).
- Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply
line. This step would immediately improve accountability
in the oil sector.
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t h e i r aq study group report
- In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the
U.S. government should press Iraq to continue reducing
subsidies in the energy sector, instead of providing grant
assistance. Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products,
drastic fuel shortages will remain.
Long Term
Expanding oil production in Iraq over the long term will require
creating corporate structures, establishing management
systems, and installing competent managers to plan and oversee
an ambitious list of major oil-field investment projects.
To improve oil-sector performance, the Study Group puts
forward the following recommendations.
RECOMMENDATION 63:
- The United States should encourage investment in Iraq's
oil sector by the international community and by international
energy companies.
- The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize
the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order
to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.
- To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge
the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes,
and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers
can track exports and export revenues.
- The United States should support the World Bank's efforts
to ensure that best practices are used in contracting. This
support involves providing Iraqi officials with contracting
templates and training them in contracting, auditing, and
reviewing audits.
- The United States should provide technical assistance to
the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving
the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting
and auditing, and updating professional training programs
for management and technical personnel.
6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction
Assistance
Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the
heart of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and capacity building demands
additional U.S. resources.
Progress in providing essential government services is
necessary to sustain any progress on the political or security
front. The period of large U.S.-funded reconstruction projects
is over, yet the Iraqi government is still in great need of technical
assistance and advice to build the capacity of its institutions.
The Iraqi government needs help with all aspects of its operations,
including improved procedures, greater delegation of authority,
and better internal controls. The strong emphasis on
building capable central ministries must be accompanied by efforts
to develop functioning, effective provincial government
institutions with local citizen participation.
Job creation is also essential. There is no substitute for
private-sector job generation, but the Commander's Emergency
Response Program is a necessary transitional mechanism
until security and the economic climate improve. It provides
immediate economic assistance for trash pickup, water, sewers,
and electricity in conjunction with clear, hold, and build operations,
and it should be funded generously. A total of $753 million
was appropriated for this program in FY 2006.
RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic assistance should
be increased to a level of $5 billion per year rather than being
permitted to decline. The President needs to ask for the necessary
resources and must work hard to win the support of
Congress. Capacity building and job creation, including reliance
on the Commander's Emergency Response Program,
should be U.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be provided
on a nonsectarian basis.
The New Diplomatic Offensive can help draw in more international
partners to assist with the reconstruction mission. The
United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and
some Arab League members need to become hands-on participants
in Iraq's reconstruction.
RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction
efforts in Iraq should be greater involvement by and
with international partners, who should do more than just
contribute money. They should also actively participate in
the design and construction of projects.
The number of refugees and internally displaced persons
within Iraq is increasing dramatically. If this situation is not
addressed, Iraq and the region could be further destabilized,
and the humanitarian suffering could be severe. Funding for
international relief efforts is insufficient, and should be increased.
RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take
the lead in funding assistance requests from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian
agencies.
Coordination of Economic and Reconstruction Assistance
A lack of coordination by senior management in Washington
still hampers U.S. contributions to Iraq's reconstruction.
Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in
short supply. No single official is assigned responsibility or held
accountable for the overall reconstruction effort. Representatives
of key foreign partners involved in reconstruction have
also spoken to us directly and specifically about the need for a
point of contact that can coordinate their efforts with the U.S.
government.
A failure to improve coordination will result in agencies
continuing to follow conflicting strategies, wasting taxpayer
dollars on duplicative and uncoordinated efforts. This waste
will further undermine public confidence in U.S. policy in Iraq.
A Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq is
required. He or she should report to the President, be given a
staff and funding, and chair a National Security Council interagency
group consisting of senior principals at the undersecretary
level from all relevant U.S. government departments and
agencies. The Senior Advisor's responsibility must be to bring
unity of effort to the policy, budget, and implementation of
economic reconstruction programs in Iraq. The Senior Advisor
must act as the principal point of contact with U.S. partners in
the overall reconstruction effort.
He or she must have close and constant interaction with
senior U.S. officials and military commanders in Iraq, especially
the Director of the Iraq Reconstruction and Management
Office, so that the realities on the ground are brought
directly and fully into the policy-making process. In order to
maximize the effectiveness of assistance, all involved must be
on the same page at all times.
RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a
Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq.
Improving the Effectiveness of Assistance Programs
Congress should work with the administration to improve its
ability to implement assistance programs in Iraq quickly, flexibly,
and effectively.
As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq
should have the authority to fund quick-disbursing projects to
promote national reconciliation, as well as to rescind funding
from programs and projects in which the government of Iraq is
not demonstrating effective partnership. These are important
tools to improve performance and accountability--as is the
work of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq
should have the authority to spend significant funds through a
program structured along the lines of the Commander's Emergency
Response Program, and should have the authority to rescind
funding from programs and projects in which the
government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership.
RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed
for the duration of assistance programs in Iraq.
U.S. security assistance programs in Iraq are slowed considerably
by the differing requirements of State and Defense Department
programs and of their respective congressional
oversight committees. Since Iraqi forces must be trained and
equipped, streamlining the provision of training and equipment
to Iraq is critical. Security assistance should be delivered
promptly, within weeks of a decision to provide it.
RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance
program for Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency
cooperation, should be authorized and implemented.
The United States also needs to break down barriers that discourage
U.S. partnerships with international donors and Iraqi
participants to promote reconstruction. The ability of the
United States to form such partnerships will encourage greater
international participation in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds
with those from international donors and Iraqi participants
on behalf of assistance projects should be provided.
7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review
The public interest is not well served by the government's
preparation, presentation, and review of the budget for the war
in Iraq.
First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal
budget request but in requests for emergency supplemental
appropriations. This means that funding requests are drawn
up outside the normal budget process, are not offset by budgetary
reductions elsewhere, and move quickly to the White
House with minimal scrutiny. Bypassing the normal review
erodes budget discipline and accountability.
Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in
a confusing manner, making it difficult for both the general
public and members of Congress to understand the request or
to differentiate it from counterterrorism operations around the
world or operations in Afghanistan. Detailed analyses by budget
experts are needed to answer what should be a simple question:
"How much money is the President requesting for the war
in Iraq?"
Finally, circumvention of the budget process by the executive
branch erodes oversight and review by Congress. The authorizing
committees (including the House and Senate Armed
Services committees) spend the better part of a year reviewing
the President's annual budget request. When the President
submits an emergency supplemental request, the authorizing
committees are bypassed. The request goes directly to the appropriations
committees, and they are pressured by the need to
act quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds.
The result is a spending bill that passes Congress with perfunctory
review. Even worse, the must-pass appropriations bill becomes
loaded with special spending projects that would not
survive the normal review process.
RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should
be included in the President's annual budget request, starting
in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal
budget process should not be circumvented. Funding requests
for the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to
Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out
its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for
the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.
8. U.S. Personnel
The United States can take several steps to ensure that it has
personnel with the right skills serving in Iraq.
All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped
by Americans' lack of language and cultural understanding.
Our embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six
of whom are at the level of fluency. In a conflict that demands
effective and efficient communication with Iraqis, we are often
at a disadvantage. There are still far too few Arab language-
proficient military and civilian officers in Iraq, to the detriment
of the U.S. mission.
Civilian agencies also have little experience with complex
overseas interventions to restore and maintain order--stability
operations--outside of the normal embassy setting. The nature
of the mission in Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous, and the
United States has had great difficulty filling civilian assignments
in Iraq with sufficient numbers of properly trained personnel
at the appropriate rank.
RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence
should accord the highest possible priority to professional
language proficiency and cultural training, in general and
specifically for U.S. officers and personnel about to be assigned
to Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough
civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies
must fill those positions with directed assignments. Steps
should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships
posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar
to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in
Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United
States government needs to improve how its constituent
agencies--Defense, State, Agency for International Development,
Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others--
respond to a complex stability operation like that
represented by this decade's Iraq and Afghanistan wars and
the previous decade's operations in the Balkans. They need to
train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries,
following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has
proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.
RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should
train personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with a
complex stability operation outside of the traditional embassy
setting. It should establish a Foreign Service Reserve
Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity
for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including
Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar
technical assistance capabilities.
9. Intelligence
While the United States has been able to acquire good and
sometimes superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our
government still does not understand very well either the insurgency
in Iraq or the role of the militias.
A senior commander told us that human intelligence in
Iraq has improved from 10 percent to 30 percent. Clearly, U.S.
intelligence agencies can and must do better. As mentioned
above, an essential part of better intelligence must be improved
language and cultural skills. As an intelligence analyst
told us, "We rely too much on others to bring information to us,
and too often don't understand what is reported back because
we do not understand the context of what we are told."
The Defense Department and the intelligence community
have not invested sufficient people and resources to understand
the political and military threat to American men and
women in the armed forces. Congress has appropriated almost
$2 billion this year for countermeasures to protect our troops in
Iraq against improvised explosive devices, but the administration
has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources
in trying to understand the people who fabricate, plant,
and explode those devices.
We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the
job at the Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two
years' experience in analyzing the insurgency. Capable analysts
are rotated to new assignments, and on-the-job training begins
anew. Agencies must have a better personnel system to keep analytic
expertise focused on the insurgency. They are not doing
enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a
national and provincial level. The analytic community's knowledge
of the organization, leadership, financing, and operations
of militias, as well as their relationship to government security
forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to know.
In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence
in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter
to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an
Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine
the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not
make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar
attack that doesn't hurt U.S. personnel doesn't count. For
example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant
acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports
for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence.
Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically
collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy
goals.
RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense should devote significantly
greater analytic resources to the task of understanding
the threats and sources of violence in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate
changes in the collection of data about violence and
the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate
picture of events on the ground.
Recommended Iraqi Actions
The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability,
initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take
full responsibility for this intelligence function.
To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the
CIA should increase its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence
personnel. The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials,
a counterterrorism intelligence center for the all-source
fusion of information on the various sources of terrorism within
Iraq. This center would analyze data concerning the individuals,
organizations, networks, and support groups involved in
terrorism within Iraq. It would also facilitate intelligence-led
police and military actions against them.
RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional
personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence
service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence
center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism
efforts.
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