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The Future of Hacking (Christopher Seline), Hackin
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>C O M P U T E R U N D E R G R O U N D<
>D I G E S T<
*** Volume 1, Issue #1.03 (April 8, 1990) **
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MODERATORS: Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer
REPLY TO: [email protected]
COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
diverse views.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the
views of the moderators. Contributors assume all responsibility
for assuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright
protections.
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In This Issue:
File 1: News and Notes (moderators)
File 2: The Future of Hacking (Christopher Seline)
File 3: Hacking into Nasa (Ellis Dea)
File 4: The FBI sets up Earth First!? (Anonymous contributor)
File 5: An Alternative view of Piracy (Jim Thomas/Gordon Meyer)
File 6: Hackers in the News: LoD, Australian Hackers
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 1 of 6 ***
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We still do not have an FTP site for archives, although we have
several volunteers if we cannot ultimately set one up here.
When we have one, we will permantely post it in the header.
If you have not received back issues of CuD but have requested to
be placed on the mailing list, re-send your request, and manually
include your address in your signature. The biggest problems seem to
be those addresses for which we must rely on the headers. BITNET is
preferred.
We are especially looking to build the archives with research
papers, such as those presented at conferences, or published
articles for which authors retain copyright. AGAIN WE CAUTION--
PLEASE BE SURE THERE ARE NO COPYRIGHT VIOLATIONS, or we cannot
post the articles. Even if an author writes and contributes a piece,
if it has been published in an academic journal, the journal
normally retains the copyright. However, because most papers are
first presented at a conference, and because the final product
usually contains substantial revisions, conference papers, or
book chapters on which the author retains copyright, are
acceptable. Same goes for newspaper articles or transcripts of
radio or tv broadcasts. So, send those articles, but if in doubt,
err on the side of caution! We will not knowingly distribute
anything that violates this or any other laws.
We are starting to put together a bibliography listing books and research
articles on the computer underground. If you come across any journals,
books, or feature-length articles (not simply news blurbs), please pass
along the *complete* reference and preferably a summary (or, better, a
review/critique) we can publish.
NOTE: WE WILL BE AT A CONFERENCE FROM WEDS, APRIL 11 THRU SUNDAY APRIL 15,
AND WILL NOT BE ANSWERING ANY MAIL UNTIL MONDAY, APRIL 16. Issue #1.04 will
be lengthy--about 2,100 lines. It will go out Monday, April 16, and will be
broken down into four (4) individual files of about 500 lines each.
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 2 of 6 ***
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From: "CHRISTOPHER J.D. SELINE - [email protected]"
Subject: Hacking in the 90's-the move from active invasions to
passive listening
To: tk0jut2
I've been thinking about the future of hacking lately. Where is it going to
go. What will it be like in a few years.
Without taking a poll, I think hacking is going to move toward obtaining
information through more passive eavesdropping rather than active invasion of
systems. Of course, the active invasion could be preceded by a long passive
invasion used to obtain passwords and operating procedures.
Basicly, my argument is this: hackers who invade systems are being detected;
once detected they are often tracked down through the electroinc network
(phone, internet, whatever) and apprehended. Hackers will try to avoid
detection by using "passive" systems to obtain information.
These passive systems will be either simple line tapping and network
eavesdropping, or the interception of compromising emanations (ELINT/CE).
ELINT/CE circuit schematics are available through the underground and for less
than $200 a hacker can produce a "box" that will "see" what someone is typing
on their terminal from several hundred meters away. ELINT/CE doesn't require
the physical invasion of an office to place a tap. It is completely
undetectable and relatively unknown. Because it is unknown there are _no_
countermeasures in place (except for government activeities with national
security information, many FBI terminals, and many DEA terminals).
Since it is passive, undetectable, and there are no routinely used
countermeasures ELINT/CE represents an extremely safe way to obtain lots of
information.
For the more adventurous there is always phone line tapping and serial line
tapping. The only drawback here is that the connection to someone's phone line
does requires (often) a bit of trespass, which makes it more likely the hacker
will be caught.
And, of course, there is network tapping. With an ethernet is this very very
easy (just put your ethernet board in promiscuous mode). This often requires
legitimate access to the network, but once a hacker has this physical access
there is little information he can not capture. Since most networks don't
monitor for "new" ethernet boards attached to the cable, an unauthorised
connection can be made with an ethernet net tap.
These are all "old" techniques. The intelligence agencies have been using them
for a long long time. All of these techniques all the gathering of a great
deal of information without the associated risk of directly invading
someone's computer. I think that they will be "the hacking of the 90's" as
more and more hackers are apprehended using the old methods.
Christopher Seline
[email protected]
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 3 of 6 ***
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(Contributed by Ellis Dea)
The March 19, 1990 issue of The Scientist contains an article
titled "NASA Network Faulted for Security Gaps" (2, 12). An interesting
heading of the page twelve continuation of the article is "NASA Says Best
Defense Against Hackers is Prosecution" (12). The Scientist, as usual,
maintains its objectivity through the novel approach of supporting BOTH
sides of the issue. Although I find it difficult to raise ambivalence and
equivocation to the level of objectivity, the publication should at least
be commended for at least mentioning the faulty security, especially as
almost everybody reading this knows full well that the system password for
NASA's computer system was for a long time 3210 (cleaver? who would ever
think of trying that?).
SPAN (Space Physics Analysis Network) is an unclassified network on
which research scientists share information that is vital to their work.
Much of the information could be of general interest, but much of it would
be far over the head of the average "hacker." SPAN investigates every
violation of security, it says, but one wonders why. None of the alleged
incidents have resulted in any loss of data, thus proving that those who
did gain access illegally had no malice in mind. If they had resulted in
loss of data, however, I would strongly question why that information was
not backed up. Better yet, why is the information restricted at all? Why
not simply make this information available to the general public, perhaps
on a duplicate machine?
What is happening here is a conflict between the General Accounting
Office (GAO) and the people who are trying to maintain the computer system.
The GAO is pointing out, quite correctly, that they are doing their jobs.
NASA is countering that it is much better to prosecute than to prevent (not
quite in those words, but that is the point that emerges). The truth of
the matter is that those who are supposed to preventing unauthorized access
to the SPAN network are incompetent. The best way to cover up incompetence
is to hide behind some sort of moral or legal shield.
Actually, what the GAO says in its report makes perfect sense which
may be one reason why NASA is resisting it and posturing instead: "Suppose
a SPAN user at university X taps into the system and is connected with the
Johnson Space Center. And suppose he figures out how to bypass the files
he is pointed to and taps into another database. Could he cause
significant damage to that system is he tried to change it? And what's the
information worth? That's what we think NASA should be trying to find
out." Suppose the system is such that he could NOT cause significant
damage? Why worry about it then? Suppose the information is worthless?
Why bother? Why not try to find out? Because this "hacker" could cause
significant damage and NASA knows it. Furthermore, NASA is incapable, at
the present time, of preventing it. If NASA had enough brains, it would
hire some of these "hackers" as consultants and fix their systems rather
than expecting our penal system to do it for them.
At the present time, it seems that NASA is relying on the threat
of prosecution to prevent unauthorized access to SPAN. One of NASA's
arguments is that to increase security would make access more difficult.
Since their database is designed primarily for scientists, especially
astrophysicists, one can not expect them to make the system too complicated
and thus above the heads of their users, but one can expect at least of
modicum of expertise in these areas from them. Certainly, the threat of
prosecution seems absurd.
We can realize its absurdity by making a simple analogy to everyday
life. Of course, it may be considered a bit unfair by NASA for us to
expect them to take reality into consideration, but a bit of common sense
can not always be out of place. The situation seems to me analogous to
saying that we will no longer lock the doors to our homes or automobiles
when we leave them --we will henceforth rely on law enforcement to protect
our belongings. From now on, we will impose draconian penalties on anyone
who steals anything from us without our permission. We will cut their
fingers or hands off, castrate them, etc. Even under these conditions,
even with a tremendous influx of money for enforcement of these penalties,
I am sure that we would continue to lock our doors and I am somewhat
certain that even those speaking for NASA in this case would continue to
lock their doors.
If I could humbly offer a bit of advice to NASA: lock your doors.
Furthermore, if you find that a hacker has opened your door, why not seek
his advice on how to lock it better? Why not even sponsor some sort of
contest? See who does the best job of getting around your security (for
they will anyway) and reward that person. Or perhaps punish him by putting
HIM in charge of your computer security. He could certainly do a damn
better job of it than you are doing now and you could go back to your
research.
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 4 of 6 ***
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Your reference to the FBI tactics in the arrest of Earth First participants
as questionable, illegal, immoral, unethical, and generally wrong, led me
to look up the original article. It appeared in THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (and
presumably other sources) on March 2, 1990, pp. 1, 12, titled "FBI tactics
questioned in probe of activeists," by Terry Atlas, date-lined Phoenix. The
article describes what appears to be entrapment, and suggests that the FBI
set up the leaders intentionally:
"PHOENIX--Mike Tait was a quiet, troubled cowboy, a Vietnam War
veteran in his early 40s who wore an Arizona Feeds cap that
covered his bald spot.
As it turned out, he was hiding a lot more than that.
To his best friend, Margaret "Peg" Millett, a part-time counselor
at a Planned Parenthood clinic in Prescott, Ariz., tait was a
good-hearted redneck who liked to dance and was trying to get in
touch with his feelings.
Along with Millett and some of her friends, he took an interest
in "monkey-wrenching"--disruptive, often illegal, acts in the
name of Mother Nature--popularized by the radical environmental
group Earth First!.
One night last May, Tait drove Millett and two of her trusted
friends into the Arizona desert outside Prescott on such a
clandestine mission.
Suddenly, flares exploded that lit up the desert sky and exposed
Tait's secret. More than 40 FBI agencies--on foot, on horseback
and in a helicopter--moved in on tait's unarmed friends as they
allegedly used a blowtorch in an attempt to cut down a power-line
tower.
The ambush, and the arrest the next morning of Earth First!
founder David Foreman 200 miles away in Tucson, climaxed an
18-month federal undercover investigation into what the
government charges was a dangerous group of eco-terrorists whose
nighttime raid was a practice run for more serious attacks on
power lines at nuclear plants in Arizona, California and
Colorado.
The investigation was begun with high-level approval from
Washington during the Reagan administration. It included putting
FBI agent Michael Fain undercover as Mike Tait, backed up by
wiretaps, hidden microphones and body wires used to secretly
record more than 1,400 %page break, con't on page 12% hours of
conversations among environmental activeists."
The article goes on to question whether such resources were
simply retaliation for Foreman's outspoken advocacy of an
anti-nuclear position. The issue raised in the article is that
the FBI was out to get Fain. The article continues (p. 12):
"And new evidence--an apparently careless remark by agent Fain
that was inadvertently recorded--lends some support to Foreman's
charge that he was the big catch the government wanted.
On one tape that the government recently provided to defense
attorneys, what is apparently Fain's voice is heard telling two
other FBI agents that Foreman wasn't an actual perpetrator. This
is the guy we need to pop to send a message."
"That's all we're really doing," he goes on, "and if we don't
nail this guy and we get only Davis, we're not sending any
message."
They laughed that the supposedly fearsome band of environmental
radicals was holding a yard sale in Tucson to raise enough money
to keep going, and Fain remarks, "They're low budget, and I don't
really look for them to be doing a lot of hurting of people."
Then suddenly realizing that the tape recorder is on, Fain says,
"We don't need that on the tape. Hoo boy," and he shuts it of.
Gerry Spence is defending Earth First!, and, according to the
article, the trial has been postponed from the original April
date.
I find the implications of this scary. I don't support bombings
and destruction of property, but I like a police state even less.
I don't know what counts as a set in law, but common sense tells me
that something's not right here. It seems like the FBI is
manipulating people and events to assure a particular kind of
outcome. What did this entire operation cost? How much will
tax payers have to pay for the prosecution of what could result in
a fiasco? Who else are the feds manipulating and for what purpose?
Who does the approving? Where does legitimate law enforcement
strategy end and gestapo tactics begin? I don't have any answers.
Does anybody else?
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 5 of 6 ***
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Gordon and I wrote the following for Northern Illinois University's THE
COMPUTING NEWS. It was not published for two reasons. First, despite the
fact that our comments are drawn from an on-going research project, it was
considered "opinionated." We were in a catch-22 situation: We were required
to work within severe space constraints, and could present neither data nor
other research citations, yet, we were also advised not to make the article
"too scholarly" for a general audience. Second, and apparently most
important, we were told that if the article were published, it would appear
to violate the NIU policy, so was inappropriate. Only through the most
adept feat of intellectual aerobics could such an interpretation be made,
because we were then, and our article is quite explicit that, in no way
opposing the policy, but only the rhetoric in which it was presented. Our
goal was to debate the rhetoric, not the policy. Such a rationale strikes us
as the CHILLING EFFECT that has occured because of recent hysteria
surrounding alleged computer abuses, and we find it quite ironic that a
University, normally the cornerstone of debate, seems to be stifling debate
on this issue. So, we present it here instead.
We have seen an earlier version of this article floating around on bulletin
boards, but this is the final, "official," version.
Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer
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SOFTWARE PIRACY: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer
(5 March, 1990)
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Jim Thomas is an associate professor in Sociology. Gordon Meyer
received his M.A. in Sociology in 1989. They are currently
researching the computer underground from which the data for this
note are drawn.
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The university policy against computer software piracy has
been widely publicized, including in a recent issue of Computing
News (December, 1989). There is no question that the university
must protect itself against actions of the NIU community for
which it could be held legally accountable. However, based on
our current research of the "computer underground" and the active-
ities of "phreaks, hackers, and pirates," we find no evidence to
support the many value judgments offered in the rationale circu-
lated by the university. These normative judgments contribute to
law enforcement tendencies to expand the definitions of illegali-
ty and, as one recent government publication has done, to place
piracy in the same category of crimes as "computer theft" and
"theft of trade secrets." Our intent here is neither to justify
software piracy nor to challenge University policy. However, be-
cause the area of copyright and "computer abuse" law is so new,
and because these laws tend to rely in media and other depictions
of "computer underground" activeity as criminally sanctionable, we
challenge conceptions of underground activeity that seem unsub-
stantiated by evidence.
The university's normative justification of the University
policy can be summarized in three broad principles:
1. Software piracy shows disrespect for the intellectual work
and property of others and subverts the mission of higher
education.
2. Software piracy deprives authors of a "fair return" for
their work.
3. Software piracy is unethical.
These assertions help justify criminalization and corresponding
sanctions. However, The data from our research do not support
these judgments for several reasons. First, software pirates
make a clear distinction between "pirates," persons who collect
and share software for as hobbyists akin to stamp collectors, and
"bootleggers." Bootleggers are persons who distribute software
for material gain. Pirates may copy and install programs, but
generally their goal is to collect, and they derive satisfaction
from running programs for which they have no need and that they
will rarely, if ever, use.
Second, software pirates--despite the claims of the SPA
(Software Publishsers Association)--report spending considerably
more money purchasing software than the average user. Many of
these purchases are for trading, and there is a strong ethos in
the pirate world that if one uses a program, one purchases it.
Reasons for purchasing include documentation, acquiring informa-
tion about and discounts on updates, and on-line technical sup-
port. It is quite common for pirates to purchase identical pro-
grams to those they have already obtained.
Third, the "no return" policy of most software merchandisers
makes it difficult for potential buyers to assess the ability of
a program to meet their needs or work adequately on their system.
Piracy creates an informed public by assuring that programs are
available for pre-testing, by providing a pool of reasonably lit-
erate users to publicly discuss the merits of competing products,
and to even offer technical assistance to those who have pur-
chased a program. In this sense, the "unauthorized" copying of
software can be seen as contributing to the university mission of
expanding knowledge, of preventing exploitation of consumers, and
above all, to the expansion of computer literacy contributing to
the free flow of information.
Fourth, pirates spend a considerable sum on their hobby.
Among the most active topics of discussion among pirates are
those of the need to endlessly upgrade, the endless purchase of
diskettes on which to store programs, and--with the popularity of
9600 baud modems--the advantages of investing between $600-900
for expanding telecommunications hardware. Because most pirates
exchange software across telephone lines, piracy has benefitted
telephone companies because of the growth of Bulletin Board Sys-
tems (BBSs). Our data indicate that an average monthly phone bill
of $200 or more is common, and active pirates easily double that
cost.
Fifth, there is simply no evidence to corroborate the claim
that piracy deprives authors of revenue. Our data suggest that
pirates annually purchase no less than three times the 1.5 pro-
grams the SPA estimates for the "average" user, purchases direct-
ly related to the hobby rather than a need. Further, few students
or faculty could afford the price of Dbase 4 and other large pro-
grams, and few people could afford to spend several thousand dol-
lars a year on computer games. Traded programs would simply re-
main unpurchased. Because piracy creates an interest in software,
expands consumer literacy, and contributes to a "user culture"
that benefits the industry as a whole, we suggest that without
such a culture there would be less interest in software and, con-
sequently, less revenue for authors.
Sixth, the claim that piracy is unethical is usually a glib
one made without a strong rationale. Although we make no metaphy-
sical claims here, we do suggest that the appeal to ethic in at-
tempts to criminalize piracy is far too serious to be so glibly
asserted, and the underlying issues require far more research and
debate. Even in the debates over VCR reproduction and photocopy-
ing books or journal articles, the appeal to ethics was never ad-
duced as stridently and self-righteously as in discussions of
software piracy.
The rapid growth of computer and telecommunications technol-
ogy brings with it new ethical, legal, and practical questions of
the nature of "private property," free and open access to infor-
mation and resources, and definitions of "authorship." Few among
us condone any form of predatory behavior. However, we find
equally disturbing the tendency to assumptively assert claims and
definitions that rightly should be brought into a public forum
for debate rather. The University has the obligation to protect
the law, but it also has an equal obligation to do so responsibly
without contributing to the current hysteria surrounding alleged
"computer crime."
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*** Computer Underground Digest Issue #1.03 / File 6 of 6 ***
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Date: Sat, 7 Apr 90 00:22:43 PDT
From: [email protected](Benjamin Rooney)
To: TK0JUT2
Subject: News Articles
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MISSOURI STUDENT PLEADS INNOCENT IN 911 SYSTEM INTRUSION CASE
Craig Neidorf, a 19-year-old University of Missouri student, has pleaded not
guilty to federal allegations that he invaded the 911 emergency phone network
for 9 states.
As reported earlier, he was indicted this month along with Robert J. Riggs,
20, of Decatur, Ga. Both are charged with interstate transportation of stolen
property, wire fraud, and violations of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986.
Prosecutors contend the two used computers to enter the 911 system of
Atlanta's Bell South, then copied the program that controls and maintains the
system. The stolen material later allegedly was published on a computer
bulletin board system operating in the Chicago suburb of Lockport.
Authorities contend Neidorf edited the data for an electronic publication
known as "Phrack."
According to Associated Press writer Sarah Nordgren, in a recent hearing on
the case Assistant U.S. Attorney William Cook was granted a motion to prevent
the 911 program from becoming part of the public record during the trial.
U.S. District Judge Nicholas Bua set April 16 for a trial.
The 911 system in question controls emergency calls to police, fire,
ambulance and emergency services in cities in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia,
Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina and Florida.
Article from "A Networker's Journal" by Charles Bowen
INFO-MAT MAGAZINE Vol.6 Num. 2
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The following is a press release from the Australian Federal Police
concerning the Australian hacker "Dave" mentioned recently in the
New York Times and two other hackers. Credit where it is due -- this
information came to me from Paul Pavlinovich in Australia where it was
originally posted on a Melbourne University newsgroup.
Ben Rooney
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"MEDIA RELEASE"
Monday 2 April, 1990
COMPUTERS SEIZED - THREE ARRESTED
Australian Federal Police detectives have executed four search
warrants on three private residences and a business address
following a six month investigation into computer hacking.
Three men, an 18 year old student of North Caulfield, a 20 year
old student of Greensborough and a 21 year old Computer
Programmer of Frankston have been arrested and are being
interviewed by Federal Police.
Federal Police computer crime investigators say their inquiries
have centred on three hackers who have used the code names
'Phoenix', 'Electron' and 'Nom'.
The hackers are alleged to have been gaining illegal access, or
breaking into computer systems in the United States and Australia.
It is alleged that whilst the hackers were accessing restricted
files and information, they also caused damage to those systems.
Australian Federal Police allege the hackers used Telecom and
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (OTC) facilities for
their illegal activeities, via modems at their home addresses.
Through the telephone system they would then use their personal
computers (PC) to communicate with the other computer systems in
the northern hemisphere and across Australia.
The activeities of one computer hacker was brought to the
attention of the United States Secret Service in 1988 at which
time investigations by the Service showed the Citibank system had
been illegally entered by an Australian-based hacker known as
Phoenix.
Further reports of extensive illegal entry to US computers
followed throughout 1989.
Federal Police were able to launch their investigation following
the introduction in July last year of new Legislation under Part
6A of the Commonwealth Crimes Act covering offences relating to
the illegal use of computers.
They allege one of the hackers under investigation was identified
in recent media stories as 'David' or 'Dave'.
He was quoted in the media as having claimed success in his
attempts to 'hack' into computers in the United States and stated
he was not concerned about being caught, because "he knew that
in Australia the laws could punish him with no more than a small
fine for trespass."
Under the new legislation, Section 76E of the Crimes Act provides
for a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment for;
"Damaging data in Commonwealth and other
computers by means of a Commonwealth facility."
There is no provision for a fine.
The AFP officer heading the investigation Detective
Superintendent Ken Hunt said, it was not unusual for the
Australian hackers to spend up to 16 hours a day on their PC's
and other computers.
He said, much of that time would be spent on international
telephone lines, with the hackers, through their computer
keyboards, directing the cost of their calls to be met by the
companies whose computer systems they had illegally accessed.
Federal Police were required to enter the premises of the
suspects early this morning and quickly disable their computers
to prevent the destruction of programme software.
During the execution of the search warrants a considerable
amount of computer software, print outs and other documentation
was seized.
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