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Operation Sundevil [from 2600]
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THE FOLLOWING TWO ARTICLES ARE FROM THE JUST-RELEASED SPRING EDITION OF
2600 MAGAZINE, THE HACKER QUARTERLY. WE FEEL THAT THE CURRENT HAPPENINGS
IN THE COMPUTER WORLD ARE EXTREMELY SIGNIFICANT FOR ANYONE WHO HAS ANY
INTEREST IN COMMUNICATIONS AND/OR TECHNOLOGY. WE'D BE MOST INTERESTED IN
ANY FEEDBACK ON THIS TOPIC.
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ARTICLE ONE: AN OVERVIEW
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A year ago, we told the stories of Kevin Mitnick and Herbert Zinn,
two hackers who had been sent to prison. It was then, and still is today,
a very disturbing chain of events: mischief makers and explorers imprisoned
for playing with the wrong toys and for asking too many questions. We said
at the time that it was important for all hackers to stand up to such gross
injustices. After all, they couldn't lock us all up.
It now appears that such an endeavor may indeed be on the agendas of
some very powerful U.S. governmental agencies. And even more
frightening is the realization that these agencies don't particularly
care who or what gets swept up along with the hackers, as long as all
of the hackers get swept up. Apparently, we're considered even more of
a threat than we had previously supposed.
In retrospect, this doesn't come as a great deal of a surprise. In
fact, it now seems to make all too much sense. You no longer have to be
paranoid or of a particular political mindset to point to the many
parallels that we've all been witnesses to. Censorship, clampdowns,
"voluntary" urine tests, lie detectors, handwriting analysis,
surveillance cameras, exaggerated crises that invariably lead to
curtailed freedoms.... All of this together with the overall view that
if you're innocent, you've got nothing to hide. And all made so much
more effective through the magic of high tech. Who would you target as
the biggest potential roadblock if not the people who understand the
technology at work? It appears the biggest threats to the system are
those capable of manipulating it.
What we're about to tell you is frightening, plain and simple. You
don't have to be a hacker to understand this. The words and ideas are
easily translatable to any time and any culture.
Crackdown
"We can now expect a crackdown...I just hope that I can pull through
this one and that my friends can also. This is the time to watch
yourself. No matter what you are into.... Apparently the government has
seen the last straw in their point of view.... I think they are going
after all the 'teachers'...and so that is where their energies will be
put: to stop all hackers, and stop people before they can become
threats."
This was one of the reactions on a computer bulletin board to a series
of raids on hackers, raids that had started in 1989 and spread rapidly
into early 1990. Atlanta, St. Louis, and New York were major targets in
what was then an undetermined investigation. This in itself wouldn't
have been especially alarming, since raids on hackers can almost be
defined as commonplace. But this one was different. For the very first
time, a hacker newsletter had also been shut down.
Phrack was an electronic newsletter published out of St. Louis and
distributed worldwide. It dealt with hacker and phone phreak matters
and could be found on nearly all hacker bulletin boards. While dealing
with sensitive material, the editors were very careful not to publish
anything illegal (credit card numbers, passwords, Sprint codes, etc.).
We described "Phrack World News" (a regular column of Phrack) in our
Summer 1989 edition as "a must-read for many hackers". In many ways
Phrack resembled 2600, with the exception of being sent via electronic
mail instead of U.S. Mail. That distinction would prove to be Phrack's
undoing.
It now turns out that all incoming and outgoing electronic mail used by
Phrack was being monitored by the authorities. Every piece of mail
going in and every piece of mail coming out. These were not pirated
mailboxes that were being used by a couple of hackers. These had been
obtained legally through the school the two Phrack editors were
attending. Privacy on such mailboxes, though not guaranteed, could
always be assumed. Never again.
It's fairly obvious that none of this would have happened, none of this
could have happened had Phrack been a non-electronic magazine. A
printed magazine would not be intimidated into giving up its mailing
list as Phrack was. Had a printed magazine been shut down in this
fashion after having all of their mail opened and read, even the most
thick-headed sensationalist media types would have caught on: hey,
isn't that a violation of the First Amendment?
Those media people who understood what was happening and saw the
implications were very quickly drowned out in the hysteria that
followed. Indictments were being handed out. Publisher/editor Craig
Neidorf, known in the hacker world as Knight Lightning, was hit with a
seven count indictment accusing him of participating in a scheme to
steal information about the enhanced 911 system run by Bell South.
Quickly, headlines screamed that hackers had broken into the 911 system
and were interfering with emergency telephone calls to the police. One
newspaper report said there were no indications that anyone had died or
been injured as a result of the intrusions. What a relief. Too bad it
wasn't true.
In actuality there have been very grievous injuries suffered as a
result of these intrusions. The intrusions we're referring to are those
of the government and the media. The injuries have been suffered by the
defendants who will have great difficulty resuming normal lives even if
all of this is forgotten tomorrow.
And if it's not forgotten, Craig Neidorf could go to jail for more than
30 years and be fined $122,000. And for what? Let's look at the
indictment:
"It was... part of the scheme that defendant Neidorf, utilizing a
computer at the University of Missouri in Columbia, Missouri would and
did receive a copy of the stolen E911 text file from defendant [Robert
J.] Riggs [located in Atlanta and known in the hacker world as Prophet]
through the Lockport [Illinois] computer bulletin board system through
the use of an interstate computer data network.
"It was further part of the scheme that defendant Neidorf would and did
edit and retype the E911 Practice text file at the request of the
defendant Riggs in order to conceal the source of the E911 Practice
text file and to prepare it for publication in a computer hacker
newsletter.
"It was further part of the scheme that defendant Neidorf would and did
transfer the stolen E911 Practice text file through the use of an
interstate computer bulletin board system used by defendant Riggs in
Lockport, Illinois.
"It was further part of the scheme that the defendants Riggs and
Neidorf would publish information to other computer hackers which could
be used to gain unauthorized access to emergency 911 computer systems
in the United States and thereby disrupt or halt 911 service in
portions of the United States."
Basically, Neidorf is being charged with receiving a stolen document.
There is nothing anywhere in the indictment that even suggests he
entered any computer illegally. So his crimes are receiving, editing,
and transmitting.
Now what is contained in this document? Information about how to gain
unauthorized access to, disrupt, or halt 911 service? Hardly. The
document (erroneously referred to as "911 software" by the media which
caused all kinds of misunderstandings) is quoted in Phrack Volume 2,
Number 24 and makes for one of the dullest articles ever to appear in
the newsletter. According to the indictment, the value of this 20k
document is $79,449. [See story that follows this one]
Shortly after the indictments were handed down, a member of the Legion
of Doom known as Erik Bloodaxe issued a public statement. "[A group of
three hackers] ended up pulling files off [a Southern Bell system] for
them to look at. This is usually standard procedure: you get on a
system, look around for interesting text, buffer it, and maybe print it
out for posterity. No member of LOD has ever (to my knowledge) broken
into another system and used any information gained from it for
personal gain of any kind...with the exception of maybe a big boost in
his reputation around the underground. [A hacker] took the
documentation to the system and wrote a file about it. There are
actually two files, one is an overview, the other is a glossary. The
information is hardly something anyone could possibly gain anything
from except knowledge about how a certain aspect of the telephone
company works."
He went on to say that Neidorf would have had no way of knowing whether
or not the file contained proprietary information.
Prosecutors refused to say how hackers could benefit from the
information, nor would they cite a motive or reveal any actual damage.
In addition, it's widely speculated that much of this information is
readily available as reference material.
In all of the indictments, the Legion of Doom is defined as "a closely
knit group of computer hackers involved in: a) disrupting
telecommunications by entering computerized telephone switches and
changing the routing on the circuits of the computerized switches; b)
stealing proprietary computer source code and information from
companies and individuals that owned the code and information; c)
stealing and modifying credit information on individuals maintained in
credit bureau computers; d) fraudulently obtaining money and property
from companies by altering the computerized information used by the
companies; e) disseminating information with respect to their methods
of attacking computers to other computer hackers in an effort to avoid
the focus of law enforcement agencies and telecommunication security
experts."
Ironically, since the Legion of Doom isn't a closely knit group, it's
unlikely that anyone will be able to defend the group's name against
these charges -- any defendants will naturally be preoccupied with
their own defenses. (Incidentally, Neidorf was not a part of the Legion
of Doom, nor was Phrack a publication of LOD, as has been reported.)
The Hunt Intensifies
After learning of the Phrack electronic mail surveillance, one of the
system operators of The Phoenix Project, a computer bulletin board in
Austin, Texas, decided to take action to protect the privacy of his
users. "I will be adding a secure encryption routine into the e-mail in
the next 2 weeks - I haven't decided exactly how to implement it, but
it'll let two people exchange mail encrypted by a password only known
to the two of them.... Anyway, I do not think I am due to be busted...I
don't do anything but run a board. Still, there is that possibility. I
assume that my lines are all tapped until proven otherwise. There is
some question to the wisdom of leaving the board up at all, but I have
personally phoned several government investigators and invited them to
join us here on the board. If I begin to feel that the board is putting
me in any kind of danger, I'll pull it down with no notice - I hope
everyone understands. It looks like it's sweeps-time again for the
feds. Let's hope all of us are still around in 6 months to talk about
it."
The new security was never implemented. The Phoenix Project was seized
within days.
And the clampdown intensified still further. On March 1, the offices of
Steve Jackson Games, a publishing company in Austin, were raided by the
Secret Service. According to the Associated Press, the home of the
managing editor was also searched. The police and Secret Service seized
books, manuals, computers, technical equipment, and other documents.
Agents also seized the final draft of a science fiction game written by
the company. According to the Austin American-Statesman, the
authorities were trying to determine whether the game was being used as
a handbook for computer crime.
Callers to the Illuminati bulletin board (run by Steve Jackson Games),
received the following message:
"Before the start of work on March 1, Steve Jackson Games was visited
by agents of the United States Secret Service. They searched the
building thoroughly, tore open several boxes in the warehouse, broke a
few locks, and damaged a couple of filing cabinets (which we would
gladly have let them examine, had they let us into the building),
answered the phone discourteously at best, and confiscated some
computer equipment, including the computer that the BBS was running on
at the time.
"So far we have not received a clear explanation of what the Secret
Service was looking for, what they expected to find, or much of
anything else. We are fairly certain that Steve Jackson Games is not
the target of whatever investigation is being conducted; in any case,
we have done nothing illegal and have nothing whatsoever to hide.
However, the equipment that was seized is apparently considered to be
evidence in whatever they're investigating, so we aren't likely to get
it back any time soon. It could be a month, it could be never.
"To minimize the possibility that this system will be confiscated as
well, we have set it up to display this bulletin, and that's all. There
is no message base at present. We apologize for the inconvenience, and
we wish we dared do more than this."
Apparently, one of the system operators of The Phoenix Project was also
affiliated with Steve Jackson Games. And that was all the authorities
needed.
Raids continued throughout the country with reports of more than a
dozen bulletin boards being shut down. In Atlanta, the papers reported
that three local LOD hackers faced 40 years in prison and a $2 million
fine.
Another statement from a Legion of Doom member (The Mentor, also a
system operator of The Phoenix Project) attempted to explain the
situation:
"LOD was formed to bring together the best minds from the computer
underground - not to do any damage or for personal profit, but to share
experiences and discuss computing. The group has always maintained the
highest ethical standards.... On many occasions, we have acted to
prevent abuse of systems.... I have known the people involved in this
911 case for many years, and there was absolutely no intent to
interfere with or molest the 911 system in any manner. While we have
occasionally entered a computer that we weren't supposed to be in, it
is grounds for expulsion from the group and social ostracism to do any
damage to a system or to attempt to commit fraud for personal profit.
"The biggest crime that has been committed is that of curiosity.... We
have been instrumental in closing many security holes in the past, and
had hoped to continue to do so in the future. The list of computer
security people who count us as allies is long, but must remain
anonymous. If any of them choose to identify themselves, we would
appreciate the support."
And The Plot Thickens
Meanwhile, in Lockport, Illinois, a strange tale was unfolding. The
public UNIX system known as Jolnet that had been used to transmit the
911 files had also been seized. What's particularly odd here is that,
according to the electronic newsletter Telecom Digest, the system
operator, Rich Andrews, had been cooperating with federal authorities
for over a year. Andrews found the files on his system nearly two years
ago, forwarded them to AT&T, and was subsequently contacted by the
authorities. He cooperated fully. Why, then, was his system seized as
well? Andrews claimed it was all part of the investigation, but added,
"One way to get [hackers] is by shutting down the sites they use to
distribute stuff."
The Jolnet raid caused outrage in the bulletin board world,
particularly among administrators and users of public UNIX systems.
Cliff Figallo, system administrator for The Well, a public UNIX system
in California, voiced his concern. "The assumption that federal agents
can seize a system owner's equipment as evidence in spite of the
owner's lack of proven involvement in the alleged illegal activities
(and regardless of the possibility that the system is part of the
owner's livelihood) is scary to me and should be to anyone responsible
for running a system such as this."
Here is a sampling of some of the comments seen around the country
after the Jolnet seizure:
"As administrator for Zygot, should I start reading my users' mail to
make sure they aren't saying anything naughty? Should I snoop through
all the files to make sure everyone is being good? This whole affair is
rather chilling."
"From what I have noted with respect to Jolnet, there was a serious
crime committed there -- by the [federal authorities]. If they busted a
system with email on it, the Electronic Communication Privacy Act comes
into play. Everyone who had email dated less than 180 days old on the
system is entitled to sue each of the people involved in the seizure
for at least $1,000 plus legal fees and court costs. Unless, of course,
the [authorities] did it by the book, and got warrants to interfere
with the email of all who had accounts on the systems. If they did,
there are strict limits on how long they have to inform the users."
"Intimidation, threats, disruption of work and school, 'hit lists', and
serious legal charges are all part of the tactics being used in this
'witch-hunt'. That ought to indicate that perhaps the use of pseudonyms
wasn't such a bad idea after all."
"There are civil rights and civil liberties issues here that have yet
to be addressed. And they probably won't even be raised so long as
everyone acts on the assumption that all hackers are criminals and
vandals and need to be squashed, at whatever cost...."
"I am disturbed, on principle, at the conduct of at least some of the
federal investigations now going on. I know several people who've taken
their systems out of public access just because they can't risk the
seizure of their equipment (as evidence or for any other reason). If
you're a Usenet site, you may receive megabytes of new data every day,
but you have no common carrier protection in the event that someone
puts illegal information onto the Net and thence into your system."
Increased Restrictions
But despite the outpourings of concern for what had happened, many
system administrators and bulletin board operators felt compelled to
tighten the control of their systems and to make free speech a little
more difficult, for their own protection.
Bill Kuykendall, system administrator for The Point, a public UNIX
system in Chicago, made the following announcement to the users of his
system:
"Today, there is no law or precedent which affords me... the same legal
rights that other common carriers have against prosecution should some
other party (you) use my property (The Point) for illegal activities.
That worries me....
"I fully intend to explore the legal questions raised here. In my
opinion, the rights to free assembly and free speech would be
threatened if the owners of public meeting places were charged with the
responsibility of policing all conversations held in the hallways and
lavatories of their facilities for references to illegal activities.
"Under such laws, all privately owned meeting places would be forced
out of existence, and the right to meet and speak freely would vanish
with them. The common sense of this reasoning has not yet been applied
to electronic meeting places by the legislature. This issue must be
forced, or electronic bulletin boards will cease to exist.
"In the meantime, I intend to continue to operate The Point with as
little risk to myself as possible. Therefore, I am implementing a few
new policies:
"No user will be allowed to post any message, public or private, until
his name and address has been adequately verified. Most users in the
metropolitan Chicago area have already been validated through the
telephone number directory service provided by Illinois Bell. Those of
you who received validation notices stating that your information had
not been checked due to a lack of time on my part will now have to wait
until I get time before being allowed to post.
"Out of state addresses cannot be validated in the manner above.... The
short term solution for users outside the Chicago area is to find a
system closer to home than The Point.
"Some of the planned enhancements to The Point are simply not going to
happen until the legal issues are resolved. There will be no shell
access and no file upload/download facility for now.
"My apologies to all who feel inconvenienced by these policies, but
under the circumstances, I think your complaints would be most
effective if made to your state and federal legislators. Please do so!"
These restrictions were echoed on other large systems, while a number
of smaller hacker bulletin boards disappeared altogether. We've been
told by some in the hacker world that this is only a phase, that the
hacker boards will be back and that users will once again be able to
speak without having their words and identities "registered". But
there's also a nagging suspicion, the feeling that something is very
different now. A publication has been shut down. Hundreds, if not
thousands, of names have been seized from mailing lists and will, no
doubt, be investigated. The facts in the 911 story have been twisted
and misrepresented beyond recognition, thanks to ignorance and
sensationalism. People and organizations that have had contact with any
of the suspects are open to investigation themselves. And, around the
country, computer operators and users are becoming more paranoid and
less willing to allow free speech. In the face of all of this, the
belief that democracy will triumph in the end seems hopelessly naive.
Yet, it's something we dare not stop believing in. Mere faith in the
system, however, is not enough.
We hope that someday we'll be able to laugh at the absurdities of
today. But, for now, let's concentrate on the facts and make sure they
stay in the forefront.
==> Were there break-ins involving the E911 system? If so, the entire
story must be revealed. How did the hackers get in? What did they have
access to? What could they have done? What did they actually do? Any
security holes that were revealed should already have been closed. If
there are more, why do they still exist? Could the original holes have
been closed earlier and, if so, why weren't they? Any hacker who caused
damage to the system should be held accountable. Period. Almost every
hacker around seems to agree with this. So what is the problem? The
glaring fact that there doesn't appear to have been any actual damage.
Just the usual assortment of gaping security holes that never seem to
get fixed. Shoddiness in design is something that shouldn't be
overlooked in a system as important as E911. Yet that aspect of the
case is being side-stepped. Putting the blame on the hackers for
finding the flaws is another way of saying the flaws should remain
undetected.
==> Under no circumstance should the Phrack newsletter or any of its
editors be held as criminals for printing material leaked to them.
Every publication of any value has had documents given to them that
were not originally intended for public consumption. That's how news
stories are made. Shutting down Phrack sends a very ominous message to
publishers and editors across the nation.
==> Finally, the privacy of computer users must be respected by the
government. It's ironic that hackers are portrayed as the ones who
break into systems, read private mail, and screw up innocent people.
Yet it's the federal authorities who seem to have carte blanche in that
department. Just what did the Secret Service do on these computer
systems? What did they gain access to? Whose mail did they read? And
what allowed them to do this?
Take Exception
It's very easy to throw up your hands and say it's all too much. But
the facts indicate to us that we've come face to face with a very
critical moment in history. What comes out of this could be a
trend-setting precedent, not only for computer users, but for the free
press and every citizen of the United States. Complacency at this stage
will be most detrimental.
We also realize that one of the quickest ways of losing credibility is
to be shrill and conspiracy-minded. We hope we're not coming across in
this way because we truly believe there is a significant threat here.
If Phrack is successfully shut down and its editors sent to prison for
writing an article, 2600 could easily be next. And so could scores of
other publications whose existence ruffles some feathers. We cannot
allow this to happen.
In the past, we've called for people to spread the word on various
issues. More times than not, the results have been felt. Never has it
been more important than now. To be silent at this stage is to accept a
very grim and dark future.
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ARTICLE TWO: A REVIEW OF THE E911 DOCUMENT ITSELF
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Documentation on the E911 System
March 1988
$79,449, 6 pages
Bell South Standard Practice
660-225-104SV
Review by Emmanuel Goldstein
It otherwise would have been a quickly forgotten text published in a hacker
newsletter. But due to all of the commotion, the Bell South E911 document is
now very much in the public eye. Copies are extremely easy to come by, despite
Bell South's assertion that the whole thing is worth $79,449.
While we can't publish the actual document, we can report on its contents
since
it's become a news story in itself. But don't get excited. There really isn't
all that much here.
Certain acronyms are introduced, among them Public Safety Answering
Point (PSAP), also known as Emergency Service Bureau (ESB). This is
what you get (in telco lingo) when you dial 911. The importance of
close coordination between these agencies is stressed. Selective
routing allows the 911 call to be routed to the proper PSAP. The 1A ESS
is used as the tandem office for this routing. Certain services made
available with E911 include Forced Disconnect, Alternative Routing,
Selective Routing, Selective Transfer, Default Routing, Night Service,
Automatic Number Identification, and Automatic Location Identification.
We learn of the existence of the E911 Implementation Team, the brave
men and women from Network Marketing who help with configuration in the
difficult cutover period. This team is in charge of forming an ongoing
maintenance subcommittee. We wouldn't want that juicy tidbit to get
out, now would we?
We learn that the Switching Control Center (SCC) "is responsible for
E911/1AESS translations in tandem central offices". We're not exactly
shocked by this revelation.
We also find out what is considered a "priority one" trouble report.
Any link down to the PSAP fits this definition. We also learn that when
ANI fails, the screens will display all zeroes.
We could go on but we really don't want to bore you. None of this
information would allow a hacker to gain access to such a system. All
it affords is a chance to understand the administrative functions a
little better. We'd like to assume that any outside interference to a
911 system is impossible. Does Bell South know otherwise? In light of
their touchiness on the matter, we have to wonder.
We'd be most interested in hearing from people with more technical
knowledge on the subject. What does this whole escapade tell us? Please
write or call so the facts can be brought forward.
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2600 MAGAZINE WANTS TO HEAR YOUR THOUGHTS AS WELL AS ANY ADDITIONAL FACTS YOU
MAY BE ABLE TO SHARE WITH US. POST PUBLIC COMMENTS HERE. YOU CAN SEND PRIVATE
MAIL TO [email protected] OR 2600 EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT, P.O. BOX 99, MIDDLE
ISLAND, NY 11953. IF YOU WANT TO CALL US, OUR PHONE NUMBERS ARE:
(516) 751-2600 (VOICE/MACHINE) OR (516) 751-2608 (FAX).
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