White Paper on Information Dominance
What is Information Dominance?
Information dominance is a delta: the difference between the
aggregate of information available to each of two opposing military
commanders. But its more than just information: Its the difference
in understanding of information in the context of some specific
purpose that is the crux of the definition. Information dominance
then refers to a difference in what is termed Battlefield
Visualization:
"Battlefield visualization is the process whereby the commander
develops a clear understanding of his current state in relation to the
enemy and environment, envisions a desired end state which
represents mission accomplishment and then, subsequently,
visualizes the sequence of activity that will move his force from its
current state to its end state."
How this delta is achieved will be addressed later in this paper.
What's central here is that the commander whose level of battlefield
visualization is greater has "information dominance." Like air
power, a ground commander can enjoy levels of information
dominance ranging from "information supremacy" to "information
parity"; an enemy can also achieve information dominance at his
expense. Information dominance can change over space and time; it
also may vary by echelon. An Army may achieve information
dominance at the operational level but lose it tactically.
The notion of information dominance is not new; throughout
history, commanders have sought to leverage the temporary
opportunity that comes from an information advantage, whether it
comes from knowledge of terrain or a satellite image. But
understanding this situation awareness in the context of some end
state has been largely an intuitive process. Truly exceptional
commanders have had it; most haven't. What's changed is that
information technologies hold a potential for making this grasp of
the battlefield and the inherent opportunities it affords more
accessible to every commander, from field army to rifle company.
With enhanced technologies, such as GPS, EPLRS, the tactical
internet and computers, the modern commander could gain a real
time knowledge of the disposition and capabilities of his force.
Raw data concerning his logistics posture and current activities
could be translated into projections of capabilities within the
framework of his concept of operation. And, these diverse elements
of information could be correlated and analyzed in a manner that
could permit the planning of branches and sequels in geometrically
compressed time.
Concurrently, the commander would be presented a comprehensive
view of the enemy. He would see his organizational whole: his
patterns of operation and his task organization, echelonment,
phasing and tempo. Moreover, by controlling the dimension of
information, he could attack an enemy in a manner that would
unhinge his organization, perhaps without physically destroying it.
Information Technologies will overlay the relevant friendly and
enemy pictures against the backdrop of the operating environment.
Topography and weather will be portrayed in either a flat, two-
dimensional map display or as an interactive three-dimensional
model. A commander would be capable of projecting his current
situation through time and space, either to support rehearsals or to
explore planning sequels. A reconnaissance would be possible
within minutes at levels of resolution never thought possible (and
from both a friendly and enemy perspective.)
Information technologies will never afford absolute visibility of the
battlefield; but, it will be possible to establish dominance by
focusing resources at a time and place of one's choosing. Where
information is massed in this manner, it will become a catalyst
around which the other operating systems will get; and, it will
likely set the tempo of battle.
The effect of these changes will be to move battlefield visualization
from an intuitive ability towards science: a deliberate, deductive
process based upon building blocks of raw data, parsed and
collated by machines and merged into visual patterns that are
presented to commanders as opportunities. Additionally, by linking
commanders at different echelons, this same technology will permit
"shared visualization": a capability that will promote synchronized
operational planning. In short, the command will see and think as
one.
Information technologies will also work for the enemy. Potential
adversaries will mimic or counter our capabilities in this dynamic
field with inexpensive, commercially available technologies. They
will look to information as both our strength and Achilles Heel.
Even if they cannot match us on an global level, they will evolve
operational and tactical niche capabilities in which devastating
advantage could be achievable. The "delta" then will not be
something that the Army can simply design into its force structure
and modernization plans. Information dominance must be fought
for and won through a deliberate process that is synchronized with
the other patterns of operation.
How To Get It?
Information dominance is achieved through a vast range of
activities that can be grouped under the rubric of Information
Operations. At strategic and operational global information
environment, etc. But at the division level, the focus narrows to
principally encompass four major activities:
1. Constructing the Information Battle Space
2. Protecting friendly information the C2 system
3. Collecting and producing intelligence
4. Attacking the enemy's C2 system
The Infosphere
It is not feasible for a division to own the spectrum throughout the
battlefield: that is, to communicate everywhere with unlimited
capacities and with absolute assurance. Where competing armies
collide, there are just too many claimants on frequencies and
means. But it is reasonable for the commander to expect to
dominate information within a specific battle space, if he's willing
to allocate resources and synchronize his activities in time and
space. The intent will be to construct an "infosphere" around the
battlespace (an additional dimension beyond physical volume
controlled by weapons effects) where redundant, high capacity
communications networks are engineered and protected. From this
infosphere there is both a capability to reachback to supporting
data bases and staffs around the world and to extend
communications to other similar areas where dominance in
situation awareness and communications is desired.
Information Protection
It's yet to be proved that a digitized force "glows in the dark." But,
the vulnerability of such a force to attack, disruption, and intrusion,
in an era rapidly expanding information technologies, must be
considered a given. Most of the technical measures necessary to
protect the Army's information capabilities will occur at echelons
far above division and long before the battle is joined. But, within a
specific battle space, the commander must undertake deliberate and
coordinated activities to protect his decision cycle and execution.
Traditional INFOSEC and COMSEC measures are, of course,
central to this effort, as are counterintelligence,
counterreconnaissance and security. But in the future, the potential
threat mandates that four relatively new capabilities come into play.
First, is mirror imaging, a dedicated effort must be undertaken that
continuously looks at every course of action from the perspective of
red information attack. Second, the vulnerability, that is inherent in
the use of situation awareness-producing technologies, compels the
user toward an accelerated OPTEMPO. Speed in decision-making
and execution is the best form of information protection. Third,
while the division relies upon other agencies for the technical
security of its information systems, it must be prepared to deal with
the calamity that could be wreaked by a virus. The sophistication
that has already been demonstrated with this new form of combat,
will elevate COMPUSEC from a prudent measure to a division
METL; reconstitution of the division's information system. Finally,
the commander must develop reactive drills that will permit him to
break contact when and where he discovers that the enemy has
achieved information dominance.
Intelligence
The intelligence area of interest of the Force XXI division should
be identical to that of the Corps; furthermore, the area of influence
can now be defined by the reach of the division's Apache attack
aviation and Block II ATACMS--about 300 Kms. this means that
the division is a key user not just of the Corps' capabilities, but of
national and theater intelligence systems (e.g. JSTARS). It is also a
contender in the joint intelligence process that allocates these
resources within the theater, (albeit at the bottom end of the
"intelligence food-chain"). To leverage this process requires more
than just a PIR statement; requirements are successfully brokered
through the joint environment because commanders are able to link
them to specific battlefield outcomes.
Top Down Intelligence is typically wide-area in focus. For tactical
users, its primary conduit is the intelligence broadcast; the
transmission of data from multiple producers to a large audience
over communications media. A user requires a small grouping of
MI soldiers and specialized equipment to access, filter, focus and
interpret the broadcast to fit his specific battle space. The
proliferation and qualitative improvement in the precision and
timeliness of broadcast intelligence makes its use both feasible and
essential at brigade level.
Perhaps the most difficult feature of top down intelligence is the
task of melding it with organic, bottom-up capabilities. This is
particularly important because of the rapid expansion of sensors
across all the BOS (tanks, airplanes, even minefields have become
sensors). The mix of organic intelligence and RSTA must
compliment the broadcast feeds, providing the responsiveness and
fidelity necessary for the close fight. As bottom up and top-down
tend to report differently in terms of their focus, timeliness, and
footprint, it's possible to lose something in the transition. A clear
and consistent view of the enemy requires a process of
synchronization of these sensors and integrated analysis of their
produce at both division and brigade level.
C2W Attack
Seeing and understanding the enemy's organizational whole,
affords an enhanced potential to attack in a manner that decouples
his ability to organize and focus combat power. Commanders will
shape the battle space by attacking, not just the traditional target
set (e.g., tanks, artillery pieces) but, the more discrete aspects of
command and control that facilitate echelonment, grouping, tempo
and synchronization. Lethal fires and raids can be focused on these
specific targets. Battle management systems, data networks,
intelligence/RSTA means and logistics management systems will
fall prey to an increasingly sophisticated arsenal of C2W soft kill
systems. But, successful C2W attack is not a blunt instrument.
Precise target identification and timing are fundamental to success.
For this reason, the division must possess an organic C2W Attack
capability. This guarantees responsiveness and supports the
combined arms training and battle drills that are critical to
synchronized execution
Conclusion
Information dominance, is a temporary tactical condition achievable
through a deliberate process. It entails the construction and
protection of information battle space, intelligence collection,
processing and dissemination and focused attack against both the
enemy's C2 and his eyes and ears. It will facilitate superiority in
battlefield visualization at a specific time and place. But this is
only a window of opportunity...temporal at best; the commander
must seize the advantage through effective Battle Command. Two
features are essential to this process. The first is CCIR. The
commander must control information, less is dominate him. CCIR
can control the glut of information and separate the true signals
from the noise, but it can't be a fixed concept. Like IPB, it must be
precise to ensure responsiveness and dynamic to survive first
contact. Second, is tempo. The time devoted to the tactical
decision-making process and execution must be dramatically
compressed. But, because the information dominance delta is
achievable through deliberate action with a specific battle space,
battle command can be better synchronized, resulting in the
creation of opportunities that presage success.
* Information dominance is the degree of information superiority
that allows the possessor to use information systems and
capabilities to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to
control the situation in operations short of war, while denying
those capabilities to the adversary.
|