Saddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador Glaspie
Transcript of Meeting Between Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein and U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie. - July 25, 1990
(Eight days before the August 2, 1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait)
July 25, 1990 - Presidential Palace - Baghdad
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie -
ÒI have direct instructions from President Bush to improve our relations
with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil
prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As
you know, I lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to
rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our
opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country.
(pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the
south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens
in the context of your threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for
us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask
you, in the spirit of friendship - not confrontation - regarding your
intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to KuwaitÕs borders?Ó
Saddam Hussein -
ÒAs you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement
on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am
prepared to give negotiations only this one more brief chance. (pause) When
we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope, then
nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be
natural that Iraq will not accept death.Ó
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie -
ÒWhat solutions would be acceptable?Ó
Saddam Hussein -
ÒIf we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab - our strategic goal in our
war with Iran - we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are
forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq
(i.e., in SaddamÕs view, including Kuwait) then we will give up all of the Shatt
to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we
wish it to be. (pause) What is the United StatesÕ opinion on this?Ó
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie -
ÒWe have no opinion on your Arab - Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with
Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the
instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960Õs, that the Kuwait issue is not
associated with America.Ó (Saddam smiles)
On August 2, 1990 four days later, SaddamÕs massed troops invade and
occupy Kuwait.
Baghdad, September 2, 1990, U.S. Embassy
One month later, British journalist obtain the the above tape and transcript
of the Saddam - Glaspie meeting of July 29, 1990. Astounded, they confront
Ms. Glaspie as she leaves the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
Journalist 1 -
ÒAre the transcripts (holding them up) correct, Madam Ambassador?Ó
(Ambassador Glaspie does not respond)
Journalist 2 -
ÒYou knew Saddam was going to invade (Kuwait) but you didnÕt warn him not
to. You didnÕt tell him America would defend Kuwait. You told him the
oppose - that America was not associated with Kuwait.Ó
Journalist 1 -
ÒYou encouraged this aggression - his invasion. What were you thinking?Ó
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie -
ÒObviously, I didnÕt think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to
take all of Kuwait.Ó
Journalist 1 -
ÒYou thought he was just going to take some of it? But, how could you?
Saddam told you that, if negotiations failed, he would give up his Iran (Shatt
al Arab waterway) goal for the ÒWhole of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be.Ó
You know that includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always viewed as an
historic part of their country!Ó
Journalist 1 -
ÒAmerican green-lighted the invasion. At a minimum, you admit signaling
Saddam that some aggression was okay - that the U.S. would not oppose a
grab of the al-Rumeilah oil field, the disputed border strip and the Gulf
Islands (including Bubiyan) - the territories claimed by Iraq?Ó
(Ambassador Glaspie says nothing as a limousine door closed behind her and
the car drives off.)
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