National Security Action Memorandum No.273: Vietnam
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 273
[Editor's note: The following contains the complete text of National Security
Action Memo (NSAM) 273 regarding US goals and policies in South Vietnam,
as signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson four days following his taking
office on the death of John F. Kennedy. Interspersed among the text are
relevant excerpts from the draft of this memo which is dated November 21,
1963, the day before JFK was assassinated. Only areas of significant change
are included in this comparison document. These are found indented from the
main text, in brackets, and noted as "DRAFT" passages. Play close to the
difference between paragraphs 7 regarding the objectives of US action, and
paragraphs 9 regarding Cambodian charges against the US.]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 26, 1963
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 273
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, AID
The Director, USIA
The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred
in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge.
He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:
1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to
assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest
against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The
test of all U. S. decisions and actions in this area should be the
effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.
2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of
U. S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of
October 2, 1963.
3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the present
provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted in consolidating
itself and in holding and developing increased public support. All U.S.
officers should conduct themselves with this objective in view.
4. The President expects that all senior officers of the Government will
move energetically to insure the full unity of support for established U.S.
policy in South Vietnam. Both in Washington and in the field, it is essential
that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance that express
or implied criticism of officers of other branches be scrupulously avoided
in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government and with the press. More
specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed
in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting, of November 20. The offices of
the Government to which central responsibility is assigned are indicated in
each case.
[DRAFT: It is of the highest importance that the United States Government
avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from
one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior
officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they
and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the
unity of the United States Government both here and in the field.
More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action
developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting of November 20. The
office or offices of the Government to which central responsibility is
assigned is indicated in each case.]
5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible we should
persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate its efforts, on the
critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration should include
not only military but political, economic, social, educational and
informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle but
of belief, and we should seek to increase not only the control of hamlets
[DRAFT: land] but the productivity of this area, especially where the
proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces.
(Action: The whole country team under the direct supervision of the
Ambassador.)
6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such
levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese
Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in
the time of the Diem Government. This does not exclude arrangements for
economy on the MAP account with respect to accounting for ammunition, or any
other readjustments which are possible as between MAP and other U. S.
defense resources. Special attention should be given to the expansion of
the import, distribution, and effective use of fertilizer for the Delta.
(Action: AID and DOD as appropriate. )
7. Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity,
and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as:
A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam;
B. The plausibility of denial;
C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;
D. Other international reaction.
Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority.
(Action: State, DOD, and CIA. )
[DRAFT: With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a
detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam
resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should
indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level
of effectiveness in this field of action.]
8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be a developed and submitted for
approval by higher authority for military operations up to a line up to
50 kilometers inside Laos, together with political plans for minimizing the
international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it is agreed that
operational responsibility for such undertakings should pass from CAS to
MACV, this plan should include a redefined method of political guidance for
such operations, since their timing and character can have an intimate
relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos.
(Action: State, DOD, and CIA.)
9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first
importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should lose
no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In
particular a plan should be developed using all available evidence and
methods of persuasion for showing the Cambodians that the recent charges
against us are groundless.
[DRAFT: It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of
the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that
we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon
that country. In particular, measures should be undertaken to satisfy
ourselves completely that recent charges from Cambodia are groundless,
and we should put ourselves in a position to offer to the Cambodian a
full opportunity to satisfy themselves on this same point.]
(Action: State.)
10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we
should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to demonstrate to
the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and
supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. In short, we need a
more contemporary version of the Jorden Report, as powerful and complete as
possible.
(Action: Department of State with other agencies as necessary.)
s/ McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy
cc:
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files
(page 3 of 3 pages)
[DECLASSIFIED - was classified TOP SECRET
Auth: EO 11652
Date: 6-8-76
By: Jeanne W. Davis
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ]
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